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AH Anno Hegirae 
AI Amnesty International 
ANSA/ANSG Armed non-state actor/ armed non-state group 
AP Additional Protocol (to the Geneva Conventions 1949) 
CA3 Common Article 3 
CE Common Era 
CIHL Customary International Humanitarian Law 
DRA Democratic Reoublic of Afghanistan 
HI(H) Hizb-i-Islami (Hekmatyar) 
HI(K) Hizb-i-Islami (Khalis) 
HIIA Harakat-e-Inqilab-e Islami Afghanistan Islamic Revolutionary Movement of 
Afghanistan.  
HJI Harakat ul-Jihad ul-Islami (Movement of the Islamic Jihad) 
HM Hizb u-Mujahidin (Party of the Mujahidin) 
HRW Human Rights Watch 
HUA Harakat ul-Ansar (Movement of the Partisans) 
HUM Harakat ul-Mujahidin (Movement of the Mujahidin) 
HW Hizb-e Wahdat-e Islami Afghanistan.  
IAC International Armed Conflict 
ICC International Criminal Court 
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross 
ICTR International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
IEA Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan 
IED Improvised Explosive Device 
IHL International Humanitarian Law 
IHRL International Human Rights Law 
IJU Islamic Jihad Union 
IMU Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 
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ISAF International Security Assistance Force 
ISI Inter Services Intelligence Directorate 
HIIA Harakat-e-Inqilab-e Islami Afghanistan.  
JI Jamaat-i-Islami (Society of Islam) 
JKLF  Jammu and Kashmi Liberation Front 
JM Jaish-i-Muhammad (Army of Muhammad) 
JTI Jamiat Tulaba Islam. Student wing of JUI. 
JUI Jami’at-i-Ulama-i-Islam (Society of the Ulama of Islam).  
JUP Jami’at-i-Ulama-i-Pakistan (Society of the Ulama of Pakistan) 
LJ Lashkar–e-Jhangvi (Army of Jhangvi)  
LOAC Laws of Armed Conflict  
LT Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure/Righteous) Pakistani Salafi jihadist group. Based in 
eastern Punjab province. 
NIAC Non-International Armed Conflict 
PDPA Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan. Leftist party in power 1978-92 
Parcham ‘Banner’ in Dari. A faction of the communist PDPA 
Khalq ‘Masses’ in Pashto. A faction of the PDPA 
PIR Tajik Party of the Islamic Resistance 
PML Pakistan Muslim League 
POW Prisoner of War 
PPP Pakistan People’s Party 
SMP Sipah-i-Muhammad Pakistan (Army of Muhammad, Pakistan) 
SSP Sipah- i-Sahaba Pakistan (Army of the Companions of the Prophet, Pakistan) 









This thesis seeks to examine how insurgent groups that have evolved in a legally pluralistic environment 
reconcile a conflict of norms in their conflict conduct. It seeks to separate their conflict practice from 
their narrative. It does this through a case study of the Afghan Taliban operating over the period of 
1994-2001, considering the impact of international, tribal, and Islamic law in their conflict conduct.   
  
Unleashing the non-native invasive ‘beast’ that is international law in the area of non-international 
armed conflict (NIAC) has seen it unable to effectively adapt or flourish in an environment it was never 
designed to inhabit. Despite the proliferation of international law within the area of NIAC, its near total 
failure, to account for the capacity, ability and will of least half of the actors inhabiting the legal space 
(armed non-state actors) coupled with high levels of competition from the native, domestic law to 
maintain exclusivity over such conflicts, has restrained its successful infiltration and application. As 
armed non-state groups (ANSGs) continue to violate the most basic humanitarian and human rights 
norms, dominant international legal regulation is questioned as being too far removed, too unnatural, 
and paralyzed by its own constitution to effectively address such violations within NIAC.  
 
At first instance, international attempts to formally engage these groups may be diplomatically 
controversial, if not illegal. Furthermore, ANSGs may not want the same international or domestic 
legitimacy as States rendering political pressure from third states or the international community 
impotent. Compounding this, ANSGs are not economically dependent on host States, and are likely to 
finance their operations through private companies, third states or illegal means. Therefore, the 
international community lacks coercive power when the institutions and mechanisms for doing so are 
non-existent, ineffective or irrelevant. Dominating contemporary conflicts yet unyielding to 
international legal influence, international regulation of these groups is a fiction. 
 
While there is burgeoning literature on the difficulties faced by the international community in its 
regulation of ANSGs, attempts to manipulate both international treaty-based and customary law in 
efforts to impose binding and enforceable obligations continue. An attempted multi-faceted, and often 
tenuous legal transposition from the state actor to non-state actor results in, if not undermining, at very 
least diluting the effectiveness of the international regime in its ability to mitigate against the cruel 
destiny of civilians caught in the cross fire.  
 
ANSG’s that identify as Islamic add an extra dimension to be understood by the international 
community. There is a humanitarian imperative to move beyond positive international law in its attempt 
to regulate Islamic ANSG conduct and look to alternate non-state and informal legal systems which 
international law can inform but is not dictated or dominated by it. The growing trend from legal 
theorists and international lawyers has resulted in the distinction between law and non-law losing much 
of its relevance, rather there is an added emphasis on whether and how the subjects of norms, rules and 
standards come to accept those norms rules and standards, and if such norms are regarded as 
authoritative, may constitute law. 
 
When the existence of international law as a practical element in the conduct of human affairs is 
questioned, and when such precepts claimed to be fundamental in that law are daily set at nought by 
belligerent’s in conflict, alternatives to that law warrant exploration. Far from advocating the removal 
of international law from the NIAC formula, it is argued that it would be better partnered with sub-state 
law to perform a ‘coordinated’ legal intervention on the regulation of ANSGs. Rather than explore 
ANSGs in terms of binding obligations they should or could possess in abstract regulatory regimes, this 
research will focus on examining the law and regulation that exists in reality as evidenced in both their 






‘[Islamic extremists] speak of deep philosophical ideas—it would be nice to think that 
someone is arguing… with the readers of Sayyid Qutb… Presidents will not do this. 
Presidents will dispatch armies, or decline to dispatch armies, for better and for 
worse.’1 
 
The aspirations of contemporary international law have not translated into a language 
intelligible by certain armed non-state groups (ANSGs) who reassert their interpretation of 
justice through Revelation. Critics of international law have exposed its anaemic lingua franca 
in both its conventional and customary legal framework; ‘its connections with the inequalities 
and exploitation inherent in the colonial encounter’2 renders the universality of international 
law a consequence of imperial expansion.3 The law governing the international society of states 
evolved in an era where Muslim majority countries were subjected to colonial domination and 
‘belated incorporation into [the] European and Western international order.’4 The respective 
ontologies attached to Islamic and Western legal norms manifest in tangible differences 
‘exacerbated by geopolitical tensions and misunderstandings along with local cultural beliefs.’5 
Yet there are continued efforts through the international system to encourage adherence to these 
culturally relativist, if not sclerotic, sources.6 Such approaches in isolation are unlikely to yield 
greater compliance with humanitarian norms by Islamic militants in their quest for legitimacy.7  
 
                                                     
1 Paul Berman, ‘The Philosopher of Islamic Terror’ The New York Times (New York, 23 March 2003)  
2 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge University Press 
2007) 117 
3 Antony Anghie, ‘Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in the Nineteenth Century International 
Law’ (1999) 40 (1) Harv Inl L J 
4 Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, The Expansion of International Society (Clarendon Press 1984), 1; Harfiya 
Abdel-Haleem, Oliver Ramsbotham, Saba Risaluddin & Brian Wicker, The Crescent and the Cross: Muslim and 
Christian Approaches to War and Peace (Palgrave 1998) 133 
5 Abdullahi An-Na’im, ‘Human Rights in the Arab World: A Regional Perspective’ (2001) 23 Hum Rts Q 725, 
726 
6 For example, the Communist Party of Peru in a statement rejected human rights as ‘bourgeois, reactionary, 
counter-revolutionary rights [which are] weapon[s] of revisionists and imperialists.’Ben Saul, ‘Enhancing Civilian 
Protection by Engaging Non-State Armed Groups Under IHL’ (2017) 22(1) Journal of Conflict and Security 
Studies 39, 44.  
7 See Wael Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law (Cambridge University Press 2005) 1-2. See for 
example Kamran Hashemi, Religious Legal Traditions, International Human Rights Law and Muslim States (Brill 
Nijhoff 2008)10; Guyora Binder, ‘Cultural Relativism and Cultural Imperialism in Human Rights Law’ (1999) 5 
Buffalo Human Rights Law Review 211; Sonia Harris-Short, ‘International Human Rights Law: Imperialist, Inept 
and Ineffective? Cultural Relativism and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (2003) 25(1) Human 
Rights Quarterly 130; Federico Lenzerini, ‘The Debate on ‘Universalism’ and ‘Cultural Relativism’ in 
International Human Rights Law’ in Chapter One, The Culturalization of Human Rights Law (OUP 2014)  
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This thesis aims to explore whether conflict conduct of contemporary mujahidin flows from 
fidelity to the foundations of faith or whether other sources of law impact conflict behaviour. 
It seeks to separate their conflict practice from their narrative. It does this through a case study 
of the Afghan Taliban operating over the period of 1994-2001, considering the impact of 
international, tribal/local and Islamic law in the conflict conduct.8 
 
Many violent ANSGs generate an Islamic theory ‘to legitimize revolt in terms of mainstream 
Sunni thought’ claiming such revolt is based on a sophisticated tradition of medieval Islamic 
jurisprudence.9 While the ideological understandings of their narrative does not represent the 
global Muslim population, the basis of this theory warrants examination, in particular whether 
it is in practice congruent with Islam and whether this interpretation of puritanical Islam is 
compatible with conventional international humanitarian law (IHL).10 Understanding the 
application of Islamic law and legal theory through a salafi lens and the points that distinguish 
between violent and non-violent puritans will aid the dialogue with groups that operate ‘beyond 
the pale’.11  Accepting Shari’a’s role as unifier, greater weight is attached to tenets of Islamic 
law and its position within the international legal order.12 Such a stance is in its own way 
radical. The Islamic law of nations transformed from a narrative to normative character in the 
thirteenth century, yet eight centuries later is still awaiting meaningful incorporation in the 
international system despite over one-fifth of the global population identifying as Muslim.13 
                                                     
8 Moazzem Begg, ‘Jihad and Terrorism: A War of the Words’ (2008) 1 Arches Quarterly 
9 Arguably the most prominent form of transnational non-state armed activism in the world, Islamic extremist 
groups have been ‘labelled a threat to international peace and security and targeted for repression through 
interstate cooperation.’ Emmanuel Sivan, Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics (Yale 
University Press 1985) 92. 
10 Modern Islamic discourse sees selective invocation of a particular juristic text to promote their individual 
conclusion, ‘without ever articulating a principle for including or excluding certain jurists or texts.’ Mairaj Syed, 
Islamic Law and The Apologetics of Jihad: A Review, Is Jihad A Just War? (2002) 2 UCLA J. Islamic & Near 
Eastern Law 155, 157. 
11 The phrase ‘beyond the pale’ dates to the 14th century, when the part of Ireland under English rule was 
delineated by a boundary of stakes or fences, known as the English Pale. To travel outside of that boundary was 
to leave behind all the rules and institutions of English society, which the English considered synonymous with 
civilization itself. Urban Dictionary 
<http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=beyond%20the%20pale> accessed 26/04/17. 
12 Noel James Coulson, A History of Islamic Law (Edinburgh University Press 2005) 5-6; James Cockayne, ‘Islam 
and International Humanitarian Law: From a Clash to a Conversation Between Civilizations’ (2002) 84 (847) 
IRRC 597, 599. 
13 In 2010, the global Muslim population was estimated at 1.6 billion. That number is projected to increase to 2.2 
billion by 2030. The Pew Forum on Religion and Public life http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/11/29/5-
facts-about-the-muslim-population-in-europe/  Conservatively, Shari’a as a completely formed ‘law’ existed 
simultaneously with ‘Western law’ until the nineteenth century, when the evolution of a Western hegemony and 
European colonial rule diluted and in some instances entirely eclipsed it. Wael Hallaq, An Introduction to Islamic 
Law (Cambridge University Press,2009)1; Hisham Ramadan, Understanding Islamic Law,(Ata Mira Press,2006) 
xi; Philip Jessup in Majid Khadduri, Islamic Law of Nations (John Hopkins Press 1966) viii; Lawrence Rosen, 




Militant groups, regardless of ideological or religious underpinnings, are not monoliths. A 
historical-legal sketching of Islam exposes a harmonizing base from both humanitarian and 
humanitarian legal perspectives, which has been warped as the law evolved and regional 
custom shaped the application of Shari’a.14 However, Islam cannot be identified wholesale 
with the actions of particular radical Islamic groups, nor can radical Islam be considered as 
having a coherent doctrine among and between various groups.  The pathologically criminal 
are not a Muslim anomaly.15 However, the haste, bordering on reflex, with which puritanical 
Islamic movements are relegated to such status reflects a complete failure to understand the 
socio-cultural conditions that generate such movements and their concomitant affiliations; the 
structure and dynamics of these groups; ethno-regional diversities; and these movements’ 
relationship to violence.16 ‘Armed groups will not disappear if we ignore them…’17 nor will 
they disappear if we bomb them. Engagement of these groups is key. 
 
The manipulation of religious language in pursuit of military strategy is not novel, nor 
constrained to Islam. Twenty-first century extremists espouse the virtues of post-classical 
Islamic jurisprudence to justify their conduct. Many self-proclaimed revolutionary Islamic 
heads issuing their own peculiar constitution of jihad, more a grouping of Qurʾanic quotations 
and derivative arguments dressed in Qurʾanic verse as opposed to a coherent theological 
doctrine.  
 
Motivations for insurgencies vary. Certain Islamic extremists seek state privileges such as 
sovereignty, territorial control, status and prestige, while others emphatically reject the 
sovereign nation-state and its international legal system. A dispassionate distinction must be 
                                                     
14 Shari’a principles are more than law encompassing the total way of life that includes faith (imam) and practices 
(amal), personal behaviour, legal and social transaction.  
15 Ammara Durrani, ‘Implications of September 11 for the Middle East’ (2002) 55(4) Pakistan Horizon 27; 
Roxanne Euben & Muhammad Zaman, Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought (Princeton University Press 2009) 
408. 
16 Contrast with perceptions around non-Islamic revolutionary movements. See for example David Graeber 
‘Occupy Wall Street’s Anarchist Roots’ Al Jazeera (New York, 30 November 2011); David Bromley ‘Violence 
and New Religious Movements’ in James Lewis, The Oxford Handbook of New Religious Movements (OUP 2004) 
143. 
17 Marco Sassoli, ‘Engaging Armed Non-State Actors with International Humanitarian Law’ (2008) 6 Hum. Sec. 
Bull 15, 16. 
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drawn between the theological, ideological and secular motivations of these groups and their 
relationship to mainstream religious views and expressions.18  
 
To imagine international peace and security the principles and rules of international 
humanitarian law need to be promoted and respected. To enhance the protection of civilians, a 
culture of compliance with basic humanitarian norms must not only be established but must be 
tailored to both the militant group and the operational environment. This means distinguishing 
strict constructionists from militants claiming a puritanical base;19 intellectual movements 
accompanied by political violence from the purely violent, and engaging in arguments 
regarding what these groups posit as a legitimate Islamic legal justification for certain conflict 
conduct.20 Violence in the name of Islam is not the same as violence permitted by Islam.21 The 
proliferation of Islamic militant groups condemns lazy labelling to compound an already 
derisive relationship between these ‘jihadists’22 and the international system. The study of 
violent armed non-state groups comprising majority Muslims cannot be constrained to 
normative debates on the role of religion in politics. Context is determinative as ‘no actor and 
no state […] moves directly from [theory] to state practice…’23 
 
In this framework, two arguments are made in this thesis: first, we must accept Islamic law as 
a jurist’s law because the exclusive use of the Qurʾan and Sunna without additional 
interpretation by jurists cannot constitute Islamic law.24 Islamic history clearly accepts the near 
exclusive authority that jurists possessed in wielding and articulating rules and norms of 
                                                     
18 Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, ‘Islam and the Bomb Religious Justification for and Against Nuclear Weapons’ (2011) 
Belfer Center for Science and International Affair 1. 
19 Extreme interpretations of religion do not equate to illegitimate intrerpretations. ‘Radical’ and ‘extremism’ refer 
to psychological and social processes in which a person develops deviant ideas from the norm. Maurits Berger, 
‘Jihad and Counter Jihad’ in M Cherif Bassiouni, Jihad and its Challenges to International and Domestic Law 
(Hague Academic Press 2010) 235. 
20 Peter Leuprecht, ‘Ways Out Of the World Disorder?’ in The New Challenges of Humanitarian Law in Armed 
Conflict (Martinus Nijhoff 2005) 57.  
21 M Cherif-Bassiouni, ‘Misunderstanding Islam on the Use of Violence’ (2015) 37(3) Houston J. Int’l Law 651. 
22 This misnomer is too often attached to groups who are simply criminals. Furthermore, one who engages in 
‘jihad’ is properly called a mujahid or (pl) mujahideen. Mujahudin, mujahideen are all accepted spellings.  
23 Cockayne, (n12) 597; Kevin Reinhart ‘Legitimacy and Authority’ in Islamic Discussions of ‘‘Martyrdom 
Operations’/ ‘Suicide Bombings’’ Enemy Combatants, Terrorism, and Armed Conflict Law: A Guide to the Issues, 
ed David Linnan Westport (Greenwood Publishing 2008) 171. 
24 The Prophet Muhammad is reported to have said ‘The scholars are the heirs of the Prophets.’ John Esposito & 
John Voll, Makers of Contemporary Islam, (OUP 2001) 8. It would be incorrect to assume the foundational corpus 
of Islamic law has been identified, with voids existing in relation to dynamics between Islamic law, tribal law, 
[the ancient Semitic- Mesopotamian legal traditions, and Jewish law]; dispute resolution mechanisms and due 
process requirements. This should not be confused with suggesting the absence of an effective rule of law system. 
Furthermore, it is contended that the foundations of Islam incorporated traditions of societies that it eventually 
subsumed, in particular the Byzanto-Roman and Sasanid civilizations. Hallaq Origins (n6) 2-4. 
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Islamic law on the basis of the divine texts.25 ‘The Law as a topically-organized finished 
product consisting of precisely-worded rules is the result of juristic interpretation; it stands at 
the end, not at the beginning, of the interpretive process.’ Secondly, as Islam sees the 
application of law founded on a system of social morality upon which the efficacy of law 
depends and from which it could not be separated, groups that exclusively use the Qurʾan and 
Sunna without additional interpretation by jurists cannot be regarded as Islamic.26 This is not 
to comment on the legitimacy of an insurgency, nor is it questioning their identity as Muslims, 
it is purely related to whether a group can claim to be Islamic if it consistently and 
systematically conducts hostilities in a manner specifically prohibited by Shari’a as interpreted 
by the jurists.  The growing trend for contemporary Islamic militants to claim their insurgencies 
are based on salafi practice and custom requires an analysis of, inter alia, combatant conduct; 
the degree of compliance with existing norms; incentives and disincentives for compliance 
within the salafi framework; acknowledging the risk in ‘which the endeavour to find classical 
legal explanations for the acts of contemporary Muslims is [possibly] antiquarian, if not 
Orientalist.’27  
 
The next step, and the purpose of this thesis is to look beyond the narrative to the practice of 
these Islamic ANSGs, assessing if the conduct is compliant with IHL and Islamic laws of armed 
conflict (LOAC). Comparison between Islamic ANSGs in their respective conduct in hostilities 
                                                     
25 Bernard Weiss, ‘Interpretation in Islamic Law: The Theory of Ijtihād’ (1978) 26(2) The American Journal of 
Comparative Law, 200. Recognizing that there are examples of statutory Islamic law promulgated by national 
territorial legislatures, these laws are the codification of juristic interpretation. The fact that Islamic nationalism 
cannot exist warns against accepting Islam as a statutory law. Aharon Layish, ‘The Transformation of the Shari’a 
from Jurists Law to Statutory Law’ (2004) 1 Die Welt des Islams, New Series 44, 86 in ME Badar, ‘Ius in Bello 
under Islamic International Law’ (2013) 13 Intl Crim. L. Rev, 596; Sadiq Reza, ‘Torture and Islamic Law’ (2007) 
8(1) Chi. J. Int'l L. 23, 25. 
26 Orthodox Sunni Muslims would advocate that anyone who professes to be a Muslim should be accepted as 
Muslim. God is the ultimate judge of the truth of their conviction. Islam is a unique example of a socio-religious 
and political movement. It does not consciously distinguish between the moral and legal. Islam comprises aqidah, 
a set of beliefs; akhlaq, a code of moralities; and Shari’a, a set of laws, which can be further divided into personal 
and public legal traditions. The personal legal traditions encompass ibadat (pl. ibadat) which regulates the 
relationship between Allah and the individual, It includes worship issues, rules of prayer, fasting, rules on hajj 
pilgrimage, zakat and jihad; and munakahat which regulates the legal relationship between individuals akin to 
Western family law. Hallaq Origins (n6) 46; Khadduri Islamic Law (n13) 9. Durrani (n15) 115. Majid Khadduri, 
The Islamic Conception of Justice (John Hopkins Press 1984) 229-232; Naseem Razi, ‘Qurʾanic Legislation in 
Modern Context’ (2011) 8 Pakistan Journal of Islamic Research 17, 28. Ibrahim Abu-Rabi ‘Book Review: 
Discovering Islam: Making Sense of Muslim History and Society  (1992) 60 (3) Journal of the American Academy 
of Religion 537; David Westbrook, ‘Islamic International Law and Public International Law: Separate Expressions 
of World Order’ (1993) 33 Va. J. Int’l L 823.  
27 Reinhart (n23) 171. 
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is of probative value but will be limited to groups who operate in similar legal pluralistic 
environments, legal landscapes encompassing tribal and religious law.28 
 
Whether rooted in popular myth or bigotry, Islamic fundamentalism, false or otherwise is part 
of our daily lives. Mapping the intellectual terrain of political Islam past and present and 
positioning the Prophet and his actions within the Islamic law construct is essential to aid in 
recovering the Muslim intellectual tradition currently obscured by certain militant groups.29 
This exercise is conditional on understanding there are no fixed or universal keys for reading 
the intellectual map of political Islam. Traversing the vast terrain of this phenomenon, through 
variable contexts of time and space it is clear there is no ‘one fundamentalism fits all formula 
for generalising about a complex current that is multi-vocal, and whose discourses speak to 
multiple “islams” in the name of a single and universal Islam.’ 30  
 
Hypothesis 
‘I am a Pashtun for 5000 years, a Muslim for 14 centuries and a Pakistani for 64 
years. Where do you think my identity lies?’31 
 
                                                     
28 Subjected to the same criticism as CIHL, common behaviour among all ANSGs would not create a customary 
rule. Determining the existence of a customary rule under international law is fraught with difficulties, 
compounded in the NIAC context. The reality is that courts, tribunals, or other bodies posit a rule as customary, 
and this rule is either accepted or rejected by states. Tadic illustrates this point. Tribunal pronouncements indicated 
that the customary laws of NIAC were much more developed than previously thought. The fact that the majority 
of states accepted the tribunal’s findings at the Rome Conference crystallized any customary law ‘overreach’ by 
the tribunal. Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (Appeal Judgement), IT-94-1-A, International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 15 July 1999. [Hereinafter Tadic]. Sandesh Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-
International Armed Conflict (OUP 2012) 104; See also Special Tribunal of Lebanon, CH/AC/2010/02, 
Prosecutor v. El Sayed, Decision on Appeal of Pre-Trial Judge’s Order Regarding Jurisdiction and Standing, 10 
November 2010, para 47. 
29 Although the medieval Islamic theory of public international law is today in a state of disuse, it has been by no 
means repudiated by the majority of Muslim states. The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), voted in 
1980 to establish an International Islamic Law Commission with the goal being to ‘devise ways and means to 
secure representation in order to put forward the Islamic point of view before the International Court of Justice 
and such other institutions of the United Nations when a question requiring the projection of Islamic views arises 
therein. Abdullah Ahsan, The Organization of the Islamic Conference (International Institute of Islamic Thought 
1988) 36. Abdullahi An-Na’im, ‘Towards an Islamic Hermeneutics for Human Rights, in Abdullahi An Na’im, 
Religious Values, An Uneasy Relationship (Rodopi 1995) xiv. Contextualizing Revelation, that is calling for its 
interpretation in light of the era in which it was revealed, is not without danger. For example, in the 1990s, Nasr 
Hamid Abu Zayd, a Muslim professor at Cairo University, argued that the Quran, while divinely revealed, was a 
cultural product of seventh-century Arabia, he was branded a heretic by the conservative-dominated Ulama of 
Egypt’s famed al-Azhar University and forced to divorce his Muslim wife (the couple fled Egypt together).’ Reza 
Aslan, No God But God: The Origins, Evolution and Future of Islam (Random House 2012) 169.  
30 Muhammad Abdalla, ‘Interregional challenges of Islamic extremist movements in North Africa’ (2011) 
Institute for Security Studies 26 
31 Farhat Taj, Taliban and Anti Taliban (Cambridge Scholars Publishing 2011) 1 
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The Afghan Taliban (1994-2001) operated through various legal systems: state based legal 
codes, IHL, Islamic law and local customary law. The conflict conduct of Pashtun Taliban 
could be regulated through any or all of these legal systems. While the Taliban as a Movement 
adjusted justification for conflict conduct to fit in an Islamic legal framework, in practice 
conduct was regulated through a hybrid tribal-religious law. IHL compliance was incidental, 
dependent on whether the tribal (local) or religious norm is compatible with IHL norms. Where 
there exists a conflict of norms regarding behaviour in war, Islam takes precedence in the 
narrative irrespective of what ‘law’ was used in practice. The system of reference individual 
Taliban or their leaders allude to, tribal, international or Islamist, depends on the circumstances 
under which a particular decision is taken and on the particular tactical or strategic aim at stake. 
 
Assumptions 
A case study of the Afghan Taliban over the period of 1994-2001 is used to test the hypothesis 
which is based on the following assumptions: 
i) Islamic law (Shari’a) is influenced by non-Muslim sources.  
ii) Where a functioning alternate law exists, for example tribal or local law, a group 
which identifies as operating within that framework will use that law to regulate 
certain conduct. 
iii) Tribal institutions are distinguished from tribal identity. Using tribal law norms in 
conflict conduct does not equate to a tribal conflict. 
iv) Where the group comprises Muslims who also identify as tribal, the group will use 
Islam to regulate behaviours that have no tribal base (for example rules around 
devotion: fasting and prayers). Tribal law or a hybrid tribal religious law will 
regulate relationships. 
v) Where this group comprises Muslims and exist in a state where Islam is the 
dominant religion, this group will use Islamic narratives to legitimize behaviour to 
third parties (with the exception of behaviour around devotion/rituals) that is in 
practice shaped by tribal law. 





‘[L]aw everywhere begins with custom [and] custom is the natural starting point of legal 
evolution.’32 Law, broadly defined, is a series of rules, often enforced by institutions, which 
govern the behavior of individuals in society. Law need not be the formal rules passed by the 
legislature. It can be unenumerated but enforced by the expectations of a community. Such 
informal rules are still ‘law’ since individuals within the collective are expected to behave a 
certain way, and when they fail to meet that standard, they are held to account by the 
community. Law defines the parameters of acceptable behavior. Social norms are distinguished 
as expectations of a certain social group that are enforced by that group. Norms can be just as 
binding and can exact the same amount of punishment when they are broken, yet they are not 
law. Law is different than norms because it is accepted across a coherent grouping, such as a 
state or a town, whereas norms are applicable through social convention to a less identifiable 
grouping. Primitive law evolved through custom irrespective of a centralized authority. Custom 
is meant to entrench ‘the institutions of antiquity in an immutable way’. 33 
 
Non-State law in the context of this research is taken to mean any law that is not state legal 
code. Contextualizing the research to Afghanistan (in Part II), non-state law includes 
international law, with a focus on IHL, religious law and tribal law.  My use of the term ‘tribal 
law’ refers to Pashtunwali, the customary unwritten law (riwaj) that is also living law in the 
border regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan where more than three million Afghan lived as 
refugees for more than twenty years.34 The term ‘tribal’ may understand certain Afghan conflict 
and community dynamics, however in using ‘tribal’ rather than ‘local’, it implies that Afghans 
have social qualities that often are not present.35 One cannot assume social structures follow a 
general template throughout Afghanistan or even within a single ethno-linguistic group.36  
 
                                                     
32 James Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence, (1901) 640 in Yoram Dinstein, International Law As A 
Primitive Legal System’ (1986) 19 International Law And Politics 8. 
33 Dinstein International Law (n32) 8. 
34 The position of Pashtunwali is to be appreciated against the historical domination of the Pashtun tribes in nation 
building. The application of local law at the micro-level emphasises local law as an unwritten code of honour. 
Karin Ask, ‘Legal Pluralism and Transitional Justice in Afghanistan: A Gender Perspective’ (2003) Hum. Rts. 
Dev. Y.B. 347, c.f. Asta Oleson, Islam and Politics in Afghanistan, (Curzon Press 1995). A detailed analysis of 
the political status of Pashtunwali in the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan is to be found in Akbar 
Ahmed, Millennium and Charisma among Pathans (Routledge 1976) 
35 Department of the United States Army, ‘My Cousin’s Enemy is My Friend: A Study of Pashtun ‘Tribes’ in 
Afghanistan’ White Paper, Afghanistan Research Reachback Centre (2009) Small Wars Journal 24  




Legal pluralism refers to situations in which there is more than one source of law, each of 
which exerts control over the behavior of individuals in that society. Afghanistan is a nation 
with legal pluralism because in addition to the formal written law other non-written, informal, 
religious or tribal law has significant effects. Anthropologists examine sets of rules to 
understand how an informal legal system works. As outlined by Llewellyn and Hoebel (1941) 
there are three ways to look at such rules: 1) rules as abstract principles, 2) rules as actual 
behaviour, and 3) rules as principles derived from legal decisions in cases of trouble.37  
 
There is no single legal definition of an armed non-state group. No international treaty 
explicitly defines the term.38 Legal instruments do however provide guidelines regarding the 
types of armed groups that are covered under the term,39 for example those with an 
organizational hierarchy that enables leaders to control subordinates and permits them to carry 
out ‘sustained and concerted military operations.’40 The International Council on Human 
Rights Policy defines ANSGs as ‘groups that are armed and use force to achieve their 
objectives and are not under state control.’41 This definition has two elements: lack of state 
control and the use of force. 
 
ANSGs vary widely in size, organization, motives, goals and resources. They often have a fluid 
membership and rapidly changing goals which compound the difficulty of formulating a useful 
definition.42  Common terminology used to reference ANSG include: guerrillas, insurgents, 
rebels, irregular forces, belligerents, revolutionaries, dissident armed forces and freedom 
fighters. The term explicitly excludes criminal organizations such as the mafia and drug cartels, 
private security companies or mercenaries, who are described in part as parties motivated by 
‘the desire for private gain.’43 Rebels, insurgents and belligerents are depicted as positioned on 
a sliding scale dependent on the degree of control over territory and recognition by 
                                                     
37 Karl Llewellyn & Edward Hoebel, The Cheyenne Way: Conflict and Case Law in Primitive Jurisprudence 
(University of Oklahoma Press 1941) 
38 Dawn Steinhoff, ‘Talking to the Enemy: State Legitimacy Concerns with Engaging Non-Sate Armed Groups 
(2010) 45 Tex Int’l L J 298. A. 47(2) AP II 
39 Orla Buckley, ‘Unregulated Armed Conflict: Non-State Armed Groups, International Humanitarian Law, and 
Violence in Western Sahara’ (2011-2012) 37 N.C.J Int’l L & Com. Reg. 793, 797 
40 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the protection of Victims of 
Non-international Armed Conflict, Art 1(1)  June 8 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 [hereinafter AP II] 
41 Int’l Council on Human Rights Policy, Ends and Means: International Council on Human Rights Policy, Ends 
and Means: Human Rights Approaches to Armed Groups (ICHRP, 2000), 5  
42 Claudia Hoffman, ‘Engaging Non-State Armed Groups in Humanitarian Action (2006) 13 Int’l Peacekeeping 
369; Marco Sassoli, ‘Seriously: Ways to Improve Their Compliance With International Humanitarian Law’ (2010) 
I J Int’l Hum L Stud. 14 
43 Art 47(2) AP II 
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government.44 At one extreme such ANSG resemble de facto governments with control over 
territory and population. This can be difficult to measure and varies widely, as some ANSGs 
influence territory through non-physical means such as using the area to recruit members, 
traffic small arms and light weapons, plant landmines, block the delivery of aid, and engage in 
a range of other activities. 45  
 
At the other extreme ANSGs are militarily and politically inferior to the established 
government, operating as loosely organized groups or cells, ‘exercising no direct control over 
territory and operating only sporadically.’46 The degree of discipline and amount of control 
within the command structure is also difficult to quantify, especially when ANSGs operate 
underground or there is limited public information or access to the group.47  The threshold 
ambiguities relating to the requisite levels of violence and organization sufficient to make a 
group ‘party’ to a conflict imports vagueness on whether these groups are actual addressees of 
international law or are confined to the scope of domestic criminal law.48 It is for States (both 
third states and the state directly involved in the conflict) to appraise, by granting or 
withholding, if only implicitly, recognition of insurgency, and whether the requirements of 
violence and organization have been fulfilled.’49  
 
Islamic ANSGs are referred to as extremist, fundamentalist (usuliyya), traditionalist, and 
totalitarian. Clarity around the authors understanding and use of the terms is important. The 
terms ‘fundamentalist’ and ‘extremists’ are contested terms. In the context of this research, 
extremist relates to those political actors who seek to impose Islamist ideology through 
violence, threatened and actual, against civilian targets that do not share their vision of fi sabil 
Allah, the [true] path of God. Fundamentalists have less of a violent flavour attached to the 
term, and while an ambiguous term, it is usually based on oversimplified polemics and often 
unscholarly interpretation of the scriptural texts. The term Islamic fundamentalism has been 
                                                     
44 Hoffman (n42) 3986; Heather Wilson, International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation 
Movements (OUP 1988) 24; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (OUP 2006); ILC 
Commentary A/56/10. Report of the IL adopted at its 53rd session 2001 para 9 of Article 10, 115  
45 Buckley (n39) 798. 
46 Liesbeth Zegveld, Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International Law (Cambridge University 
Press,2002) 1 
47 Hoffman (n42) 398-9.  
48 See Prosecutor v Haradinaj, Balaj, and Brahimaj ICTY, Trial Chamber, 3 April 2008 in particular para 49 and 
60 which reveals a high but realistic threshold.  Sassolia‘Seriously’a(n42)a14. 
49 Antonio Cassese, International Law (OUP 2005) 125; Clapham Obligations (n44) 271 
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criticized for both coherence and political potency.50  Originally used in relation to Protestant 
Charistianity, after the 1979 Iranian revolution it has been used to identify ‘radical Islam’ or 
Islamist movements in Muslim countries.51 While ensuring the religion maintains authentic, 
fundamental roots is essential, there is an inherent danger that ‘fixating on the past … is a sort 
of (aberrant) fundamentalism.’52 Fundamentalists claim, often fanatically, to be the authentic 
voice of the tradition.  It implies the ‘activist affirmation of a particular faith that defines that 
faith in an absolutist and literalist manner.’53 Parekh outlines both structural and individual 
elements of fundamentalism. Structually, there is a separation between religion and society; 
either a single text or various texts in hierarchical relationship; direct access by the believer to 
those texts and authority within the religion for using the state to enforce religion. The 
individual fundamentalist will not separate politics from religion, will reject the authority of 
interpretive tradition however will simultaneously read the text in light of political objectives 
justifying the process ‘to challenge and remake the world.’54 Generally, fundamentalists are 
loyal to a leader rather than a doctrine.55  
 
This research considers a distinct ethnic tribal group of Afghanistan, the Pashtuns.  Ethnicity 
which is a vague term is defined in terms of identifying traits of an ethnic community, a 
collective name, a myth of common ancestry, shared historical memories, a distinctive shared 
culture, association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity.56  In many cases, members 
of a tribe have memories of tribal identies that do not always determine their behaviour. 
Anthropologists define this disconnect between the narrative and action using the term ‘native 
model’ (also known as the ‘emic’ model). Every society has its own way of thinking about 
itself, and that image of itself may not correspond exactly to the description of an external 
observer.57  
 
                                                     
50 Dieter Eickelman & James Piscatori, Muslim Politics (Princeton University Press 1996). 
51 Sivan (n9); John Esposito, Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism or Reform? (Lynne Rienner 1997); 
Mohammed Ayoob (ed.), The Politics of Islamic Reassertion (Croom Helm 1981) 17 
52 Abdel-Haleem (n4) 121. 
53 John Voll, ‘Fundamentalism’, in John Esposito (ed.), The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World 
(OUP 1995) 32-34. 
54 Bhihk Parekh, ‘The Concept of Fundamentalism’ in Alexsandras Shtromas (ed.) The End of ‘Isms’?: Reflections 
on the Fate of Ideological Politics after Communism’s Collapse (Blackwell 1994) 105-106, 116. 
55 William Maley (ed), Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban (Hurst & Co 1998) 18. 
56 John Hutchinson & Anthony Smith, Ethnicity (OUP 1996) 6-7. 
57 The native model should always be taken into account because it influences how people think and it reflects a 





‘What you see and what you hear depends a great deal on where you are standing. It 
also depends on what sort of person you are.’ 58  
 
Through my work within the humanitarian community I have been exposed to people from 
varied backgrounds who have worked in the Pashtun belt in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region 
during various periods of its conflict history. My own experiences in this region, in Peshawar 
and Kandahar, also gave me a unique perspective on the people straddling the border.   
 
In this thesis, the Kandahari Taliban operating from 1994 through to 2001 will be used as a 
case study, focusing on how their conduct aligned with Islamic Siyar, Pashtunwali and IHL.59 
Account will be taken of their ethnic unity, tribal heritage and religious leanings in 
understanding this regulatory system. 
 
Adopting an anthropological approach, this research considers the context of enforceable 
norms: the social, political, economic. It moves past Western conceptions of law, and while 
taking account of formal justice institutions and their social environmernt, it also encompasses 
law-like activities and processes of establishing order in other social domains including 
informal and unofficial law. Local worlds are impacted by global events; just because 
something is distinguished as law, whether it be local or international, does not mean it is 
obeyed. 
 
Primary sources of this research consist of autobiographies, declassified diplomatic cables, 
newspapers, field reports; background papers, studies, guidelines; and Taliban propaganda 
material. Secondary sources include: textbooks; academic journals; research and conference 
papers; blogs by media and academic commentators. Using interviews conducted by the 
Afghanistan Justice Project, an independent non-governmental group that has investigated 
military operations in Afghanistan from 1979 through 2001 and reports from the Afghanistan 
Human Rights Commission, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, I have focused 
on three main events to test my hypothesis: the massacre at Mazar-i-Sharif (1998); the 
                                                     
58 CS Lewis The Magician's Nephew (Harper Collins 2005) 
59 Vincent Bernard, ‘Interview with David Kilcullen’ (2011) Vol 93 (883) IRRC 587, 596 
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destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas (2001); and the refusal of the Islamic Emirate of 
Afghanistan to hand Osama bin Laden over to the the United States of America (2001).  
 
As Glaser and Straus state: 
 
Comparative analysis requires a multitude of carefully selected cases, but the pressure 
is not on the sociologist to ‘know the whole field’ or to have all the facts ‘from a careful 
random sample.’ His job is not to provide a perfect description of an area, but to develop 
a theory that accounts for much of the relevant behaviour.60 
 
Two field trips were taken to Afghanistan. While in Afghanistan the first time, one of my ICRC 
colleagues was kidnapped across the border in Quetta, Pakistan, his beheaded corpse 
discovered in April 2012. The body was left on a road outside the city in southern Baluchistan 
province, with a note attached which said he had been killed because a ransom had not been 
paid to his captors. ICRC humanitarian activities in Pakistan were scaled down significantly 
and remain minimal. 
 
A couple of months later I was involved an unfortunate incident with an improvised explosive 
device (IED) which subsequently led to the formulation of the research hypothesis of this 
thesis.  While walking to Mirwais hospital from the carpark, a group of colleagues and I passed, 
as we did every day, a large old tree. This day there was a motorbike resting against it. The 
very moment we passed the bike it made a sound like a car backfiring and small fragments of 
the bike flew into the group. We all jumped, and one of my colleagues remarked it must have 
overheated. About an hour later we were evacuated from the hospital and subsequently 
discovered that the bike had its wheels fitted with explosives and bullets.61 The remote 
controlled IED had failed. The impact of this targeted attack meant all activities in Kandahar 
were temporarily halted and health care activities at the hospital ceased for a year. There were 
several theories about who was responsible, a rogue talib, the Taliban as a strategic move or an 
individual Pashtun who invoked his right to revenge to defend his honour.  
 
                                                     
60 Barney Glaser & Anselm Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative 
Research (Aldine Pub. 1967) 30. 
61 Basir Naadim, ‘Bomb Rigged Bike Seized un Kandahar’ Pajhwok Afghan News (Kabul, 22 Jun 2012) 
http://archive.pajhwok.com/en/2012/06/22/bomb-rigged-bike-seized-kandahar accessd 04 November 2015. 
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I failed to understand what possible benefit the Taliban as an ANSG would gain from this war 
crime.62 I set about researching the Taliban. The first thing I discovered was that there are two 
distinct Taliban Movements: the original and the neo or resurgent Taliban. The ‘neo-Taliban’ 
which reconstituted in 2002 sought to reclaim the moral highroad in Afghanistan by rebranding 
themselves as a broad-based independence movement as opposed to the original movement of 
religious fundamentalists obsessed by personal morality. It is the neo-Taliban that has generally 
targeted aid workers. My second trip (2017) narrowed the group demographic and added 
context and nuance to the group I wanted to examine, the original Afghan Taliban. In particular 
I wanted to look at ex-fighting members of the mujahideen in the Soviet invasion (1979-1989) 
and first to second year converts in Mullah Omar’s original Taliban (1994 -2001). Focus was 
limited temporally, historically, tribally and geographically: temporally to being involved in 
the movement over the period of 1994/5-2001; historically to being members of the 
mujahideen, fighting under Hizb-i-Islami either Hekmatyar or Khalis’ faction at any point from 
1979-1989; tribally to identifying as Pashtuns; geographically to being born and maintaining 
familial links to Kandahar.  
 
Literature Review 
Relevant bodies of literature to this thesis are: global law; the application and applicability of 
international law to ANSGs; transitional justice, Islamic law, IHL, customary and local law. 
These are considered in turn. 
 
Work by legal theorists and international lawyers has resulted in the distinction between law 
and non-law losing much of its relevance.63  Attempts at theorizing the sources of international 
law in a global world go in from two directions. On the one hand, international lawyers are 
discussing how the sources doctrine needs to be reconfigured to account for the role of actors 
other than States.  On the other hand, legal theorists have been analysing new legal 
phenomenon including self-regulation and spontaneous law.64  
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http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0& (accessed Nov 16, 2014)  
21 
 
The work of Sousa Santos, a legal sociologist, is heralded by many as representative of post-
modern thinking about global law.65 For Santos, law can come in a variety of settings: the state 
but also at work or in local communities. Instead of looking for a criterion to distinguish law 
from non-law, he is more interested in probing how norms interact. Santos claims all law is 
characterised by the complex interplay between rhetoric, bureaucracy and violence. Legal 
orders with little bureaucracy typically rely on rhetoric, whereas those where bureaucracy has 
taken off and a monopoly on violence is established have less room for rhetoric.66 Gavin 
Anderson starts from the premise that ‘the primary reference point’ in explaining law in a 
globalized era is no longer the nation-state, but rather the global economy.  As a result, 
Anderson dismisses traditional state-centric ideas about law and presents a wide array of 
sources of legal pluralism, including ‘laws made in the family, in the workplace, in indigenous 
societies, among neighbours.’67 This research builds on the work of Anderson and Sousa by 
adding weight to local or tribal law to the extent that it can displace state-centric law as the 
main regulator of conduct.  
 
Scholarly contributions to the field of the internal regulation and legitimization of the ANSGs 
are scarce. Literature is constrained to explaining the growth of the legitimacy in terms of a 
response to governance failure. Literature on the normative regulation of armed non-state 
groups is limited. Scholars attribute legitimacy seeking by armed non-state groups through 
adherence and reference to international law, relegating local, tribal, or religious norms to a 
subsidiary status.68 
 
Academic attention on the regulation of armed non-state groups has focused on the difficulties 
in binding ANSGs within a State-centric international legal framework.69 There has been some 
lateral movement looking at internal regulation. For example, Sandesh Sivakumaran posited 
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the idea that IHL could be used to regulate intra-party conduct;70 and Nagamine who discusses 
the gap between what a group posit in doctrine as guiding their conduct and their actual conflict 
conduct.71 While manuals and codes of conduct are reflective of a group’s normative 
legitimization strategy, it is seen in this context as obscuring the reality of how these groups 
act on the ground. Rather such manuals are accepted as a normative document, not a tactical 
guideline.72 Although internal regulation vis a vis external legitimacy is deduced from other 
theories, it is rarely developed.73 Consider Abrahms theory that ANSGs use of terrorism is to 
maximize social solidarity as opposed to achieving political objectives. He proposes that 
ANSGs ‘routinely engage in actions to perpetuate and justify their existence even when these 
undermine their official political agendas.’74 This idea lends to the conclusion that where a 
conflict between internal and external legitimacy exists, ANSGs will prioritize the internal.75 
My contribution is deconstructing the ANSG narrative and adding emphasis to ANSG practice.  
 
The expansion of international criminal law has been ‘accompanied by a critical turn in 
transitional justice scholarship’76 which has ‘led to an increasing interest in bottom-up justice 
initiatives in the wake of political violence often established and supported by non-state 
actors.’77 These shifts in the scholarship have highlighted disagreements between global and 
local transitional justice objectives within an environment of diverse actors with multiple 
interests.78 In this growing body of literature focusing on post-conflict bottom up justice 
initiatives, the relative absence of pre-conflict or conflict grass-roots initiatives to obviate the 
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need for transitional justice mechanisms conflict conduct is a gap that is ready to be filled. This 
thesis aims to highlight pre-conflict faultlines that, if acknowledged and addressed at grass-
roots level, could have avoided or mitigated the need for transitional justice. 
 
Comparative analysis between Islamic law and IHL draw almost exclusively on the Western 
experience.79 Further most academic literature is desperate in its efforts to reconcile Islamic 
Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC) within IHL. These efforts, while promoting an environment 
of harmony on paper among an increasing xenophobic world, it is neither academically honest 
nor helpful in understanding the basis of fundamentalist’s ideas.  
 
Literature on the Pashtuns also suffers from Anglo-centricity. Sir Olaf Caroe’s book The 
Pathans: 550 BC –AD 1957 remains one of the most robust studies of the Pashtun heritage.80 
Although there have been a number of ethnographic studies focusing on Pashtuns in Pakistan, 
there are relatively few such studies specifically on Pashtuns in Afghanistan.81 
 
Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided into two parts. The first part will look at the general legal frameworks for 
non-state regulation of Islamic ANSGs namely Islamic Law and IHL. Recognizing that 
discussing Islamic groups in abstraction ignores the culture and context in which they flourish, 
part II contextualizes this research with a case study of the Afghan Taliban. This will add 
another non-state legal framework to be considered, the tribal law which is operational through 
the Pashtun belt.  
 
Chapter one examines the ability of international law to regulate armed non-state groups 
considering the western bias underpinning its evolution. It looks at the ANSGs in the legal 
order and focuses on the international law applicable in NIAC. The chapters on Islam are 
intended to expand an understanding of Muslim heritage in relation to war, or more correctly 
the methods employed to achieve peace.  Chapters two and three provide a historical and 
contextual survey of the sources of Islmaic law, illustrating the debate around jihad and its 
interpretations. This is necessary as the majority of Islamic ANSGs that have emerged over the 
                                                     
79 Khadduri, Islamic Law (n13) xii. 
80 Olaf Caroe, The Pathans: 550 B.C.-A.D. 1957 (OUP 1958) 
81 One exception is the field research on the Zadran clan in eastern Afghanistan by Alef-Shah Zadran, 'Kinship, 
Family and Kinship Terminology' (1980) Afghanistan Quarterly,33.  
24 
 
last three decades have claimed to be informed by principles stemming from early Islam. It 
considers juristic principles and their use in being able to justify conflict conduct. Chapters 
four and five trace the orignis and evolution of Islamic use of force doctrine. It considers the 
weight that early Muslims attached to agreements and positions Islamic just war theory in early 
Islam. Finally, it considers Islamic LOAC through primary and secondary sources as well as 
grand narratives. It uses the modern restatement of IHL in the Geneva Conventions as the 
comparator.  
 
Part two contextualizes the research with a case study of the Afghan Taliban over the period 
of 1994-2001. Chapter six begins with providing country context about Afghanistan, 
considering its creation and the ethno-political dynamics within the country. It briefly examines 
19th and 20th century Afghan conflicts highlighting certain conflict conduct against 
Pashtunwali with salafi LOAC.  The analysis of conflict conduct seeks to understand how the 
mujahid-cum Taliban operated within the plural legal orders in Afghanistan examining the 
interaction and hierarchy between the different norms. Chapter seven introduces the tribal law, 
Pashtunwali. It considers this law’s role as an alternative or symbiotic regulatory framework 
for Pashtuns in Afghanistan. Chapter eight brings the various laws together, measuring certain 
Taliban conflict conduct, in particular conduct relating to the principle of distinction, against 
these various legal frameworks.   
 
Scope and Limitation 
With a history stretching to antiquity it was necessary to temporally bracket the research. For 
the purpose of illuminating the evolution of the conflict conduct of the Afghan Taliban, the 
period covering the latter part of the Great Game including the first Anglo Afghan Wars 
through to 2001 will be considered in greater detail, with emphasis on the period 1978-2001. 
It is conceded that much of the literature available on 19th century Afghanistan provides an 
Anglo-centric view of the state, a British and Indian military history of the various conflicts. 
Sources from Pashtun perspective are sparse.82 
 
After the NATO invasion, the ‘neo-Taliban’ regrouped in 2002 evidencing important 
discontinuities with the original Taliban of 1994-2001. The group evolved both technologically 
and ideologically. The Taliban issued a rule book, the Layeha, in 2006 which has been 
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subsequently revised several times and subject to much scholarly attention. As this research is 
confined to a specific period of the Taliban insurgency, up until it became an international 
armed conflict (IAC) in 2001 the Layeha falls outside the scope of this research and will not 
be considered. 
 
There are enormous difficulties in establishing an authoritative and objective record of past 
abuses in Afghanistan. Such difficulties include the dearth of documentary evidence, the 
atrophy of public institutions that could contribute to official truth telling.83 As such, examples 
which are used to illustrate hierarchy or conflict of norms are widely known and their occurance 
is accepted.  
 
This research does not consider radical Islamist ideologues in great detail. Sayyid Qutb and 
Azzam, Zaraqawi have cameo appearances in this work as their platform has been transnational 
jihad and the Taliban insurgency was originially localized, and while puritanical in ideology, 
it was constrained to Afghanistan and the border region of Pakistan.  Further, this research 
makes no claim to have represented an exhaustive understanding of Islamic law as would be 
expected from a student of theology, rather it forms part of a socio-legal research focused on 
norm regulation. 
 
This thesis occupies an isthmus joining the socio-legal discipline with theology. It does not 
claim to provide an exhaustive analysis of Islamic law. At best, it hopes to avoid orientalist 
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Chapter 1 Non-Native Invasive International Law  
‘[International] laws are like cobwebs: strong enough only to detain the weak, and 
too weak to hold the strong.’84 
 
This chapter will examine the challenges to both conventional and customary international law 
within non-international armed conflict (NIAC), contextualizing these challenges within the 
international system. While these challenges have been addressed separately by different 
scholars, a holistic approach illuminates the complex reality that international law is paralyzed 
by its own constitution.85  Failing to account for the exigencies of the people it seeks to govern 
and misdirecting resources by exclusively modelling ANSG regulation within the state-centric 
international system accentuates the problem.86  It will briefly critique the existing relevant 
international law applicable to NIAC, highlighting intractable problems relating to its 
application. Adopting a critical perspective, this chapter aims to show the need to move beyond 
a positive, formal legal position in ANSG regulation and look towards alternate non-state law, 
which can be informed by international law but not dictated or dominated by it.  
 
The international legal framework governing armed non-state groups (ANSGs) is convoluted 
at best.87 Within this context, the continued ability of ANSGs to wage war and mimic state 
functions, threatens core ‘Westphalian’ principles of sovereignty and territorial supremacy.88 
State preservation dictates insurgents be regulated under the vertical domain of domestic law. 
Paradoxically, it is ANSGs’ very ability to undermine the state and truncate the process of 
peace that elicits international intervention.  
 
To precondition regulation on only the most serious ANSGs is problematic. Whether a group 
is willing to comply with restraints will only be shown ‘by the result of the process and 
therefore cannot be a precondition to the process.’89 The terms of recognition on an 
                                                     
84 Anacharis in Leuprecht (n20) 48 
85 Charles Garraway, ‘The Use and Abuse of Military Manuals’ (2004) 7 YIHL 434 
86 Klabbers ‘Constitutionalization’ (n63) 125 
87 ANSGs referenced in this research are taken as qualifying as a party to the conflict and therefore engaged in a 
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88 The Peace of Westphalia is the name commonly used for the treaties of Osnabruk signed in 1648 to end the 
Thirty Years War. The Treaty established inter alia, principles of the sovereign state, and equality among nation 
states. Derek Croxton, ‘The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty’,(1999) 21(3) The 
International History Review 569; Jennifer Beard, ‘The International law in Force: Anachronistic Ethics and 




insurrectional group by the relevant state, will dictate the international rights and obligations 
that flow from this status. It can also be determinative of whether a state will engage an armed 
group.90 The political legitimacy that ANSGs gains from legal recognition can be more harmful 
to a state than any loss in the state’s ability to apply domestic laws.91 Because the legal 
consequences of recognizing an insurgent group are vague, States are reluctant to admit that 
the conditions have been met for the application of international law, fearing it is tantamount 
to conceding governmental loss of control while elevating the status of the rebels. 92  
 
Attempts by the international legal community to make its law inclusive and applicable to all 
actors involved in NIAC is continually frustrated by the state, which is unwilling to relinquish 
these Westphalian privileges to account for actors who seek to threaten them.93 This has 
resulted in international law seeking to craft a delicate balance between humanitarian concerns 
within these conflicts and deference to the State. Although the scales are biased to favour the 
State, international law continues to fashion inroads in the area of NIAC, engaging in 
exhaustive political and diplomatic negotiations between state institutions to reach agreement 
not only on the legal classification of the conflict but also on the status of insurgents, its ultimate 
aim, for states to forfeit exclusivity in favour of international supervision.94 Once international 
law succeeds in gaining a state-accepted role within NIAC, the binding nature and subsequent 
application of obligations stemming from the relevant international instruments is 
contentious,95 and realistically can only be aspiration as a result of ANSGs inability to accede 
to international conventions, their non-participation in its formation, and by virtue of the 
traditional Westphalian enforcement mechanisms largely ignoring these groups.96 
 
                                                     
90 Eibe Reidel, ‘Recognition of Insurgency’ in Rudolf Bernhardt (ed) Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, 
vol IV (Elsevier 2000a) 47-50. 
91 International legal protections may imply that the insurgents earn political rights when they gain legal 
recognition. Zegveld (n46); Lindsay Moir, Law of Internal Armed Conflict (Cambridge University Press,2002); 
Clapham Obligations (n44) 275; Stephen Krasner ‘Sharing Sovereignty: New Instruments for Collapsed and 
Failing States’ (2004) 29(2) Quarterly Journal for International Security 655  
92 Steinhoff ,‘Talking to the Enemy’,(n38) 310; Clapham Obligations (n46) 272 
93 Sassolia‘Seriously’a(n42)a18. 
94 Zegveld (n46); Moir (n91); Clapham Obligations (n44) 275; Pascal Bongard & Jonathon Somer, ‘Monitoring 
Armed Non-State Actor Compliance with Humanitarian Norms: A Look At International Mechanisms and the 
Geneva Call Deed of Commitment (2011) 93 (883) IRRC 673, 674. 
95 IHL is governed by the Geneva Conventions, the extent to which each applies in the area of NIAC is contentious. 
96 International law, by virtue of its construction, mandates dialogue and sanction ultimately between itself and 
the state, and state to state. However, ratification of international law does not equate to compliance with that law. 
Marco Sassoli ‘Possible Legal Mechanisms To Improve Compliance By Armed Groups With International 
Humanitarian Law And International Human Rights Law’ Paper Submitted At The University Of Quebec In 
Montreal (Vancouver, 13-15 November 2003) 
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The normative international framework applicable to ANSGs encompasses several braches of 
law: relevant international humanitarian law; human rights law; criminal law and customary 
law. Lacking a hierarchy of norms within and across these bodies of law, there are increasing 
claims that certain of these norms bind ANSGs irrespective of their acceptance.97 However, the 
majority of legal constructions justifying the binding nature of these obligations have the 
disadvantage of often making ANSGs’ obligation dependent on the government against which 
they fight.98   
 
Refusing to accept the reality that ANSGs are navigating within an international legal abyss, 
the international community returns to its default position, seeking refuge in customary law. 
International law, however, weights majority state practice alone in the creation of its 
customary law with no account for insurgent practice or opinio juris.99 ANSGs generally 
disregard these laws, and it has been argued that evaluation of their compliance is redundant.100 
Much time, resource and academic discourse has been invested in enumerating de lege lata and 
de lege ferenda 101 in this area, with little consensus on the enforcement of international 
obligations under international law, and little success in regulating ANSG conduct.102 
 
This already cumbersome international legal regime, is compounded with the competing 
domestic law of the place in which the conflict is occurring. Plagued with political and 
diplomatic constraints, the international regulation of NIAC occupies one of the most 
challenging areas of international law.103 
                                                     
97 Academie de droit international humanitaire et de droits humains a Geneve ‘Armed Non-State Actors and 
International Norms: Towards a Better Protection of Civilians In Armed Conflicts’, 2 
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Despite the burgeoning literature on the difficulties encountered by the international legal 
community in regulating, engaging and enforcing binding obligations on ANSGs,  in an era 
where cultural relativism is progressively integrated within international discourse, the value 
of non-state law, indeed non-law, as an intermediary regulator of ANSGs is for the most part 
consigned to rhetoric.104 However, there is a great deal that does not happen, and may not 
happen because of the law, and there is great difficulty construing this absence. Barely visible 
in the international legal framework, ANSGs’ ‘existence and influence is deduced by observing 
their effects.’105 
 
ANSGs, by their very definition would not be armed groups engaged in an armed conflict if 
they were in the practical reach of the law of the land and the law enforcement systems of the 
state on whose territory they are fighting. International law, by virtue of its inherent bias 
towards the State, cannot provide either an appropriate playing field or referee to regulate 
parties engaged in NIAC. Yet the international legal landscape governing these conflicts should 
not be diluted or interpreted ad absurdum to account for ANSGs, whether it be through 
elimination of the distinction between IAC and NIAC, or transposing the obligations of state 
actors onto non-state groups engaged in asymmetrical warfare, as it is too oft ‘having the 
perverse effect of seeming to reward non-compliance and paradoxically incentivizing further 
violations of law.’106 If ‘…a departure from [the state-centric international paradigm] becomes 
unavoidable,’ it should not be through academic and judicial creeping, encroaching on 
fundamental legal principles.107 
 
Even with the tenuous legal transpositions affording an abundance of international law to 
govern NIAC, its ‘existence…as a practical element in the conduct of human affairs’ is 
undermined by its inability to adapt within an environment it was never designed to inhabit.  
Precepts claimed to be fundamental in that law are ‘daily set at nought by belligerents in… 
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conflict.’108 Far from advocating the removal of international law from the NIAC equation, it 
is proffered that it would be better partnered with sub-state law which is less constrained, not 
just from bureaucracy but through proximity to ANSGs.109 Rather than explore ANSGs in 
terms of binding obligations they should or could possess in abstract regulatory regimes, the 
focus should be on examining the law and regulation that exists in reality as evidenced in 
ANSG practice.110  
 
Most academic texts on international law state the founding event of modern international law 
to be the Peace of Westphalia, 1648.111 These treaties exemplify legal agreements legitimizing 
the ‘dawning of a new society of legal subjects (states) and a system of laws to regulate those 
subjects.’ Establishing the law of nations, it recognized the existence of ‘nascent, territorial 
states comprising their own legal and religious jurisdictions.’112  Pre-Westphalia, non-state 
sources, including the universal common law of ius gentium113, were more important than state 
generated norms.114 Post Westphalia, the legal universe comprised two guiding principles. 
‘First, law was deemed to reside only in the acts of official, state-sanctioned entities. Second, 
law was seen as an exclusive function of state sovereignty.’115 Framed as the ‘sum total of 
obligations consented to by states and binding upon those states,’ international law was derived 
from the consent of those it governed, 116 whether express through treaties, or tacit as with 
                                                     
108 Gordon Sherman, ‘Jus Gentium and International Law’ (1918) 12(1) The American Journal of International 
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custom.117 Accordingly, this state-centric subject exclusivity meant that states could be the only 
entities capable of creating the laws by which they were bound.118 This traditional narrative of 
international law, comprising state sovereignty with its concomitant monopoly on legal 
personality, and claim to exclusivity in international law creation, has been subjected to a 
persistent and systematic challenge from globalization since the latter half of the twentieth 
century.119 
 
Globalization’s impact on state sovereignty functions as a decentralizing influence, 
diminishing the importance of sovereign states vis a vis other non-state actors which are 
exercising increased influence in the creation, implementation and enforcement of international 
law. While at times complementing or supplementing the law it still at no stage replaces the 
state in law creation.120 Although sovereignty is described as ‘perforated, defiled, cornered, 
eroded, extinct, anachronistic, even interrogated’,121 it continues to remain central to 
understanding the state and international system.122 
 
Historically, non-state entities such as individuals and armed groups were considered to be 
objects rather than subjects of international law.123 International law’s limited subject base is 
no longer defensible. It has evolved and is now concerned with individuals who have 
international rights, obligations and enforcement capabilities.124 Yet, no link is made between 
having these rights, duties and enforcement capabilities, and the capacity of non-state actors 
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123 ‘Not only did individuals not hold international rights or obligations, but any wrongs against them were cast 
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(NSA’s) to play a role in international law making.125 While individuals may have obligations 
and capacities under international law, they do so only to the extent recognized by states.126 
 
The state-centric international system restrains a formal position for ANSGs. This is necessary 
from the State’s perspective of preservation, and logical from the ANSGs position, potentially 
viewing international law as ‘inimical or even hostile to the aims of the armed group at 
issue.’127 State resistance in sharing their law-making role with non-state actors is amplified in 
the context of sharing this role with an armed group who challenges their authority. This seems 
rational given the State’s necessary ‘perception of the illegitimacy and threat of such 
groups.’128 Although there is evidence of States indirectly conferring some legal status upon 
ANSGs,129 such a law making role could not transpire without state consent.  
 
Whether ‘the monopoly of the state as a political actor in the international system has been 
entirely broken’ and international reality is less state centred, international law remains very 
much state-centric.130 Not only are most of its rules exclusively addressed to States, its 
implementation mechanisms and law creation capacity is even more state-centred.131 This 
construct mirrors process legal theory arguments, ‘view[ing] law as an on-going process of 
authoritative decision making by various actors,’132 however, conceding that the ‘authorized 
decision makers’ remain predominately, if not wholly, state actors.133 
 
The doctrine of sources as enunciated in Article 38(1) of the Statute International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) is the conventional starting point for discussions on law-making in the 
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international community. A hybrid naturalist-positivist doctrine, it accounts for the ‘path from 
morality to law[,]’134 distinguishing legal obligations from non-legal practice.135 Article 38 
recognizes three sources of international law: treaties; customary international law; and general 
principles of law. In this doctrine, it falls under the exclusive remit of states to make 
international law. It also articulates two subsidiary means of law determination, deferring to 
‘judicial decisions and the writings of the most highly qualified publicists of all nations.’ This 
latter concession acknowledges that a limited range of actors other than states may play a role 
in identifying, codifying and progressively developing international law.136 However, ‘such 
development will unlikely extend to law creation,’137 relegating this role as ‘evidence of law 
rather than dispositive statements of what the law actually is.’138 Influencing international law 
rather than instigating it maintains the core structure of international law without 
‘inappropriately legitimizing the relevant non-state actors.’ 139 
 
In an age of legal pluralism, logically non-state actors (NSAs) can and do set legal norms. Such 
a view however cannot be reconciled absent state consent. A more tempered approach 
recognizes a role for NSA in influencing or shaping international law that does not necessitate 
a role in direct law creation. As State can confer rights, obligations and enforcement capacities 
on NSAs, they can also confer discrete law-making roles on NSAs, based on the notion of 
delegated law-making powers. A bilateral agreement between a state and NSA is tantamount 
to consenting, at least implicitly, to that NSA having some role in law creation, at least for the 
limited purpose of entering into and being bound by that agreement. However, accounting for 
the state-centric international legal order, if NSGs have any international legislative 
competence, it is only, arguably must only, exist through some form of state consent. Such 
delegated law-making capacity is compatible with the statist doctrine of sources framework.140 
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1.1 International Law in Non-International Armed Conflict 
Conventional laws of armed conflict (LOAC) or IHL, consists of two theoretically different 
legal systems: Hague Law and Geneva Law. Hague Law concerns the rights and duties of 
belligerents while Geneva Law is concerned with protecting those not, or no longer, taking 
direct part in hostilities ensuring their humane treatment. Hague Law is best captured in the 
Hague Convention 1907,141 its regulations include provisions proscribing the wounding or 
killing of surrendered combatants; killing and wounding ‘treacherously’; provisions protecting 
property, churches, hospitals, historic monuments as well as enemy property unless 
‘imperatively demanded by the necessity of war.’ It extends LOAC protections to public and 
private property, establishing rules of combat and attempting to limit through arms control, 
‘weapons of horror’.142  
 
A restatement of traditional rules of war, the articles of the Geneva Conventions 1949 and its 
two Additional Protocols (AP) 1977 claim universality and house minimum standards for 
conflict conduct by appealing to innate humanity.143  Its foundation principles are distinction 
and proportionality which must be weighed against military necessity. It reflects a concern for 
the need to protect the life of those hors de combat and those not taking part in the conflict and 
to ensure that they are treated humanely.144 The Conventions house specific protections for the 
sick and wounded combatants whether on land or sea; prisoners of war (POW) and civilians in 
occupied territory. The APs extend protections to proscribe acts of war that cause ‘superfluous 
injury…unnecessary suffering or widespread, long term and severe damage to the 
environment.’145  
 
Since 1945, the majority of armed conflicts have been internal in nature, involving domestic 
hostilities between ANSGs and States.146 The decline of IACs was the result of fear over 
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nuclear war, with medium and larger powers fighting wars by proxy in the territory of third 
States who were suffering fragile political infrastructure, and often ‘beset with tribal or other 
conflicts.’147  Accounting for this change in modern warfare, there is a disproportionate legal 
focus on IAC with its detailed body of IHL regulating conduct therein. Regarding NIAC, there 
are only minimum humanitarian norms constituting the positive rules on the conduct of 
hostilities, and in the absence of other regulatory mechanisms, parties have been evading 
humanitarian regulation of their conflict conduct.148 Commonly referred to as civil wars, legally 
defined as ‘armed conflicts not of an international character,’149 such conflict, ‘triggered by the 
absence of effective formal and informal channels for resolving…social and political 
grievances,’ represents a threat to the international equilibrium and to the state from within.150 
 
The regulation of civil war dates to the 19th Century, where simultaneous reluctance on the part 
of States to regulate NIAC through international law emerged. This reluctance was stimulated 
by sovereign claims to war making authority and internal conflicts being within the domaine 
reserve of states and thus a matter for the affected state alone.151 The international community 
treated internal conflicts as a matter for domestic security in which third states had no right to 
interfere.152 Third state recognition and support of ANSGs was tantamount to a declaration of 
war by that state on the state in which the ANSGs were fighting. Such co-belligerency had the 
effect of, at very least, internationalizing the conflict.153 
 
The changing nature of conflict over the last 50 years has dictated international legal attempts 
to make inlets in the regulation of NIAC, with regulatory patterns spanning ad hoc to systemic; 
treaty based to customary. The common aim, to make the legal landscape and protections 
relating to NIAC akin to that offered in IAC.154 This phenomenon is traced to the 1936 Spanish 
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Civil War, where despite international law barely featuring during that conflict, jurisprudence 
reveals it still applied.155 ‘State practice revealed a tendency to disregard the distinction 
between international and internal wars and to apply certain general principles of humanitarian 
law, at least to those internal conflicts that constituted large scale civil wars.156 With a stroke 
of judicial ‘creativity’, international law thus rooted the origins of the international regulation 
of NIAC, or at least the right to regulate, to the Spanish Civil War,157 pioneering the idea that 
rules governing IAC also applied in NIAC. This idea was however qualified with the 
concession that the Spanish Civil War had elements of both an internal and international armed 
conflict.’ As modern conflicts increasingly have defacto state co-belligerents, parallels can be 
drawn.158 Whether grounding international regulation of NIAC on these facts is an overreach, 
the approach was endorsed by a majority of states in negotiations leading to the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court (ICC). 159  
 
Irrespective of the blanket applicability of international law to all armed conflicts, actually 
discerning the point at which internal troubles or disturbances transform into armed conflict, 
remains unclear.160 There is no settled definition of the term, but the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) definition in the Tadic case is most frequently cited 
as authoritative. The Tribunal held that ‘armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to 
armed force between states or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and 
organized armed groups or between such groups within a State.’161 
 
After establishing the existence of an armed conflict, the next hurdle is clarification of the 
temporal application of the law and agreeing on a definition of an ‘armed conflict not of an 
international character’. Both these aspects continue to lack consensus and are couched in 
vague terms, ‘[e]very armed conflict which ‘does not involve a clash between nations’ is not 
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of an international character...’,162  and the law regulating NIAC ‘extends beyond the cessation 
of hostilities until…a peaceful settlement is achieved.’163 
 
IHL applies whenever a de facto armed conflict exists, irrespective of whether the party to the 
conflict accepts this conflict classification.164 The objective legal question of the existence of 
an armed conflict is determinative,  but the state must accept the decision, importing an element 
of subjectivity into conflict classification.165 With this retention of control in accepting the 
existence of such conflicts, states will likely disregard international law unless it is in its own 
interests to apply it.166 Compounding this situation is the absence of any body capable of 
compelling a state to account for its refusal to accept a decision regarding the existence of an 
armed conflict.167 States have, and continue to deny the existence of an armed conflict and have 
subsequently prevented the application of the minimum standards applicable in NIAC.168  
 
The status of combatants and subsequent punishment of actors actively involved in the 
hostilities is an important distinction in the classification of a conflict.169 Since there is no 
combatant status in NIAC, members of armed non-state groups captured in NIACs are not 
entitled to prisoner of war (POW) status. States maintain asymmetry between POW status of 
state and non-state fighters in efforts to deny their ANSG opponents combatant legitimacy.170 
In IACs POWs are ‘released and repatriated after the cessation of active hostilities.’171 In 
internal armed conflicts, the Government will retain a degree of discretion with regard to the 
release of captured rebels, with ‘…those who have taken up arms…not in principle enjoy[ing] 
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POW status and consequently subject to penal sanctions imposed by the State, since they are 
not legally entitled to fight or to take up arms. In doing so they are guilty of an offence, such 
as rebellion or sedition, which is punishable under domestic legislation…’172 Hence, a person 
who would qualify as a lawful combatant in an IAC becomes a common criminal in a NIAC.173 
This status determination is further complicated when innovative terms like ‘unlawful 
combatant’ are used in difficult cases to circumvent IHL obligations. ‘Unlawful Combatants’ 
are not a category referenced in the Geneva Conventions or recognized in international law. 174 
By using this term, individuals ‘orbit outside criminal justice, float[ing] about, unmoored, in 
their capacity as sub-defendants.’175 Difficult cases should avoid making bad law.  
 
The current tendency of international criminal tribunals, humanitarian and human rights 
institutions, and scholars to bring NIAC closer to that of IAC may have a negative side effect. 
The ICTY states in Tadic ‘that in the area of armed conflict the distinction between interstate 
wars and civil wars is losing its value as far as human beings are concerned.’176 It forgets that 
law governing NIAC fundamentally differs from that governing IAC as far as it addresses are 
concerned.177  The law of NIAC seeks to bind both state and ANSGs, the latter lacking the 
capacity to adhere to several of the provisions legitimately expected by States and applicable 
in IAC. 
 
According to the definition of a NIAC, the ANSG in question must have a certain degree of 
organization, command and discipline, and thus a capacity to enforce rules. If IHL requires 
ANSGs to comply with such standards it must also enable them to comply with it, inter alia, 
by establishing courts to prosecute violations. Indeed, there are several examples of 
‘revolutionary’ courts in practice, however these courts have faced a barrage of criticism in 
relation to their failure to adhere with due process requirements. Little of this criticism is ‘aimed 
at helping armed groups to improve the quality of justice meted out,’178 however, it is difficult 
to imagine a criminal court constituted by any entity other than a State. Although there are 
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instances where non-state courts are sought by civilians as the preferred mechanism for justice, 
this is generally when the state court system is ineffective, corrupt or expensive.179   
 
In NIAC, at best, only one of the parties has participated in the creation of the law that is meant 
to govern all parties to the conflict.180 By definition these conflicts are fought as much by 
ANSGs as by state forces. If only the needs, difficulties and aspirations of the latter are legally 
accounted for, the law will be less realistic and effective. While some rebel groups seeking to 
become the government of a state may be looking for international legitimacy, and could 
perhaps be convinced of the need to accept the application of norms accepted by the 
international community of states, other groups may have no such aspirations, being content 
with the control of certain natural resources and the opportunity to run an alternate governance 
outside the Westphalia system.181  Furthermore, the combat style of ANSGs and state actors 
vary, the former adopt tactics of a hit and run nature, using ‘clandestine methods, seeking 
shelter and intelligence from sympathizers.’182 They do not have sophisticated logistics and 
will rely on foreign supplies or captured stocks for weapons and ammunition.183 
 
The international community is riven with discord, dissension and dissonance. Its lack of 
foresight in accounting for the practical distinctions of ANSGs and states is illustrated in 
Hadzihasanovic where the ICTY concluded that command responsibility must necessarily 
apply in NIAC as in IAC.184 This pronouncement implies that command responsibility also 
applies to ANSGs which may have much less factual control over their members than 
commanders of governmental armed forces and which may not have the legal capacity to 
punish its members who commit violations. To suggest ANSG commanders hand over their 
violating subordinates to the government or international tribunals is unrealistic.185 
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The international law governing NIAC continues to be created asymmetrically, holding 
individual ANSGs responsible for violations, imposing binding obligations as a group, yet 
excluding participation in the formation of law which specifically targets them. ‘A legal system 
which treats actors as second- rank citizens should not be surprised that those…citizens aim to 
upgrade their status, and the shortest route to being heard and…taken seriously is through 
violence,’186 a logical unfolding of Hegels ‘master-slave’ dialectic.187 
 
The extension of the international community’s role in the regulation of NIAC, has manifested 
as stretching and testing the law, and through transposing obligations. ‘The history of 
international humanitarian law shows that states have consistently rejected any form of binding 
supervision of their conduct in… non-international conflicts.’188  Judicial transposition of the 
existing law of IAC in the regulation of NIAC circumvented the arduous task of getting states 
to formally legislate for increased protections during internal conflicts.189 Modelling the 
underdeveloped NIAC instruments on the highly regulated IAC provisions sees the court and 
tribunals applying protections by analogy. The appropriateness of transposition by analogy is 
not self-evident, and leaves largely unregulated situations in NIAC that yield no analogy to 
IAC.190 While it is uncontroversial to claim that ANSGs are bound by certain international 
humanitarian rules it remains highly contested exactly how they are bound.191 The explanation 
behind the binding nature of the rules may influence the degree of compliance with the rules 
by ANSGs. Many of the explanations are not sufficient, and a theoretically pleasing approach 
must not come at the ‘expense of an unacceptable explanation to the armed opposition 
group.’192 
1.2 Binding Armed Non-state Groups in International Law   
Different legal constructions have been put forward by scholars, international organizations 
and military manuals reflecting different conceptions of the legal status of ANSGs explaining 
                                                     
186 Klabbers,‘Recognition’,(n66),54-5. 
187 See Georg Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit (OUP 1979) 
188 As Romania stated at the 1974-7 Diplomatic Conference ‘[t]here [is] a fundamental difference between 
international and non-international armed conflicts, and it would be a mistake automatically to transpose the 
provisions of … [IAC instrument] to [those governing NIAC].’ Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on 
the Reaffirmation and Development of IHL Applicable to Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1974-1977) (Federal Political 
Department, 1978) Vol 8, 221 para 33 (Romania). Toni Pfanner, ‘Various Mechanisms and Approaches for 
Implementing International Humanitarian Law and Protecting and Assisting War Victims’ (2009) 91 (874) IRRC 
307. 
189 Sivakumaran, Law (n28) 76. 
190 Sandesh Sivakumaran, ‘Re-envisioning the International Law of Armed Conflict’ (2011) 22 EJIL 219. 
191Sassolia‘Seriously’a(n42)a14. 
192 Sivakumaran ‘Binding’ (n146), 371. 
42 
 
their obligations under interstate treaties.193  In a NIAC, ANSGs will, if they reach the threshold 
to qualify as a party to the conflict, be bound at a minimum by Common Article 3 (CA3) of the 
Geneva Conventions.194 As such CA3 implicitly confers (despite expressly articulating the 
contrary) a limited international legal personality to armed groups.195 The question remains 
whether ANSGs should be bound by the same rules as states. One approach is to look at the 
opinio juris of ANSGs, or claim that there is a rule of customary international law according 
to which ANSGs are bound by obligations accepted by the government of the state on the 
territory of which they fight.196 Alternatively, one can consider ANSGs bound by IHL under 
the general rules governing the binding nature of treaties on third parties.197 This presupposes 
that these rules are the same for States as they are for non-state actors, and more importantly, 
that a given armed group has actually expressed its consent to be bound by them.198 
 
Consistent with the statist paradigm of international law, arguments positioning ANSGs within 
a state-like structure form the basis for the theoretical justifications underpinning the way 
international law comes to bind these groups, that is, viewing ANSGs as proto-state; pre-state; 
or sub-state actors.199  
 
When ANSGs display state-like characteristics,200 there is debate about the potential of such 
entities to engage in law creation as a ‘proto-state’. However, pre-conditioning a potential for 
law-making capacity on the basis of state like characteristics privileges only ANSGs attaining 
that threshold, possibly incentivizing other armed groups to use violent means to gain 
equivalent state-like qualities so as to be afforded a similar role in law-making.201 ANSGs as 
proto-state implies that any effective power on the territory of a state is bound by that State’s 
obligations.202 This proto-state argument, recurring in international human rights law (IHRL), 
sees ANSGs bound as de facto authorities in a particular territory and want to exist in the 
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Westphalian system.203 ANSGs are then regarded as independent entities that exist along-side 
the established authorities. It abandons the traditional conception of the state as an impermeable 
whole. This argument can, however, only apply to those groups which actually exercise de 
facto authority over persons or territory. It is unable to explain the obligations of groups lacking 
such authority, but which are nonetheless bound by CA3. 
 
Interconnected but distinguished in nuance is the justification of ANSGs as pre-State, premised 
on the groups intention to become the government of the State, but not necessarily reaching the 
proto-state threshold. Once in government such a group is bound by the international 
obligations of that state. The argument follows that the group must comply with these 
obligations even before it reaches this aim.204 While innovative, conditioning current 
obligations on potential performance, this idea typifies the convoluted rules at play, effectively 
binding ANSGs in abstraction, crystallizing on gaining power, disappearing if remaining in 
armed opposition but losing the intensity to trigger CA3.  
 
ANSGs as sub-state actors considers groups bound because a state incurring treaty obligations 
has legislative jurisdiction over everyone found on its territory, including ANSGs.205 Such 
undertakings then become binding upon the ANSG through the incorporation of international 
rules into national legislation or by the direct applicability of self-executing international rules.  
 
‘International bodies have generally considered the ratification of the relevant norms by 
the territorial state to be sufficient legal basis for the obligations of armed opposition 
groups. The conception of international law as a law controlled by states, means states 
can simply decide to confer rights and impose obligations on armed opposition 
groups.’206  
 
Once the territorial state has ratified the Geneva Conventions (GCs) and/or AP II, ANSGs 
operating on its territory become automatically bound by the relevant norms laid down therein. 
This explanation views the relationship between the established government and the ANSG as 
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hierarchical in nature. However, this view is difficult to uphold. ANSGs seek to exercise public 
authority, and in doing so they question the authority of the established government, including 
the governments laws.207  
 
From a pragmatic and humanitarian point of view, it is preferable to give ANSGs the possibility 
to respect IHL rather than exclude them from the outset.  However, it is more difficult for 
ANSGs than governments to implement IHL, as they lack an appropriate infrastructure to 
facilitate implementation.208 For all existing, claimed and newly suggested rules of IHL, or 
whenever IHL is interpreted, there needs to be an evaluation of whether the ANSG possess the 
necessary will and capacity to comply with the rule found and whether compliance makes 
sense.209 For example, ANSG are expected to comply with international Criminal Law while 
simultaneously being told they lack the competence to administer criminal justice.210 
 
CA3 and AP II do not expressly oblige the parties to the conflict to ensure respect for its norms, 
and international practice generally provides little support for the obligation of ANSGs to 
ensure respect for the applicable law. The translation of such practice means international 
bodies have done little to make the applicable law effective.211 Yet the general opinion is that 
violations of IHL stem from an unwillingness to respect the rules contained therein, from 
insufficient enforcement mechanisms, and lack of awareness from the parties concerned of the 
rules, not from an inadequacy of its rules.212 The behaviour of ANSGs is difficult to influence 
through international mechanisms because they are often denied political legitimacy.213 
 
The architecture of international law exposes the underregulated position of ANSGs. Falling 
in a regulatory gap, the law is unwilling to commit to whether these groups and the use of force 
against them should be regulated through a criminal law or an international law paradigm. 
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When examining ANSG conflict conduct, what is really being considered is the regulation of 
their use of force. 
 
The scope of applicable international obligations which attach to ANSGs is underdeveloped in 
law and practice. While state responsibility is largely codified in a sea of treaties, the 
international responsibility of ANSGs, as a group, remains largely unchartered.214  Existing 
international courts allow only cases to be brought against individuals or states. Yet armed non-
state groups have an abundance of obligations in international legal rhetoric. The tangible 
translation of these obligations, in relation to enforcement, continues to cage these obligations 
in abstraction. 
 
ANSGs challenge many sources of legitimacy. They ‘often develop [and thrive] in states in 
which there is a power vacuum or in which states already fail to provide economic and physical 
security for some portion of the population.'215 A state’s willingness to engage an armed group 
is likely bounded by the degree to which it considers the group a threat to its territorial integrity, 
not the potential impact engagement would have on the groups legal status. State fear of 
legitimizing insurrection has resulted in a near absence of rules intended to limit violence. The 
situation remains relatively static, the laws applicable to NIAC remain rudimentary and 
applicable only in limited situations.216 
 
An inclusive approach to law-creation represents an unprecedented shift in the traditional 
paradigm of sources and law-making. As the legal framework currently exists, such creation 
can only ever involve indirect participation of NSAs in the process; that is one pre-conditioned 
on state consent.217   Despite the support for modifying the frame of reference from the doctrine 
of sources and to look at who is actually making the law,218 Article 38 continues to represent a 
‘common denominator’ of international legal source. ‘[I]nternational law was by definition 
formed by states, and no noble aspirations or sentiments, love of progress or anxiety for the 
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well-being of the peoples of the world could be embodied in international instruments without 
the collective assent of the international community.’219 
 
There is an alternative to traditional international law, one that does not require the assent of 
states to not only apply but bind individuals through international borders. The next chapter 
will trace the evolution of Islam and Islamic law to show how, and to what extent Islamic law 
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Chapter 2 Tracing Conflict in Islam* 
‘Religious discourse can recode virtually any content as sacred, ranging from the 
high-minded and progressive to the murderous, oppressive, and banal, for it is not 
any specific orientation that distinguishes religion, but rather its meta-discursive 
capacity to frame the way any content will be received and regarded.’220 
 
In countering the radical methodology advanced as a foundation by militants who proclaim an 
Islamic base, Ehrlich’s premise, that ‘the centre of gravity of legal development [and legal 
deviancy lay]…in society itself’ is resurrected as the regulatory formula to be addressed to 
ameliorate the increasing friction between fringe radical groups and international law.221 The 
first hurdle is reconciling this formula with classical Islamic theory which proffers itself as ‘a 
divinely ordained system preceding and not preceded by the Muslim state, controlling and not 
controlled by Muslim society.’222 Examining the theological discourse of Islamic ANSGs 
requires an understanding of Islamic legal sources and the interaction between these sources in 
shaping Islamic humanitarian rules and laws of war.223 This chapter this contextualizes Islam 
within the international legal order. It considers its evolution to provide a frame of reference 
from which Islamic LOAC can be traced. 
 
Competing discourses from various regions are engaged in a battle for legitimacy within Islam 
and the global community.224 One dimension of this discourse manifests in advocating 
individual interpretation of the Qurʾan, ignoring the robust Islamic jurisprudence that has 
                                                     
* Almost all the Islamic tradition is oral and all is in Arabic, many agree that the Qurʾan is only intelligible in that 
tongue which is itself subject to innumerable idiomatic and regional inflections. The variegated nature of Islamic 
legal discourse coupled with the fluid nature of Islamic law necessitates the caveat that any analysis will be 
relatively superficial, and for the purposes of the examination, limited to Sunni Islamic theory. This chapter serves 
as a contribution. It does not claim to be ether definitive nor complete. This is not a thesis presented in a department 
of Islamic or Arabic Studies. 
220 Bruce Lincoln, Holy Terrors: Thinking About Religion After September 11 (Chicago University Press 2003) 6. 
221 This legal development attaches the caveat that it evolves from a stable law that is not to say that it needs be 
‘imprisoned in a code.’ Eugen Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law, (Harvard University 
Press 1936) 193, 390. While Ehlrich claims living law dominates life itself, he is criticized for romanticizing the 
law creating role of customs and practices on small scale rural communities. Teubner argues the global world 
relies on ‘cold technical pressures not warm communal bonds.’ Gunther Teubner, ‘Global Bukowina Legal 
Pluralism in World Society in Global Law Without a State (G Teubner edn., Dartmouth Aldershot 1997) 3; David 
Nelken, ‘Eugen Ehrlich, Living Law, and Plural Legalities’ (2008) 9(2) Theoretical Inquiries in Law 443.  
222 Coulson (n12) 1. 
223 Andrew March & Naz Modirzadeh, ‘Ambivalent Universalism? Jus ad Bellum in Modern Islamic Legal 
Discourse’ (2013) 24 EJIL 367 368 
224 Islam literally means surrender. The origin of the word is salaam, meaning peace. There is a common 
misconception espoused by many Muslims today that Islam means peace. Islam means ‘submission’, ‘Salaam’ 
means ‘peace’. Begg, ‘Jihad’ (n8) 
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evolved since the 7th century common era (CE)225 and failing to acknowledge the historical 
context in which Revelation was received.226 The ‘chaos theory’ which results from such an 
approach renders prediction of individual conduct within the collective impossible, even the 
slightest deviation in interpretation yielding diametrically opposed behaviours. This leads to a 
fractured Hobbesian ‘state of nature’ where each decides for themselves how to act, and is 
judge, jury and executioner in their own case whenever disputes arise; a state of perfectly 
private judgment, in which there is no agency with recognized authority to arbitrate disputes 
and effective power to enforce its decisions.227 While exploring the ‘law’ these insurgents claim 
regulate their conduct, the possibility exists that certain militants espousing an Islamic base, 
absent collective interpretation, consensus or tempering through legal tools, are theoretically 
and operationally irreconcilable with both Islamic international law and the ius gentium.228 
Distinguishing these groups and their views on the wider international community, those not 
recognizing the defacto provisional legitimacy of the sovereign nation-state system of the 
globalized world and its international legal system must be considered when exercising 
leverage to persuade or coerce compliance with humanitarian norms. 
 
From the outset, it is important to pre-empt two criticisms. First, there is the view that a 
comparative analysis with Islam and IHRL/IHL will be susceptible to hermeneutical criticism 
of which interpretation of Shari’a will be compared to the conventional legal norm.229 This 
research focuses on popular conceptions of fundamentalist interpretations which make 
                                                     
225 This thesis will, when necessary for context, use a dual system of dating, the Gregorian (CE) and the Muslim 
Hijri (AH) calendar. The reason being that it provides a historical relativity for Islam. 
226 ‘The notion that historical context should play no role in the interpretation of the Quran – that what applied to 
Muhammad's community applies to all Muslim communities for all time – is simply an untenable position in every 
sense.’ Max Rodenbeck, Sunday Book Review: ‘Reza Aslan, No God but God: The War Within Islam’ The New 
York Times (NY, May 29 2005). Shaheen Ali, ‘The Conceptual Foundation of Human Rights: A Comparative 
Perspective’ (1997) 3(1) European Public Law 261, 278. See Human Rights Committee Summary record of the 
1251st meeting (Iran) UN. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1252 (29 July 1993); Hashemi (n6) 12. 
227 S Lloyd Morality in the Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes: Cases in the Law of Nature (Cambridge University 
Press,2009) 
228 ‘To the Romans the term ius gentium signified in the wide sense the law common to civilized peoples and 
included both public and private law; in the narrow sense it meant the principles governing the relations of the 
Roman people regarded as a whole with foreign peoples similarly regarded.’. Dietrich Ompteda, Litteratur des 
gesammten sowohl naturlichen als positiven Völkerrechts (Regensberg 1785) 169 in James Scott, Preface in 
Francisco Vittoria, De Indis et De Iure Belli: Relectiones, Being Parts of Relectiones Theologicae XII, E Nys edn., 
(Oceana Publications 1964)   
229 See for example, Heiner Bielefeldt, "Western" versus "Islamic" Human Rights Conceptions: A Critique of 
Cultural Essentialism in the Discussion on Human Rights, (2000) 28(1), Political Theory 90; Andrew Rippin, 
Defining Islam: A Reader (Routledge 2007); Mahmoud Hussein, Understanding the Qur’an Today (Saqi 2013);  
Mahmoud Ayoub, The Qurʾan and Its Interpreters (Vol.1) (State University of New York Press 1984); Marie 




permissible in Islam that which is prohibited in IHL and therefore is not constrained to a 
particular interpretation. The second criticism is the risk of legitimizing the incorporation of 
Islam in the international legal order.230 The separation of religion and government has been 
recognized by the majority of states as a necessary principle for the effective functioning of 
individual state institutions, deference given to the historical precedent of the problems directly 
resultant from fusing religion or ideology with state foreign policy and action.231 It would 
however be a gross misrepresentation to posit either International, or state law and justice as 
being divorced completely from religious principles. Additionally, such a position fails to 
account for the role [religion] has played in legitimizing state building along secular-nationalist 
lines, or has had against the state, or as a ‘legitimator of political reform at a level below the 
state.’232  
 
Attempts to implement one law, revealed by a ‘Divine Legislator’ to uphold His sovereignty 
vis a vis other world orders, is a recurring theme in history. In the early centuries of the 
Common Era, religion was citizenship.233 Religious based morality provided an ‘effective and 
pervasive mechanism of self-rule and did not require the marked presence of coercive and 
disciplinarian state agencies.’234 Culminating in the Peace of Westphalia, state sovereignty 
displaced transcendental law. States conceded their ability to maintain a Divine monopoly in 
favour of a new world order based on reciprocity and mutual interest for the collective benefit 
of nations.235   
 
                                                     
230 That is, the impropriety of the targeted inclusion of a single religion in an international system which espouses 
universal rights and values consented to by all states. While in the Western tradition the state is viewed as a 
territorial and political body, based on ‘temporal elements such as shared memory, language, race, or the mere 
choice of its members.’ Khomeini rejected this view, seeing the secular, political state and nationalism as Western 
constructs of imperialistic design to damage the cohesion of the umma and impede the ‘advancement of Islam.’ 
Farhang Rajaee, Islamic Values and World View: Khomeyni on Man the State and International Politics 
(University Press of America 1983) 7, 67-71 
231 The majority of states have seen the separation of the sacred and the political not greatly curtailing religious 
freedom or worship. ‘All religions are inextricably bound to the social, spiritual, and cultural milieux from which 
they arose and in which they developed. It is not prophets who create religions. Indeed, it is most often the 
prophet’s successors who take upon themselves the responsibility of fashioning their master’s words and deeds 
into unified, easily comprehensible religious systems. Aslan (n29) 17; Ali Mazrui, ‘The Ethics of War and the 
Rhetoric of Politics: ‘The West and the Rest’ (2002) 2 Islamic Millennium Journal 1, 3-4; Khadduri Islamic Law 
(n13) 69 
232 The separation of Islamic law and state law is completely inimical to puritanical Islam. Abdalla (n30) 5. 
233 It ‘defined ethnicity, culture, social identity, politics, economics, and ethics.’ Thus, ‘the Holy Roman Empire 
had its officially sanctioned and legally enforced version of Christianity, just as the Sasanian Empire had its 
officially sanctioned and legally enforced version of Zoroastrianism. Aslan (n29) 80. 
234 Hallaq Introduction (n13) 57. 
235 Khadduri Islamic Law (n13) xi. 
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The ‘law’ that subsequently evolved to satisfy this mutual interest and deference to sovereignty 
appeared adequate to manage inter-State conflict relationships. However, continuing western 
hegemony and geopolitical exclusionism has fostered resentment among the ‘others’.236  
International law's posture towards legacies of colonialism has created a ‘legalized 
hegemony’.237 ‘[T]he founding conception of late nineteenth-century international law was not 
sovereignty but a collective (European) conscience.’238 Constructions of sovereignty 
predictably evolved to mirror the Eurocentric scale of ‘civilization’ attendant to colonialism.239  
 
Islam challenges this dominant world view yet ‘remains peripheralized [which] simply 
heightens [its] sense of marginalization.’240 Recognition of legal inequality coupled with both 
the changing nature of warfare and colonial emancipation, (which factored neither the 
'enslaved' population’s cultural nuances nor its customary law in the evolution of the droit des 
gens241 questions whether international law is able to satisfy a truly inter-national legal 
mandate.242   
 
Whether the fragility of international law is a necessary by-product of the tension between state 
egoism and the recognition of community interests in pursuit of a common good, it is the 
responsibility of a true and progressive law of nations to reflect a standard of justice governing 
the relationship among nations as determined by the united interest of all nations. Only then 
will international law be emancipated from the orientalist defects that continue to undermine 
it.243 ‘The future of the international legal order rests ultimately on its ability to identify and 
                                                     
236 Abdel-Haleem (n4) 208. 
237 Gerry Simpson, Great Powers And Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns In The International Legal Order 
(Cambridge University Press,2004), x; R. W. Tucker, The Inequality Of Nations 3 (Basic Books, 1977). 
238 Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise & Fall of International Law 1870–1960 
(Cambridge University Press,2001) 98-178. 
239 Geret Gong, The Standard Of 'Civilization' In International Society (Clarendon Press 1984) 44. 
240 Drumbl (n99),92. 
241 In Vattel’s, Le Droit des Gens (1758) ‘The Law of Nations’, he applied a theory of natural law to international 
relations. It was the first time the term was coined. Jeremy Bentham shortly afer coined the term international law, 
J. Bentham An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1780) (Dover Publications Inc 2007). 
242 ‘The violence of positivist language in relation to non-European peoples is hard to overlook. Positivists 
developed an elaborate vocabulary for denigrating [colonised people], presenting them as suitable objects for 
conquest, and legitimizing the most extreme violence against them, all in the furtherance of the civilizing 
mission[,]-the discharge of the white man's burden.’ Anghie, Peripheries (n3) 7. It is contended that the laws 
governing secession and self-determination also reflect euro-centric imperialism. Khadduri Islamic Law (n13) 1. 
243 ‘The Muslim masses have lost their confidence in the international system as Neutral Problem-solver after the 
experiences of the last [three] decade[s].’ Ahmet Davutoglu, Civilizational Transformation and the Muslim World 
(Mahir Publications 1994) 103-104. 
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reflect in its prescriptions and procedures the common interests of all members of the world 
community.’244 
 
Navigating the relative absence of Islamic law in colonialist discourse reveals not only 
shortcomings in conventional law as it relates to the modern law of nations but also betrays the 
imperialist preference to weight Roman law over Shari’a.245 Engaging the premise that while 
Grotius is recognized as the father of a Euro-centric droit des gens, the failure to account for 
what Euro-centric scholars refer to as his Islamic ‘counterpart’, the eighth century Islamic jurist 
Shaybānī (d. 804), whose jurisprudential contribution to the law of nations is neither recognized 
nor reflected in contemporary international law or legal discourse, constrains the order in its 
current form from having universal application or arguably even legitimacy.246  
 
Exhibiting orientalism in parts where the West is taken as the baseline and Islam relegated to 
the ‘other’,247 comparative analysis between the West and Islam is not intended to reduce these 
traditions to static constructs. Rather, what is intended is a historical approach with a 
                                                     
244Sarvenaz Bahar, ‘Khomeinism, The Islamic Republic of Iran and International Law: The Relevance of Islamic 
Political Ideology’ (1992) 33 Harv. Int’l L. J 145, 189-190. 
245 Shari’a, unlike Canon law, does not simply represent religious laws but covers a wide range of secular laws 
and ordinances. These include areas as diverse as international commercial law, criminal law, constitutional and 
administrative law, humanitarian, and human rights law. The root Arabic word of Shari’a is the verb ‘shara’a, 
meaning ‘to open upon a street. From shara’a, comes mashra’a which means path to watering place Legally, 
Shara’a means to make or establish laws. ‘sirah’ (pl) siyar means the attitude adopted by the rulers towards aliens 
in the state of war and peace. Youseff Aboul-Enein & Sharifa Zuhur, ‘Islamic Rulings On Warfare’ (Carlisle 
Barracks: Strategic Studies, 2004), 6; Hallaq Origins (n6) i.  
246 This feeds into the increased resentment of continuing Western hegemony, arrogance and geopolitical 
exclusionism. Prior to 1856, European international law treated those who fell outside the European state system 
as ‘passive objects of the law’ rather than as active subjects. Cockayne, (n12) 599. Although Western scholars 
have intermittently referred to Shaybānī as the ‘Grotius of the Muslims’ it is opined that such reductionist rhetoric 
continues to perpetuate a western biased, Manichean world-view construct. The choice of Siyar scholar is limited 
to Shaybānī’ as it relates to the laws of war and therefore will search for points of convergence and divergence 
with ius in bello. This necessary limitation is based simply on the fact that when Shaybānī was interpreting ‘prior 
teachings and traditions, incorporating his own opinions through juridical analogy and pure juristic reasoning it 
was through a conflict context, Shaybānī living in an era where the ‘normal relationship between Islam and other 
peoples was [jihad] [or as European jurists would have referred to it, bellum justum].’ Phillip Jessup in Khadduri 
Islamic Law (n13) viii- x; Christopher Weeramantry, Islamic Jurisprudence: An International Perspective 
(Macmillan 1998) 149-158. Although there were precursors to Grotius, none before his treatise De jure belli ac 
pacis (Paris, 1625) had considered the law of nations in its entirety. Scott (n228) 
247 See Edward Said, Orientalism (Random House 1978) which provides a classic critique of the Western view of 
Islam. He posited that ‘because of Orientalism the Orient was not (and is not) a free subject of thought or action.’ 
This Orientalism has been somewhat reversed by radical Islamists of the 20th century, where Western discourse 
first read Muslims as ‘lethargic, child like, feminine and devoid of energy and initiative’ Muslims are now depicted 
as ‘overly aggressive and violent.’ Where Western stereotypes of Muslim Orient centred on ‘its backwardness, its 
silent indifference, its feminine penetrability, supine malleability’ the dominant contemporary stereotype sees 
Muslims as ‘intrinsically prone to violence.’ Bruce Lawrence, Shattering the Myth: Islam Beyond Violence 
(Princeton University Press 1998) 4; Albert Bergesen, The Sayyid Qutb Reader’ (Routledge 2008) 13. Both 
orientalists and occidentalists are guilty of generalisation and reductionism. 
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comparative flavour employed to illuminate the parallels between western jurisprudence and 
the madhahib248 within usul al-Fiqh (‘fiqh’);249 sources of contemporary international law and 
sources of siyar;250 IHL as codified in the Geneva Conventions and Islamic legal restrictions 
on conflict conduct.  
 
Although fully formed Islamic law was established seven centuries before the emergence of 
Grotian philosophy, the evolution of the legal framework that forms the basis of ius gentium 
and Siyar has followed a similar trajectory.251 This is not to equate Islamic law ‘to the notion 
of law as found…in common law or civil law systems,’252 indeed its differences vis a vis other 
legal systems makes its study indispensable to ‘appreciate the full range of possible legal 
phenomena.’253 Yet it is evident there are points of confluence, neighbourly cohabitation 
compelling moral and legal obligations which over time form a system of international law.254 
There is one glaring distinction. Irrespective of how various legal orders have evolved, in Islam 
the overarching supreme law remains the lex dei. This is a uniting factor in Muslim history and 
identity which has enabled the Islamic community to overcome vicissitudes that have presented 
over fourteen centuries.  
 
                                                     
248 The madhhab (pl. madhhahib) meaning ‘school of jurisprudence’ is one of two devices used in Islamic law to 
instil order in a sea of differing translations. Scholars who could trace their doctrine back to the same seminal 
authority would consider themselves as followers of that discrete ‘school’. There are four main recognized Sunni 
schools, Hanafi, Shafa‘i, Maliki and Hanbali. 
249 ‘The word 'fiqh', when used in the form of 'faqiha ya faqahu' means 'to know, to understand.' Asifa Quraishi 
‘On Fallibility and Finality: Why Thinking Like a Qadi Helps Me Understand American Constitutional Law’ 
(2009) Michigan State L Rev. 339, 342. 
250 The Statute of the ICJ, Article 38(1) although concerned primarily with the composition and functioning of the 
Court, incidentally lays out the sources of international law which can be divided into primary and secondary or 
subsidiary sources. Similar to article 38 (1) (c) and (d), there are additional recognized sources of Islamic law: urf 
(custom) and maslaha mursala (Maslaha is pubic interest and Mursala is public welfare), which also lack 
universal acceptance. The sources of the Islamic law of nations conform generally to the same categories as those 
stipulated in article 38(1) Statute of the International Court of Justice. To achieve an effective conceptual 
confluence of Western and Islamic international law, contemporary state or proto-state practice of Islamic 
jurisdiction must be viewed as the ‘operative’ Islamic law, thus comparing practice of legal norms as well as 
abstract ideological or rhetorical precepts. Tauseef Parry, ‘The Legal Methodology of ‘Fiqh al-Aqalliyyat’ and its 
Critics: An Analytical Study’ (2012) 32(1) Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 88, 92; Shaheen Ali & Javaid 
Rehman ‘The Concept of Jihad in Islamic International Law’ (2005) 10(3) Journal of Conflict & Security Law 
321, 343. 
251 Parry, ‘Legal Methodology’ (n250) 92. 
252 ‘Nor has it come into being the way conventional law has. It has not had to undergo the same process of 
evaluation as all the man-made laws have done. The case of the Islamic law is not that it began with a few rules 
that gradually multiplied or with rudimentary concepts refined by cultural process with the passage of time; nor 
did this law originate and grow along with the Islamic community.’ Aslan (n29) 167. 
253 Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (OUP 1982) 2. 
254 Rudolph Peters Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law (Cambridge University Press,2005); I; Sythoff Korff, 
‘An Introduction to the History of International Law’ (1924) 18 American Journal of International Law 246, 248. 
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Mainstream Islam has adjusted to the Grotian formulation of international law by harmonizing 
Islamic with Conventional Law. The integration of Islamic countries into the community of 
nations has seen Islam’s conception of justice on the international stage evolve and undergo 
significant changes.255 Yet shifts from globalization to a ‘cold war nationalism’ has the effect 
of ‘othering’ which is in turn incentivizing radicalisation.256 This radicalisation has manifested 
in some areas returning the practice of Islam to its seventh century context.    
 
2.1 The Jahiliyya 
In the pre-Islamic era, jahiliyya, the Arabs in the Peninsula and adjacent areas were a primitive 
enmeshment of disjointed tribes whose nomadic nature was inconsistent with the social and 
economic hierarchies prevalent in sedentary societies.257 Polytheistic animism dominated 
Arabia, with only a scattering of Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians. These seventh century 
Arabs venerated courage and kinship and strictly adhered to ancestral customs. A tribal ethic 
founded on the principle of individual responsibility and obligation, maintained stability and 
unity. Survival in the nomadic tribal system, which was logistically resistant to material 
accumulation dictated maintenance of tribal solidarity through resource sharing. 258 This social 
egalitarianism was essential in preserving the tribal ethic. 
 
Inter-tribal relationships were maintained through a network of allegiances. The tribal leader 
or Shaykh was tasked with ensuring neighboring tribes were aware that any act of aggression 
against the tribe would be equally avenged. However, crimes committed against those outside 
of the tribal system ‘were not only unpunished, they were not really crimes. Caravan raiding 
(ghazi) was a legitimate means of wealth distribution and provided no blood was shed, there 
was no need for retribution.’259 Stealing, killing or injuring another person was not considered 
a ‘morally reprehensible act per se’, and such acts were punished only if they negatively 
                                                     
255 See for example the doctrine of fiqh al-aqaliyyat developed in the 1990s to assist Muslims living in Muslim 
minority countries to reconcile tenets of Islam and the country of residence. Khadduri Justice (n26) 229. 
256Said popularized the term ‘other’ in discussions on culture and society. He criticized Western writings on the 
East as being subjective in their depiction of the East as weak, feminised, backward ‘other’, contrasted against the 
strong and masculine West in order to justify continued inequalities. ‘Othering’, is any action by which an 
individual or group become classified in somebody’s mind as different. This psychological tactic may have had 
its uses in our tribal past, a form of evolutionary psychology or social contract. Said, Orientalism (n247) 
257 The Arabian Peninsula or jazeerah is largely what is now Saudi Arabia.  
258 Aslan (n29) 27. 
259 Aslan (n29) 82. 
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impacted the tribal dynamic. The honour and prosperity of the tribe was paramount.260 There 
was no shared codified moral code, the law of these ancient Arabs was ‘decidedly profane… 
even their penal law…reduced to questions of compensation and payment…This system 
implied…the absence of a developed concept of criminal justice and the reduction of crimes to 
torts…,[collective punishment], and therefore blood feuds, mitigated by the institution of blood 
money…’261 In a ‘society with no concept of an absolute morality as dictated by a divine code 
of ethics’ the Shaykh had only one effective avenue of legal redress for regulating intra-tribal 
order; lex talionis.262  
 
As primitive as these laws were, the Arabs developed a hybrid separation of power doctrine. 
Concerned at divesting absolute authority in one person, namely the Shaykh, important 
decisions were made through ‘collective consultation with other individuals in the tribe who 
had equally important roles: the Qa‘id, who acted as war leader; the Kahin, or cultic official; 
and the Hakam, who would settle disputes.’263 
 
Mecca was positioned between two centers of empire of the ancient and Near East: Byzantine 
to its north-west and Sasanid in the north-east.264 A series of conflicts between these powers 
forced trade routes to be diverted through Arabia, which remained largely independent.265 
Lying on the ancient trade route ‘from Indonesian Archipelago and India to Syria, Mecca was 
a trading superstore,’ attracting an array of cultures and influences. It also housed animist 
shrines, and devotees would petition particular deities through sacrifices and other rituals.266  
 
                                                     
260 The Animist Arabs did not subscribe to the idea of a Day of Judgment and saw death as the end of the individual 
which would have no impact on the continuance of the tribe. Jeffry Halverson, H. Lloyd Goodall, Steven Corman, 
Master Narratives of Islamic Extremism, (Palgrave Macmillan 2011) 39; Aslan (n29) 30. 
261 Schacht Introduction (n253) 6-7 
262 While orientalists pejoratively reduce lex talionis, or the law of retribution, to ‘an eye for an eye’, the object of 
this law was to limit barbarism so that retribution was permissible only to an equal extent of the initial wrong. 
Aslan (n29) 30.  
263 Although there was no formal law enforcement or judicial system in either Bedouin or sedentary Arab society, 
in situations where negotiation was required a Hakam would act as arbiter. The accumulation of the Hakam’s 
declarations became the foundation of a normative legal tradition, or Sunna, which in turn served as a discrete 
tribal legal code. Problematic in Hakam dispute resolution was that each tribe had its own arbiter and Sunna which 
meant the laws and traditions of one tribe did not necessarily conform nor apply to another. Aslan (n29) 30-31. 
Similarly, the authority of the Shaykh was recognized by their own clan, every chief considered himself the equal 
of any other, so there was no overall commander whose authority could compel the obedience or tactical direction 
of the army as a whole.  Richard Gabriel, Muhammad: Islam’s First General (Oklahoma University Press 2007) 
264 The lesser Yemenite to the south was less of a superpower of the ancient and Near East. Hallaq Origins (n6), 
9 
265 Although pockets of the peninsula were controlled by the empires at certain times. Halverson (n260) 41 
266 Hallaq Origins (n6) 9 
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In the fourth century CE, the city became controlled by a collective of Arabian tribes known 
as the Quraysh. The Quraysh were united into a single dominant tribe under Qusayy, who 
recognized the source of Mecca’s power lay in its sanctuary. This sanctuary owed its status to 
‘the Ka’aba: The Cube, a small, nondescript…roofless edifice made of unmortared stones and 
sunk into a valley of sand.’267 After Qusayy captured the Ka’aba from rival clans, and installed 
the idols venerated by neighbouring tribes within it, he guaranteed control over the city.’268 Its 
sanctity like all Semitic sanctuaries concentrically radiated to the surrounding areas, with a 
prohibition on inter-tribal fighting and weapons within Mecca. The combination of this 
prohibition coupled with the caravan route diversion through Mecca facilitated a lucrative trade 
economy and a new level of wealth not previously enjoyed.269 As a concentration of wealthy 
Quraysh trading families began to rule Mecca economic disparity and competitive materialism 
sounded the death knell for the social egalitarianism that once flourished in this tribal 
Peninsula.  
 
Muhammad ibn Abdullah was born into the Banu Hashim clan of the Quraysh tribe in 570 
CE,270 and was invariably influenced by the religious and political landscape.271 He suffered 
the temporal defect of being born in Mecca when the tribal ethic had all but disappeared and 
Meccan society had become severely stratified. Orphaned as a small child, he fell outside the 
Meccan religio-economic system, however, as nephew of the Shaykh, Abu Talib, he avoided 
the slave fate of most orphans.272 Muhammad worked in his uncle’s employ as a trader, 
eventually leaving to work for a successful businesswoman, Khadija, whom he subsequently 
wed.273 Although this marriage facilitated Muhammad’s ascension through the ranks of 
                                                     
267 Orthodox Muslims believe that the Ka’aba was built by God in the time of Adam or by the prophet Abraham 
(Ibrahim) and his son Ishmael but was over the centuries corrupted for pagan worship. There is no archaeological 
evidence to confirm its origin. Aslan (n29) 3, 25; Halverson (n260) 39. 
268 In all, there are said to be three hundred sixty idols housed in and around the Ka‘aba, representing every god 
recognized in the Arabian Peninsula, each venerated in its own right. Allah was not the central deity in the Ka‘aba. 
That honour belonged to Hubal, the Syrian god who had been brought to Mecca centuries before the rise of Islam.’ 
Although non-Arabic texts would indicate Mecca was not an international trading hub. Aslan (n29) 3-4; 8, 25, 28.  
269 Halverson (n260) 41; Aslan (n29) 26. 
270 A ‘small…yet prestigious clan within the…Quraysh.’. ‘Clans in the Arabian Peninsula were primarily 
composed of large extended families that called themselves either bayt (house of ) or banu (sons of ) the family’s 
patriarch.’ 570 CE is neither the correct year of Muhammad’s birth nor of the Abyssinian attack on Mecca; modern 
scholarship has determined that momentous event to have taken place around 552 C.E’ Aslan (n29) 18, 25, 32. 
271 Aslan (n29) 17.  
272 As an orphan, Muhammad had lacked even the most rudimentary military training typically provided by an 
Arab father. Later in life, he compensated for this deficiency by surrounding himself with experienced warriors.  
Gabriel (n263) 
273 Pre-Islam, women had few human rights. Trading offered increased opportunities. When Khadija became 
widowed, her husband left her a strong business which she managed with great acumen. Khadija and Muhammad 
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Meccan hierarchy, He was deeply affected by the extremes of Arab society. This ontological 
anxiety was remedied, or at least somewhat abated, through spiritual retreat to the mountains 
with his family.274  
 
It was in this context the illiterate Muhammad received his first Revelation in 610 CE.275 These 
Revelations, the revealed law of Allah, were subsequently codified in the Qurʾan as the 
positivist embodiment of a natural law theory, crafted as a joint enterprise between revelation 
and reason. Revealed by the Archangel Gabriel to Muhammad (Salla allahu ‘alayhi wa Salam) 
276 in Arabic so that the peoples of his region could understand its message; reasoned through 
human agency to construct and fulfil the maqasid al-ahkam al Shari’a277 according to the need 
of time and circumstance.278  Muhammad would see the interpretations of these Revelations 
reform the Peninsula: socially, economically and politically. He would see his belief in Islam 
and his own role as ‘Messenger’ revolutionize Arabian warfare, the result of which saw the 
creation of the ancient world’s first army motivated by a coherent system of ideological 
belief.279 
 
2.2 Building Islamic Law: Revelation, the Shahada, & the Umma 
‘Words can be relied upon only if one is sure that their function is to reveal and not 
to conceal.’280 
 
Social identity in pre-Islamic Arabia was derived solely from tribal membership based on ius 
sanguinis principles. As procreation was determinative for the continued existence of the tribe, 
there was a limited capacity for growth. In contrast, membership into Islam required no blood 
line, ethnic or kinship relationship. Rather, it required only the simple declaration or 
                                                     
were married for twenty-four years, until her death. Although polygamy was the norm in this era, Muhammad 
never took another wife in her lifetime, nor did he ever prohibit her from working. 
274 The mountain where Muhammad reflected is known as Jebil Nur. Carl Brown, Religion and State: The Muslim 
Approach to Politics (Columbia University Press); Carl Ernst, Following Muhammad: Rethinking Islam in the 
Contemporary World (University of North Carolina Press 2003) 
275 It is important to emphasize the illiteracy of Muhammad as it supports the idea that he was free from Christian 
and Jewish influences. However, it is unrealistic to posit that His exposure to Christian, Jewish and Arabian tribal 
world views would not impact his own perspective.  Aslan (n29). 
276 Henceforth ‘The Prophet’ or ‘Muhammad’.  
277 Maqasid translated as the purpose or objective of Shari’a 
278 By his own admission, Muhammad’s message was an attempt to reform the existing religious beliefs and 
cultural practices of pre-Islamic Arabia so as to bring the God of the Jews and Christians to the Arab peoples. 
‘[God] has established for you [the Arabs] the same religion enjoined on Noah, on Abraham, on Moses, and on 
Jesus,’ the Quran 42:13. Razi (n26) 18 
279 Gabriel (n263) xix 
280 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1973) 
57 
 
shahādah.281 Islamic conversion however, did require extrication from tribal activities and 
from the tribe itself, dual membership was prima facie mutually exclusive.282 Attaching such 
preconditions on membership meant that the community or umma283 had an unlimited capacity 
for growth through conversion.284 This faith based membership at first blush created a greater 
source of group cohesion than blood or clan ties, the precepts of Islam providing a framework 
for discipline.285 All adherents of Islam constitute the umma yet this community is subsidiary 
to the ultimate monotheistic reference point and the message of the Prophet.286 Under this 
exclusive definition of umma only its members can serve as subjects of the Islamic legal and 
ethical system, leaving the remaining community as objects of Islam.  
 
By transcending clans and tribes, Muhammad could forge a common identity among the Arabs 
for the first time. 287 The umma’s transformation of the social composition of Arabian society 
altered fighting loyalties. Blood kin allegiances became subservient to this new body of 
religious believers united under the command and governance of Muhammad.288 Muhammad’s 
first recitations tackled the demise of social egalitarianism and the tribal ethic in Mecca.289 
                                                     
281 lā ʾilāha ʾillā-llāh, muḥammadur-rasūlu-llāh (There is no god but God, and Muhammad is God’s 
Messenger.)’Contrast with position of ibn Taymiyya and Abdul alWahhab who claim that the double creed does 
not suffice to make a person a Muslim. Daniel Benjamin & Steven Simon, ‘Ibn Taymiyya and His Children’ in 
Daniel Benjamin The Age of Sacred Terror (Random House 2002) 52 
282 This point becomes pronounced when there are competing older tribal rules in majority Muslim countries. For 
example in Afghanistan, Pashtunwali and Islam. Aslan (n29) 46; RB Serjeant, ‘The Constitution of Medina.’ 
(1964) 8 Islamic Quarterly 3, 4 
283 The problem with this term, however, is that no one is certain what it meant or where it came from. It may be 
derived from Arabic, Hebrew, or Aramaic; it may have meant ‘community’ ‘nation,’ or  ‘people’. The word umma 
inexplicably ceases to be used in the Quran after 625 CE, when, as Watt notes, it is replaced with the word qawm, 
Arabic for ‘tribe’ ‘Despite its ingenuity, Muhammad’s community was still an Arab institution based on Arab 
notions of tribal society…Indeed, there are so many parallels between the early Muslim community and traditional 
tribal societies that one is left with the distinct impression that, at least in Muhammad’s mind, the Umma was 
indeed a tribe, though a new and radically innovative one.’ Aslan (n29) 57. 
284 While monotheism was implicit from the beginning of the Revelation, it was not until 613 CE that this 
profession of faith dominated the theology and defined the mission and principles of Islam. ‘Proclaim to them 
what you have been commanded, and turn away from the polytheists’ Qurʾan, 15:94.  Serjeant (n282) 4.  
285 Gabriel (n263) xix 
286 Monotheisim is referred to as Tawhid/ Tauhid/Tawheed. In Islam, the oneness of God as manifested in the 
shahada formula: ‘There is no god but God and Muhammad is His prophet.’ Tawhid further to the nature of that 
God-that he is a unity, not composed, not made up of parts, but simple and uncompounded. 
<http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/tawhid> accessed 27/01/15 
287 ‘The rapid growth of Muhammad’s insurgent army is evident from the following figures. At the Battle of Badr 
(624 CE), Muhammad could only put 314 men in the field. Two years later at Second Badr, 1,500 Muslims took 
the field. By the 628 battle at Kheibar, the Muslim army had grown to 2,000 combatants. When Muhammad 
mounted his assault on Mecca (630) he did so with 10,000 men. And at the Battle of Hunayn a few months later 
the army numbered 12,000 men. Gabriel (n263) xix. 
288 This is an important policy in the development of the small group of Muslims in Medina to the larger Muslim 
community and empire. Barakat Ahmed, Muhammad and the Jews. (Vikas Publishing House 1979) 46-7. 
289 The animist and merchant society controlled by the Quraysh was a harsh and unforgiving one, which explains 
in part the emergence of Islam as a radical restructuring of the existing social order and a reaction to its serious 
socioeconomic shortcomings. Halverson (n260) 38; Aslan (n29) 40. 
58 
 
These recitations advocated against the mistreatment and exploitation of the vulnerable, and 
imported social responsibility on the wealthy to provide for the underprivileged and oppressed. 
This message was wholly welcomed by the disenfranchised segment of Arabian society who 
then became his early followers.290 This was an innovative message in Mecca. ‘Muhammad 
was not yet establishing a new religion; he was calling for sweeping social reform. He was not 
yet preaching monotheism; he was demanding economic justice.’291 These reform initiatives 
would eventually extend to governance, turning the pre-Islamic division of powers structure 
into an autocracy. 
 
2.3 The Hijra: Moving a Movement 
In 622CE Yathrib, an oasis settlement approximately 400 kilometres from Mecca, lex talionis 
was failing. Designed to deter ongoing tribal conflict, the law of retribution could no longer 
cope with the longstanding conflict between the two largest Arab tribes in Yathrib, the Aws 
and Khazraj.292 Muhammad was sourced as hakam to act as an arbiter within this feud which 
had escalated when several other clans entered the fracas.293 The invitation was timely. As 
Muhammad’s following increased so did the threat it posed to the Quraysh monopoly over 
Mecca. The resultant hostility against Islam reached a sufficient threshold that the new Muslim 
community, supported through Revelation, were compelled to flee Mecca. This pivotal event 
is known as the hijra or ‘migration’ and marks year one of the Islamic calendar. Neighbouring 
Yathrib welcomed the migrants from Mecca, the muhajirun, in its entirety and while not 
necessarily believing Muhammad was a ‘Prophet’ believed he was a man of judicious character 
and well placed to resolve its protracted tribal dispute.   
 
Shortly after settling in Yathrib or Medina as it was subsequently known, Muhammad drafted 
the Sahifat al-Madinah (Charter/Constitution of Medina), ‘a series of formal agreements of 
nonaggression among Muhammad, the Emigrants, the Ansar, and the rest of Yathrib’s clans, 
                                                     
290 ‘Do not oppress the orphan…and do not drive away the beggar’ Qurʾan 93:9–10. 
291 There are several examples of Muhammad’s reforms; he outlawed usury (The Qurʾan 3:130), instituted a 
mandatory tithe called zakat, which was means tested and applicable to every member of the umma. Once 
collected, the money was redistributed as alms to the community’s neediest members. Aslan (n29) 41, 60. The 
Qurʾan also prohibited the practice of female infanticide and changed the way marriage dowry was distributed – 
efforts referenced by Muslim scholars when defending the status of women in Islam. Some have challenged the 
historicity of such accounts. See for example Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a 
Modern Debate (Yale University Press 1993) 39-40. 
292 While Revelation supported lex talionis, it tempered its rigidity, providing a platform to end blood feuds, see 
The Holy Qurʾan 2:178; 4:92 and 5:45. Peters Crime (n254) 40. 
293 Muhammad was well placed to arbitrate because of His divinely sanctioned authority and impartiality. 
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both Jewish and pagan.’294 Whether a unilateral proclamation or a social contract, the 
Constitution of Medina was not crafted under a Rawlsian veil.295 Encompassed in the 
Constitution were solutions to unite the tribes it sought to bind under the sovereignty of 
monotheism, with peaceful methods of dispute resolution.296 The Constitution divested 
absolute authority in Muhammad over the entire Yathrib population consolidating all pre-
Islamic power positions unto himself, so that he was the shaykh of his community, its hakam, 
its qa‘id, and, as the only legitimate connection to the Divine, its kahin.’297 The corollary of 
this absolute authority was absolute responsibility for the protection of the entire community.  
 
Within the context of early Islam and the Charter of Medina, the entire community was 
included under the umma banner: that is both Muslims and non-Muslims.298 According to early 
Islamic doctrine, so that decisions by the Muslim community were infallible, the entire 
community participated in the decision-making process. This became untenable as the 
community grew and consensus of the whole was no longer practical.299 While preferencing 
forgiveness over retribution, Muhammad recognized the utility of lex talionis,300 however, 
                                                     
294 The Charter of Medina set the precedent for the treatment of mua'ahids (dhimmīs are those non-Muslim 
subjects who become subjects after a war. If there is no war and there is a negotiated settlement, then they are 
called mua'ahids). When Prophet Muhammad was popularly appointed Medina's ruler, he entered into a pact with 
the Jewish communities of Medina. Through this pact, he granted equal political rights to non-Muslims. They 
were ensured complete freedom of religion and practice. SG Vessey-Fitzgerald, ‘Nature and Sources of the 
Shari’ah’ in Majid Khadduri & Herbert Liebesny (eds.) Law in the Middle East, Vol 1, Origin and Development 
of Islamic Law (The Middle East Institute 1995) 87; Aslan (n29) 56.  See Annex 2, Charter of Medina.  
295 Contrast Bernard Lewis, The Arabs in History (OUP 2002) 42 and Ali Khan ‘Commentary on the Constitution 
of Medina’ in Ramadan (n13)  
296 ‘The constitution reveals his Muhammad’s great diplomatic skills, for it allows the ideal that he cherished of 
an umma based clearly on a religious outlook to sink temporarily into the background and is shaped essentially 
by practical considerations.’ AT Welch, The Encyclopaedia of Islam, vol. 5 (E.J. Brill 1960) The Sahifat al-
Madinah is regarded as the first codification of human rights in Islam. A unilateral agreement between the Prophet 
and those who followed him to Medina as well as those non-Muslim tribes who lived in and around Medina, it 
advocated equality and freedom of religion for all those resident in Medina at the time of the charter’s drafting.  
M Cherif Bassiouni, Shari’a and Islamic Criminal Jusrice in the Time of War and Peace, (Cambridge University 
Press,2014) 159-160. 
297 Aslan (n29) 58. 
298 This variance in lexicon has had ramifications on subsequent use of legal tools with far reaching consequences. 
The term has subsequently deviated from this original inclusive intent to be restricted exclusively to the Muslim 
community. There is much contention on this point, as well as the egalitarian status of the ‘dhimmīs’. See ‘The 
Status of Non-Muslim Minorities Under Islamic Law’ http://www.dhimmītude.org/  < accessed 02/02/15>; 
‘Islamic Teaching On Dhimmī Status Creates An Atmosphere Of Intolerance’ 
http://www.archons.org/pdf/issues/DHIMMĪ.pdf < accessed 02/02/15>; 
299 Harold Rhode, ‘Can Muslims Reopen the Gates of Ijtihād?’ (Gatestone Institute, 2012) 
<http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3114/muslims-Ijtihād> 
300 ‘The retribution for an injury is an equal injury, but those who forgive the injury and make reconciliation will 
be rewarded by God.’ The Qura’n 42:40. 
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Muhammad’s version of the law of retribution deviated from pre-Islamic conceptions, 
revealing the weight he attached to moral rather than utilitarian principles.301  
 
Reflecting what is now considered a Clausewitzian position; Muhammad emphasized use of 
force as a tactical means to achieving larger strategic objectives, a fact not lost on modern 
jihadists in their citation of Muhammad’s use of violence to justify their own. Tracing the 
evolution of Islam and the contexts in which it evolved establishes the platform for examining 
Islamic law within a salafi construct. The following chapter examines the Islamic legal sources 
and tools that can be invoked to make permissible conflict conduct that would otherwise be 


















                                                     
301 While the Constitution of Medina sanctions retribution as a deterrent for crime, it has the ‘unprecedented 
stipulation’ that the entire community has equal blood worth, an innovation in the Arabian legal system. 
Importantly, while all Muslims are equal, the value of a Muslim in Islamic law is greater than that of a non-
Muslim, hence a Muslim may not be executed for killing a non-Muslim. See The Qurʾan 8:65; Aslan (n29) 59. 
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Chapter 3 Allahu a’lam, God Knows Best 
3.1 The Epistemological Foundation of Islamic law  
The Islamic tradition is guaranteed by a theo-political system: theologically through the 
institution of fuqaha or ulema; politically through the system of Caliphate or Islamic 
governance.302 The acceptance from inception that Muslim behaviour would be regulated 
through Revelation enumerated in the Qurʾan (literally meaning ‘the recitation’) and Sunna 
(the actions and words of the Prophet) provided the framework for Islamic law to transcend 
Westphalian division. So deeply embedded in the Islamic way of life, Shari’a is described by 
Orientalists and Muslims alike as the ‘core and kernel of Islam itself’.303 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the role Islam plays as a regulatory mechanism, 
highlighting its position within the conventional international legal order. It will consider how 
Islamic law is deduced and the tools which facilitate such deduction.       
 
All Muslims are subservient to the absolute sovereignty of Allah, therefore any idea of Islamic 
nationalism is entirely eclipsed by Islamic internationalism.304 While state law is bound to 
respect the principle of sovereignty and only in extreme circumstances will concern itself with 
how individuals behave outside its sphere of concern, Islamic law has an omnipresent interest 
in human acts irrespective of territorial and jurisdictional demarcation.305 Regardless of 
subsequent division into competing political entities, Islam and its law unified Islamic 
communities through this common frame of reference allowing civil society to operate through 
political borders.  
 
As with all legal systems, Islamic law has its sources (al-masadir) and guiding principles (al-
usul) which dictate the nature of its ‘evidence’ (al-adilla). In completing the structure of its 
legal theory Islamic law utilizes both legal maxims (al-qawa’id) and objectives (al-
maqasid).306 Shari’a is the overarching normative framework of the Islamic legal tradition, 
developed ‘with rudimentary concepts refined by cultural process with the passage of time,’ a 
                                                     
302 Cherif-BassiouniaJihada(n19) 61. 
303 Schacht Introduction (n253) 1. Shari’a is distinguished from siyasa, which deals with administration or 
governance: duties like building infrastructure; collecting taxes; raising armies; keeping the peace. Reza, (n 25), 
26. Westbrook (n26) 823. 
304 ‘[T]raditional Islamic legal personnel were not subject to the authority of the state, simply because the state as 
we know it did not exist.’ Hallaq Introduction (n13) 7; Marmaduke Pickthall, ‘Islamic Culture’ (1927) 
http://muslimcanada.org/pickthallculture.html last accessed 14/02/15, x. 
305 Hallaq Introduction (n13) 19. 
306 Gavin Picken, Islamic Law (Routledge 2010). 
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process influenced by custom and both Talmudic and Roman law.307  Somewhat misleadingly 
translated as ‘Islamic law’, Shari’a literally means ‘way’ or ‘road’.308 It indicates Divine law, 
‘a sort of Muslim rule of law’309  illuminating the distinct relationship Islamic law has as a 
regulatory mechanism on the Muslim population as well as Islamic identity. Shari’a is not 
motivated by control or discipline. Rather it seeks to provide a blueprint for peaceful relations 
both internally and with the greater community provided they are aligned with the purpose or 
maqasid al-ahkam al Shari’a, namely the preservation of religion; life; progeny; intellect and 
property.310 To achieve the maqasid, anything necessary for its realization may serve as an 
independent basis for a legal decision. The interpretation of what constitutes preservation, and 
the methods (aggressive or defensive) employed to achieve the maqasid al-ahkam al Shari’a 
will be discussed in chapter 4.2 on ‘Unapologetic Jihad’ 
 
3.2 Sources of Islamic Law 
Shari’a comprises primary sources: the Qurʾan and Sunna311, the latter compiled in Hadiths 312 
and secondary sources: derivatives from the interpretation of these sources: ijma and qiyas. 313 
All acts are regarded as shar’i, subject to Shari’a regulation and therefore pronounced as law 
                                                     
307 ‘With the exception of the Quran, every single source of Islamic law was the result of human, not divine, 
effort.’ There are points of convergence with the conventional ius gentium vis-à-vis the Islamic law of nations. 
Aslan (n29) 167.  
308 Islamic law as an expression does not exist in Classical Islam. Hallaq Origins (n6), I; Hallaq Introduction (n13) 
19; March & Modirzadeh (n233) 368. 
309 Quraishi, (n248) 340. 
310 Comparisons are made between the Qurʾan as the Muslim Bible. This is misleading, especially on a structural 
level. The Qurʾan was revealed as rahma (mercy/compassion) to man. Rahma manifests in three aspects: 
educating the individual; establishing justice and realizing public welfare. This represents the commonly 
understood conception of maqasid developed by the 12th century Islamic scholar Al-Ghazali (d. 1111 CE). Al-
Ghazali posited that the ‘objective of Shari’a is to promote the well being of all mankind, which is safeguarding 
their faith (din), their self (nafs); their intellect (aql ); their posterity (nasl); and their wealth (mal). The most 
extensive discussion in classical scholarship is found in al-Shatibi’s (d. 1388) Al-Muwafaqat fi’usul al-Shari’a. 
Halverson (n260) 2. 
311 The Sunna is a compilation of Prophetic traditions. It is divided into: Sunna with legal implications and Sunna 
without legal implications. When reading hadith reports, their value must be distinguished from that of the Qurʾan 
as the former has a different epistemological standing, and careful analysis must be undertaken to delineate 
between Prophetic statements and those mistakenly attributed to him. 
312 The memorisation and transmission of the Sunna in a literary form is characterised as ahadith and represents 
the ‘report of the Prophet’s Sunna. Hadith meaning ‘occurring’ or taking place. Ali & Rehman (n250), 325. The 
most authoritative hadith are attributed to the ninth century scholar’s al-Bukhari (d. 870) and Muslim ibn Hajjaj 
(d. 875). Halverson (n260) 4. Weiss, (n25), 200; Cherif-BassiouniaShari’aa(n296) 53; Syed, ‘Islamic Law and 
the Apologetics Of Jihad’, (n10), 156; M. Ṣaghīr Ḥasan Ma’ṣūmi ‘Ijtihād Through Fourteen Centuries’ (1982) 
21(4) Islamic Studies, 45; Abdel-Haleem (n4) 60. 
313 Ijma means consensus. Generally taken to mean consensus of jurists of each of the four madhahib. Ironically 
there is no consensus on whether the consensus must be from the umma entire or just the ulama (learned Muslim 
scholars). Qiyas means to reason by analogy; Analogical deduction derived from Qurʾan/Sunna. 
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in its construction as a moral-legal commandment.’314 The Islamic tradition places great 
emphasis upon the centrality of Shari’a, yet the tradition acknowledges that Revelation was 
never intended to be ‘passively received and applied; rather, it is to be actively constructed on 
the basis of those sacred texts which are its acknowledged sources.’315 The triangular 
formulation of the Qurʾan, Sunna and Hadith evolved into foundational dogma which has 
‘provided the ligament binding Islam, the Muslim umma, and individual Muslims together 
through fourteen centuries.’316  
 
The Qurʾan is the divinely preserved Revelation of Allah to humanity, miraculously dictated 
through the angel Gabriel (Jibril) to Muhammad over twenty-two years in the Hijaz region of 
Arabia.  As the recipient of the message, Muhammad is considered the last in a series of 
Prophets that include Noah, Abraham, Moses and Jesus.317 The Qurʾan constitutes the supreme 
law of Islam, a paradox considering it ‘does not profess to be a code of law or even law book.’318 
A framework for debate, it is divine in source as opposed to divinely inspired. Consisting of 
114 chapters or sura of varying length and diverse subject matter, the chapters are further 
divided into verses or ayat, comprising speeches of Allah, metaphors, allegories, and rulings 
(ahkam).319 Where narrative content is provided by the Qurʾan it is fragmented, relying on a 
range of exegetical materials and supplemental sources for coherency.320 Neither linear nor 
explicit, the Qurʾan was taught by the Prophet who elaborated its meaning and explained its 
                                                     
314 Both Sunni and Shi’ite sects subscribe to this pyramidal order of sources determining normativity in Islam and 
while agreeing the primary sources, the weight the different sects, and within the sects, attach to secondary sources 
is variable. Eg Hanbali and Malik preference the Sahaba for ijma not the entire umma. Hallaq Introduction (n13) 
20. 
315 Weiss, (n25), 199; Javaid Rehman Islamic State Practices, International Law and the Threat from Terrorism: 
A Critique of the ‘Clash of Civilisations’ in the New World Order (2005) Ali & Rehman (n250), 324-326. 
316 Cherif-BassiouniaShari’aa(n296) 53. 
317 Some accounts state Revelation occurred over 23 years. Abdel-Haleem (n4) 2. 
318 The impetus of Qurʾanic legislation was an appeal to faith and the human soul over a classification of legal 
prescriptions. Khadduri &. Liebesny (n300), 87. Indeed, there is an argument that Allah does not have a legislative 
function, rather Allah establishes values as opposed to laws. See Mojtahed Shabestari, Hermeneutic, the Scripture 
and the Tradition (Tarh-e 2000) 114; Ali & Rehman (n250), 325. Similarly, it is argued that just war theory was 
never intended tio be a legal code but was rather a ‘proposal’. Oliver O’Donovan, ‘The Just War Revisited’ 
(Cambridge University Press,2003) 14 
319 Halverson (n260) 2. Only a minimal amount of Qurʾanic verses are in the form of explicit rules. Sometimes 
extremely specific and detailed, their revelation corresponds to concrete events. The Revelation has been 
transmitted to subsequent generations us through an authentic continuous narration without doubt. Al-Bazdawi, 
Abdul Aziz al-Bukhari, Kashf-al Asrar ‘an Usul al-Bazdaw (Dar l-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 1997)1:22. When the 
Prophet died in 632 CE ‘the Qurʾan had barely been organized in chapters and verses and the hadith and Sunna 
had not yet been compiled. The transcription of the Qurʾan started about 40 years after the Prophet’s death, and 
the compilation of authentic hadith took a total of 132 years to come about. Cherif-BassiouniaShari’aa(n296) 53-
4.  
320 The Qurʾan has a literary structure and reads as sermon-like; a unilateral conversation that invokes narratives 
to illustrate imperatives to the audience. Halverson (n260) 2. 
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injunctions and prohibitions ‘to be followed by the [companions of the Prophet] sahaba in the 
manner the Prophet demonstrated by his words, deeds, approvals and gestures.’321 The sahaba, 
therefore, considered the Sunna as binding as the Qurʾan, and only next to it in importance.  
 
The Qurʾanic legislation that evolved through Revelation reflected the social exigencies 
confronting Islam during a specific time. As such, the Qurʾan can be characterized as 
incremental Revelation, its verses generally revealed to solve problems which confronted the 
umma.322 It can be divided into two distinct phases: the Meccan and Medinan, or the religious 
and social. The Meccan phase revolved around implementing monotheism and an Islamic 
notion of morality. During this phase, there was a prohibition to fight (despite the unrelenting 
persecution by the Quraysh of the Prophet and his followers).323 The Medinan component 
paralleled the hijrah and ended at Muhammad’s death in 632 CE. It was in this phase, the 
Muslim community was born, and ‘Muhammad’s Arab social reform movement transformed 
into a universal religious ideology.’324 The subsequent Qurʾanic legislation that evolved during 
this period focused on the organization of the Muslim state and the regulation of its 
inhabitants.325 Notably, this phase saw a fortuitous revelation rescinding the prohibition on 
fighting which allowed the persecuted Muslims to defend themselves against an increasingly 
violent Qurayshi offensive.326  
 
Although credited with creating a successful egalitarian regulatory framework in the Medinan 
years  enabling various religions to peacefully co-exist, the Prophet was not a lawgiver in any 
Western sense’ nor did ‘law’ appear a major preoccupation.327 However, an Islamic ‘law’ did 
                                                     
321 In the third century after the hijra the traditions which had been relayed orally were codified and the subject 
material was systemized. Rules that could not be traced back to the Qurʾan were cast into the forms of the Sunna. 
Rudolph Peters (trans) Jihad in Mediaeval and Modern Islam Vol 5, Nisaba Series, (E.J. Brill 1977) 1, 3; M. 
Ṣaghīr Ḥasan Ma'ṣūmi ‘Ijtihād Through Fourteen Centuries’ (1982) 21(4) Islamic Studies 45 
322 By tracking the incremental Revelation, early Qurʾanic interpreters were able to create a chronology of its 
verses. This chronology is meant to indicate that ‘God was rearing the Umma, instructing it in stages and making 
alterations when necessary, from the first Revelation in 610 to the last in 632.’ Aslan (n29) 168. 
323 Other transliterations include Qureish, Quraish, Quresh, Qurish, Kuraish, and Coreish. Muhammad Shalabi, 
Al-Madkhal fi al-T’arif bil-Fiqh al-Islami (Beirut: Dar alNahdah al-‘Arabiah,1969), 51-56. 
324 Aslan (n29) 52. 
325 Taha argued that the Qurʾanic verses revealed during the Meccan era were more egalitarian and democratic in 
spirit while the Medinese verses display a hierarchical trend. See Mahmoud Mohamad Taha, Second Message of 
Islam trans. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Naim (Syracuse University Press 1987). 
326 Qurʾan,2:190 ‘Fighting is prescribed for you, and ye dislike it. But it is possible that ye dislike a thing which 
is good for you, and that ye love a thing which is bad for you. But God knoweth, and ye know not.’ Qurʾan 
(2:216). Indeed 2:216 is used as the basis for the compulsory nature of jihad. Intertribal warfare in the stateless 
polity coupled with resistance to the Prophet’s monotheistic revelations, makes ‘sociological sense’ that the 
Qurʾan would contain permissions concerning the use of violence. Bergesen (n247) 12. 
327 The Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought, Jihad and the Islamic Law of War (Jordan 2009) 5. 
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evolve before his death and an Islamic polity ‘guided by both…Qurʾanic legal ethic and the 
customary laws of the Peninsular Arabs’ was fashioned after his death.328  
 
The sacred texts do not enumerate the law in a strictly legal sense, rather they contain the Law.  
 
‘Because the Law is buried, as it were, within the (legally) imprecise and sometimes ambiguous 
language of the sacred texts, it is said to be extracted from the texts; and it is for this reason 
that the texts are to be considered sources of the Law rather than the Law itself.’329 
 
Thus the development of Islamic law is more properly attributed to Muslim jurists and their 
use of juridical methods.330 In principle, the Muslim jurist never invents rules, he formulates 
rules which God has already decreed and which are concealed in the sources.331  These rules, 
which constitute the ideal Law of God, exist objectively above and beyond all juristic 
endeavours.332 Similarly, while ‘[t]he Islamic state upholds the Law and enforces it, [it] has no 
right to make law.’333 Because jurists are supposed to discover not create the law of God, no 
individual jurist was considered authoritative. Placing oneself in a school of thought was one 
way of garnering authority for a particular interpretation.’334 
 
                                                     
328 Viewed in the larger context of the existing legal landscape of Jewish and ancient Semitic-Mesopotamian legal 
traditions, the legal contours of the Qurʾan provide ample evidence of an Islamic conception of law. Hallaq 
Origins (n6) 3 -4 
329 Weiss (n25) 199 
330 The ‘corpus of Islamic law as it developed over the ages is ‘manmade’ in the sense that it resulted from the 
efforts of the jurists of the various schools of law.’ It is important to understand that Islam never tried to remove 
all existing laws of a society, rather, it aimed to remove the evils of those laws and to make them beneficial for 
all. Shah Waliullah, Hujjat Allah Baligha (Tijarah al-Kutub 1978) in Razi (n26) 20; Hashemi (n6) 6; ‘If civil law 
can be described as a legislator’s law as to its source, and common law as a judge’s law, then Islamic law is a 
jurist’s law,’ developed through theoretical juristic discourse. Javaid Rehman and Susan Breau, Religion, Human 
Rights and International Law (E.J. Brill 2007) 92; G.M Badr, ‘A Survey of Islamic International Law’ (1982) 76 
Proceedings of the American Society of International Law 56. Schacht argues that ‘Islamic law represents an 
extreme case of ‘jurist’s law’. Legal science and not the state, plays the part of a legislator, and scholarly 
handbooks have the force of law. Schacht Introduction (n253) 5; Yet it would not be acceptable to speak of those 
who interpret the sources as in any sense creating law. It is much more appropriate to refer to the interpreter as 
one who discovers the law. Weiss, (n25) 200 
331 There is evidence however that early Muslim jurists extrapolated rules absent positive doctrine founded in the 
Quran or Sunna. Rather these jurists, particularly through the 16th centuries based their interpretation on natural 
law inclination, subsequently fortified through assumption that these rules were necessary for the social good and 
to give ‘substantive content to their legal determinations.’ Anver Emon, ‘Huquq Allah and Huquq Al-Ibad: A 
Legal Heuristic for A Natural Rights Regime’ (2006) Islamic Law and Society 325 ,326 
332 Weiss, (n25) 200 
333 In the classical Sunni theory of the caliphate, the ideal caliph was envisaged as a qualified jurist; and as such 
was simply first among equals. He had no exclusive right to expound law or to delegate a law- making function 
to others. Weiss (n25) 201 
334 Natana DeLong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam: From Revival to Global Jihad (OUP 2004) 53 
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The third source of Islamic law is ijma, or consensus. While this source is not directly 
enumerated in the Qurʾan or Sunna, its weight as a source is derived from solitary reports 
speaking of the impossibility of the umma as a whole ever agreeing an error, the idea that 
consensus would guarantee the infallibility of a legal ruling or opinion.335 To add gravitas to 
this source, jurists departed from the perspectives of grouping solitary reports verbally, and 
began consolidating the reports along thematic lines. In this way, a single recurrent theme was 
found in the hadith.336  In areas where the Islamic position is unclear, the ‘conclusion is sought 
in the debate (ikhtilaf or legitimate disagreement) and the interpretation of the Shari’a by legal 
scholars.’337 Ijma by Islamic scholars (ulama) on an issue would create binding legal decisions, 
irrespective of whether such consensus contradicted Qurʾanic prescriptions.338  
 
Interlinked with ijma is the interpretative tool Qiyas, which although characterized as the fourth 
source of Islamic law, is distinguished from other sources in that it was not a ‘material source 
on the substance of which a jurist could draw’. Rather it ‘provide[d] a set of methods, [most 
commonly analogy] through which the jurist arrives at legal norms.’339 Islamic conquests 
coupled with rapid social changes created situations that lacked a clear solution in either the 
Qurʾan or Sunna. The jurists resorted to free interpretation of the sources which generally 
manifested through qiyas, where it was assumed the ratio legis of the separate cases was 
comparable.340 Ijma provided authority for this human interpretation adding weight to the 
authority of the ulama as sole dictators of acceptable Muslim behaviour.341 
 
                                                     
335 Hallaq Introduction (n13) 21 
336 To group solitary reports verbally would not have provided as strong a base as grouping thematically. This 
doctrine is thus justified on the grounds that ‘if consensus on probable evidence is attained, the evidence cannot 
be subject to error inasmuch as the community cannot err in the first place.’ The cases or rules in which there was 
ijma are limited constituting less than 1 percent of the total body of law. Hallaq Introduction (n13) 21-22. Ijma 
may also be regarded as an essentially textual source as it is expressed in the statements of learned persons, as 
such it is considered sacred to the extent that it is the product of special divine guidance bestowed upon the 
Community, safeguarding it against error. Weiss, (n25), 201; 'Ali al-Khafif, Muha in M. Ṣaghīr Ḥasan Ma'ṣūmi 
Ijtihād Through Fourteen Centuries (1982) 21(4) Islamic Studies 47 
337 Nagamine,(n71),53. 
338 Aslan (n29) 165. 
339 Hallaq Introduction (n13) 22 
340 Qiyas operates for the sole purpose of providing legal determination and classification into one of the five legal 
norms in such novel cases, however for it to be invoked there must exist a case already settled through either the 
revealed text or ijma which shares a common attribute, or ratio legis, with the new case. The legal norm in the 
original case is then able to be transposed due to similar features with the novel case. Much analysis is dedicated 
by jurists in finding the ratio legis, agreeing the common attribute between cases pivotal in the application of 
qiyas. 
341  Weight was attached to the Prophet’s saying that ‘my community will never agree on an error.’ Aslan (n29) 
165, 168.  
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The absence of positive doctrine articulating the history of Islamic law during the first three or 
four centuries of its life increases the scope for unrestrained interpretation. There are no known 
court records or any other source that can reveal the operating procedures of the judiciary in 
the formative period. Nor is there evidence of the types of cases litigated; doctrines applied; 
representation in proceedings; the accessibility of the courts to women; or how judges used 
social/tribal ties to negotiate and solve disputes.342 Hallaq describes the evolution of Shari’a in 
terms of identifying its ‘essential attributes’: ‘the evolution of a complete judiciary; the full 
elaboration of a positive legal doctrine; the full emergence of [both] a science of legal 
methodology and interpretation [and] doctrinal legal schools…’ He posits the latter two 
attributes remained in gestation until the middle of the 10th century CE. 343 
 
Islamic methodology dictates that the scholar must first search for precedent in the works of 
renowned jurists. If no precedent is found; he may look to factually analogous cases. The 
subsequent ruling will fall into one of five legal norms: wajib, the obligatory which attracts 
punishment upon omission of an act whose performance is deemed necessary; haram, the 
forbidden which will attract punishment upon commission of an act deemed prohibited; 
mandub, the recommended; mubah, the permissible or neutral; and makruh, the disapproved.344 
 
3.3 ‘Ilm Usul al-Fiqh: the Central Role of the Islamic Jurist 
The broader Islamic legal system comprises Shari’a, the schools of fiqh and methods of 
interpretation. Usul al-Fiqh differs from Shari’a in that Shari’a refers to the revealed religion 
as a whole; it covers the entirety of Allah’s prescriptions in the regulation of human conduct. 
Fiqh refers to how the rules of Shari’a are to be applied; a science where scholars refer to 
scriptural sources to identify and define a methodology of extraction.345 Absent a final 
                                                     
342 Hallaq Origins (n6) 1- 2. 
343 This is problematic in relation to a Salafi construct. (see 3.7) Hallaq Origins (n6), 3. 
344 Wael Hallaq, ‘Was the Gate of Ijtihād Closed?’(1984) 16 Int J Middle East Stud, 4; Hallaq Introduction (n13) 
174. 
345 Muslims live according to Shari’a as embodied in fiqh. A scholar in fiqh is called a faqih. Qadis performed a 
form of ‘applied ijtihād; responsible for ‘determining the truth of the facts and then applying the fiqh to those 
facts. Where faqihs considered hypothetical fiqh, qadis animated the fiqh to resolve actual disputes. Quraishi, 
(n248) 345. There are several categories of fiqh, for example 'ilm al-fiqh deals with the actions which people 
should do and those which they should not do. Juristic literature has generated two major literary genres. One, 
known as usul al-fiqh (roots of jurisprudence), deals with hermeneutical principles that can be used for deriving 
rules from revelation. The other, dominant genre, furu' al-fiqh (branches of jurisprudence), is an elaboration of 
rules which govern ritual and social activities. An overall philosophy of law in Islam can only be discovered 
through consideration of both genres, such a stance not fully articulated in the pre-modern tradition. Parry, The 
Legal Methodology (n250); Al-Mawdudi describes fiq as ‘Detailed law derived from the Qurʾan and the Hadith 
covering the myriad of problems that arise in the course of man's life.’ M  Ishaq Zahid, "Glossary of Islamic 
Terms", [Online Document], 1998, [cited 2015, Apr 27]; Peters Jihad (n321) 1 
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ecclesiastical authority which has a monopoly on Qurʾanic interpretation, ‘ilm usul al-fiqh, the 
science of discovering the law of Allah, is of crucial significance. Fiqh’s development was an 
organic response to discover the ‘right’ answers, its classical legal methodology is identical to 
that of Shari’a.346 
 
As Islamic law is not a uniform formulation, and interpretation of the Qurʾan and Prophetic 
hadith lack universal consensus, the institution of madhahib was introduced to provide order, 
coherency and consistency to the different interpretations.347 It is intended that adherents of 
each respective school would be ‘bound to follow the opinions of the school’s respective 
Imam’s.’348 Crudely described, a madhhab is a pervasive doctrinal legal school that follows a 
methodology of equations when determining ambiguities within the Qurʾan by establishing 
conceptual juristic boundaries of a set of cases. The legal opinions stemming from these schools 
were primi inter pares.349 
 
The rapid expansion of Islam paralleled the proliferation of Islamic legal schools, which at its 
peak numbered over 500. Although most of these schools either disappeared or merged by the 
ninth century, the majority of Sunni scholars decided that all essential jurisprudential questions 
had been answered by the four main madhahib; this was in part a way to redress suspicions of 
ongoing corruption. With the institutionalization of the madhahib within the Muslim world, 
the binding legal decisions created through ijma, also became institutionalized. This created 
the situation where decisions of one generation of Ulama were blindly accepted as judicial 
precedent for subsequent generations. This blind imitation is known as taqlid and those that 
                                                     
346 Fiqh is divided into two branches: fiqh ibadah and fiqh mu’amalat. ‘For ‘ibadah, humans should look to the 
Qurʾan or the Sunna for answers, but regarding the relationship between humans, mu’amalat, humans should look 
for the best public solution.’ Parry, ‘Legal Methodology’ (n250) 95- 96.   
347 When prominent jurists began to have a loyal and large following that exclusively applied their doctrine in 
courts of law these ‘personal schools’ emerged. Only a handful of jurists were elevated to the status of founder of 
a doctrinal school including Abu Hanifa; Ibn Abi Layla; Abu Yusuf; Shaybānī; Malik; Awza’I; Thawri and 
Shafi’i. Hallaq Introduction (n13) 3; Hallaq Origins (n6), 153, 156; Peters Crime (n254) 1; Centre for International 
Peace Operations (ZIF), ‘Conference Report,’ Islamic Law, The Rule of Law and International Peace Operations, 
Cairo: ZIF, 2011 
348 The importance of understanding these various schools is that it provides insight into the customary practices 
and law of a particular country. For example: the Hanbali School of Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 855), the most 
traditionalist of the legal schools; Maliki jurisprudence, which was founded by Malik ibn Anas (d. 795); The Shafii 
School, founded on the principles of Muhammad ash-Shafii (d. 820); The Hanafi School of Abu Hanifah (d. 767). 
Peters Crime  (n254), 1 
349 Hallaq Origins (n6) 150, 156 
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practice it are known as muqallid.350 Although taqlid can be seen as a form of intellectual 
decline, some posit it as an attempt to create a stable rule of law. 351 
 
The four surviving Sunni madhahib agree the sources of Islam, that is the Qurʾan and Sunna 
Mutawatir,352 Ijma and Qiyas, but there is divergence in methodology after that.353 Within 
Islamic States, rulers historically directed adjudication along the lines of a particular madhhab, 
however the madhhab was not judicially prescriptive.354 Militant non-State Islamic groups 
have claimed Islamic legitimacy by citing their violent actions are supported within these four 
schools of Sunni thought; others who adopt an anti-madhahib position legitimate violence 
through their own reading of the Qurʾan.355  
 
3.4 The Islamic Jurists & His Tools 
The authority of the Muslim jurist is derivative in nature; derived entirely from the authority 
of God. To position the jurist hierarchically, they ‘intervene between God and the State.’ It 
seems then a paradox that the weight attached to the jurist in Islamic law is not met with 
equivalent enforcement powers. In fact, the Islamic jurist has no enforcement powers.356  
 
The description of the Islamic jurist is distinguished from his Western counterpart, he is not 
circumscribed by the ongoing legislative activity of the state and his authority has completely 
                                                     
350 The consequence of this interpretation is it portrays Islam as lacking a process to derive rules for modern 
problems. Ijtihād is contrasted to taqlid a term which refers to the acceptance of a rule, not on the basis of evidence 
drawn directly from the sources, but on the authority of other jurists. Weiss (n25) 200; Hallaq Origins (n6) 147. 
351 Mohammed Fadel, ‘The Social Logic of Taqlid and the Rise of the Mukhatasar, (1996) 3 Islamic L & Soc. 193, 
197. 
352 Depending on the number of the reporters of the hadith in each stage of the isnad, i.e. in each generation of 
reporters, it can be classified into the general categories of Mutawatir (‘consecutive’) or Ahad (‘single’) hadith. 
A Mutawatir hadith is one which is reported by such a large number of people that they cannot be expected to 
agree upon a lie, all of them together, along the lines of the doctrine of ijma. T al-Jaza'iri, Taujih al-Nazar ila Usul 
al-Nazar (Maktaba 'Ilmiyyah, Madinah, N.D.), 33. 
353 Despite having a main school under which Qurʾanic and Sunna interpretations occur, there is often mixing 
permitted for the sake of necessity. (Darura (doctrine of necessity) makes permissive something that would 
otherwise be prohibited.). The Madhahib will use an alternate formula for maslaha when its own formula is 
untenable. The madhahib accept hadiths as a source for legal decisions. The greater number of hadiths accepted 
by a particular school would dictate the rigidity of the school. TAslan (n29) 170; Rhode (n299). 
354  As there are differing opinions even within the schools, a hierarchy of authority was developed to deal with 
situations of conflicting norms. Yet if a ruler wanted to adopt a following of a different school he could direct the 
qadis that were appointed to follow the preferenced school.  Yet even if a certain madhhab was followed, it would 
not exclude a conflict of opinion within the school, leading to jurists within the distinct schools developing a 
hierarchy of norms. Wael Hallaq Authority, Continuity and Change in Islamic Law (Cambridge University Press, 
2001). 
355 Rashad Ali and Hannah Stuart ‘A Guide to Refuting Jihadism Critiquing Radical Islamist Claims to 
Theological Authenticity’ (Henry Jackson Society 2014) 10. 
356 Reza (n 25) 26 
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monopolized Islamic jurisprudence.’ The supreme weight attached by the Islamic jurist to 
hermeneutics means the Islamic jurist derives authority from his skills as interpreter rather than 
any inherent wisdom. He is guided, not by intuition, but by dalil, by textual evidence.357 This 
text-oriented approach is regarded as the only true means by which Islamic law historically 
developed. Muslim jurisprudence goes to great lengths to delineate opinion from knowledge in 
matters of law: knowledge correlating with certainty, opinion with probability.  
 
The authority of the jurist rests upon the intrinsic validity of what he declares. The subsequent 
declaration is authoritative not because it is the jurist who declares it, but because the 
declaration has been validly derived from the textual sources and is therefore an acceptable 
expression of the Law of God. Irrespective of the authority of these declarations they are not 
characterized by absolute definitiveness. At most they are ‘approximations or understandings 
of God’s law rather than definitive statements of it.’358 As a result, no jurist can claim greater 
authority in the Shari’a than another.359  The jurist is however guided by certain rules: for 
example, harm must be removed but should not be removed by a greater harm; and removing 
harm comes before acquiring benefit.360  As there is no uniform definition or exhaustive list on 
what constitutes ‘harm’ or ‘benefit’ this imports subjectivity around its understanding as well 
as necessary methods of its removal.  
 
Islamic jurists employed different types of legal reasoning to discover the law. Some fell under 
the general head of qiyas, others under additional sources such as istislah or maslaha (public 
interest); istihsan (juristic preference), and darura (necessity).361  
 
As a tool, maslaha has been consistently invoked to manipulate Shari’a interpretation to satisfy 
a reformist agenda.362 Seminal twentieth century Islamist Rashid Rida was an effective 
                                                     
357 The Sunni jurist in particular is bound more to the formal texts despite orientalists ascribing an amplified 
weight to the role of individual discretion in the historical development of Islamic law. The Sunni jurist declares 
the will of God as revealed in the sacred texts; he does not proclaim the dictates of his own intuition. An essential 
characteristic of Islamic jurisprudence is that it eventually set aside the relatively unrestricted, discretion in favour 
of a constrained, text-oriented approach to the exposition of law. Weiss (n25) 201- 205 
358 Reza, (n 25) 26 
359 Contrast this position with the use of takfir in chapter 3.7 and 4.5. 
360 Abdel-Haleem (n4) 61 
361 Maslaha, istihsan and istislah are subjective legal methodologies invoked when reasoning based on texts 
produces extreme hardship. Darura is derived from the lexical root darur which signifies harm or damage.’ Hallaq 
Origins (n6) 144; Ian Netton, Encyclopaedia of Islamic Civilization and Religion, ‘Darura’ (Routledge 2008) 134-
135 
362 Using public interest or welfare to determine the permissive or prohibitive nature of an action, considering 
public interest in Shari’a is considered a basis of law, there is argument that rather than tools for determining the 
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protagonist of the use of maslaha as a source of legal and political reform. Rida developed the 
concept of maslaha as the primary means of effecting religo-legal change and a platform to 
allow reinterpretation of the Shari’a.363  
 
Long before other nations of the world considered necessity a legal tool, the scholars adopted 
the doctrine of darura, (al-darura tubih al-mahzurat), ‘necessity makes permissible the 
prohibited.’364 In case of necessity, a prohibited thing becomes permissible to the extent of 
removal of that necessity.365 This doctrine becomes pivotal in justifying conflict conduct in 
Islamic LOAC. 
 
3.5 Ijtihād and Its Role in Modern Warfare 
‘Draw your knowledge from whence the Imams drew theirs, and do not content yourself 
with following others, for that is certainly blindness of sight.’366 
 
Since the formative stages of Shari’a, the process for discovering the Revealed law within 
Islam has followed a strict formula: if the Quran and Sunna are silent on an issue, qiyas and 
ijma may be employed. However, if all these components failed to provide a solution to the 
problem, a qualified legal scholar, a mujtahid, could through his own independent juristic 
reasoning, issue a ruling, a fatwa which could be accepted or rejected by the umma.367  The 
process of extracting or deriving legal rules from the sources is termed, ‘with reference to its 
                                                     
law, maslaha and istislah are a basis of law. For example, Al-Wahhab (d.  1792) used maslaha as a tool to achieve 
his reformist agenda. Different madhahib refer to this public benefit in alternate terms and rate its value as a source 
differently Maslaha mursala is maslaha without textual base. Parry ‘Legal Methodology’ (n250) 95- 96. 
363 Malcom Kerr Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rashid Rida 
(University of California Press 1996) 187-90. See Rashid Rida al-Khilafa, aw al imama al-uzma (The caliphate 
or the Supreme Authority) (Cairo:1341) in Parry ‘Legal Methodology’ (n250) 96 
364 Darura is invaluable to the moderate doctrines of fiqh al-aqalliyyat. There are several fatwa-based examples 
of how the darura doctrine has been used to reconcile traditional Shari’a with Muslims living in a western context; 
whereby the Quran is frustrated by the national law where the Muslim resides. An example is the case of burials, 
if necessity demands, Muslims can be buried in non-Muslim cemeteries. Parry ‘Legal Methodology’ (n250) 95-
97; Ali & Stuart, (n363), 12. Al-Zuhayli claimed that necessity would occur when the state of danger or extreme 
hardship affects the life, body, honour, mind or property of the human being. Al-Zuhayli, Nazariyat al darura al-
shar’iyya, (Beirut 1995) in Nagamine,(n71), (fn99) 223. 
365 For example, keeping fast of Ramadan is an obligation for Muslims (Qurʾan 2:183). Yet, if it causes excessive 
hardship the obligation circumscribed.  
366 Thomas Hughes, Dictionary of Islam (Kazi Publications 2007)  
367 Fatwa (pl. Fatawa) is a ruling given by the scholar. A fatwa is given on the understanding of the text and the 
context. When a fatwa is creating problems, scholars will use maqasid to make it maslaha. A mujtahid or mufti 
cannot be outsourced as decisions are context specific and based on urf in that culture. Every fatwa issued by a 
mufti should have methodological process that is agreed. A mufti possesses the same qualifications as a mujtahid 
with the additional characteristics of being ‘pious, and of just character and must take the religion and law 
seriously.’ Hallaq Origins (n6) 147 
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character as a human activity,’ ijtihād.368 The principle of ijtihād is considered to have roots in 
a hadith.369  
 
‘Except for a… few Qurʾanic and Prophetic statements which were unambiguous 
and…contained clear and specific normative rulings, the rest of the law was a product of 
ijtihād.’  Its theory presupposes that the process of producing rules is one of elucidating that 
which is present but not self-evident. In the standard Islamic metaphor, the rules themselves 
are ‘branches’ (furu') or ‘fruit’ (thamara), which grow out of ‘roots’ (usul), that is, from the 
sources. Only the roots are given; the branches, or fruit, are not. [T]hey must be made to appear, 
and for this to happen …, human husbandry is required.’ 370  
 
Ijtihād is a medium for the jurist to master and apply the rules of usul al-fiqh for the purposes 
of discovering the Divine law and to interpret the legal corpus of Shari’a. It is an Islamic 
instrument used to render a rational meaning to religious texts by the believer.371 Seminal 
scholars of usul al-Fiqh (usuli scholars), when discussing Shari’a rules. Seminal usuli scholars 
defined it as ‘the total expenditure of effort made by a jurist in order to infer, with a degree of 
probability, the rules of Shari’a from their detailed evidence in the sources;372 the exertion of 
‘mental energy in the search for a legal opinion to the extent that the faculties of the jurist 
become incapable of further effort.’373 Whether legal reasoning can be performed apolitically 
                                                     
368 ‘In the pre-Islamic period, the words jihad, mujahid (the one who actually struggles), and mujtahid were used 
for physical and intellectual effort and were not necessarily associated with warfare or religion.’ Nagamine,(n71), 
54; Weiss (n25) 200; Sobhi Mahmassani, ‘The Principles of International Law in the Light of Islamic Doctrine’ 
(1966) 117 Recueil des Cours, 221 in Badar ‘Ius in Bello’ (n25) 596 
369 In a discourse between the Prophet and a qadi on his way to al-Yaman, the Prophet asked him how he would 
decide matters coming up before him. ‘I will judge matters according to the Qurʾan, if the Book of God contains 
nothing to guide me, I will act on the precedents of the Prophet of God, and if it is not in that either, then I will 
make a personal effort [Ijtihād] and judge according to that’. The Prophet is said to have been approving of this 
reply. Cyril Glasse, The Concise Encyclopaedia of Islam (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2008) 182. See also 
Shafi'i, al-Risalah, ed. Ahmad Muhammad Shakir, 1358/1940, First Edition, (Mustafa al-Babi al-Halabi Press, 
Cairo) 404 in M. Ṣaghīr Ḥasan Ma'ṣūmi  Ijtihād Through Fourteen Centuries (1982) 21(4) Islamic Studies, 39  
370 Weiss (n25), 199, 200; Hallaq Introduction (n13) 27  
371 The word ijtihād is derived from the three letter Arabic verbal root of j-h-d (jahada) which means ‘to 
endeavour’. ‘Jihad’, another derivative from the same expression, means utmost effort. Rhode (n299); Hallaq 
Ijtihād (n344) 3 
372 See for example Abu al-Husayn 'Ali otherwise known as al-Amidi (d. 631 A.H.) and Mohammad ibn Ali Al-
Shawkani (d.1255A.H.).  
Islamic System Blog Spot (December 12, 2005) http://islamicsystem.blogspot.com.au/2005/12/Ijtihād-applying-
islam-in-21st-century.html  
373 This Usuli definition of Ijtihād was derived from the evidences which discuss Ijtihād and establish its 
obligation.  Hallaq, Ijtihād, (n344), 3; Parry ‘Legal Methodology’ (n250), 93. Durrani (n15) 114; The Royal Aal 
al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought (n333), 1 
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and free of substantive value choices has been an issue grappled with by Western legal 
scholars.374 
 
Where questions arose but there were no plain answers, the Prophet would convene the umma 
and through shura, as per Qurʾanic injunction, there was a collective exercise of ijtihād. 375 
When ijma was reached, it would be applied to the problem.376 Ijtihād in legal matters was 
confined to the grey areas of the law, where textual certainty was absent but where human 
reasoning on the basis of the texts might uncover the law as intended by God.377 
 
In relation to Sunni jurisprudence, this jurist’s tool was accepted and encouraged during the 
first centuries of Islam.378 Legal theory played a supporting role in favour of ijtihād, its practice 
was the primary objective of the methodology and theory of usul al-fiqh throughout Islamic 
history evolving with Islam, arguably allowing Islam to evolve.379 As a legal tool, it 
distinguishes itself from other tools as it is conditioned on intellectual independent 
interpretation vis a vis fatwas, permitting the scholar to not only rule on the basis of precedent, 
but also his own understanding of the texts.380 However, because fatwas are the result of 
                                                     
374 For example, Jerome Frank, Karl Llewellyn. Morton Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law: 1870-
1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy (OUP 1992) 170 
375‘It is, however, to be noted that the Prophet preferred to consult the well-known devotees to Islam like the first 
Four Caliphs, Ubaiy ibn Ka'b, Mu'adh ibn Jabal, Abu ‘Ubaydah, the chiefs of clans and prominent companions.’ 
M.Ṣaghīr Ḥasan Ma'ṣūmi, ‘Ijtihād Through Fourteen Centuries’ (1982) 21(4) Islamic Studies, 43; ‘The scope of 
ijtihād does not include matters of Aqeeda (belief). This is because ‘aqeeda is definite and decisive and cannot be 
taken except from the definite dalil (evidence) and it is prohibited to take it from the speculative evidence. Hallaq, 
Introduction (n13) 27. 
376 To clarify, ijthad and ijma while related are distinct. Ijtihād is 'the logical deduction on a legal or theological 
question by a learned and enlightened doctor [whereas] ijma, is the collective opinion of a council of divines.' 
Furthermore, ijtihād excluded those cases that had become the subject of ijma, such cases not subject to further 
juristic interpretation. Yet ijma and Ijtihād are not necessarily partners. Indeed, it is difficult if not impossible to 
reach consensus on an ambiguous issue by the very nature of ambiguity. Rather it is posited that ijma is only 
possible in situations where there is specific evidence explicit in the Qurʾan. Aznan Hasan ‘An Introduction to 
Collective Ijtihād: Concept and Applications’ (2013) 20(2) The Am J Islamic Social Sciences 26, 30. 
377 There is a phrase in Islamic jurisprudence that states ‘ijtihād against the text is not allowed’ similar to the 
phrase expressum facit cessare tacitum (‘if something is expressed in the text, there is no room for implication). 
Mojtahed Shabestari, Faith and Freedom (Tahr-e No Publisher 2000) 160. Hashemi argues that a more correct 
articulation of this phrase is that ijtihād against the essential principles provided by the text is what is not allowed. 
Hashemi (n6), 14; Muslim jurisprudence insists very strongly that the results of ijtihād be classified as zann, or 
opinion/knowledge and that zann be carefully distinguished from 'ilm, or knowledge. Weiss (n25) 203. 
378 Rhode (n299). 
379 As a derivative from the revealed sources, Islamic legal theory is sanctioned by divine authority. Hallaq Ijtihād, 
(n344), 5 
380 See for example Averroës, born Abu al-Walid Muhammad Ibn Muhammad Ibn Rushd, (d. 1198 CE) seminal 
legal work, Bidayat al-Mujtahid wa Nihayat al Muqtasid (the beginning for him who interprets the sources 
independently and the end for him who wishes to limit himself.) The book belongs to the genre of ikhtilaf works, 
treatise in which the opinions of the different schools are juxtaposed and in which the legitimate disagreement 
between the early lawyers are discussed. Averroes usually reduces the debate to a disagreement about the question 
of how two conflicting Qurʾan verses or Traditions are related to each other. This often manifests as either 
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humanly fallible ijtihād and therefore a probable articulation of Divine Law, they cannot be 
binding.381  As there is more than one jurist capable of exercising ijtihād, a single set of facts 
will yield multiple opinions.  
 
‘[There is no] single legal stipulation that has monopoly or exclusivity...Islamic law is 
thus characterized by legal pluralism (both in hermeneutics and legal doctrine), not only 
because it acknowledges local custom and takes it into serious account, but also because 
it offers an array of opinions on one and the same set of facts.’382  
 
As Islam spread, the Islamic intellectual tradition relied upon ijtihād to compensate for its lack 
of centeredness, to enable it to expound an Islam that could be localised into indigenous 
traditions.383 As ijtihād was the only means Muslims could determine the extent their acts 
aligned with Allah’s intent, it was at one point indispensable in legal matters, its practice 
incumbent on all ijtihād practitioners whenever a novel case required erudition.384   
 
Those with capacity to exercise independent interpretation of the sources are forbidden by his 
conscience to adopt the opinion of others through taqlid, for such a person the opinion of 
another is not a valid legal rule.385 ‘[However,] if an individual knows himself to be incapable 
of deriving rules for his own conduct from the sacred texts, as presumably is the case with the 
vast majority of believers, he turns to those who are more capable of understanding the sacred 
texts.’386 The reality is that it is not exclusive personal reasoning of an individual; rather it is 
an extraction of the hukm (ruling or decision) of Allah from the sources of Shari’a. It has been 
argued that personal reasoning alone is dangerous as it infers that it is a product of the mind 
                                                     
questioning one as the rule, and the other as the exception or whether one rule has abrogated the other. Peters, 
Jihad (n321) 6; Parry ‘Legal Methodology’ (n250) 93. 
381 Quraishi (n248) 345. 
382 Hallaq Introduction (n13) 27; Khaled Abou El-Fadl, ‘Speaking in God’s Name: Islamic Law, Authority, and 
Women (One World Publishers 2001) 39. 
383 Abdalla (n30) 14; Hallaq Ijtihād (n344) 3–41. 
384 The legislative portion of Qurʾan presents a principle of ijtihād for amendments and legislation to 
accommodate new issues based on the public interest for the sake of umma. Razi (n26) 5 
385 ‘Because the positions taken by jurists regarding a particular legal question are all opinions, one cannot know 
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386 See for example Abu al-Husayn 'Ali otherwise known as al-Amidi (d. 631 A.H.) and Mohammad ibn Ali Al-
Shawkani (d.1255A.H.) 




alone as is the case in Western legislation. Islam differs from Western methodology in that the 
mind is a source or conduit to discover Revelation.387  
 
Opinion distinguishes Divine Law from jurists' law. With every opinion of a jurist, the 
possibility of error arises, and in such instance the Law of God becomes clearly distinguishable 
in substance from the law conceived by the jurist. Even an erroneous opinion (provided that it 
has not been identified as such by supervening knowledge) carries weight as long as the jurist 
has been duly sincere and diligent in his scrutiny of the sacred texts. A jurist who has 
unwittingly proffered an erroneous opinion is excused for his error and exonerated of all taint 
of sin.388 The correctness of fiqh is grounded in the process of ijtihād that generates it. So long 
as the fiqh is the result of sincere ijtihād, any conclusion qualifies as a possible articulation of 
God’s law, and none can claim with certainty that their understanding of the Divine Law is 
correct, nor that another’s is incorrect. Muslims accept that a level of uncertainty in legal 
conclusions, with all ijtihād efforts sharing equal legitimacy.389  This inevitable presence of 
error in law should not be unduly exaggerated. Sunni Islam places a great amount of confidence 
in the capabilities of its great jurists and regards their opinions as being generally reliable. Both 
doctrines, ijtihād and taqlid, can be manipulated to promote a self-serving agenda, especially 
because determination of the capacity to exercise such interpretation is between the individual 
and the divine. Despite Islam creating individual responsibility to Allah which should 
encourage self regulation in interpretation, parameters evolved to establish preconditions for 
the practice of ijtihād. Usuli scholars preconditioned its exercise on three criteria: first, exerting 
effort in a manner until he feels unable to exert anymore; secondly, this exertion should be in 
search for a precedent about an already deduced issue from the Shari’a rules; finally, the 
opinion formed should be sourced from the Shari’a texts as the only basis from which Shari’a 
rules may be derived.390 The fulfilment of the condition that the jurist makes a ‘total 
expenditure of effort’ in his search for an opinion can only be verified by the jurist himself. 
‘Such subjective verification entails an exercise of conscience.’391  
 
                                                     
387 This is contentious. See al-Amidi argument cited in Hallaq Ijtihād (n344) 7 
388 Weiss (n25) 204- 205. 
389 Quraishi (n248) 342. 
390 See for example Abu al-Husayn 'Ali otherwise known as al-Amidi (d. 631 A.H.) and Mohammad ibn Ali Al-
Shawkani (d.1255A.H.).  
Islamic System Blog Spot (12 Dec 2005) http://islamicsystem.blogspot.com.au/2005/12/Ijtihād-applying-islam-
in-21st-century.html  
391 Weiss (n25) 207. 
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At the end of the tenth century traditionalist ulama who had a stronghold on the madhahib 
proscribed ijtihād as a legitimate tool of exegesis.392 As the interaction between reason and 
revelation is the raison d’etre of ijtihād, absent ijtihād, Islam is a rigid immutable system, 
unable to be modified by any legislative authority and which has no flexibility to produce law 
based upon human reason in the context of the local circumstances and the particulars needs of 
the given community. Considering its modern role in resuscitating Sunni revivalist movements, 
the controversy surrounding the closure of the Gates of Ijtihād (insidad bab al- ijtihād) as well 
as qualification of those permitted to practice it warrants exploration.393  
 
3.6 Mujtahid Qualification 
Depending on the scholar informing the debate, the controversy about ijtihād started in its 
primitive form between the ninth and fourteenth century CE.394 The underlying rationale for 
the closing of the gates of ijtihād is traced to the idea that the critical thinking involved in its 
practice led to questioning authority, potential insurrection, and ijtihād’s use as a tool to invoke 
the immunity of Shari’a from governmental interference.395 It is alleged that through the ninth 
and eleventh centuries, ijtihād was rejected by several groups, largely extreme legal theo-
political sects that preferenced purist taqlid and condemned qiyas, which as an indispensable 
tool in the practice of ijtihād sounded its death knell.  When extremists (ghulāt) were accused 
of invoking ijtihād to justify dissent, somewhere around the eleventh century saw the active 
closing of the ‘Gates’ by Islamic authorities to quash dissent and maintain an autocratic 
regime.396  
 
After centuries of ijtihād having a contentious status, the nineteenth century saw ‘the 
widespread abandonment of taqlid of the madhahib in favour of various forms of ijtihād.’397 A 
                                                     
392Aslan (n29) 165. 
393 The expression was only used as a majority view among Islamic scholars. There was also always a minority 
that claimed that the closing of the door is wrong, and a properly qualified scholar must have the right to 
perform Ijtihād, at all times, not only up until the four schools of law were defined. 
394 None of these scholars provide historical evidence for a consensus of Muslim scholars on the point that the 
gate of ijtihād was closed. See Hallaq Ijtihād  (n344) 4 
395 Montgomery Watt, Islam and the Integration of Society (Evanston, 1961), 206-207, 242-243; Herbert 
Liebesny, ‘Stability and Change in Islamic Law,’ (1967) Middle East Journal 16, 19; Coulson (n12) 80-81; 
Schacht Introduction (n253) 75; Fazlur Rahman, Islam (University of Chicago Press 1966) 77-78 
396 Ijtihāds’ catalyst for dissent and resultant encouragement for its abandon by Muslim rulers meant that Muslim 
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science and technology to improve their governance and weapons. The Ottoman Empire (circa 1389-1918) 
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(n299) 
397 Mark Segwick, ‘In Search of a Counter-Reformation: Anti-Sufi Stereotypes and the Budshishiyya’s Response’ 
125-146 in Bergesen (n247) 8 
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‘prerequisite for the survival of Islam in a modern world’ constituting the foundation of Sunni 
legal doctrine, ijtihād has also enabled the resuscitation of revivalist movements.398 With the 
advancement of technology in warfare and no analogous cases to draw from, self-proclaimed 
orthodox Islamic groups must use ijtihad to justify certain violent conduct and legitimize such 
conduct under Islam. As a method of legal reasoning ijtihād does not rely on the traditional 
madhahib which amplifies its value exponentially considering the most extreme Islamic groups 
reject the institution of madhahib altogether. However fundamentalist Muslims also contend 
that modern ijtihad has liberalised under colonial domination to such an extent it has lost the 
virtue of Islamic law.399 
 
Jurists recognize as a sacred purpose of usul al-fiqh, the role of suitably qualified jurists to 
extract rulings for novel cases. The task of Qurʾanical exegesis, that is the ulama who engage 
in intellectual ijtihād, are known as mujtahid.400 Only mujtahids can determine whether an act 
is analogous and proceed in giving it a haram or halal status.401 To produce ijtihād it must be 
shown that the interpretation is acceptable in terms of Arabic language; that the mujtahid, has 
an exhaustive mastery of all the primary texts as it relates to each question as well as the 
principles of inference (istidlal), and qiyas; and that the mujtahid is familiar with the 
methodology of usul-al-fiqh needed to join between the primary texts. Logically, the more 
detailed requisite mujtahid qualification paralleled the evolution of Islamic legal 
jurisprudence.402 At one point mujtahid qualification became so ‘immaculate and rigorous and 
were set so high that they were humanly impossible of fulfilment.’403  
                                                     
398 Knut Vikor, ‘The Development of Ijtihād and Islamic Reform,, 1750-1850’ (paper presented at the Third 
Nordic Conference on Middle Eastern Studies: Ethnic Encounter and Culture Change, Joensuu, Finland, 19-22 
June 1995) http://org.uib.no/smi/paj/Vikor.html accessed 20/03/15; Al- Alwani, founder of the fiqh al-aqalliyyat 
doctrine, champions the use of Ijtihād especially in cases where account for modern Western knowledge is 
unavoidable. For the use of Ijtihād in contemporary Islam see Dr Muzammil Siddiqi response to a question on 
artificial insemination on Islamonline in Parry ‘Legal Methodology’ (n250) 94  
399 Abdel-Haleem (n4) 110 
400 Schacht Introduction (n253) 1-5; Hallaq Ijtihād (n344) 5; Nagamine,(n71),54. 
401 In Sunni Islam the closing of the gates of ijtihād made unlimited interpretation of Shari’a haram. This means, 
if a Sunni adherent subscribes to the doctrine that the gates of ijtihād were closed, in a Sunni context wars are 
waged according to ancient interpretations of Islam. There will be a discussion as to whether such an interpretation 
aligns with contemporary IHL. S Zuhdu Pasha Al-majmu’at az-Zuhdiyya in Ahmet Paşa, The Sunni Path (Hakikak 
Kitapevi 2013) 45. In reality, Islamic militant groups could rely on either taqlid or ijtihad depending on their 
agenda. 
402 Hallaq Ijtihād  (n344) 5 
403 The eleventh century text of al-Baṣrī  is the first reference to mujtahid qualification. Central tenets of al-Baṣrī’s 
doctrine included: mujtahid knowledge of the principles' or 'usul' (Namely the Qurʾan, Sunna, Ijma and Qiyas) 
emphasising the credibility of hadith transmission; mujtahid familiarity with urf as necessary to tailor 
extrapolation of rulings to meet the exigencies of Muslim life in specific contexts; positioning qiyas as 
indispensable in the practice of Ijtihād; and adherence to the doctrine purporting the infallibility of the umma. 




Because ability varies from jurist to jurist; from generation to generation; classical theory 
presumes levels or ranks of ijtihād. These levels range from ijtihād directed at questions of law, 
to ijtihād confined solely to the limits of one's particular madhhab, and to the ‘absolute’ ijtihād 
exemplified by the founders of the great schools. The very existence of Islamic law as a body 
of positive law capable of regulating an entire society presupposes that the great majority of 
men will leave ijtihād to the few and act in accordance with what these few decide. ‘If every 
man were a mujtahid there would be no law in the ordinary sense: every man would be a law 
unto himself.’404  In the interest of social order only certain men should acquire the 
qualifications needed to practice ijtihād. Those who do must decide, through introspection, 
how far they will pursue their ijtihād.  
 
In the seventh century CE, when the corpus of Islamic law was in its infancy, the threshold 
requirements to exercise ijtihād expected from the Prophet’s companions, His followers and 
those after the followers, the salaf’s, was in stark contrast to that required when it was fully 
evolved.405 Initially, only a negligible amount of legal knowledge was required to practice 
ijtihād, and those mujtahid who did exert themselves to formulate legal decisions through this 
tool were entitled to otherworldly rewards irrespective of the correctness of the result of his 
ijtihād.406 This lower threshold requirement was simply because such mujtahid’s were not 
exposed to the developed law or jurisprudence of contemporary Islam. This line of reasoning 
lends weight to the argument that revivalist puritanical groups would also only require a level 
of erudition expected of mujtahid’s of the 7th through to the 11th century CE.  
 
                                                     
Lutz Wiederhold, ‘Legal Doctrines in Conflict The Relevance Of Madhhab Boundaries To Legal Reasoning in 
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405 Salaf is an Arabic noun which translates to ‘predecessor’, or ‘forefather’. The term 'Salafi' comes from the 
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the best generation of Muslims on Earth, and are therefore seen by the vast majority of today's Muslims as a model 
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strict orthodox followers of the Qurʾan and Sunna. http://wikiislam.net/wiki/Salaf_%28definition%29 accessed 
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406 Hallaq Ijtihād (n344) 33. 
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As the qualification, practice, and result of ijtihād is dependent on the social construct in which 
the mujtahid exists, the 7th century-styled contemporary mujtahid would have few limitations 
in rationalising military jihad as well as accepting what would under IHL be prohibited conduct 
in war.  It is for every Muslim to choose between following the ijtihād of a mujtahid who 
satisfies the qualification requirements, or the ijtihād of another ‘movement leader’, whose 
qualifications may be purely a matter of reputation.  
 
Ijtihād or neo-ijtihād, is likely the key concept that has allowed Islamiyyun, the Islamists, ‘to 
expound a thoroughly modern conception of what it means to be a Muslim in the contemporary 
Muslim world through a more politically sensitive lens’ largely free of traditional legal 
interpretation.407  
 
‘This trend is mostly manifest in the rich panoply of religious discourse and counter-
discourse in Muslim and non-Muslim countries. What is most specific about the return 
of ijtihād is the phenomenon of Islam as a shared terrain for all discourses. All claimants 
of ijtihād deploy Islam to legitimate their thought and practice to delegitimise 
opponents.’408  
 
The significance of this tool in radical discourse is tempered with a blanket warning by scholars 
of attaching too much weight to non-State armed group’s reference to discrete aspects of 
Islamic law, ‘Muslim fighters are for the most part no more able to read al-Sarakhsi or Ibn 
Rushd [Averroes], than an American soldier is able to read Summa Contra Gentiles in the 
original Latin.’409 
 
3.7 The Importance of Being Salaf  
Manichean constructs of good and evil, savages and saviours dominate the Abrahamic religions 
and provide a platform for extremism to flourish. In Christianity, this manifests in the utopian 
Garden of Eden corrupted by the sin of Adam and Eve.  In Sunni Islamic thought, the ‘evil’ is 
seen as the time of ignorance, and barbarism before Revelation, the jahiliyya. Islam remedied 
jahiliyya and quashed all the evils that stemmed from this period of ignorance.410 Extremist 
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discourse has positioned only those who replicate the actions of the Prophet and the sahaba in 
the seventh century as ‘true’ Islam. The remaining world, including those Muslims who do not 
subscribe to this extremist view, have diluted and corrupted the purity of the Divine message 
and have reverted to jahiliyya and are thus enemies of Islam. The only cure is armed struggle 
to purify the apostates that do not subscribe to the extremist idea of the absolute sovereignty 
of God and the creation of an Islamic State.411 
 
Literally, ‘salaf’ means ‘predecessor’ or ‘ancestor’. In relation to a movement, there is no 
unanimously agreed upon definition of a ‘salafist’, however it is the salafist position that ‘no 
one has understood Islam properly except the Prophet and early Muslims.’ Traditional Islamic 
scholarship would refer to someone who died within the first four hundred years after the 
Prophet’s death as ‘salafi’. This includes the founders of the madhahib: Abu Hanifa, Malik, 
Shafi'i, and Ahmad ibn Hanbal’.412 The logic behind the reverence attached to a salaf, 
especially in its transformation over the last century into an Islamic methodology, is the same 
as that attached to the sahaba: that the salaf had proximity to the teachings of the Prophet, the 
amal ahl al-Madina,413 the period of Revelation that would embody a pure Islam.414  The Salafi 
movement advocates a return to a Shari’a-minded orthodoxy that would purify Islam from 
unwarranted accretions. The criteria for judging adherence to this orthodoxy is the Qurʾan and 
Sunna relying on ijtihād and qiyas to determine the Prophet’s position on modern issues not 
imagined in the 7th century CE.415  
 
The generic nature of the term ‘salaf’ has resulted in several groups identifying or being 
labelled as such. This is problematic as each group considers the application of the term 
exclusive to itself. Salafism exists on a continuum.’ It represents a diverse community although 
                                                     
411 The writings of Pakistani Islamist Abu ‘Ala Mawdudi (d. 1979) on the Principle of God’s sovereignty 
influenced Sayyid Qutb’s (d. 1966) jahiliyya narrative in extremist discourse which in turn influenced al-Qaeda 
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413 Amal ahl al Madina : Prophetic custom and local practices of the people of Medina. 
414 This is similar to the rationale for weighting amal ahl al-Madina 
415 Quintan Wiktorowicz, ‘A Genealogy of Radical Islam’ (2005) 28 Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 75, 77. 
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there are individuals and movements that cannot be positioned on the scale.416 At one end there 
is the mainstream Saudi salafism which adhere to a madhhab (generally Hanbali), are pacifists, 
and denounce extremist jihad groups. At the other end of the spectrum, the radical salafists that 
advocate violence to achieve a return to first principles.417 Militant salafists, while articulating 
some semblance of salafi methodology, are generally rejected by other salafi groups not just 
because of the militancy but also the weight they attach to their version of jihad vis a vis other 
issues mainstream salafis would prioritize. Indeed, the weighting attached to daʿwa 
(proselytization) or jihad will distinguish Islamic groups on the salafi spectrum.418  ‘Although 
all jihadist movements which give priority to jihad are salafist, the reverse is not true. Many 
salafist movements are opposed to armed jihad, either tactically or by conviction, and advocate 
the daʿwa... as a preferred form action.’ Yet there is no clear demarcation between these groups, 
with a flow from daʿwa to jihad linked to a ‘strategic and political context.419  
 
All salafis share a puritanical approach to the religion intended to eschew religious innovation 
(bid’a) by strictly replicating the model of the Prophet Muhammad, each believing they 
correctly espouse the teachings and beliefs of salaf al-salih. Salafiī’s ‘ardent rejection of human 
reason, logic, and desire intends to eliminate the biases of human subjectivity and self-interest, 
thereby allowing them to identify the singular truth of God’s commands. From this perspective, 
there is only one legitimate religious interpretation; Islamic pluralism does not exist.’420 Further 
commonalities between salafists is an absolute rejection of metaphoric or symbolic 
interpretation of the Divine Names and Attributes; a categorical imperative affirming God’s 
exclusive right to be worshiped; an opposition to all reprehensible or potentially reprehensible 
bid’a; and a respect for the theological and legal opinions of Taqi al-Din Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya 
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(1263-1328).421 Taymiyya has more authority than any other orthodox jurist in sharpening the 
Muslims’ consciousness of the excruciating choice they have to make between anarchy and 
injustice each time they feel oppressed by authority. A devout religious scholar advocating 
Muslim interests, Taymiyya warned against the evils of anarchy in favour of enduring the status 
quo.422 However he stressed the need for all Muslims, both rulers and ruled, to follow the 
obligations of their faith. No one was to be free from the obligation to encourage virtue and 
condemn vice. Taymiyya claimed the right of ijtihād and used his ijtihād to rearticulate the 
general principles provided by the Qurʾan and the Sunna. He helped define the intellectual’s 
alternative to the stable ulama establishment that was emerging in the thirteenth century, 
advocating strict application of the Quran and Sunna.423  
 
The salafi community also distinguishes itself on various issues. These differences can be 
divided into six distinct elements. The first is the status of the madhahib and subsequent 
adherence within salafi movements. Certain salafī movements allow subscription to a 
madhhab in times of necessity, so while discouraged it is, within strict parameters, permissible. 
On the extreme end, there are salafi movements which prohibit adherence to a madhahib.424  
Secondly, is the dissociation from ahl al-bidʿa. This dissociation on religious innovation is a 
cornerstone of salafi ideology. While some salafīst’s are willing to cooperate with certain non-
salafi communities, the majority position is complete dislocation. The pragmatic 
implementation of this dissociation varies with the strictest salafists tarnishing a person as 
‘deviant’ should they have even the most tenuous association with another who engages in 
bid’a.  
 
Thirdly, salafists hold divergent views on the requirements associated with 'īmān' (faith) and 
whether actions are a requisite element of faith or are subsidiary to it. Fourthly, salafists lack 
consensus on the question of permissible political dissent and activism toward an Islamic ruler, 
with contention as to right authority in calling for jihad against apostate rulers;  the nature of a 
‘defensive’ and global hirabah; the permissibility of targeting civilians; and the legitimacy of 
suicide bombings (what radicals call ‘martyrdom operations’).425 Some factions adopt the 
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position that any criticism of a ‘legitimate’ ruling authority is haram426 while others would 
insist on dissent and activism, by force if necessary, based on the illegitimacy of certain rulers 
of Muslim lands.427 This feeds into the fifth point of difference, the issue of takfīr (deeming the 
belief of a Muslim to be invalid) and in particular takfīr of the rulers who do not judge according 
to Sharīʿa.428 Some salafists would subscribe that rulers of Muslim lands who govern with 
secular laws maintain legitimacy; others would feel such governance equates to kufr, and their 
rule is illegitimate.  Finally, the salafi movements’ relationship to jihād has proven divisive. A 
vocal minority have adopted a militarist position. This jihad manifests in cumulatively or 
individually ‘removing secular rulers from Muslim lands’ [or] maintaining perpetual conflict 
against non-Muslim governments that have militarily intervened in Muslim lands.429  
 
Radical Islamic militants use the same texts, quotes, and religious evidence as other salafis, but 
they have developed new understandings about context and concepts such as ‘belief,’ ‘defence 
against aggression,’ and ‘civilians.’ The evolution of jihadi thought is less about changing 
principles embedded in the religious texts than the ways in which these principles are operative 
in the contemporary period.430  The divergent ideological trends are attributable to a large 
extent, in the inherently subjective process of Qur’anical exegesis whereby immutable 
religious texts and principles are applied to new circumstances and issues, often stretching their 
logical conclusion in a way that increased the scope of permissible violence. 
 
Building on the previous two chapters, the following chapter will consider Islamic conflict 
relations and the obligations which flow from Islamic conflict classification. It will focus on 
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428 Iftikhar Malik, Pashtun Identity and Geopolitics in Southwest Asia: Pakistan and Afghanistan Since 9/11 
(Anthem Press 2016) 5 
429 Qadhi (n418) 
430 Wiktorowicz ‘Genealogy’ (n415) 75-6 
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Chapter 4 Islamic International Law and the Right to War 
4.1 Siyar and the Islamic Framework for Conflict Relations 
‘A Muslim has no country except that part of the earth where the Sharia of God is 
established and human relationships are based on the foundation of relationship with 
God; a Muslim has no nationality except his belief, which makes him a member of the 
Muslim community in Dar al-Islam; a Muslim has no relatives except those who share 
the belief in God…A Muslim has no relationship with his mother, father, brother, wife 
and other family members, except through their relationship with the Creator, and 
then they are also joined in blood.’431 
 
Traced to 630 CE the international law of Islam pertains to Shari’a sanctioned relations 
between Islamic states and non-Islamic States.432 Known as Siyar, this body of law on one hand 
crystallized the Islamic effort to promote a stable and ordered global society,433 and on the 
other was an acknowledgment of the failure of Islam to ‘win the whole world.’434 This branch 
of Shari’a establishes fundamental principles regulating various forms of warfare and 
encompasses the attitude adopted by the rulers towards aliens in the state of war and peace.435 
Siyar manifests from the same scriptural sources as the Shari’a, the Sunna of the Prophet 
elaborates these rules as do the conduct and statement of the rightly guided Caliphs (rāshidūn). 
Siyar ‘applie[s] as part of an Islamic State’s domestic legal order, whether or not non-Muslim 
States accepted it as binding.’436  This chapter purports to examine justifications for war within 
an Islamic framework.  
 
                                                     
431 Qutb, Milestones 118-119  
432 ‘To each among you, We have prescribed a law and a clear way…’The Qurʾan, 5:48. While the law of war 
and peace in Islam is as old as the Quran itself. [in] Islamic international law this conduct [war and peace] is, 
strictly speaking, regulated between Muslims and non-Muslims, and not in actuality between states.’ Malik, The 
Qurʾanic Concept of War (n304), x; AM Khoja, Elements of Islamic Jurisprudence (Mirror Press Ltd 1977) 145; 
Muhammad Tallat Al Ghunaimi, The Muslim Conception of International Law and the Western Approach 
(Martinus Nijhoff 1968) 96 
433 Siyar is the plural form of the Arabic sirah which is derived from the verb sara-yasiru (to move). ‘Sirah is 
technical term in the Islamic sciences meaning the bibliography of the Prophet while…Siyar refers to legal 
matters.’ Siyar is not mentioned in the Quran, however its singular form, sirah is found 27 times in the Qurʾan. 
Badar ‘Ius in Bello’ (n25) 600 
434 Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Johns Hopkins Press 1955) 43-44 
435 Although it originally pertained to the Prophet Mohammad's conduct in war, siyar was later formalized to 
encompass laws on the conditions for peace and neutrality. Hamidullah, (n584), 61-72,88. 
436 Islamic legal thought dictates that States can never be sovereign and are always subordinate to God’s will. 
Further, the Muslim jurist does not distinguish between the ordinary laws of the land and interstate conduct. Joseph 
Schacht, ‘Islamic Law in Contemporary States’ (1959) 8 American Journal of Comparative Law 133, 144; Malik, 
The Qurʾanic Concept of War (n304), x; Hamidullah, (n584) 4-5. 
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Credited with formalizing and codifying these laws are the salafi Islamic scholar Hanafi and 
his pupil Mohammad bin Hasan al-Shaybānī.437 Structured as a dialogue, Shaybānī’s Kitab al-
Siyar posits a question about a point of law and answers it in the format of his opinion. There 
are only glimpses of ahadith used as evidence to support this personal opinion (ra’y) with the 
majority of the work relying on his exercise of ijtihad.438  
 
Siyar incorporates ius ad bellum and ius in bello principles within its scope with passages 
relating to regulation of ‘the conduct of warriors…, what is incumbent upon them and for 
them[,]’439 as well as ‘the conduct of the Islamic state in its conflicts with apostates and 
rebels.’440 Although captured under an umbrella legal head, conflict conduct and legitimate use 
of force are distinguished. The two realms ‘coexist independently…[,]’ the legitimacy of 
waging war does not affect the rules for the conduct in war’ akin to the demarcation of 
contemporary ius ad bellum and ius in bello.441 
 
Classical Islam divides the world into the dualistic dar al-Islam (Abode of Islam; Peace or 
Submission) and dar al-harb (Abode of War). However these concepts are better attributed to 
a human attempt to provide the Muslim community with a ‘geopolitical scheme’ that seemed 
                                                     
437 Siyar has been recognised as an integral part of Islamic law and Islamic jurisprudence, maturing into a fully 
functional body of the Shari’a several centuries before parallel developments in the Western world. Ali & Rehman 
(n250), 323; Abu Hanifah al-Nu‘man b. Thabit (699–767 CE) also developed the law of baghy, a response to the 
several instances of rebellion during his lifetime. M. Rashid Ahmad Khan, Islamic Jurisprudence (Lahore, 
Pakistan: Sh. Mohammad Ashraf, 1978), 199; Al-Sarakhsi, Muhammad b. Ahmad, Kitabal-Mabsut (Misr: Matb’a 
al-Sa’adah, 1327 A. H.), 456; Hamidullah, (n584), 88; Abdel-Haleem (n4) 74. 
438 This body of law is further bolstered through juristic tools such as ijma, istihsan, maslaha. Khadduri Islamic 
Law (n13) 230-254; Khadduri, War (n434) 36; Anke Bouzenita ‘The Siyar – An Islamic Law of Nations?’ (2007) 
Asian Journal of Social Science 24; Abdel-Haleem (n4) 74. 
439 While within western scholarship and discourse there continues to remain substantial debate over the 
acceptance of international law as a distinct field of law and its relationship with domestic laws, Islamic 
international law adopts a different approach from its western counterpart. MN Shaw International Law (2004) 
120-174 in Ali & Rehman (n250), 323. Only when the prohibition on the use of force appeared did the ius ad 
bellum/in bello terminology appear. Robert Kolb, ‘Origin of the Twin Terms Ius ad Bellum-Ius in Bello’ (1997) 
320 IRRC 553, 561-2 
440 Daniel Thuerer, International Humanitarian Law: Theory, Praxis, Context, (Hague Acadamy of International 
Law 2011) 233. M al-Sarakhsi, Kitab al-Mabsut, Beirut: Dar al Ma’rifah, n.d., Vol 10, 2 in Ahmed Al-Dawoody, 
War in Islamic Law: Justifications and Regulations (Palgrave MacMillan 2011) 198. 
441 Roughly defined as the right to war (ius ad bellum) and the laws of war (ius in bello). Immanuel Kant stressed 
the necessity of distinguishing the branches of law, and modern jurists would see the demarcation as critical for 
the effective protection of civilians and war victims and for the survival of IHL. Immanuel Kant, The Philosophy 
of Law, An Exposition of the Fundamental Principles of Jurisprudence as the Science of Right, trans, W Hastie 
(Edinburgh 1887) para 597-604; Christopher Greenwood, The Relationship Between Ius ad Bellum and Ius in 
Bello’ (1983) 9 Review of International Studies 234. A. Rahim The Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence According 
to the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’I and Hanbali Schools (Kitab Bhavan 1994), 393. Ius ad bellum has no impact on the 
applicability of IHL and may not be used to interpret a provision of IHL Marco Sassoli, ‘Ius ad Bellum and Ius in 
Bello’ in Michael Schmidt & J Pejic (eds,) International law and armed conflict: Exploring the Faultlines 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2007) 241 
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appropriate to the exigencies of the time.442 This ‘Two Nation Theory’ interpreted and 
developed from Revelation states ‘Who has created you; so some of you are non-believers and 
some of you are believers.’443 This text presents a clear dichotomy interpreted by some to 
unequivocally support this divide, where Muslims of the whole world constitute one nation and 
non-Muslims another competing nation perpetually struggling with the former.444 Muslims 
living outside the dar al-Islam can only obey domestic laws when there is not a conflict with 
Islamic law.445 While this Manichean construct is traced to the primary sources it is better 
attributed to a ‘paralegal description of the reality of medieval international relations.’446  
 
Dar al–Islam comprises the Muslim community, the umma and the dhimmīs, people of the 
book within an Islamic state subjected to jizya (poll tax) payable to the Islamic authority.447 
The remaining world constitutes the dar al-harb, the inhabitants of such territory known as 
harbi. Similar to the Roman law doctrine, where the ius civile applied only to Roman citizens, 
within the dar al harb, harbi’s lacked both rights and duties. 448 In classical Islamic law, the 
killing of a person is permissible if he lacks legal protection (‘isma). The categories of persons 
that lack ‘isma in classical Islamic doctrine include: apostates (murtadd); and those kafir that 
                                                     
442 Z Badawi, Introduction, in Taha Jabir al-Alwani, Towards a Fiqh for Minorities: Some Basic Reflections, (The 
International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2003) 69; Abdel-Haleem (n4) 71. 
443 The Qurʾan 64:2. Certain neo-classical Muslim scholars, who interpret Islam to be fundamentally at war with 
the non-Muslim world, see Islamic law and international law as inherently irreconcilable. Syed Hassan, The 
Reconstruction of Legal Thought in Islam (Law Publishing Company 1974) 157 
444 While non-believing nations were considered to be operating under a ‘state of nature’ this did not equate to a 
legal void, Islamic law recognized only the fact of possession, whether by conquest or otherwise. Malik, The 
Qurʾanic Concept of War (n304), Preface; Cherif-BassiouniaShari’aa(n296) 158 There appears a threshold within 
the state of war that existed between the dar al-harb and dar al-Islam. When hostilities ceased the status of the 
enemy territory would be downgraded to one of simple non-recognition. This non-recognition did not frustrate an 
ability to conclude binding treaties. Khadduri Islamic Law (n13) 13-14 ; M. Khan, Islamic Jurisprudence (n445), 
204. Zawati deconstructs Khadduri's assertion that the default state between an Islamic polity and a non-Islamic 
state is hostility, by showing that the juristic distinction between dar al-Islam, dar al-harb, was not interpreted as 
static, unchanging definitions by classical jurists. In other words a ‘territory can be considered dar al-Islam even 
if it is not under Muslim rule as long as a Muslim can reside there in safety and freely fulfil his religious 
obligations’ Hilmi Zawati, Is Jihad a Just War?: War, Peace, and Human Rights Under Islamic and Public 
International Law (The Edwin Mellen Press 2001) 211 
445 Abdel-Haleem (n4) 140 
446 Ali & Stuart (n363) 10. 
447(Dhimmīs) – those who, by virtue of a Dhimmah pact, acquire the right to permanent residence in Islamic 
territory and to the protection of Islamic law under certain conditions such as payment of a tribute and performance 
of certain conventional or customary duties. Mahmassani (n368) 250-263. ‘In the early and medieval Islamic 
periods, Jews and Christians were, for the most part, treated relatively well. They were ‘people of the book’-
monotheists whose beliefs were drawn from sacred scriptures, even if they did not accept Muhammad's prophecy. 
They benefited from certain privileges, in return for paying a jizya, keeping their religious practices out of sight, 
abstaining from proselytizing, and, in the case of Jews, wearing distinctive clothing in public.’ Benjamin & Simon 
(n281) 66; Abdel-Haleem (n4) 77 
448 Cherif-BassiouniaShari’aa(n296)159; Khadduri Islamic Law (n13) 11, 359 
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live in the dar al-harb.449 In practical terms this means that killing an apostate will only attract 
discretionary punishment for not following the proper procedure, there will be no blood money 
or retaliation.450  
 
The categorization of a territory dictated applicable law. Normative Islamic law governed the 
dar al-Islam and all those lawfully present in Islamic territory while the law of conquest was 
applicable to the dar al-harb irrespective of whether the conduct related to non-Muslims 
exclusively or whether as individuals or States.451 Conceiving the world in this dualistic sense, 
the ‘damned and the elect’ has polarized and heightened the level of hostility between a 
movement and host social order.452 This two nation construct is the most fundamental concept 
in Islamic international law and central to the violent campaign of jihadists, manipulated as an 
obligation to fight against those not falling under dar al-Islam.453  
 
Although subject status within the dar al-Islam dictated the extent of civil liberties enjoyed, 
(the umma enjoying the full complement of rights while the dhimmīs enjoyed only partial 
rights), the Imam or Caliph was charged with ensuring all subjects received protection in 
relation to internal security and foreign attack. The Caliph regulated the relationship between 
the umma and dhimmīs and other non-Islamic communities within the Islamic state through 
bilateral agreements.454 The dar al-harb was considered an object rather than subject of Islamic 
law, and Muslim rulers were compelled to subsume these apostate nations under Islamic 
sovereignty if they had adequate resources.455  The Islamic position on dar al-harb provided 
that anyone present in such territory, could ‘imprison, seize the personal property of, enslave, 
or even kill other persons’ within this territory without legal sanction from the Islamic State, 
‘Islamic law…silent as to the legal [not moral] consequences of conduct in the dar al-harb 
                                                     
449 Peters Crime (n254) 38 
450 Mohammad Mahdi, al-Fatawa al-Mahdiyya fi al-waqa I al-Misriyya, (Cairo: Matba ‘at al-Azhar, 
1884(1301H)) cited in Peters Crime (n254) 38. 
451 Cherif-BassiouniaShari’aa(n296) 159 
452 Bromley (n16) 145 
453  This construct sees good and evil; right and wrong; Haq (truth) and Na Haq (untruth); Halal (legitimate) and 
Haram (forbidden). Ali & Stuart, (n363), 10; Ali & Rehman, (n250) 328-330. 
454 These particular charters enumerated Islamic tolerance for each religious community in relation to their matters 
of personal status. Non-believers could also avail of the Islamic justice system if desired, despite lacking a Muslim 
conviction. 
455 Historically, Islam has revealed a paradox in its relations with apostate nations. Depending on the forefront 
regulatory incentive that the religious doctrine sought to achieve, whether as a basis for state regulation with 
external actors or as a foundation for moral sanction, has in turn dictated whether the religious doctrine is used to 
promote conflict or tolerance. Khadduri Islamic Law (n13) 69. 
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unless it involved Muslims exclusively[,]’ and unless the dar al-Islam  had made an agreement 
with the dar al-harb altering its enemy status.456  
 
4.2 Binding Islamic Groups: Pacta Sunt Servanda and ‘al ‘aqd Shari’at at al-
mut’aqidin  
‘Believers, fulfil your bonds[,] covenants should not be broken because one 
community feels stronger than another.’’457 
 
‘Muslims anywhere are like parts of a single body, so that the pain of one part affects the 
others.’ It is a duty to intervene when called upon to help others ‘except against a people with 
whom there is a treaty.’458 The binding nature of treaties under Shari’a is congruent with the 
brocard pacta sunt servanda.459 Its Islamic legal articulation grounded in the Shari’a principle 
‘al ‘aqd Shari’at at al-mut’aqidin, ‘the contract is the law of the parties’.460 This principle is 
derived both from the Qurʾan and the Sunna,461 as well as the practices of the first Caliph, and 
holds that a treaty takes precedence over all other laws except when a specific verse of the 
Qurʾan or hadith prohibits the act in question. Not only must all Muslims adhere to the spirit 
and intendment of the concluded treaty, the observance of the agreement is more than political 
necessity, Qurʾanic prescription transforming it into a religious duty.462 A binding agreement 
in Islamic law is ‘not merely a matter of secular law between contracting parties, but a covenant 
                                                     
456 Cherif-BassiouniaShari’aa(n296) 159. 
457 The Qur’an 5:1 and 8:91-2. 
458 Hadith: Bukhari. 
459 Latin ‘agreements must be kept’. Reflected in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, see in particular 
article 26, March 23 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
460 Cherif-BassiouniaShari’aa(n296) 150. 
461 The Qurʾan 17:34 ‘And fulfil (every) engagement, for (every) engagement will be enquired into (on the Day 
of Reckoning); The Qurʾan 2:177 ‘…it is righteousness…to fulfil the contracts which ye have made…Such are 
the people of truth, the Allah-fearing.’ The Prophet said, ‘The Muslims are bound by their obligations, except an 
obligation that renders the lawful unlawful and the unlawful lawful.’ Cherif-Bassiouni The Shari’a (n296) 154; 
Malik, The Qurʾanic Concept of War (n304), Preface. 
462 Shari’a compliant treaties are self-executing in theory, however post World War II, international law dictated 
treaty execution a matter for national discretion. The Qurʾan, 8:72 ‘Those who believed, and adopted exile, and 
fought for the Faith, with their property and their persons, in the cause of Allah, as well as those who gave (them) 
asylum and aid, these are (all) friends and protectors, one of another. As to those who believed but came not into 
exile, ye owe no duty of protection to them until they come into exile; but if they seek your aid in religion, it is 
your duty to help them, except against a people with whom ye have a treaty of mutual alliance. And (remember) 
Allah seeeth all that ye do.’ 
The Qurʾan, 16:91 ‘Fulfil the Covenant of Allah when ye have entered into it, and break not your oaths after ye 




with God.’463 Breaking treaties puts the offending party on a status lower than animals, only 
when the other party breaks their obligation can a Muslim rescind theirs.464 All kinds of 
treachery, breaking treaties or agreements are outlawed in Islam, regardless of how powerful 
the Muslim is. The exception is if the other party breaks the pact first and then only after due 
warning is given.465 
 
Islamic jurisprudence supports the idea that a country governed by Muslim rulers can contract 
through peace treaty with a non-Muslim state or community. Such treaties are entered into with 
perceived enemies or illegitimate States if it is in the greater interest or maslaha of the umma.466  
The single condition precedent attached to a treaty being a binding source of Islamic law is that 
its purpose and terms is Shari’a compliant.467 Early Muslim treaties addressed issues of peace 
and peaceful co-existence, as well as giving safe conduct to envoys. Jurist’s subsequent 
interpretations of these treaties have formed the basis of Siyar. Entering into treaties with non-
Muslim states is not only permitted but encouraged to prevent conflict.  
 
The first Islamic state was founded by the Prophet through treaty in 622 CE. A social contract, 
the Constitution or Charter of Medina established a religiously tolerant ‘…Free State for a 
pluralistic community composed of Muslims, Jews, and Pagans.’ Contrasted from the fictional, 
artificial and theoretical accounts of social contract theory derived from Hobbes, Rousseau and 
Rawls, the first Islamic state was founded on the reality of an actual agreement ‘among real 
                                                     
463 UNODC, Combating Trafficking in Persons in Accordance with the Principles of Islamic Law (2010) 23 < 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/human-
trafficking/Islamic_Law_TIP_E_ebook_18_March_2010_V0985841.pdf> accessed 09/06/2017 
464 The Qurʾan 9:3-4 
465 International lawyers deployed the same line of reasoning to defang the classic doctrine of ribus sic stantibus 
(things thus standing), whereby a fundamental change of circumstances can justify unilateral termination of 
treaties. As now enshrined in Article 62 of the Vienna Convention, the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus stands 
confined within narrow limits as a legal question/ A treaty is terminable only when unforeseen changes in the 
circumstances underlying the conclusion of the treaty transform radically the extent of the obligations still to be 
performed. The ICJ has held that the changed conditions had to be ‘so closely linked to the object and purpose of 
the Treaty that they constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties and, in changing, radically altered 
the extent of the obligations still to be performed.’ Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 
64 (Sept. 25). In the end, rebus sic stantibus stands sacrificed at the altar of pacta sunt servanda. Abdel-Haleem 
(n4) 139. 
466 For example, the Treaty of Hudaibiyya 627 CE, negotiated between Mohammad and the Meccans in the year 
627 CE was the first treaty in Islam and is referenced as an authoritative source and precedent for international 
agreements between Muslims and non-Muslims. This treaty negotiated an end to the fighting between the two 
sects and called for a ten-year peace agreement. The Prophet’s willingness to enter into an agreement with non-
Muslims is an example of the correct interpretation of Revelation. Daniel Pipes, ‘Lessons From the Prophet 




people of diverse ethnic and religious groups…The Medina Constitution offered a social 
contract in real time…space [and] people through a real agreement.’468  
 
Whether a single contract or a compilation of multiple agreements, the Constitution addressed 
rules relating to mutual relations among Muslims as well as inter-communal relations between 
Muslims and Jews.  The normative establishment of a pluralistic community, the Charter 
removed any distinction between Yathrib natives and the immigrants from Mecca. Part one of 
the Charter conceptually established a community of believers (ummat-al mumunin), 
articulating principles of equality and justice to all Muslims regardless of tribal connections.  
Part two of the Charter expanded these rights to non-Muslims, granting each tribe the right to 
be ‘one community with the believers.’ The significance of this expansive approach is that an 
Islamic Free state was never conceived as an exclusively Muslim nation. To reframe in modern 
terms, the idea of cleansing an Islamic state of non-Muslims is repugnant to the Charter of 
Medina.469  While not a distinct source of Islamic law, the Charter recognized lawful 
agreements are subject to supra-normative constraints, agreements contrary to state policies 
unenforceable. However, this construction of a constitutional theory implicit in the text ‘may 
have more to do with twentieth century politics in the Muslim world than with anything 
inherent in the text.’470 
 
Of the landmark treaties between the umma and non-Muslims, the unilateral declaration made 
by the second Caliph, ‘Umar ibn al-Khatta, evidences the weight attached to the principle ‘al 
‘aqd Shari’at at al-mut’aqidin. In 14 AH/636 CE the Battle of Yarmuk saw the defeat of the 
Roman army by Muslim forces who continued on to capture Jerusalem. Recognized by the 
‘People of the Book’ as a Holy City, ‘Umar refrained from entering the city on horse, rather 
requesting the Christian Bishop and other religious leaders of the city meet him at the city’s 
gate. ‘Umar then pronounced that Jerusalem would from that moment be a city for all, and 
while not specifically mentioning the Jews, his declaration was interpreted as abrogating their 
previous expulsion by the Christians. After ‘Umar’s Declaration, the Jews returned to 
Jerusalem and along with the Christians and the Muslims resumed administration of their holy 
                                                     
468 Ali Khan, ‘Commentary on the Constitution of Medina’ in Ramadan (n13) 205-206 
469 ibid (n13) 206 
470 Anver Emon, Reflections on the Constitution of Medina, (2001-2002) 1 UCLA Journal of Islamic and Near 
Eastern Law 103, 133  
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sites. This policy of pluralism continued even after Israel seized the city from Jordan in 1967 
CE.471 
 
The dar al-sulh is the Islamic law doctrine providing for contractual relations to be established 
between Muslim governments and non-Muslim residents of dar al-Islam. When a Muslim ruler 
concludes the contract, he guarantees to protect the life, property and freedom of religion to 
non-Muslims who contract to abide by the law of the land and pay jizya.472 Certain Muslim 
jurists posit that if non-Muslims fail to accept Islam or pay the jizya, the male unbelievers may 
be killed.473  
 
Those from dar al-harb could enter Muslim territory under an agreement known as an aman 
that provided temporary safeguard and entitled them to trade, or to enter for other peaceful 
purposes.474 One way to ensure safe passage for foreigners, including aid workers, is through 
aman. Under aman, there also a contract of protection known as quarter, which is provided 
during wartime to protect the person and the property of an enemy belligerent.475 ‘Both 
moderates and salafists agree that the concept is valid, but it is a question of negotiating it and 
making sure that other groups know you are protected by it, different groups may not respect 
the aman’s signed by others.476   
 
Such jurisprudence is inimical to the jihadist ideology which consider these treaties as a 
‘religious betrayal.’477 Yet the respect accorded non-Muslims did not equate to recognition of 
their status as equal under Islamic law as this would undermine the entire distinction between 
dar al-harb and dar al-Islam. The practical translation of this respect would mean that a 
Muslim entering enemy land would be obliged to respect the authority and laws of the non-
                                                     
471 By virtue of membership to the UN and being party to the Geneva Conventions 1949, Muslim States have 
contracted to be bound by both ius ad bellum and ius in bello principles. As part of the international community 
Muslim States are also bound by ius cogens peremptory norms. Cherif-BassiouniaShari’aa(n296) 151-155 
472 Sadia Tabassum, ‘Combatants, Not Bandits: The Status of Rebels in Islamic Law’ (2011) 93(881) IRRC  11 
473 Khaled Abou El-Fadl, ‘The Rules Of Killing At War: An Inquiry Into Classical Sources’ (1999) 89(2) The 
Muslim World 151 
474Aman is based on the Qurʾan 9:6 ‘And if anyone of the polytheists seeks your protection, then protect him until 
he hears the word of God. Then, afterwards, escort him to his place of safety.’ Aboul-Enein & Zuhur (n251), 6   
475 Rudolph Peters, Islam and Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History (Mouton 1979) 29  
476 Practically speaking, when groups like Médecins Sans Frontières and the International Committee of the Red 
Cross negotiate with armed groups for safe access to conflict zones, they are negotiating an aman, even if the 
specific terminology is not used. When humanitarian workers are targeted, Fadl says that these radical groups see 
them as ‘just another part of an invading army [arriving without] permission. They haven’t gotten any sort of 
aman.’ El-Fadl ‘Rules’ (n473). 
477 For example, Al-Qaida, Hamas and Lashkar-e-Ta’iba refuse to recognize Israel arguing it is an illegitimate 
State. Ali & Stuart, (n363),11. 
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Muslim state for as long and in so far as these apostate laws did not conflict with Islamic law. 
478 The issue of which jurist has competence to determine a conflict of laws, that is the Islamic 
jurist interpreting apostate laws or the converse is not settled in either domain.  
 
If the ultimate aim of Islam is to convert the world in its entirety, then the dar al-Islam is in a 
constant state of conflict with the dar al-harb. If Pax Islamica dominated the world order, and 
non-Muslim communities were subsumed within the territory either as dhimmīs or autonomous 
entities contracting with it, the dar al-harb would disappear. Hence, jihad is often cited as the 
bridge to transform dar al-harb to dar al-Islam.479 This bridge gives rise to a liberation 
ideology where individual Muslims must return to the original teachings of the Quran, Muslim 
lands must be returned from foreign domination and apostate states must be replaced by Islamic 
law and tradition.480 
 
Extremist groups maintain that lands formerly under Muslim control are now dar al-harb, and, 
as such, there is a religious necessity to fight in order to re-establish the Caliphate, a point 
contended among classical scholars who would consider attaching such gravity to the Caliphate 
an exaggeration.481 Furthermore this extremist assertion does not correspond to a definitive 
reading of religious scripture, both traditional scholarship and Islamic jurisprudence 
recognizing that lands have frequently exchanged authority, hence the normative values 
exhibited in dar al-Islam, that is the right to practise Islamic rules and the free exhibition of the 
symbols of Islam.482 
 
                                                     
478 ‘Questions of international law arose largely in connection with their analysis of the law governing international 
wars (jihad and siyar) and treaties…These rules represented a pre-political baseline upon which the Islamic state 
was authorized to enter into binding agreements with non-Muslims both as individuals and as States. Mohammed 
Fadel, International Law, Regional Developments, Islam in Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International 
Law (OUP 2010); Khadduri Islamic Law (n13) 13 
479 ‘This text presents a clear definition of a nation, and according to which the Muslims of the whole world 
constituent one nation, while non-Muslims are another nation. The international relations of the Muslims being 
one with other nations of the world can be set up only by declaring the oneness of mankind on the basis of 
equality.’Shaybānī was the first who wrote a comprehensive book on this subject, named as Kitab Siyar al-
SaghirAl-Sarakhsi, Muhammad b. Ahmad, Kitabal-Mabsut (Matb’a al-Sa’adah 1327 A. H.) 456; Hamidullah, 
(n584), 88; Khadduri, War (n434) 53, 229. 
480 Mowatt-Larssen, (n18). 
481 Fadel International Law (n478) 
482 Ali & Stuart (n363) 10 
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4.3 Unapologetic Jihad 
‘Those nations who have engaged in jihad have won the blessings of sovereignty and 
independence. Conversely, those nations who have put their swords in their sheaths, 
they have not won anything except the chains of slavery around their necks.’483 
 
Islam evolved in an era where ‘religion explicitly sanctioned the state, [and] territorial 
expansion was identical to religious proselytization, [making] every religion… a ‘religion of 
the sword.’’484 It matured in an environment where armed violence, actual or threatened, with 
some degree of organization and planning was an activity and expectation of daily life. 
Portraying Islam as ‘a military religion, [with] fanatical warriors engaged in spreading their 
faith and their law by armed might,’ to a warrior religion steeped in ‘bloody borders’ and a 
religion not concerned with ‘salvation’;485 both the crusaders and colonialists created a moral 
justification to plunder the resources of the Middle East and North Africa. This Middle Ages 
propaganda continues to be echoed in contemporary scholarship and stereotypes on Islam, and 
in particular in narratives on jihad.486  
 
Accounting for the historical context in which jihad evolved, it is difficult to reconcile these 
traditions with the modern caricature of jihad, that is the ‘global jihad’ or ‘holy war’, where 
the violent wing of fundamentalists gives the impression that the point is ‘simply violence and 
killing, while care for the unfortunate, generosity and socially and politically constructive 
activities in general, are all matters of indifference.’487 Understanding jihad as a ‘holy war’ in 
                                                     
483 Translation taken from Niaz Shah ‘The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (n72) 457. 
484 Aslan (n29) 79- 80. 
485 Aslan (n29) 78- 79 quoting Bernard Lewis, Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civiliations and the Remaking 
of World Order (Simon & Schuster 1998) & Max Weber respectively.  
486 Jihad is derived from the verb juhd or jahada which means ‘to exert’, ‘to struggle’ or ‘to strive’. The Arabic 
lexicon describes jihad as ‘making the utmost effort to attain something beloved or to save oneself from something 
disliked.’ Although in the West, jihad is often seen as ‘terrorism’ it is correct to describe it as ‘tourism’. The 
Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) said ‘the tourism of my nation is jihad’. This is one reason why many Muslims 
travelled to Palestine, Chechnya, Kashmir, Iraq and Afghanistan. Sunna Abu Dawood cited in Begg, ‘Jihad’ (n8). 
Western parlance translates jihad as ‘an armed struggle against the West.’ While the term is sometimes reduced 
to mean ‘holy war’ ‘the term holy war originated with Christian Crusaders who used it to theologically legitimate 
a battle for land and trade routes.’ Aslan (n29) 80. To translate ‘holywar’ back to Arabic it would be ‘al-harb al 
muqaddas’ a term which does not exist in the Islamic tradition. The Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute for Islamic 
Thought, (n333). The Islamic historical position on jihad can be viewed through a modernist, fundamentalist and 
conservative narrative. Modernists reduce jihad to its spiritual meaning; fundamentalists see jihad as the 
obligation of every Muslim to fight for Islam; and conservatives moderate the fundamentalist position by 
restricting the fight to self-defence against colonialism or to the armed resistance against attacks by enemy states. 
Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (IB.Tauris 2002); Cherif-BassiouniaJihada(n19) 61-62.  
487 Michael Bonner, Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrines and Practice (Princeton University Press 2006) 173; 
Abdalla (n30) 25; Abdel-Haleem (n4) 67. 
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a purely military sense ‘strips away the spiritual, intellectual and social substance of jihad,’ 
and allows the doctrine to become ‘shorthand for all war, and war by any means, including 
terrorism.’488 When tackling this militarized narrative, deconstructing what is deemed radical 
rhetoric serves to illuminate its substantive content. Firstly, there is no word corresponding to 
‘holy war’ in classical Arabic. War according to the Qurʾan is either just or unjust. It is never 
‘holy’.489 Reductionism by orientalists on the jihad doctrine ‘perverts and distances [it] from 
its godly and intended meanings, none of which support terrorism.490 Yet it is evident that the 
historical development of jihadi thought has been one of increasingly expansive violence, not 
one of limitations,  ‘…one hour in the path of jihad is worth more than 70 years of praying at 
home’491 
 
The jihad doctrine has deep normative, intellectual and historical roots in Islamic law. With its 
foundations in both the Qurʾan and hadith, it references external and internal struggles.492  Its 
purpose is to protect not oppress.493A merge of ‘the archaic and medieval religious references 
with modern technologies, internet and globalised media, the panoply of interpretations of 
jihad demands a brief overview of the doctrines evolution.494 Whether an intentional 
prohibition or just an unnecessary right at that time, the initial years of the Prophet’s campaign 
in Mecca saw any use of force, even in self-defence impermissible.495 It was only in the context 
of the unrelenting threat from the Quraysh that use of force was sanctioned through Revelation 
grounding jihad in a narrative on legitimate violence in defence of religion. 496 Of the 24 verses 
                                                     
488 Abdalla (n30), 25 
489 Distinctions must also be made between the Arabic words for ‘war’ (Harb ) and ‘fighting’ (Qital). Aslan (n29) 
81. 
490 Sohail Inayatullah & Gail Boxwell (Eds), Islam, Postmodernism And Other Futures – A Ziauddin Sardar 
Reader (Pluto Press 2003) 
491 Wiktorowicz ‘Anatomy’ (n416) 94; Abdul Azzam, Ummah Forum. “Sheikh Abdullah Azzam - the 20th 
century Mujahid Imam.” 12 September 2004. http://www.ummah. net/forum/printthread.php?t=43451  
492 Jihad in its primary religious context means the ‘struggle of the soul to overcome sinful obstacles that keep a 
person from God. This is why the word jihad is nearly always followed in the Quran but the phrase ‘di sabil Allah’ 
‘in the path of God. Aslan (n29) 81; Cherif-BassiouniaJihada(n19) 61. 
493 Begg, ‘Jihad’ (n8) 
494 Amna Guellali, ‘Understanding the Discourses on Jihad in Islam through Classical and Modern Narratives,’ 
in Cherif-Bassiouni, Jihad (n19) 82; Mirza Ahmad Murder in the Name of Allah (Lutterworth Press 1989) 
105,110. 
495 Even when Muhammad and the Sahaba were persecuted by the Quraysh to the extent they were forced to seek 
refuge in Abyssinia and then Medina, the exclusive propagation of Islam through daʿwa remained intact as per 
Revelational instruction. ‘So wait patiently (O Muhammad) for thy Lord’s decree, surely thou art in Our sight’ 
(52:48); ‘Then bear with them and say: peace. They will (eventually) come to know’ (43:89); ‘So forgive, with a 
gracious forgiveness’ (15:85). Mohammad Hashim Kamali, ‘Jihad and the Interpretation of the Qurʾan’ in Cherif-
BassiouniaJihada(n19) 42 
496 The defensive theory of Jihad is compatible with the 1945 UN Charter. Art. 2(4) prohibits the use of force, but 
Art. 42 allows the Security Council to authorize the use of force for maintaining or restoring peace and security. 
Art. 51 allows the use of force in self-defence as an exception. Patricia Crone, God’s Rule Government and Islam. 
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which reference jihad, many verses on defensive jihad were revealed shortly after the Prophet 
made the hajj to Medina.497 
 
From the first through to the final Revelation, the Islamic community and its understanding of 
jihad passed through three distinct stages. The first stage, 610-622 CE, Revelations 
commanded restraint from use of force, focusing on ‘piety and inner strength in the face of 
social exclusion and oppression.’498 Through the hijra and in the initial resettlement in Medina 
approximately 623-626 CE, Revelation permitted Muslims only defensive jihad. This period 
sees the recurrent use of the phrase in relation to jihad to ‘those who fight you’ affording the 
reasonable conclusion that not only could Muslims not be aggressors, but permission to use 
force is predicated on ‘wronging’ Muslims.499 The final phase 626-632, reveals the divinely 
sanctioned aggressive jihad, ‘initially against the polytheists and then against monotheists like 
the Jews of [Khyber].’500 These three stages of jihad form one of the main arguments used to 
justify an offensive jihad approach, that is, that offensive jihad was an organic incremental 
progression on the use of force,501 from ‘the first jihad – the hijra [to Medina] (a non-violent 
jihad) – to the permission to fight…and then to the fard or obligatory duty to fight.’502   
 
The fully developed doctrine of jihad did not find ideological expression until long after 
Muhammad’s death, when Muslim conquerors began absorbing the cultures and practices of 
                                                     
Six Centuries of Medieval Islamic Political Thought (Colombia University Press 2004) 12; Muhammad Asad, 
Message of the Qurʾan (Dar al-Andalus 1993) 512; Cherif-BassiouniaJihada(n19) 61 
497 In 2:190 there is reference to the duty of Muslims to ‘fight in the cause of God those who fight you and be not 
aggressors, God loveth not those who are aggressors.’ Malik The Qurʾanic Concept of War (n304) Preface. This 
defence involves not only self defence but also defence of oppressed and defenceless Muslims, Qurʾan 4:75. ‘And 
what is [the matter] with you that you fight not in the cause of Allah and [for] the oppressed among men, women, 
and children who say, ’Our Lord, take us out of this city of oppressive people and appoint for us from Yourself a 
protector and appoint for us from Yourself a helper’ This revelation does not limit such defence to Muslims and 
there is no reason such defence could not be extended infinitely on humanitarian grounds. Shah, ‘Force’ (n71), 
344- 345; Nagamine,(n71), 54. 
498 ‘Therefore listen not to the Unbelievers, but strive against them with the utmost strenuousness, with the 
[Qurʾan] (25:52); ‘…that ye believe in Allah and His Messenger, and that ye strive [your utmost] in the Cause of 
Allah, with your property and your persons: That will be best for you, if ye but knew! (69:11) Yusuf, The Holy 
Qurʾan; cited in Nagamine,(n71), 54-55. 
499‘ Qurʾan 2:190 (n326) 
500 James Robson, trans., Mishkat al-Masabih, vol. 2 (M. Ashraf, 1963-5), book XV, chap. 5, 752-5, book XVIII, 
chap. 1, 806-16; Mishkat al-Masabih, vol. 3, book XVIII, chap. 5, 836-9; L Veccia Vaglieri, The Encyclopedia of 
Islam (Brill 2012) 1137-43. 
501 In the last year of the Medinan period (9 AH) the argument goes, all the verses relating to self-defence were 
repealed by verses 9:5 and 9:29, making jihad a continuous obligation for Muslims of all ages. Shah ‘Force’ (n71), 
346; As Muhammad and the umma strengthened their position in society, the scope of jihad bi’l sayf extended. 
To suggest however that the Muslim community was not permitted to fight in the Meccan period purely because 
they were outnumbered is to overlook the fact that the Muslims were outnumbered three to one at the Battle of 
Badr which occurred in the Medinan phase. The Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought (n333) 6 
502 See Al-Shafi’i Kitab al-Umm (The Mother of Books) in Abdel-Haleem (n4) 75 
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the Near East. While the origin and precise meaning of jihad is open to interpretation, ‘the 
Muslim conquests of the seventh century, and the juridical writing of the eighth century, began 
to apply the term to military action.503 Sunni and Shi’ite madhahib developed a variety of 
similar doctrines on jihad between the 7th and 12th century CE with a penchant to focus on 
jihad’s warlike features over its spiritual aspects.504 Resurrection of this position has resulted 
in jihad becoming a catalyst for armed insurrection as the preeminent enactment of individual 
Muslim piety.  
 
Islamic jurisprudence has distinguished four different ways in which a believer may fulfil jihad 
obligations: with faith in his heart; by preaching and proselytizing with his tongue; by good 
deeds with his hands; and by confronting enemies with the sword.505 An individual as well as 
collective duty extending to civilians and soldiers alike, jihad was a political obligation 
imposed on the umma as subjects of Islamic law, the instrument to achieve Islam’s overarching 
maqasid: the universalization of the faith and the establishment of God’s sovereignty over the 
world.506 Shaybānī suggests jihad to be a struggle both to improve and expand Islam.507 The 
obligation of every Muslim, the internal struggle, or jihad al-nafs, is a pillar of the Muslim 
quest for morality, and a holistic world view for the greater sake of a humane existence for 
Muslim and non-Muslim alike.508  Jihad al-nafs is the foundation for all jihad, fighting an 
external enemy preconditioned on succeeding in mastering this internal struggle.509  
 
                                                     
503 Bergesen, 12 
504 Kamali (n506), 45 
505 Khadduri, War (n434), 56-7; Khadduri Islamic Law (n13) 16; Mahnoud Ayoub, ‘Jihad: A Source of Power 
and Framework of Authority in Islam,’ Bulletin of the Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, 6 (1992); Reuven 
Firestone, Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam (OUP 1999) 37, 84; Moulavi Cheragh, The Critical Exposition 
of Popular Jihad (Karinsons 1977)  62-6, 51-5, 123-5. 
506 There are several Qurʾanic verses and Hadith literature rendering jihad obligatory on every Muslim male, yet 
it is only a general duty which, if accomplished by a sufficient number, the rest will not be condemned for the 
neglect of that duty – this fact renders administration of jihad entirely in the hands of the government. Those 
sections of society exempted from jihad include children, the blind, sick and very poor. Khadduri ‘International 
Law’ in Khadduri & Liebesny (n300) 353, where it stated that jihad was a required duty of the whole Muslim 
community, binding the Muslims en masse rather than individually. Kasani, VII, 97 in Mahmassani (n368) 280. 
Ali & Rehman (n250) 332-3.  
507 While the inner jihad has become demarcated and marginalized in contemporary Islamic literature, early 
scholars did not see the two forms of jihad as mutually exclusive. Nagamine,(n71),56. 
508 Abdalla (n30) 25 
509 Jihad al-nafs is jihad in relation to self-discipline. Kamali (n506) 44. Also called jihad bin-nafs (striving within 
oneself). There are four categories of jihad generally accepted by scholars: jihad of the nafs (self); jihad against 
the shaytan (devil) [desires]; jihad against unbelievers and hypocrites; jihad against oppressors and evil doers. 
Limiting jihad to a singular interpretation can be misleading. Begg ‘Jihad’ (n8) 
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Fighting on behalf of the wider community, jihad bi’l sayf,510 is generally considered the lesser 
jihad, the struggle against ‘evil in one’s soul’ taking precedence.511 However, this apologetic 
emphasis on the aspect of moral improvement has been attributed by critics to both orientalists, 
desperate to portray Islam as a peaceful religion, or to ‘modernists who promote Islam as an 
irenic religion that respects international law and that does not stand in the way of 
modernization of Muslim countries.’512 The reality is that the overarching doctrine dictates 
neither peaceful not violent means in achieving this aim,513 there are certain Revelation verses 
more difficult to understand whether a physical element is involved.514  
 
4.3.1 Right Authority 
The typology of Islamic warfare (qital) is divided into four discrete areas: tribal warfare; feuds 
and raids characteristic of primitive people; wars prescribed by sacred law and war against 
rebels and dissenters.515 There is some consensus in condemning as unjustified tribal warfare 
and feuds for their material motivations, only the latter two types of conflict constituting the 
Aristotelian idea of ‘just war’ as their objective was in pursuance of maintaining a religio-
ethical standard.516  Hence jihad b’il sayf  was the Islamic bellum justum. Implicit in the 
Qurʾanic teaching is the justification that war is to prevent evil from triumphing.517 ‘Just wars’ 
were the only exception to Islam’s prohibitive rules on engaging in conflict whether within an 
Islamic territory or outside, while the contemporary concept of jihad has changed, there 
remains little divergence among Islamic scholars and jurists, orthodox or heterodox, on this 
fundamental duty.518 The idea of waging war only when it was in accordance with the lex dei 
and the bellum justum is a key and continuous theme in Islam.519 Ad bellum conditions for 
                                                     
510 Translated (Arabic) Jihad of the sword. 
511 Upon his return from the last known raid in Islamic history, Prophet Muhammad said: ‘We have returned from 
the lesser jihad to embark on the greater jihad,’ describing the latter as the fight against inner demons controlling 
one’s ego. Aly, (n618). Although this hadith is disputed for reliability. Benjamin & Simon (n281) 55; The Royal 
Aal al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought (n333) 7-8; Bonner (n487) 51; Durrani (n15) 322. 
512 The peace like objectives of jihad and respect for the freedom of religion is evident in the Constitution of 
Medina 622 CE which guaranteed freedom of religion for the dhimmīs and Muslims. Islam views religion as a 
bilateral pact between man and God. On this basis there can be no compulsion or force used in religion. Ali & 
Stuart, (n363), 12; Guellali, ‘Understanding the Discourses’ in Cherif-BassiouniaJihada(n19) 74. 
513 Jihad b’il sayf was equivalent to the Christian concept of Crusade. M. Khan, Islamic Jurisprudence (n455) 204 
514 Shah ‘Force’ (n71) 344-345 
515 Abdel-Haleem (n4) 4. 
516 A al-Rahman Ibn Khaldun, al-Muqqadima ed. W. M. de Slane (Paris, 1858), Vol II, 65-79; Eng trans F 
Rosenthal (1958), Vol II, 73-88 in Khadduri Islamic Law (n13) 16 
517 The Qurʾan 2:251. War in Islam is ‘controlled by one master desire…pleasing the Lord and defending the 
lawful interests of those who, having believed in Him, are not being allowed to carry on. the obligations imposed 
on them by their religion.’ Malik The Qurʾanic Concept of War (n304), Preface 
518 Khadduri Islamic Law (n13) 16 -17 
519 Aboul-Enein & Zuhur (n251) 5  
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Islam’s just war is similar to those employed by St Augustine: right intention; right authority; 
reasonable prospect of success; last resort and proportionality.520 In line with Augustine and 
Aquinas, Islam considers the right intention to pursue good and avoid evil, righting a wrong 
with the ultimate aim of establishing peace, the dar al Islam.   
 
Before addressing whether the right authority exists to declare jihad, the ‘right intention’ must 
be established. This essential condition for fighting is prescribed in the Qurʾan, that intention 
for fighting must be fi sabil Allah, in the way of God. Self-aggrandizement, fighting for 
material gain or lust for power were rejected by the Prophet as possessing the right intention to 
fight.521 Where it is generally believed that jihad may only be waged when directed by the 
‘right authority’ fragmentation of the ‘right authority’ has splintered the meaning of jihad. 
Declared with proper authority, jihad creates a ‘legal state of hostilities’ as the collective duty 
of the Islamic polity.522 As discussed, war must be initiated by the right authority. While 
internationally and conventionally the right authority would be, subject to the United Nation 
Security Council (UNSC) as defined in Articles 42 and 51, sovereign states only, it is clear that 
fundamentalist Islamic ANSGs do not share the same vision of the right authority.523  
  
There is discord in Islamic legal theory on who can, with political and religious legitimacy 
declare jihad; whether the declaration needed to come from a Caliph or whether individuals 
and non-state actors can make a legitimate declaration. While the right authority to declare 
jihad generally rests with the Imam or Caliph heading the Muslim polity524 there are 
                                                     
520 Abdel-Haleem (n4) 113-115. Contrast with Alfonso Tostado the 15th century theologian and jurist whose works 
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declare Jihad.’ A.Y. Ali, The Meaning of the Noble Quran (1989), 390. Shah, ‘Force’ (n71) 358; Nagamine (n71) 
57. 
523 Abdel-Haleem (n4) 115. 
524 In all jurisdiction, it is assumed that Jihad is organized and conducted by the imam who is also regarded as the 
chief military commander (amir), The imam or his deputy, has the exclusive powers to call for Jihad.[…] Jihad 
is therefore conceived as taking place under the leadership of the imam, even though he may be deemed unjust or 
lacking in ethical or moral conduct.’ W Hallaq, Shari’a: Theory, Practice, Transformation, 327; Ali, The Meaning 
of the Noble Quran (n530), 390; Ali & Stuart, (n363), 12. 
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exceptional circumstances where individuals or a group of individuals may differ with a given 
government on the issue of declaring jihad. Certain Muslim armed groups may rebel against 
the rulers of a Muslim state. ‘In such a situation, the test is public support. If the public trusts 
and believes that the government is Islamic, then it is for the government to decide on the 
declaration of jihad. In this case any opposing individuals or groups have no authority. 
However, if the given government loses public support and trust because it is considered un-
Islamic then those who have the support and trust of the public can, after being put in a position 
of authority, take decisions on declaring jihad. This indicates a potential situation where 
individuals not in government may by consensus, be able to legitimately declare jihad.’525  
 
Jihad is an inseparable component of Islam which embodies the very highest principles of faith, 
morality and rules of war time engagement.526 Selective appropriation of Qurʾanic verses and 
historical precedents to interpret narrow militant constructions of jihad minimize this complex 
subject matter.527 While the Qurʾanic justification for an offensive jihad approach is 
contentious and difficult to justify without the abrogation doctrine, more dangerous is how 
arguments are being crafted by Islamic groups to increase the scope of defensive jihad, 
broadening it to subsume what should be rightly considered offensive.528 Former Advocate-
General of Pakistan, A.K Brohi, draws an explicit distinction between dar al Islam and dar al 
harb. He accepted the redefinition of defensive jihad to include the removal of any obstacles 
and countering any resistance to the spread of the message of Islam and the institutionalization 
and governance according to Shari’a. In this view, even passive resistance to the advancement 
of Islam is legitimate grounds for attack.529 
 
Puritanical ideologues like ibn Taymiyya and bin Abdul Wahhab planted seeds for radicals like 
Sayyid Qutb, and Osama bin Laden to resuscitate the theory of ‘proactive jihad’, that is the 
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idea of using jihad as a means to create a universal Islamic community.530 Fundamentalist 
Islamic groups centre ‘methodologically, [on] examining the theory of jihad [with absolute 
reliance on] the Qurʾan and the Prophetic Traditions as law.’531 This results in such groups 
ignoring robust jurisprudence that has developed over the centuries citing this evolution as 
polluting pristine Islam. Such a position reveals a formulaic conundrum: whether Qurʾanic 
verses or Prophetic traditions can, without more, be considered ‘law’ or if they must be 
‘appropriated and given legal import by a juristic tradition to be properly considered as at least 
relevant to legal hermeneutics.’532  
 
There have been many apologetic attempts to defend the doctrine of jihad and even assert its 
superiority above modern theories governing the conduct of war.533 Rather than trying to make 
seventh century Islamic law fit into contemporary conventional law, focusing on the actual law 
root is more illuminative. While apologetics argue that there ‘is considerable support for the 
belief that the norms of international humanitarian law adopted in more recent international 
agreements were in fact endorsed by Islamic international law fifteen centuries ago,’ this is not 
historically correct or academically honest. That is not to say there is no confluence. The fact 
remains that the law was primitive as Islam was evolving, and the wars adopted a more private 
flavour than a public one.534 
 
4.4 The Doctrine of Abrogation in Justifying Aggressive Jihad 
‘None of Our revelations do We abrogate or cause to be forgotten, but We substitute 
something better of similar.’535 
 
There are numerous verses in the Qurʾan advocating peace and compromise over violence.536 
Interpretative difficulties arise when different verses are afforded inconsistent weighting which 
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is further complicated by the chapter size over chronological order in which the Qurʾan is 
composed.537 This ordering of the Qurʾan has great repercussions in light of Islam’s acceptance 
of a doctrine of abrogation (naskh), whereby subsequent pronouncements of Muhammad 
nullify earlier prescriptions.538 Alternatively, abrogation may result when one text stipulates 
the specific abandonment of a matter articulated in another text.539 The doctrine is grounded in 
the Qurʾan and is critical to understanding jihad. 540 Cognisance must be had that the doctrine 
is not unanimously recognized or accepted, some sects arguing against the doctrine as it infers 
the Qurʾan is fallible,541 and certain scholars refuting the doctrine in its entirety, claiming it 
‘has no basis in historical fact, and must be rejected.’542  
 
Jurists and individuals who accept the doctrine bypass negative arguments by simply asserting 
the historical context of the Revelation. While acknowledging the Qurʾan read as a whole 
would reveal inconsistencies, these inconsistencies can be explained by dividing Revelations 
into those received in Mecca, when Muhammad and his small community were more inclined 
to compromise to facilitate the growth of the religion, and those revealed in Medina, when 
Muhammad and his growing community were stronger. Understanding the timing of 
Revelations is crucial to resolving apparent inconsistencies.543 The Qurʾan itself indicates that 
irrespective of the message being eternal, it was revealed in response to very specific historical 
situations.  
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7, 195-205. Asad Message of the Qurʾan (n496) 22-3, fn. 87 
543 Bukay ‘Peace?’ (n536) 3; A. al-Hassan Ali Ibn Ahmad al-Wahidi al-Naisaburi, Kitab Asbab nuzul al-Qurʾan 




‘Indeed, during the twenty-two years of Muhammad’s ministry, the Quran was in an 
almost constant state of flux, sometimes altering dramatically depending on where and 
when a verse was revealed, whether in Mecca or Medina, whether at the beginning or 
the end of Muhammad’s life.’544  
 
Those who minimize abrogation see the doctrine as evidence of the Qurʾan’s flexibility, 
interpreting the verses revealed by Muhammad in Mecca to ‘address spirituality and see those 
revealed later in Medina not as abrogation but rather as expanding context to understand the 
whole.’545 So complicated an area of hermeneutics, an entire subset of theological study is 
dedicated to the determination of verses which abrogate and those which are abrogated.546  
 
4.5 The Sword Verse 9:5 
‘But when the forbidden months are past, then fight and slay the Pagans wherever ye 
find them, and seize them, beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem 
[of war].’547 
 
Aggressive or proactive jihad can only exist if the doctrine of abrogation is accepted. This 
would permit the understanding that initially in Islam ‘aggressive fighting was forbidden; it 
later became permissible and subsequently obligatory.’548 The so-called ‘verse of the sword’ is 
                                                     
544 Aslan (n29) 167. 
545 ‘Classical scholars also examined the pattern in which Muhammad engaged in abrogation during revelation 
because Qurʾanic laws were brief and insufficient for the needs of the huge Muslim community. Muhammad 
changed his rules according to the circumstances.’ Ali Dashti, 23 Years: A Study of the Prophetic Career of 
Mohammad (Mazda 1994) 54; Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, At-Tafsir al-Kabir, vol. 1 (Cairo: Maktabat ‘Alam al-Fikr 
1956) 446. 
546 This doctrine of abrogation is not restricted to the Qurʾan but applies to all revelations for example those passed 
to Jesus or Moses. See for example Sura 2:106. A al-A'la al-Mawdudi, The Meaning of the Qurʾan, vol. I (Lahore: 
Islamic Publications, Ltd., 1967), p. 102, fn. 109; Ali, Al-Qurʾan (n536) 24. 
547 The verse also calls for leniency ‘But if they repent, and establish regular prayers and practice regular charity, 
then open the way for them; for Allah is oft forgiving, Most Merciful.’ 
548 The Qurʾan, 2:190 & 9:5 respectively. M Khan, "Introduction," xxiv-xxv. Suyuti said that everything in the 
Qurʾan about forgiveness and peace is abrogated by verse 9:5, which orders Muslims to fight the unbelievers and 
to establish God's kingdom on earth 
 Proponents of the argument claiming the rules of jihad progressed from a state of patience to the use of force in 
self-defence followed by an obligatory jihad against the polytheists and People of the Book, accept that verses 9:5 
and 9:29 abrogated verses 22:39 and 2:190. ‘If this interpretation is accepted, it would simply mean that verse 9:5 
obliges Muslims to forcefully convert polytheists to Islam or kill them, which would amount to a rule for genocide. 
It would also mean that verse 9:29 obliges Muslims to subjugate the People of the Book.’ Moderates dismiss such 
an argument as untenable when accounting for the historical context in which verses 9:5 and 9:29 were revealed. 
Niaz Shah, ‘The Use of Force Under Islamic Law’ (2013) 24 EJIL, 347 
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often cited as a justification for military jihad.549 Contemporary parlance would see the sword 
verse under the head of pre-emptive attack. 
 
Shortly before Muhammad’s death, a Revelation, titled ‘Ultimatum’ was received. In context, 
the verse was revealed six years after the hijra at the time when the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah 
6AH/627 CE was signed between Muhammad and the Qurayshi oligarchy. The Treaty, one of 
the most important precedents for Siyar, provided for non-aggression, the protection of life and 
property and prisoner exchange between the idolaters of Mecca and the Muslims of Medina.550 
It was when the Quraysh violated the terms of the pact that the verse was revealed.551 
Positioning the ‘verse of the sword’ within the historical framework clearly directs the act of 
aggression against those that initiate an attack on Muslims and the idolatrous tribes that broke 
treaties with Muslims and initiated attack.552  
 
The chronology of the sword verse means it displaces earlier Revelation.553 Practically, this 
means that the violent passages contained within this chapter abrogate the peaceful content 
contained in earlier verses.  It is often held as the dualist justification for war in Islam: the 
protection of Muslim land against invasion or ‘consolidation of the Islamic religion lest it 
should be wiped out,’ both forming part of the maqasid al-Shari’a.554  
 
The verse has been invoked to justify the killing of women and children apostates who refused 
to either convert to Islam or live under Muslim rule and pay a tax.555 The sword verse 
                                                     
549 Qurʾan, 9:5 
550 Imran Hosein, ‘Diplomacy in Islam, Treaties and Agreements. An Analysis of the Treaty of Hudaibiyah’ (1986) 
3 Muslim Educational Quarterly 67-85;  Cherif-BassiouniaShari’aa(n296) 159-160 
551 The text goes on to state that if the enemy forces repent and mend their ways, violence must be brought to an 
end. Qurʾan, 9:5 
552 See Qurʾan 9:13 and 8:56. Khadduri War (n434) 540-41. 
553 ‘It is the only chapter that does not begin ‘in the name of God, most benevolent, ever-merciful.’ It is argued 
this omission is due to the fact that the compilers of the Qurʾan were not sure if they were separate chapters. 
Chapter 9 follows the argument of Chapter 8 so closely it is difficult to delineate whether it warrants a new chapter.  
Shah, ‘Force’ (n71) 348; Bukay ‘Peace’ (n536) 7. Alfred Guillaume, The Life of Muhammad (OUP 1955) 617-9. 
554 Peters Jihad (n321) 3; Surah 8:39 ‘…[F]ight them until there is no fitna [persecution] and the religion, all of 
it, is for Allah.’ 
555 A contemporary Al-Azhar University scholar posited that ‘the (sword) verse does not leave any room in the 
mind to conjecture about what is called defensive war.’ This verse asserts that holy war, which is demanded in 
Islamic law, ‘is not a defensive war because it could legitimately be an offensive war. That is the apex and most 
honourable of all wars. Its goal is the exaltation of the word of God, the construction of Islamic society, and the 
establishment of God's kingdom on earth regardless of the means. It is legal to carry on an offensive holy war.’ 
Muhammad Sa'id Ramadan al-Buti, Jurisprudence in Muhammad's Biography (Dar al-Fikr 2001) 323-4. 
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abrogated, cancelled, and replaced at least 114 verses spread into 54 suras of the Qurʾan that 
called for tolerance, compassion, and peace.556 
 
The manipulation of the doctrine of abrogation in Islamic theology is a favourite tool and 
rationale for acts of aggression and use of force by Islamic militants. It is important to 
remember that Sunni Islam does not recognize human intuition as a valid source of law. 
Consequently, it maintains an absolute dependence upon the sacred texts. Among Sunni jurists, 
God alone is the ultimate determiner of all rules of human conduct. The obverse of this is that 
the human intellect, without revelation, is incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong. 
This incapacity exists because right and wrong exist solely by virtue of divine command, and 
because divine command is considered to be beyond the reach of the unaided human intellect. 
The problem is that no text, however sacred, is so unambiguous that it does not require some 
interpretation.557 
 
While some scholars credit the jihad doctrine with being responsible for converting dar al-
harb into a dar al-Islam,558 the way in which the doctrine has been interpreted and embraced 
by certain movements,  in particular the ‘sword verse’ imports on the umma an obligation to 
‘take up arms against idolaters until the unbelievers convert or submit.’559 This warlike 
interpretation of jihad has in some instances eclipsed the meaning of jihad in the sense of a 
lifelong struggle to control the ego and internal caprice and a striving for ilm.560 The Qurʾan 
does however provide several references using the language ‘kill them’.561 These references 
are contingent upon those whom the ‘kill’ reference is attached acting or failing to act.562 ‘The 
rule of killing for specific reasons is not confined to non-Muslims only. Islamic law allows the 
killing of Muslims in certain cases, such as in rebellion.563 
 
                                                     
556 Cherif-BassiouniaJihada(n19) 45 
557 Weiss (n25) 211- 212 
558 Khadduri War (n434) 53 
559 Rudolph Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam (Markus Wiener Publishers 1996) 5. 
560 Ilm is Arabic for knowledge. ‘Islamic jihad is directed to the securing of essential human liberties’ which is 
not tantamount to a defensive war. The Qurʾan ordains fighting tyranny and suppression of liberties until 
persecution stops and people are free to believe and act in accordance with their true conscience.’ Mazheruddin 
Siddiqi Modern Reformist Thought (Islamic Research Institute 1982) 91 
561 See for example The Qur’an 2:191; (4:89); (4:91).  
562 Eg, verse 2:191 is about expelling non-Muslims from where they had expelled Muslims. Verse 4:89, the killing 
is contingent on ‘if they turn away’, whereas in verse 4:91 it is conditional upon ‘if they do not stay away from 
you’. The ‘kill them’ language has been used on specific occasions for specific groups of people. Shah, ‘Force’ 
(n71), 350 
563 Shah, ‘Force’ (n71), 350 
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‘[A] primary concern of Islam, given its impetus to conversion by the sword, is the 
conduct of war... [T]he study of the law of war, the Siyar, so encompasses the attitude 
of Islam to the non-Muslim world that it has taken on the connotation of Islamic 
international law in general.’564  
 
Islam emerged in the 7th Century as a conquering power with world domination as its goal, its 
notion of international law was bound to be in keeping with its mission of proselytization of 
the whole of humankind.565 
 
4.6 Dar al Baghy  
Within the Harb/Islam dichotomy there exist several subsets each dealing with nuanced 
relationships in turn providing corresponding rights and obligations.566 Classical Islamic 
discourse delineates harb al- bugha (war against Muslims) and harb al-kuffar (war against 
unbelievers).567  The general law of armed conflict applies when the insurgency consists wholly 
or in part of non-Muslims, however a different set of laws apply, the law of baghy, when 
Muslims engage in armed conflict with a Muslim ruler irrespective of the justness of the 
conflict.568 This law does not apply to all fighting that may happen between Muslims, rather it 
applies only to fighting that may occur between Muslims and a specific category of Muslims 
called the bugha, the exception to the general rule that Muslims are prohibited from fighting 
                                                     
564 James Busuttil, ‘Humanitarian Law in Islam’ (1991) the Military Law and Law of War Review 113 
565 Majjid Khadduri, ‘Islam and the Modern Law of Nations’ (1956) 50 AJIL 358-9; Khadduri, War (n434) 51-
54. 
566 Dar Al-'Ahd (Abode of Covenant), Dar Al-Sulh (Abode of Truce), Dar Al-Maslubah (Abode of Pillaged Land), 
Dar Al-Baghy (Abode of Usurpation), Dar Al-'Adl (Abode of Justice), Dar al-Kufr (Abode of Unbelief).  In 
relation to international law, it is the dar al-ahd or dar al-sulh which carries weight to the enforcement of 
international treaties, however this subset is contested within the madhahib. Dar al-Sulh refers to states with which 
the Muslim nation has a formal treaty, or at least non-belligerent relations. Duncan Macdonald & Armand Abel, 
‘Dar al-Sulh’, Encyclopedia of Islam (Brill 2012). The rationale for the law of rebellion and its exclusive 
application to inter-Muslims conflict is traced to the Qurʾanic reference to rebels as ‘believers’. The rules of 
rebellion apply only when both the warring factions are Muslims. The Qurʾan calls the rebels ‘believers’ (The 
Qurʾan, 49: 9) and ‘Ali is reported to have said regarding his opponents: ‘These are our brothers who rebelled 
against us’. From this, jurists derive this fundamental rule of the Islamic law of baghy. Tabassum, (n472) 2.  
567 El-Fadl ‘Rules’ (n473) 144 
568 Baghy literally means disturbing the peace and causing transgression. The word baghy comes from the root 
bagha, which means ‘to desire or to seek something’, ‘to cause corruption’, ‘to envy’ or ‘to commit injustice. 
Edward Lane, Arabic-English Lexicon, (Cambridge 1984), 231.  In Islamic legal parlance, it denotes rebellion 
against a just ruler. The term khuruj, (lit. ‘going out’), was used for just rebellion against unjust rulers. As the 
justness of war is subjective Muslim jurists developed the code of conduct for rebellion irrespective of whether 




each other. Once bugha status was acquired the majority of jurists agree that this category of 
persons were not criminals.569  
 
Rebellion was commonplace in early Islam, with two of the four Caliphs immediately 
succeeding the Prophet martyred by rebels. While an Islamic government would generally 
deem rebels to be bandits and robbers, the Muslim jurists forcefully asserted that rebellion 
stands distinct and as such, rebels are not governed by the general criminal law of the land even 
if punitive action could be taken against them for disturbing the peace and taking the law into 
their own hands.570 As such jurists were conscious of developing a distinct doctrine recognizing 
the obligations of both factions when each party to the conflict was Muslim.571 As with Siyar, 
the Qurʾan provides principles on rebellion elaborated through the Sunna and exemplified in 
the conduct of the Caliph’s who succeeded the Prophet.572 In relation to baghy, rebellion is 
‘just’ provided that it is kept within the bounds of proportionality,that the harm caused by the 
rebellion is not greater than the harm caused by an unjust ruler.573  
 
The Battle of Jamal in 36 AH/656 CE is regarded as the first armed conflict (fitna) between 
Muslims. The conflict saw forces loyal to Ali ibn Abi-Talib, the fourth Caliph, fight the forces 
loyal to Aisha bint Abu-Bakr, the wife of the Prophet.574 The rules of engagement employed 
by Ali in this battle provided the historical foundation for Islamic laws of armed conflict 
relative to Muslim on Muslim fighting.  
 
‘[Ali] forbade his men to kill the enemy wounded or captives. These were not apostates 
but good Muslims, he declared; they should be accorded the utmost respect…All 
                                                     
569 El-Fadl ‘Rules’ (n473) 145 
570 For Sunni scholars, the baghy were political rebels and remained Muslims, therefore a separate set of rules 
applied to conflict with these rebels within the Dar al Islam. For Sunni’s, the central focus is on jihad against non-
believers. Howard Hensel, The Prism of Just War and Western Perspectives on the Legitimate Use of Force 
(Ashgate 2010) 
571 ‘Uthman, the third caliph, was martyred by rebels in 35 AH (655 CE). ‘Ali had to fight several wars with his 
opponents among Muslims and was martyred by a rebel in 40 AH (660 CE). His son al-Husayn was martyred by 
the government troops in Karbala’ in 61 AH (681 CE). The idea of rebellion against a Muslim ruler was ‘not 
readily acceptable to traditional Sunni political theory,’ a throwback to the trauma caused by the civil wars that 
affected the Islamic community in the mid-seventh century. Sivan (n9) 91; Tabassum (n472) 2. 
572 ‘Ali, laid down the norms that were accepted by the Muslim jurists who in time developed detailed rules. The 
Hanafi jurist Abu Bakr Muhammad b. Abi Sahl al-Sarakhsi, in his analysis of the Islamic law of baghy, asserts in 
many places that ‘Ali is the imam in this branch of law.’ See Abu Bakr Muhammad b. Ahmad b. Abi Sahl al-
Sarakhsi, al-Mabsut, ed. Muhammad Hasan Isma‘il al-Shafi‘i, Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 1997, Vol. 10, 
132. 
573 Abdel-Haleem (n4) 123. 
574 It is sometimes referred to as ‘The Battle of the Camel’ because Aisha rode into battle on a red camel from 
which she directed her forces. Khadduri, The Shari’a and Islamic Criminal Justice in Time of War and Peace, xiii 
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prisoners were to be set free after pledging allegiance to him, and the usual spoils of 
war…were to be returned... The enemy dead were buried as honourably as those who 
had fought for Ali. The hundreds of severed limbs were gathered together and placed 
with ceremony in one large grave.’575  
 
The following year there was another challenge against the leadership of ‘Ali. The Battle of 
Siffin 657 CE, saw the Kharijites (khawarij) rebel against ‘Ali culminating in his assassination 
in 661 CE. The Kharijites practice of takfir, declaring certain Muslims infidels, distinguished 
this group from mainstream Sunni Muslims who reject the practice as heresy. However 
contemporary extremists have revived this practice and used it as a platform to engage in 
revolution and violence.576 
 
As with IHL, Islamic law has developed indicia to help with conflict classification and status 
of parties. In Islamic law, rebellion can be defined as ‘the act of resisting or defying the [social, 
political or religious] authority of those in power’, occurring either in the form of ‘passive non-
compliance with the orders of those in power’ or in the form of ‘armed insurrection’.577 Internal 
violent opposition to government can be positioned on a sliding scale. When opposition to 
Government is directed towards certain acts of government officials it can be classed as 
insurrection; when this insurrection increases to the extent that the opposing party has some 
territorial control within the state it becomes rebellion.578 At the stage when rebels control 
territory in defiance of government and have capacity to act as proto-State, it is known as dar 
al-baghy.579 De facto, the dar al-baghy enjoys many of the prerogatives reserved for States. It 
can enter into treaties with other States;580 it can impose taxes when crossing borders between 
the dar-al ‘adl and dar al-baghy; and its court decisions are not necessarily or automatically 
reversed even if the central government reclaims control over the rebel territory.581 The belief 
of the Muslim rebels in the justness of opposition to Government is determinative in classifying 
                                                     
575 Lesley Hazleton After the Prophet; The Epic Story of the Shia-Sunni Split (Random House 2010) 122 
576 Halverson (n260) 203- 204 
577 Khaled Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law (Cambridge University Press,2001) 4 
578 Muhammad Hamidullah, The Muslim conduct of State (M. Ashraf 1977) 168 
579 Hanafi jurists consider faling outside the jurisdiction of the dar al ‘adl central government of the Islamic State. 
Dar al-‘adl (Territory or House of Justice) is the antonym of dar al baghy (Territory of Rebels). Tabassum (n472) 
5 
580 Provided such a treaty will not permit unfair terms towards the central authority. Abu Bakr Muhammad b. 
Ahmad b. Abi Sahl al-Sarakhsi, al-Mabsut, ed. Muhammad Hasan Isma‘il al-Shafi‘i, Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 
Beirut, 1997, Vol. 10, 141 in Tabassum (n472) 16 
581 However, the courts of dar al-baghy have no legal authority to bind the courts of dar al- ‘adl. Ibid (n497)  5 
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the existence of baghy. The rebels must consider themselves ‘to have ta’wil, legal justification 
for their struggle.’582 The cumulative requirements of territorial control or resistance capability, 
mana‘ah, and a challenge to the legitimacy of government are hence the indicia of baghy. 
 
Up until the point the rebels attain mana‘ah, even if they possess ta’wil, they are subject to the 
full force of the criminal law of the State.583 As with IHL, there exists in the law of baghy 
cumulative prerequisites before a group can trigger certain protections that would distinguish 
the group from common criminals.  In practical terms this means that when a group qualifies 
as rebels under the law of baghy, the criminal law that would usually regulate their conduct is 
suspended. This does not equate with recognition that the acts of the rebels are lawful.584 Once 
the threshold is reached to qualify as rebellion, the rules governing the rebels’ conduct alters 
completely. Shaybānī asserts that ‘when rebels repent and accept the writ of the government, 
they should not be punished for the damage they caused [during rebellion]’.585  
 
International law, including IHL, has difficulty regulating NIAC. State reluctance in 
acknowledging the conflicts’ existence within their borders leads to many conflicts mislabeled 
as internal strife or unrest and beyond the purview of international supervision.586 States also 
fear that affording equality to belligerents will affect the latter’s legal status, elevating the status 
of the group which are fighting the Government to being equal with the Government.587 Under 
the law of baghy, belligerents are equal in Islamic law simply because both parties are Muslim. 
Arguments regarding the binding authority of these laws which are rife in traditional IHL are 
moot under the law of baghy, as this law is divinely sanctioned. Muslim rebels cannot deny its 
                                                     
582 Tabassum, (n472) 6 
583 ‘When those who revolt lack mana‘ah, and only one or two persons from a city challenge the legitimacy of the 
government and take up arms against it, and afterwards seek aman [peace], the whole law will be enforced on 
them’. Abu Bakr Muhammad b. Ahmad b. Abi Sahl al-Sarakhsi, al-Mabsut, ed. Muhammad Hasan Isma‘il al-
Shafi‘i, Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 1997, Vol. 10, 141 cited in Tabassum (n472) 8 
584 At the time of fitnah [war between Muslims] a large number of the Companions of the Prophet were present. 
They laid down by consensus that there is no worldly compensation or punishment for a murder committed on 
the basis of a ta’wil of the Qurʾan, for a sexual relationship established on the basis of a ta’wil of the Qurʾan and 
for a property damaged on the basis of a ta’wil of the Qurʾan. And if something survives in their hands, it shall 
be returned to its real owner. Abu Ishaq Ibrahim b. ‘Ali al-Shirazi’s al-Muhadhdhab Kitab Qital Ahl al-Baghy (Al 
Muhadhdhab fi Fiqh al-Imam al-Shafi‘i, Dar al-Ma‘rifah, Beirut, 2003) Vol. 3, 406 in Tabassum (n472) 10 
585 Abu Bakr Muhammad b. Ahmad b. Abi Sahl al-Sarakhsi, al-Mabsut, ed. Muhammad Hasan Isma‘il al-Shafi‘i, 
Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 1997, Vol. 10, 136 cited in Tabassum (n472) 8 
586 See Cherif-BassiouniaShari’aa(n296); Clapham Obligations (n44) 
587 Conventional IHL binds ‘each party to the conflict’. Equality of belligerents is a fundamental principle of IHL. 
Hersch Lauterpacht ‘The Limits of the Operation of the Law of War’ (1963) 30 BYIL 206. It results from the 
fundamental distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello which holds that all parties to the conflict have the 
same rights and obligations as a matter of law irrespective of the ‘justness’ of their cause. Sassoli ‘Seriously’ (n42) 
16 - 17 
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binding nature and cannot make the plea that the law has been laid down through treaties to 
which they are not party.  
 
This discrete law acknowledges important rights for those engaged in baghy.588 So while both 
Muslim and non-Muslim rebels are treated as combatants and the law of war is applicable, 
when some or all the rebels are Muslims the law imposes further restrictions on the authority 
of the government and an extension of rights on rebels. This enhanced status incentivizes rebels 
to comply with the law of war, as the rebel status suspends the general criminal law, meaning 
rebels can only be punished for violations of the laws of war.589  
 
The alternate argument is that Muslims are not supposed to fight other Muslims unless they 
oppose Muslim rulers because of a ‘diverging, but plausible, interpretation of religious 
texts.’590 If the Muslim is considered an apostate, as many Muslim governments are labelled 
by rebels in today’s conflicts, none of these exceptions apply. There is speculation as to whether 
this doctrine is purely abstract and in reality ‘modern Islamic law would make no distinction 
between Muslim and non-Muslim: [rather] the overriding principles…of justice and public 
welfare’ would take precedence.591  
 
The next chapter will look at the basis for Islamic conflict conduct through the lens of seventh 
century war campaigns and the dicta of the first Caliphs. It will make a comparative analysis 








                                                     
588 Hamidullah, (n584) 167-8  
589 Tabassum, (n472) 12 
590 Aly (n618); El-Fadl ‘Rules’ (n473) 145 
591 Usama Hasan Cited in Aly (n618). 
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Chapter 5 Islamic Laws of Armed Conflict 
‘To understand war, one has to study its philosophy; the grammar and logic of [the 
parties]. Only then are you approaching strategic comprehension. To understand the 
war against Islamist[s] one must begin to understand the Islamic way of war, its 
philosophy and doctrine, the meanings of jihad in Islam—and one needs to 
understand that those meanings are highly varied and utilitarian depending on the 
source.’592 
 
Ancient civilizations created rules that would govern hostilities. Agreement on certain conflict 
conduct and abstention from certain practices in an effort to avoid retaliation were in the 
common interest.593 Through religious sources like the Old Testament considering Israelite 
relations with its neighbours; the Greeks in their relationship with Rome and other nations; or 
Islam and its doctrine of Siyar, a law of nations based on some form of natural law can be 
traced throughout history.594 So too can unbridled ferocity.  
 
When Grotius was exploring classical just war theory subject to temperamenta belli, classical 
Islamic legal doctrine had already developed safeguards for the limitations of war.595 Usul al-
fiqh provides rules or doctrines pertaining to conduct in warfare, however there is no ‘Islamic 
analogue to the Geneva conventions.’596 ‘Despite its many overlaps with Islamic law, Muslim 
scholars maintained IHL is a man-made law and only acceptable to Muslims so long as it does 
                                                     
592 S.K. Malik claims ‘[r]esearch into the Holy Quran is not one man’s job. It is the collective and continuous 
responsibility of the entire [community]. It takes a lifetime of research to extract a drop out of this never-ending 
reservoir of knowledge and wisdom; and it is only by pooling such drops that we can derive the maximum benefit 
from it.’ (Authors note); also Malik, The Qurʾanic Concept of War (n304) 108-9.  
593 There is evidence that the ancient Egyptians and Babylonians had agreements signed with their neighbours 
dealing with problems like water usage, exchange of prisoners and dispute resolution mechanisms for frontier 
disputes. Khadduri Islamic Law (n13) 4 
594  See for example Baron de Montesquieu The Spirit of the Laws, trans. Th. Hugent (1900) Vol I, 5; Coleman 
Phillipson, The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome (Macmillan 1911) 
595 Temperamenta Belli means moderation in the conduct of war. This term is used in Hugo Grotius's work De 
jure belli ac pacis (1625). M. Sassoli, ‘Ius ad Bellum and Ius in Bello’ in M Schmidt International law and armed 
conflict: Exploring the Faultlines (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2007) 243; It is argued that just war theory was 
never intended to be a legal code, rather it was meant to be a ‘proposal’. O’Donovan (n318) 14 
596 The Prophet is heralded for advocating ‘humanity, tolerance, equality and mutuality for the greater sake of 
coexistence and shared knowledge [and ultimate peace]…for all peoples.’ Cherif-BassiouniaJihada(n19) 62. The 
caveat is attached that the Islamic humanitarian laws or rules on warfare while not synonymous are generally 
congruent with many rules of modern international humanitarian law. Abdullahi An’Na’im, ‘Islamic Law, 
International Relations and Human Rights: Challenge and Response’ (1987) 20 Cornell International Law Journal 
317, 326. Syed (n10) 160; Aboul-Enein & Zuhur (n251) 2. M de Taube, ‘Etudes sur le development historique du 
droit international dans l’Europe orientale’ 393-394 in Elawa Badar (n25) 594. Sheikh Wahbeh alZuhili, ‘Islam 
and International Law’ (2005) 87(858) IRRC 275, 282. 
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not conflict with the Shari’a[,]’597 which supersedes any international treaty; Qurʾanic 
prescriptions trump any contract; and the lex pium is the basis for  an Islamic bellum justum.598 
Added to which, the Shari’a does not provide for the enumeration of individual rights, ‘[w]here 
Westerners speak a language of rights and entitlements, Arabs speak a language of context and 
relationship…’599  
 
This chapter will examine the evolution of Islamic LOAC providing a framework for the 
actions of certain salafi-styled Islamic groups. It will analyse the robust narratives and practical 
application of Islamic LOAC as it developed through the salafi era, distinguishing siyar from 
modern IHL with a focus on the principle of distinction. It will begin by briefly speaking to ad 
bellum comparisons before moving into in bello considerations.  
 
In the pre-Islamic traditions of Northern Arabia, ‘aggrieved parties would look to larger, 
powerful pastoral nomadic groups for revenge and protection.’600 A quasi-Hobbesian platform 
of ‘ritualized raiding and conflict was a normal state of affairs,’ clearly distinguished from 
larger scale conflict.601 Ghazi raiding typifies this normal state of affairs as it avoided 
confrontation with a greater emphasis on looting. There appears definite rules in this type of 
raiding with a primitive form of equality of belligerents, ‘attacking non-combatants with lethal 
intent…was…generally avoided,’ as was a general prohibition on violence against women and 
children.602 These pre-Islamic traditions act as a reservoir from where early Islamic notions of 
laws of war flow. As the Muslim conquerors developed the meaning and function of war in 
Islam, they subsumed the already developed and ‘imperially sanctioned ideals of religious 
warfare as defined and practiced by the Sasanian and Byzantine empires.’603 
 
                                                     
597 ‘Humanitarian Law and Islam’ (2005) The Magazine of the International Red Cross and Crescent Movement 
http://www.redcross.int/EN/mag/magazine2005_1/24-25.html accessed 25/06/15 
598 ‘Islamic rules of warfare are complex, appear to be contradictory and require careful analysis.’ Aboul-Enein 
& Zuhur (n251), 1.While the Islamic law of war is not dependent on treaties, ratification of treaties may impose 
additional restrictions on conflict conduct. For the importance of keeping agreements see chapter 4.1 Binding 
Islamic Groups: Pacta Sunt Servanda and ‘al ‘aqd Shari’at at al-mut’aqidin. Hamidullah (n584), 229.  
599 Rosen (n13) 173 
600Fred Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton University Press 1981) 34. 
601 For example, Hobbes elaboration of a state of Nature in Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Michael Oakeshott ed., 
1957); Bergesen (n247) 11. 
602 Donner (n606) 35; Bergesen (n247) 11. 
603 See John Rich, ‘The Fetiales and Roman International Relations’ in James Richardson & Federico Santangelo 
Priests and State in the Roman World (Franz Steiner Verlag Stuttgart 2011) 187; Abdalla (n30) 25. The UN 
Security Council is a modern equivalent of the fetiales. Shearer (n520) 7. Aslan (n29) 80. 
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A first reading on Islamic rulings on war does not clearly distinguish whether they promote 
war or peace.604 The Qurʾan does not order war, rather it permits it when certain conditions are 
met.605 Consistent with all Islamic methodology, scholars provide Qurʾanic verses and 
Prophetic traditions as evidence of the existence of certain rules governing combat during 
war.606 Of the 6666 verses in the Qurʾan approximately 70 address the conduct of hostilities, 
which early Islamic scholars have extrapolated to form a coherent doctrine subject to 
interpretation As with conventional IHL, the Islamic law of qital balances the principles of 
military necessity, unnecessary suffering, distinction, and proportionality to guide conduct in 
conflict. These rules, though originating in the seventh and eighth century are still relevant.607 
‘Islam has always handcuffed its fighters’ hands,’ the primary sources of Islamic law imposing 
limits on the means and methods used during actual combat.608 
 
Islamic rules of war evolved from the 27 battles in which Prophet Muhammad played a direct 
or indirect role. Scholars who seek to harmonize Islamic LOAC with conventional IHL rely on 
three seminal figures in Islamic history with supporting ahadith: a Directive from the first and 
second Caliph’s and, although not temporally satisfying the salafi criteria, the documented 
conflict conduct of Salah al-Din Yusuf ibn Ayyub.609  
                                                     
604 Aboul-Enein & Zuhur (n251), 3. 
605 A. Abou-El-Wafa, Islam and the West: Coexistence or Clash/ (Dar Al-Nahda, Cairo, 2006), 249-262 in Badar 
(n25) 604 
606 Zawati (n444) 41-42. 
607 ‘By affirming the principle of humanity in the midst of war, al-Shaybānī… helped pioneer the modern law of 
armed conflict.’ However religious influence on the laws of war is not a settled subject. ‘As regards war, much is 
borrowed from the Etymologiae of St. Isidore 636 AD of Seville, whose influence on Mussulman law is clear.’ 
Scott (n228); Heba Aly ‘Islamic law and the rules of war’ (IRIN, April, 2014) 
<http://www.irinnews.org/report/99987/islamic-law-and-the-rules-of-war>; J Busuttil, ‘Humanitarian Law in 
Islam’ (1991) 30 Military law and Law of War Review 113 (Appendix) J Busuttil, ‘Humanitarian Law in Islam’ 
(1991) 30 Military law and Law of War Review 113 (Appendix). Ali & Rehman (n250), 338; Karima Bennoune, 
‘As-Salāmu ̀Alaykum? Humanitarian Law in Islamic Jurisprudence’, (1994) 15(2) Mich. J. Int’l L. 605, 620-621. 
608 Cockayne, (n12), 599. 
609 Several hadiths prohibit the attack of specific categories of enemy non-combatants who do not participate in 
hostilities including: women and children, the old and infirmed, the blind, the incapacitated, the clergy and al-asif 
(farmers, craftsmen and traders). See for example Hadith 17932, 17933, 17934,17935, 17936,17937,2613 and 
2614 in Ahmad lbn Al-Husayn Ibn Ali Ibn Musa Al-Bayhaqi, Sunan Al-Bayhaqi Al-Kubra. Badar (n25) 620. A 
similar provision is found in Article 3(a) of the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, which provides that 
‘in the event of the use of force and in case of armed conflict, it is not permissible to kill non-belligerents such as 
old men, women and children.’ Cairo Declaration (1990). While religious personnel (the clergy) are protected 
persons under Islamic LOAC, this is not a blanket protection and distinguishes certain clergy. Aboul-Enein & 
Zuhur (n251); Roger Algase, ‘Protection Of Civilians Lives In Warfare: A Comparison Between Islamic Law 




5.1 Directives of Abu Bakr and ‘Umar 
The directive of Abu Bakr to Muslim troops before engaging in the Syrian campaign of 12 
AH/634 CE reflects the spirit of moderation and the humanitarian approach of the law of 
Islam.Its requirements serve as an important precursor to conventional IHL.610 Abu-Bakr gave 
the following instructions to Usama, the Muslim commander in chief leading the campaign:  
 
‘Do not betray or be treacherous or vindictive. Do not mutilate. Do not kill the children, 
the aged or the women. Do not cut or burn palm trees. Do not slay a sheep, a cow or 
camel except for your food. And you will come across people who confined themselves 
to worship in hermitages... Leave them alone to what they devoted themselves for.’611  
 
Four years later Caliph Umar ibn Al-Khattab extended this Directive, when his army laid siege 
to Jerusalem: 
 
‘I grant them security of lives, their possessions, their children, their churches, their 
crosses, and all that belong to them…Their churches shall not be impoverished, nor 
destroyed; neither endowments, nor their dignity…Neither shall the inhabitants of 
Jerusalem be exposed to violence in following their religion; nor shall one of them be 
injured.’612 
 
The Islamic conduct in hostilities exemplified by Abu Bakr and Umar continued through the 
seventh and twelfth centuries. The Ayyubid Caliph Salah al-Din Yusuf ibn Ayyub evidenced 
the values exhibited by the first two Caliph’s in their dealings with the Christian Crusaders. 
Moderates claim this indicates a continuous ‘recognition of [certain] values and proscriptions 
of the Shari’a and what would be modern IHL…’613 It is contended that claimimg a ‘continuous 
                                                     
610 While these commandments are invoked in every text which seeks to reconcile Islamic LOAC with modern 
IHL, some assert the motive for Abu Bakr’s commandment on keeping enemy property in tact was that he knew 
would win the wars and wanted the property to be useful spoils of war. Saqr, Al-Alaqat Al-Dawliyyah, in 
Hamidullah, (n584), 253-256.  
611 Another interation in the form of ‘commandments’ see Abu-Bakr instructing Yazid ibn-Abi Sufian for 
observance and adherence by the Muslim combatants. Maher Hathout, War Ethics in Islam (Minaret Publishing 
House 1989) 9 ; Al Watha’iq Al-Dawlia Wa  Al-Iqlimiyya Al-Macniyyaa Bi Huquq al-Isnan (M. Cherif-Bassiouni 
& K Mohey El Din eds., 3 vols., Cairo, Egypt: Dar al-Nahda, 2011). A M Cherif Bassiouni, (ed.), A Manual on 
International Humanitarian Law and Arms Control Agreements, (Transnational Publishers 2000); Alternate 
interpretation Abu Bakr al Siddiq in Maliks Muwatta Book 021, Hadith 010 under section on Prohibition against 
Killing Women and Children in Military Operations, cited in Wiktorowicz ‘Genealogy’ (n415) 86. 
612 S Imad-Ud-Din Asad Islamic Humanitarian Law, Dawn, (24 February 2006).  
613 Cherif-BassiouniaJihada(n19) 161; Amin Mallouf, The Crusades Through Arab Eyes (Schocken Books 1989) 
114 
 
recognition’ is an overstretch and undermines a robust and honest comparison of Islamic 
LOAC and IHL.  
 
‘[I]t is the mistaken idea that the proper way to do history is to prune away the dead 
branches of the past, and to preserve the green buds and twigs which have grown into 
the dark forest of our contemporary world.’614 
 
Learned academics defend Islam as a moderate religion claiming the targeting of civilians 
including women and children, hors de combat, the destruction of religious property and torture 
are prohibited in Islam. They continue, that no amount of doctrinal rationalization by 
‘insufficiently informed’ Muslim theologians and political activists can change this 
prohibition.615  Yet the recurrent flagrant disregard by certain Islamic groups of the ius in bello 
codified in the Geneva Conventions coupled with a quasi-uniform interpretation by these 
groups in their approach to Islamic LOAC casts doubt over this blanket opinion. It is suggested 
that rather than ignoring modern IHL, these groups, in the first instance, define the conflict 
theatre differently through the harb/Islam dichotomy. Further, they have different conceptions 
of distinction and what constitutes a legitimate target; different interpretations of what 
constitutes military necessity, what elements are weighed when measuring proportionality, as 
well as what is regarded as defensive.  
 
 ‘Islamic law assumes that the lives and property of non-believers are legitimate targets, 
except by virtue of a peace treaty (sulh), a safe-conduct (aman), or a covenant of 
protection (dhimmah); for the land of the enemy is a land of fighting, plunder, and 
legitimate targets.’616  
 
The urge to reconcile Islamic LOAC with modern IHL has led many publications to focus on 
conduct that aligns with conventional LOAC, avoiding acknowledging Islamic conflict 
conduct that would be prohibited under IHL. Aspects of modern IHL do not reflect salafi 
Islamic LOAC. Rather than move the chess pieces to make all of Islam fit into modern 
conceptions of IHL, a more intellectually honest approach would be to acknowledge that the 
chessboard moved in the nineteenth century and as a result some practices became violations 
                                                     
614 David Hackett, Historian Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought (Haroer & Row 1970) 135 
615 Cherif-BassiouniaShari’aa(n296) 3; Cockayne (n12), 599; Aly (n618) 
616 Mowatt-Larssen (n18) 144 
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of the laws and customs of (Christian) war.617 Historical narratives in Islamic extremist 
discourse illuminate the exegetical differences and make clear there are aspects of Islam that 





























                                                     
617 See the Battle of Solferino, the trigger for Henry Dunant to codify laws in war in a treaty. Both sides were 
Christian fighters: Franco-Sardinian Alliance against the Austrian Army. Althoughconventional IHL claims to be 
codification of universal LOAC. 
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Table 1. Protections of Specific Categories of Persons ( denotes protections) 
            Salafi Usul on Qital  
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A. 24 GC I 
A.36 GC II 
 
5.2 Distinction in Islamic Extremism 
‘Since the basis for permissible fighting is jihad which strives to uphold religion, and 
make the word of God Supreme, whoever obstructs [these purposes] must be fought. 
                                                     
618 Ibn Rushd (1126-1198) opines there is consensus among classical jurists that non-believers may be captured 
in war time including women and children. Ibn Rushd and I Nyazee, The Distinguished Jurist’s Primer, Ithaca 
Press (2000) cited in Nagamine,(n71),226. 
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[S]ome have argued that the status of unbelief in itself merits execution, but they 
exempted women and children because they may be useful for Muslims.’619 
 
The dualistic principle of distinction in conventional IHL requires parties to distinguish at all 
times between civilians and combatants as well as between military and civilian objects. 
‘Civilians enjoy their protection from direct attack unless and for such time as they take a direct 
part in hostilities. Only military objectives may be attacked.’620  
 
‘Warre be so managed that the innocent may be as little damnified as possible.’621 The 
concept of innocent in early English discourse means ‘unoffending’, ‘not deserving of the 
suffering inflicted.’ In a conflict context, it means those whose life and work ‘in no way 
contribute to the prosecution of war, whose manner of life is ‘opposed to war’, for example 
farmers, nursing mothers, the infirmed, writers and children.622 Gaps have been identified 
in this construct regarding the vast cohort of people who sustain war operations from the 
shadows and cannot claim a ‘moral’ innocence. Where military engagements in puritanical 
Islamic discourse distinguishes between the innocent and the guilty,623 conventional IHL 
has moved the distinction brackets from questions of who is innocent to who qualifies for 
protection. It is difficult to keep the moral legal lines separate. 
 
Neo-classical interpretations of hadiths, jurisprudence and legal text extend the status of 
protected persons under Islamic law to include: women; children; peasants; and religious 
personnel; relative of fighting persons; craftemen; traders; farmers; hermits and servants cannot 
                                                     
619 Ibn Taymiyya, al-Siyasa, 106 in El-Fadl ‘Rules’ (n473) 152. 
620 The principle of distinction is codified in A. 44(3), 48, 51(2) and 52(2) of API; A. 13(2) AP II prohibits making 
the civilian population as well as individual civilians the object of attck. See also Rule 1 CIHL https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule1; ICJ Nuclear Weapons Case; Article 3 (a) Cairo 
Declaration on Human Rights in Islam. In the conduct of hostilities, Art. 50(1) of Protocol I defines civilians as 
all those who are not ‘referred to in Article 4(A)(1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third Convention and in Article 43 of 
this Protocol’. Once they have fallen into enemy hands, Art. 4 of Convention IV defines as protected civilians all 
those who fulfil the nationality requirements and are not protected by GC III. This would mean that any enemy 
who is not protected by GC III falls under GC IV.  
621 William Ames, 17th Century Puritan Divine cited in Abdel-Haleem (n4) 133. 
622 Abdel-Haleem (n4) 137. 
623 John Kelsay, Islam and War (John Knox Press 1993) 36 
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be targeted.624 This is not to say that these protected persons are immune from capture, 
enslavement or exchange.625 
 
The practice of the Prophet Muhammad was to make a clear distinction between combatants 
and non-combatants’ although qualification for protected status is unclear.626 Two distinct 
categories of persons similar to conventional IHL were developed, one protected, the other a 
legitimate target: Al-muqatilah, ahi Al-qital, al-muharibah (combatants, fighters, warriors) and 
Ghayr al-muqatilah, ghayr al-muharibah (non-combatants, non-fighters and non-warriors).627 
It also distinguishes combatant status along identity lines, ‘Muslim vs. non-Muslim. In some 
cases, it distinguishes further between fellow ‘scriptuaries’, Jews and Christians, and other non-
Muslims, such as pagans.’628  
 
Non-combatant Immunity in Islamic law is typically determined by the capacity of the target 
country or individual to fight against Muslims.629 ‘[T]he Islamic position is clear: there is no 
justification for warfare directed intentionally against non-combatants in jihad.’630 Violence 
directed towards civilians, Muslim or non-Muslim is contrary to Islam, however the definition 
of civilian is highly varied in Islamic jurisprudence.631 In Islam, the restriction around protected 
                                                     
624 Aly (n618); See also Al-Zuhili who refers to the Islamic principle of distinction between legitimate military 
objectives and civilian objects as an important one in an Islamic law of war, as well as prohibitions of the killing 
of priests, women, and children. alZuhili (n596) 289-81; Sohail Hashmi, ‘Saving and Taking Life in War: Three 
Modern Muslim Views’ (1999) 89(2) Muslim World 158, 169; Hamidullah, (n584) 59; Abu Dawud Book 008, 
Chapter unknown, Hadith No. 2608; ibn ‘Umar Book 052, Hadith No. 258; Malik Mwatta Book 021, Hadith No. 
009, section 293 cited in Nagamine,(n71), 221. 
625 ‘[Islamic] literature on who may or may not be targeted in war indicates that non-combatant immunity was a 
full-blown doctrine developed by the second/eight and third/ninth century Muslim jurist.’ Al-Dawoody (n440) 
116, 205 
626 In early Islamic times tribal conduct in conflict included using children as human shields by holding them over 
the walls of the fort so that the enemy would stop shooting them with arrows. M. Al-Shaybānī, The Islamic Law 
of Nations: Shaybānī’s Siyar (trans. Khadduri 1966), 103. When Muslim fighters inquired whether it was 
acceptable to hit the children with their arrows Muhammad advised they distinguish to the best of their ability 
between combatants and non-combatants. A.H. Al-Mawardi, The Islamic Law of Governance (trans. A, Yate, 
2005), 65; Shah, ‘Force’ (n71), 360. A mujahidin would be considered a professional soldier; his proto-State 
recognized as an Islamic State so long as, and to the extent that all his activities took on the ‘colour of Allah.’ 
General M. Zia ul-Haq, Foreword to Malik, The Qurʾanic Concept of War (n304). 
627 Hamidullah defines combatants as ‘those who are physically capable of fighting’. Hamidullah, (n584), 59 
628 If distinction is frustrated to the extent it is near impossible to distinguish between military from non-military 
targets or if every effort is made to distinguish between them, then any resulting collateral damage is acceptable. 
Collateral damage is allowed, but distinction remains one of the basic principles of the Islamic law of qital. Aly, 
(n618); Sobhi Mahmassani ‘International Law in the Light of Islamic Doctrine’ (1966) 117 RdC, 301 cited in Ali 
& Rehman (n250) 335. 
629 Chaiwat Satha-Anand, ‘Nonviolent Crescent: Eight Theses on Muslim Nonviolent Actions,’ in G Paige, C 
Satha-Anand & S Gilliatt (eds), Islam and Nonviolence (University of Hawaii Press 1993); Charles Lindholm, 
Generosity and Jealousy: The Swat Pukhtun of Northern Pakistan (Columbia University Press 1982) 10 
630 James Johnson, Morality and Contemporary Warfare (Yale University Press 1999) 186 
631 Cherif-BassiouniaShari’aa(n296) 3 
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categories of person centre on whether the person is ‘fit for fighting.’632 Children could not 
directly participate in hostilities until the age of fifteen.633 
 
In the waging of jihad, all adult males, except for slaves and monks, are considered legitimate 
military targets and no distinction is made between military and civilians the same way that 
within the umma there was no distinction between the citizen and the soldier. Women and 
children may not be targeted directly, unless they act as combatants by supporting the enemy 
in some manner.  The extent to what constitutes the Islamic equivalent to direct participation 
in hostilities (DPH) is unclear. The enemy may be attacked without regard for indiscriminate 
damage, and it is permissible to kill women in night raids when Muslim fighters cannot easily 
distinguish them from men.634 
 
The verse ‘Fight in the cause of Allah’ [or more befittingly ‘for the sake of Allah’] those who 
fight you’ limits the target to the actual aggressor.635 Weighting engagement in active fighting 
over profession as a determinant of combatant status has received support from many 
scholars.636 Rationale for the Islamic law principle of distinction being action based over status 
based is credited to the period in which the principle evolved. The Qurʾan and Sunna of the 
Prophet Mohammed are replete with enjoinments against killing civilians. However, civilians 
can lose their protected status if they take part in the fighting. As in IHL, the definition of DPH 
is contentious and subject to differing opinions.637 
Distinction under Islamic law was developed when professional armies did not yet exist and 
ad hoc recruitment of fighters met the needs of a particular battle. While moderates would 
                                                     
632 Muhammad Al-Ghazali, Al-Wasit Fi Al-Madhhab, ed. Abmad Mahmud Ibrahim and Muhammad Tamir, 7 
Vols. (Dar Al-Salam, Cairo 1997/1417) Vol.7, 19, in Al-Dawoody, (n440) 112. 
633 The figure stemming from when the Prophet is said to have stopped a fourteen-year-old Muslim boy named 
Ibn Umar from fighting in the Battle of Uhud, but one year later allowed him to fight in another war. Khadduri 
War (n434) 54 
634 It was after encountering the body of a non-Muslim woman killed in battle that the Prophet (PBUH) said ‘She 
is not one who would have fought.’ He then said to one of his companions ‘Catch up with Khalid [Ibn al-Waleed, 
the foremost Muslim general] and tell him not to kill women, children and prisoners.’ Sunan Abu Dawood and 
Ahmed cited in Begg, ‘Jihad’ (n8). The protective status of women is expounded from the Sunna where ‘[t]he 
Messenger of Allah…saw the corpse of a women who had been slain in one of the raids, and he disapproved of it 
and forbade the killing of women and children.’ Malik, Al-Muwatta, 21:3:9 
635 The Qurʾan 2:190. Nagamine,(n71), 61. 
636 ‘Force should be used only against those ranks that are engaged in fighting or at the most against those from 
whom you fear some evil. All others should be safeguarded from the effects of war.’ Mawdudi, al-Jihad fi al-
Islam, 217 
637 ‘Once they carry weapons for fighting, or contribute intelligence, war strategies or suggestions to the army, 
their status changes from civilians to combatants,’ according to more extreme interpretations, supporting the 
enemy even by opinion, propaganda or moral support makes someone a combatant. Aly (n618). 
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crudely align with conventional IHL, albeit including a much broader concept of DPH,638 more 
extreme views would pre-empt a combatant as ‘anybody who is physically capable of 
fighting’.639 Proponents of offensive jihad would see all unbelievers as permissible targets. The 
Qurʾanic concept of war applies to both soldier and civilian alike. Jihad fi-sabil Allah is not 
the exclusive domain of the professional soldier, nor is it restricted to the application of military 
force alone.640 
 
In a situation of invasion or occupation, all those associated with the effort, even if not carrying 
arms, are considered legitimate targets and all Muslim civilians are under obligation to fight to 
defend the homeland.  Al Qaeda reasons that because a democratically elected government 
reflects the will of the people, a war against Islam of this magnitude must have popular support. 
So while the Qurʾan states that ‘God does not forbid you to show kindness to unbelievers who 
do not fight you because of your faith or drive you from your homes,’641  extremist circumvent 
this call for peaceful relations seeing citizens of countries with foreign policy they find inimical 
as combatants, and aggressors. 
 
Radicals emphasize that alleged ‘civilians’ are not really non-combatants.642 One example is 
in the case of conscription where the entire country must perform mandatory military duty. 
Such states, through a radicalized lens, can be viewed as a ‘completely military’ societies that 
do not include any civilians, thus all inhabitants are legitimate targets, without exception.  643  
 
5.2.1 Distinction and Apostasy 
‘When your Lord revealed to the angels: I am with you; therefore make firm those 
who believe. I will cast terror into the hearts of those who disbelieve. Therefore strike 
off their heads and strike off every fingertip of them.’644 
                                                     
638 For example, al-Zuhayli includes inter alia: heads of state, military leaders, military medical personnel, and 
military postal carriers – anyone who would direct or support the war effort. Al-Zuhayli, Athar al-harb fi al-fiqh 
al-islami:dirawa muqarana, 505 cited in Hashmi ‘Saving’ (n624) 169.  
639 Hamidullah (n584) 59. 
640 A different puritanical take on targeting non-believer civilians is submitted by Abdel Kishek, a prominent Sufi 
sheikh during the jihadist attacks on nightclubs and bars in Egypt in the late 1980s and 1990. He argued this ‘kill 
the infidel’ mentality had no basis in Islamic logic: Satan, he told Salafists that Islam’s purpose was to show 
people the light. By killing the so-called ‘infidels’ and sending them to Hell, Salafists were not helping God; they 
were helping Satan. Aly (n618). 
641 The Qurʾan 60:8-9. 
642 Wiktorowicz ‘Genealogy’ (n415) 93- 94. 
643 “Stop Terror Sheikhs, Muslim Academics Demand.” Arab News. 30 October 2004. 
http://archive.arabnews.com/?page= 4&section=0&article=53683&d=30&m=10&y=2004  




Where IHL distinguishes between combatant and non-combatant, prisoners of war and those 
hors de combat,645 fundamentalist Islamic LOAC distinguishes primarily between those 
subordinating themselves to God’s will and those who intend to usurp the sovereignty of God; 
those who follow in the path of God and those who do not. Put crudely, good is distinguished 
from evil. This good-evil polemic is exemplified in the hadd offence of apostasy which creates 
in Islam another category of combatant or class of people that have lost their civilian status.646  
 
The institution of the hadd offence serves to deter Muslims from crimes harmful to 
humanity.647 There are fixed punishments attached to each offence ranging from flogging and 
amputation escalating to death by crucifixion or stoning.648 Although purification from sin is 
an important element in the hadd cycle, the ‘universal application of hadd offences in its 
application makes expiation a secondary consideration.’649 Hadd crimes, while few, are 
‘notoriously harsh’ and for the most part ‘irreconcilable with contemporary human rights 
norms.’650 Apostasy, or ridda, is considered a hadd offence by most schools of Islam.651  
 
There were competing trends within Classical Islam concerning the penalty for failing to adopt 
Islam. The first believed this offence warranted execution. The second trend was more lenient, 
seeing apostasy as a grave crime but not sufficient to warrant death.652 Scholars disagreed over 
whether apostates could be killed simply for their disbelief or only if they posed a danger to 
                                                     
645 See GC III protection for prisoners of war. IHL also protects other persons deprived of liberty as a result of 
armed conflict. See also Rule 47 CIHL ‘Attacking persons who are recognized as hors de combat is prohibited.’ 
In IAC see Article 41(1) and 85(3)(e); in NIAC see CA3; Article 4 AP II; ICC Statute, Article 8(2)(b)(vi). Rule 
87 CIHL It is unclear the value added by the word’especially’. 
646 While it is tempting to equate the IHL principle of direct participation in hostilities (DPH) such comparison 
would be lazy. Better aligned with the doctrine of DPH, Islamic jurists provide that if women and children are 
involved in fighting during the war, by direct participation, physically or in an advisory role their protective status 
is forfeited. Mahmassani (n368) 221 in Badar (n25) 607- 608. 
647 Scholars generally agree between four and seven such crimes: adultery; false accusation of adultery; wine 
drinking; theft; brigandage; and apostasy. 
648 The fixed nature of the punishments is designed to act as a deterrence to would be offenders. MS El-Awa, 
Punishment in Islamic Law (Am Trust, 1982) cited in Reza (n 25) 23 
649 Peters Crime  (n254) 53 
650 The declaration of a person as an apostate has serious repercussions, and the vast majority of Muslims are 
conservative in their approach to such a pronouncement, congruent with ‘Qurʾanic cautionary notes and stories 
about the Prophet.’ It appears from various reports that provided a leader has a ‘mustard seed of faith’ and 
implements prayer, he should be considered Muslim. If a Muslim calls another kafir [unbeliever], then if he is a 
kafir let it be so; otherwise, he [the caller] is himself a kafir. (saying of the Prophet from Abu Dawud, Book of 
Sunna, edition published by Quran Mahal, Karachi, vol. iii, 484) (saying of the Prophet from Bukhari, Book of 
Ethics; Book 78, ch. 44) Wiktorowicz ‘Genealogy’ (n415) 77; Reza (n 25) 22. 
651  Peters Crime (n254) 53. 
652After 4AH/10CE the lenient strand became dominant eclipsed the harsher position. El-Fadl ‘Rules’ (n473) 152 
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Muslims.653 One interpretation of apostasy finds the non-believer guilty of treason in Islamic 
law following the logic that every human is a slave to God and when that slave acts in a defiance 
of God’s authority he becomes guilty of an offence and should be treated as a ‘cancerous 
growth on the organism of humanity.’654 Insurrection against apostate regimes was used as a 
religo-politico justification for armed revolt against infidel rulers and the imperative of 
Muslims.655  There remains minority juristic opinion that subscribes to the ‘moral guilt incurred 
when one fails to adopt Islam justif[ying] their execution.’656 
 
Contextualizing ridda in the 7th century positions the offence in an era where war was 
recognized ‘as a lawful means of conquering territories’ and subduing a population by Caliphs, 
Monarchs, Khans and like rulers. Apostasy features throughout Islamic narratives providing 
contemporary fundamentalists with a reservoir of examples from which to base their extremist 
rhetoric. Counterarguments cite Qurʾanic verses that show Islam clearly advocating that there 
is no compulsion in religion,657 which in turn means ‘waging jihad against non-Muslims on 
account of their denial of Muhammad's mission is at variance with Qurʾanic teachings.’658  
 
‘[E]mphasis on non-violence is not the pattern in the Muslim culture. To the contrary, 
violence has been a central, accepted element, both in Muslim teaching and in the 
historical conduct of the religion. The religious bias in the Middle Eastern Culture has 
not been to discourage the use of force, but to encourage it,’659 with Islam as ‘a religion 
of the sword...glorify[ing] military values.’660   
 
For militant Islamists, the problem is defined by religion, the conflict flows from religion, and 
the solution is derived from religion. In their view, the root of the problem is essentially 
                                                     
653 By the 10th century, according to Abou El Fadl, the predominant view was that only those who fought could 
be killed. 
654 Malik The Qurʾanic Concept of War (n304), Preface; The apostate delineation between Muslim and non-
Muslim within Islamic law is comparable to the crusade doctrine within ius ad bellum legitimizing war against 
Islam as a ‘just war’, ‘a manifestation of God’s disapproving judgment’ against the infidels. Cockayne, (n12), 
600. 
655 Al-Mawardi, a leading Shafi’i jurist teaching in Basra and Baghdad in the 11th century, divided armed conflict 
in the Islamic nation into two general categories: wars of public interest and wars against polytheists and apostates. 
Ramadan (n13) 68, 157; Durrani (n15) 324.  
656 See El-Fadl ‘ Rules’ (n473) 144, 152. 
657 The Qurʾan 2:256. 
658 Syed (n10) 158. 
659 James Payne, Why Nations Arm (Blackwell 1989) 121. 
660 Huntington (n485) 263. 
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mankind’s alienation from God, the need to be reconciled with God, and Islam’s role in 
bringing mankind back to God’s good graces.661 
 
Apostasy has from its inception aligned with grand narratives of Islam. The Qurʾan, Sunna and 
hadiths provide many examples of good triumphing over evil. These binary oppositions play 
an important role in guiding extremism, whereby extremists source these narratives, ignoring 
‘inconvenient details’, to rationalize their conduct and rally support for their cause (see table 
2). Binary themes of Nobel sacrifice and betrayal, deliverance and revenge with characters 
including the tyrant, martyr, saviour and traitor are recurrent features in extremist 
propaganda.662 These narratives provide greater understanding into conflict conduct that was 
permissible in the time of Muhammad and permits comparison with the conflict conduct of 
contemporary extremist groups who claim to be aligned with these practices. 
 
5.2.2 Distinction and Jahiliyya  
Islamist ideologue and most prominent theoretician of militant Islamist ideology Sayyid Qutb 
premised his discourse on the ills of the world being a symptom of a reversion to jahiliyya. 
Man, through his self-deifying systems like communism, socialism and nationalism had 
attempted to usurp the sovereignty of God on earth.663 Qutb claimed that once the sahaba died 
out, the purity of Islam lost its way and that the whole world was steeped in the symptoms of 
the jahiliyya disease.664 Qutb resurrected the heretical doctrine of takfir or excommunication, 
articulated by ibn Taymiyya, claiming that the Egyptian regime, Nasser and his supporters were 
in fact apostates. Islamic extremists following the doctrine of takfir would see as part of their 
role the determination of who is and is not Muslim. Taymiyya claimed that anyone who did 
not rule according to Shari’a should be fought as they are apostates. Ruling with mixed laws 
is also tantamount to usurping Gods sovereignty, the Mongols who used customary Mongol 
law (Yasa) instead of Shari’a were subjected to military jihad against them. Qutb favoured the 
idea of all-out war against the forces of jahiliyya. 665 By manipulating interpretations of verses 
                                                     
661 Mowatt-Larssen (n18). 
662 The late nineteenth century saw the rise of the discipline of geopolitic-knowledge claims about the impact of 
geography on the conduct of foreign policy. A geopolitical vision is ‘any idea concerning the relation between 
one's own and other places, involving feelings of (in)security or (dis)advantage (and/or) invoking ideas about a 
collective mission or foreign policy .... [which] requires at least a Them-and-Us distinction.’ Gertjan Dijkink, 
National Identity & Geopolitical Vision: Maps Of Pride & Pain (Routledge 1996); Halverson (n260) 184, 189, 
201. 
663 Qutb’s treatise Milestones (Ma’alim fi’l’Tariq), written during his imprisonment under the regime of Gamal 
‘Abdel-Nasser (d.1970) is the most famous and influential of his radical works.  
664 S Qutb, Milestones, trans Anonymous (New Delhi: Islamic Book Service, 2002), 10-11,82. 
665 Halverson (n260)43. 
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of the Qurʾan, Qutb was able to sanction action to dismiss rulers who failed to comply with the 
divine law.666  Echoing the ‘Marxist treatises of Lenin and Trotsky’ Qutb’s posited an idea of 
a revolutionary vanguard to lead the struggle for a new social order.667 
 
The Pharaoh: The Qurʾanic Personification of the Fallen Man. 
‘The Pharaoh of the time sends arrows everywhere 
These arrows will finally strike Washington’s chest’668 
 
The Torah claims Moses was reared as an Egyptian prince. As Moses grew up he ‘encountered 
the god of his ancestors, Yahweh, in the desert [as told through the story of the burning 
bush].’669 Moses used the threat of divine retribution to champion the emancipation of the 
Hebrew people. When the Pharaoh refused Moses’ request, Yahweh punished him by 
drowning. Although there is no archeological evidence of either the existence of Moses or the 
enslavement of Hebrews, nor does the Torah identify the Pharaoh in the story by name, the 
Pharaoh-Moses narrative was resuscitated in the seventh century in the Qurʾan.670 
 
Akin to the Torah, the identity of Moses’ Pharaoh is unnamed in the Qurʾan although it is 
believed to be Ramses II (d. ca. 1213 BCE). The Pharaoh is the most prominent archetype in 
the Qurʾan, with references scattered throughout the non-linear Qurʾanic structure. Portrayed 
as an arrogant, authoritarian obsessed with material gain, this obstinate tyrant that rejects the 
Word of God revealed by His Prophet is punished and his body is preserved as a divine warning 
for future nations to submit to Gods Will. The narrative of the Pharaoh is used by Islamic 
extremists as a mirror of their own struggles against anti-Islamic rulers.671  
 
The Pharaoh in extremist discourse is evidenced throughout the Islamic world. In Egypt it was 
used by the assassin of Anwar Sadat in 1981. After shooting Sadat thirty-seven times the 
assassin, Lieutenant Khalid al-Islambouli, a member of an Islamic extremist group Tanzim al-
                                                     
666  Shahrough Akhavi, ‘Sayyid Qutb’ The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, Vol 3, ed J L 
Esposito (OUP 1995) 402 
667 Halverson (n260) 45. 
668 Example of Pashtun Poetry in Alex Strick Van Linschoten & Felix Kuehn, Poetry of the Taliban, (Hurst and 
Company 2012) 44 
669 Halverson (n260) 28. 
670 The Arabic word for Pharaoh in the Qurʾan is fir’aun which gave rise to the verb tafar’ana meaning ‘to behave 
like a tyrant.’ Joseph Campbell, The Power of Myth (Anchor 1991). 
671 Halverson (n260). 
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Jihad exclaimed ‘I have killed the Pharaoh!’672   Former Israeli President Arial Sharon was 
also compared to the Pharaoh in 2006. Having enraged the Muslim community with his right-
wing actions regarding Palestine, amplified after he toured al-Asqa Mosque and asserted Israeli 
sovereignty over the Nobel Sanctuary to the Muslims and Temple Mount to the Jews. When 
Sharon fell into a coma after a stroke, Islamic (and Jewish) extremists attributed his fate to 
divine retribution. Propaganda began appearing on the internet, cartoons of Sharon in a 
vegetative state with a photo on his side table of Ramses II.673 The US Presidents are favorites 
of the Pharaoh narrative in Islamic extremism. Bin Laden referred to President George W Bush 
as the ‘Pharaoh of the century’674 while the Taliban published an article in its online Arabic 
language magazine Al-Sumud in 2009 which equated President Bush to the Pharaoh and the 
mujahidin to Moses and his people.675 The designation of Pharaoh extends to Western leaders 
as a whole, and there is a recurring theme that the West are Pharaoh and Islamic extremists 
take the role of Moses charged with delivering divine retribution.676 Through this narrative, 
extremists position themselves as having a prophetic role as Allah’s agent on earth and create 
a framework for violent revolutionary action. 
 
5.3 Battles  
The conflict typology of the Prophet’s campaign consisted of Muslims fighting non-Muslims, 
yet the battles could not properly be classified as tribal or religious. These battles were not 
tribal since members of the same tribe, even the same family could be found on opposing lines; 
nor were they religious in the sense that the fighting against non-Muslims was not based on 
religious identity. Rather, this early fighting was simply for the protection of life, property, 
honour and the right to believe and practice their faith.677  Using case studies of Muhammad’s 
military campaign and understanding the historical conflict narrative contextualizes the conflict 
conduct that contemporary Salafi-styled Islamic groups subscribe. These battles have remained 
a normative reference point for contemporary mujahid and Islamic extremists alike. 
                                                     
672 The designation of Pharaoh extends to all rulers not just those of Muslim countries, and any political ruler 
deemed to be hostile to Islam is a worthy Pharaoh to be opposed. Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The 
Prophet and Pharaoh, (University of California Press 1993); Halverson (n260) 33. 
673 Halverson (n260) 35. 
674 In an audio statement released November 2002 Bin Laden quoted in Henry Shuster, ‘Al-Qaeda-Linked Web 
Site Posts Bin Laden Tape Text,’ CNN (NY, 14 Nov 2002) 
675 Opensource cited in Halverson (n260) 35.   
676 See also Shaykh Faisal  ‘Rejecting the Taghut (False Idols), ‘The Propoganda War: War of Words’ (2009) 
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5.3.1 The Battle of Badr (624 CE) 
Triumph against all odds, the tales of epic battles where the righteous conquer evil are recurrent 
legends of the ancient world. The Battle of Badr is arguably the most famous of these battles 
in Islamic history. Comparable to an Islamic David and Goliath parable,678 the conflict saw a 
small and ill-equipped army of three hundred Muslim believers triumph over a superior pagan 
army of one thousand animist warriors. Aided by the support of Allah and His angels, 
Muhammad’s small army of believers defeated the jahili.  
 
The battle stemmed from a ghazi raid gone awry. When the muhajirun, the Muslim migrants, 
left Mecca they arrived in Yathrib without any assets. There was one viable traditional avenue 
for revenue open to these migrants, ghazi raiding. Ghazi raids fell within the traditional cultural 
norms of Arabia, and the Muslim community launched raids against pagan caravans for booty. 
The idea was to avoid physical confrontation and focus on the goods to be confiscated. Ghazi 
raids were not only expected, they were morally justified through revelation.679 
 
In 624 CE Muhammad planned such a raid against a gold carrying Quraysh caravan.  On siting 
the caravan, Muhammad, the Muslims and some of Medinese ‘Aws and Khazraj tribe began to 
strategically manoeuvre. The Meccan caravan became aware of Muhammad’s plan and was 
rerouted to safety. When the Meccan forces subsequently positioned themselves in attacking 
distance of Medina, the Muslims mounted their defence. This consisted of crystallizing the 
loyalty of the tribes that were present through a pledge of obedience; cutting off the water 
supply that would have sustained the advancing Meccans.680 The Prophet is said to have 
distinguished himself during through the Battle of Badr 624 CE and it was recorded that the 
Muslim warriors wore for the first time a special sign made from wool. When the battle began 
to escalate, and the Muslim fighters assumed their position, Muhammad prayed for Divine 
assistance. The response was Allah sending a thousand angels to reinforce Muhammad’s 
men.681 While the majority of the Meccan’s retreated at the sight of the angels joining the 
struggle against them, some Meccan’s remained. ‘Amir ibn Hisham pejoratively known as Abu 
Jahl (‘father of ignorance’) was one of the military leaders who stayed.682 Two young Islamic 
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679 The Qurʾan 22:39- 40 
680 S ur-Rahman al-Mubarakpuri, Ar-Raheeq al-Makhtun (The Sealed Nectar): Biography of the Nobel Prophet 
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converts managed to disarm ‘Amir, and as he lay on the ground taking his last breath he was 
beheaded by a sahaba (‘Abdullah ibn Masud) announcing ‘This is the Pharaoh of this nation.’ 
Of the seventy Meccan captives, two were executed.683 The Battle of Badr narrative, the 
deliverance, has resonated with current conflicts, most notably, the Soviet-Afghan War giving 
extremists a popular David and Goliath platform.  Citing the Battle of Badr, Ayman al-Zawahiri 
(Al-Qaeda) argued that it was forbidden for Muslims to show any kindness towards unbelievers 
even if they were in their own families.684 
 
5.3.2 Battle of the Trench/ Battle of Confederates 627 CE 
In conjunction with the elect and damned polemic that manifests in Islam through the Badr and 
Jahiliyya narratives is the triangular construct of treachery and betrayal with its consequent 
vengeance.  In Christianity, this construct is best expressed in the archetypal form of Judas of 
Iscariot who betrayed Jesus to the Romans. This betrayal laid the platform for centuries of anti-
Semitism, which by the fourth century CE became entrenched in the writings and teachings of 
the Church. 685 While in Christianity the betrayal is by an individual, in Islam the betrayal is 
collective and the entire group is condemned.686  
 
The Battle of the Trench also known as the Battle of the Confederates was a 27-day-long siege 
of Medina by Arab and Jewish tribes. Through the Charter of Medina, Muhammad formed 
alliances with the different tribes including the Bani Qaynuqa, Bani Nadir and Bani Qurayza. 
Through its affirmation of the mutual rights and protections between Muslims Jews and Arab 
tribes (‘Aws and Khazraj) the Charter and these alliances were invariably tested through 
various offensives between the Meccans and the Muslims. The first test came through the Bani 
Qaynuqa. One of their tribe killed a Muslim after an altercation. The Jewish tribe had expected 
the Muslims to revert to ‘the old Arab tribal system of honour, revenge, and blood feuds.’687 
                                                     
683 ur-Rahman (n680) 229 in Halverson (n260) 52. 
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Pre-empting such action and ignoring the role arbitration was meant to play under the Charter 
of Medina, the Bani Qaynuqa ‘withdrew to their fortified settlements…and summoned their 
old tribal allies to defend them.’688 When they eventually surrendered Muhammad banished 
them to Syria for breaching the Pact.  
 
This disregard of the Charter was closely followed by another betrayal, this time from the Bani 
Nadir. Tensions already existed following the Battle of Badr and were exacerbated following 
a subsequent act of treason. When Muhammad discovered a member of the Bani Nadir had 
attempted to poison him he banished the entire tribe. When they refused to leave a small battle 
ensued and after the Bani Nadir surrendered the majority settled in the northern town of 
Khaybar.  
 
While in exile, the Jews of Bani Nadir aligned with the Quraysh and other enemies of the 
Prophet. On discovering a ten thousand strong army descending on Medina, the Muslims built 
a trench around the city to fend off Meccan cavalry. One of the Bani Nadir was adamant he 
could convince the remaining Jews from the Bani Qurayza tribe still inside the fortification of 
Medina to join the confederates. Although not unanimous the Bani Qurayza that supported 
betraying the Muslims outweighed the loyalists and they joined the confederates. The narrative 
sees bad weather orchestrated by the Divine making combat conditions unbearable for those 
outside the trench and they retreated, leaving the Bani Qurayza alone inside the trench. 
Revelation sanctioned the Muslims to besiege the Bani Qurayza fortress which, after twenty-
five days, left the Jewish tribe defeated and subject to a fate prescribed by the ‘Aws tribe. This 
included death to men who could potentially fight and enslaving the women and children.689  
A new trench was dug in the marketplace and for hours between six and seven hundred Bani 
Qurayza were beheaded and cast into the makeshift grave.690 
 
5.3.3 The Battle of Khaybar (629) 
One year after the Battle of the Trench, Muhammad signed a peace accord with the Quraysh, 
the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah 628 CE. A strategic arrangement, by securing peace to the south, 
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Muhammad could focus on the Jewish threat of Khaybar and their agenda of ‘exterminating 
the Islamic State.’691 
 
 ‘The Prophet set out for Khaybar and reached it at night…when day dawned, the Jews 
came out with their bags and spades. When they saw the Prophet the said: ‘Muhammad 
and his army!’ The Prophet said ‘Allahu Akbar! (Allah is greater) and Khaybar is 
ruined, for whenever we approach a nation (i.e. enemy to fight) then it will be a 
miserable morning for those who have been warned.’692 
 
Muhammad had discovered a water supply servicing the Bani Qurayza and to gain advantage, 
turned it off, forcing the Jews into combat. Once again Muhammad and the Muslims were 
victorious.693  
 
Al-Qaeda, Lebanon’s Hezbollah, the Baathists have used the Battle of Khaybar and protection 
of the Islamic state to rationalize anti-Semitism and the destruction of the Jewish State. The 
narrative proves convenient whenever there is an ‘archetypal traitor’ and provides ‘fodder for 
violent actions [and] a degree of persuasive power that discourages those who may otherwise 
be inclined towards peace…694  
 
Table 2    The Use of Narratives by Armed non-State Actors in Islamic Extremism 
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692 Narrated Anas, Sahih al-Bukhari Vol 4, Book 52, No 195; 
http://cmje.usc.edu/schools/college/crcc/engagement/resources/texts/muslim/hadith/bukhari/052.sbt.html#004.0
52.195 
693 To balance this perspective, some claim that Muhammad went after the Jewish tribe to gain their wealth and 
land. Michael Cook & Patricia Crone, Hagarism: The Making of the Islamic World (Cambridge University Press, 
1976) 
694 Halverson (n260) 78 – 80. 
130 
 
5.4 Prisoners Of War (POW) 
‘So when you meet those who disbelieve [in battle], strike [their] necks until, when 
you have inflicted slaughter upon them, then secure their bonds, and either [confer] 
favour afterwards or ransom [them] until the war lays down its burdens. That [is the 
command]. And if Allah had willed, He could have taken vengeance upon them 
[Himself], but [He ordered armed struggle] to test some of you by means of others. 
And those who are killed in the cause of Allah - never will He waste their deeds.’695 
 
Islamic tradition outlines clear standards of responsibility and accountability. The following 
hadith encourages fighters to refuse to commit war crimes on the battlefield: Aligned with the 
laws around baghy, ‘[i]t is obligatory for one to listen to and obey a Muslim ruler’s orders, 
unless these orders involve disobedience to God; but if an act of disobedience to God is 
commanded, it is not listened to or obeyed.’ In one example, the Prophet’s companion, 
Abdullah bin Umar, refused to comply with an alleged order from his commander Khalid bin 
Walid, one of Islam’s greatest generals, to kill all prisoners since bin Umar saw it as unjust. 
His decision was later vindicated by the Prophet.696 
 
There is no Qurʾanic prescription that says POWs must be held captive, although this was the 
practice of the time. Further, nothing in the Qurʾan would prevent Muslim compliance with 
GC III.697 The Qurʾan only mentions their treatment in two cases.698 Early Muslim scholars 
held it was an allowable option for the Imam to kill able bodied POWs, the other options were 
to enslave, ransom or release. Shaybānī believed logistical requirements dictated treatment of 
prisoners after battle.  These views are ra’y (personal opinion) with no legal base in the Qurʾan 
or Sunna.699  
 
There is distinction in the treatment of Muslim and non-Muslim POWs. Muslim prisoners may 
not be executed or enslaved, post-conflict, Muslim prisoners must be released. The property of 
Muslims must not be taken as spoils of war and any property taken must be returned after 
                                                     
695 The Qurʾan 47:4 
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fighting has ceased.700 Antiquarian logic rationalized the execution of male prisoners on their 
potential threat to the Muslim community if allowed to live. However executing prisoners was 
the exception in the battles fought by the Prophet with a total of 3-5 prisoners of war being 
executed. 701 Regardless, the fact that the Prophet did execute POWs in the course of a war is 
used as a legal base by proponents of execution.702 After war, the release of prisoners is 
mandatory as stipulated in the Qurʾan 47:4.703 Abu Bakr sent forces to suppress the secessionist 
tribes and restore the writ of Islamic government. According to al-Sari, he gave the following 
instructions to commander al-Muhajir before sending him as a reinforcement to the expedition 
of Kindah: ‘[i]f this letter of mine reaches you before you have achieved victory, then,if you 
conquer the enemy, kill the fighting men and take the offspring captive if you took them by 
force.’704 
 
There is a difference of opinion among Muslim jurists regarding treatment of prisoners of war 
which they considered under the heading of ‘spoils of war’. This distinction is based on two 
sets of Qurʾanic verses, each enjoying a different course of action in the treatment of POWs. 
The first verse declares that there are only two options available for prisoners who do not 
embrace Islam or enter into a pledge of safeguard or pact of dhimmah. Otherwise, they are to 
be killed or enslaved. There are examples of the Prophet releasing prisoners freely; releasing 
prisoners for money or prisoner exchange and one unique example of the Prophet releasing 
prisoners after they taught Muslim children to read and write.705 These divergent practices led 
                                                     
700 Under Islamic rules in war, if the enemy embraces Islam before or after the capture, he cannot be treated as a 
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jurists to develop three distinct approaches to POWs: releasing or exchanging as provided by 
Qurʾan 47:4 abrogating the practice of enslaving or executing;706  giving the head of state wide 
discretionary powers to decide whether to execute, exchange, enslave or free POWs,707 or a 
complete prohibition on the execution of prisoners irrespective of reciprocity or lex talionis 
arguments.708  This rule was followed by ‘Caliph Mu’awiyah Ibn Abi Sufyan (d. 60/680) when 
he refused to execute the Roman prisoners he held after the Roman emperor had broken the 
peace treaty with the Muslims by executing the Muslim hostages he held.’709 Most jurists prefer 
to base their rules on a later Qurʾanic verse that provides for redemption or release of POWs. 
According to this interpretation of siyar, POW or hostages are never to be killed or enslaved. 
 
While the prisoner is at the mercy of the Muslim captor, the Qurʾan, Sunna and hadiths provide 
guidance on permissible treatment. ‘And they feed, for the love of God, the indigent, the orphan 
and the captive’710 Caliph Abu Bakr said: ‘Treat the prisoners and he who renders himself to 
your mercy with pity, as Allah shall do to you in your need; but trample down the proud and 
those who rebel.’711 ‘Prisoners are your brothers and companions…They are at your mercy, so 
treat them well as if you were treating yourself, with food, clothes and housing.’712 Muhammad 
Hamidullah in a detailed examination has listed nineteen practices expressly prohibited by 
Islamic law, including a ban on the abuse and maltreatment of prisoners and hostages.713 Using 
prisoners as human shields, while accepted practice in the 7th century jahiliyya seems to have 
been prohibited in Islam.714 Classical Islamic rules on prisoners distinguish treatment on sex 
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of the captive. Captured women and children are enslaved or exchanged for Muslim 
prisoners.715 Captives be treated humanely, that the wounded and sick be medically cared for, 
and that the dead be buried with dignity.716 
 
Following Muhammad’s own practice, a jihadi may execute, enslave, ransom, or release enemy 
captives. Although captured women and children were not supposed to be killed, they could be 
enslaved, and Muslim men could have sexual relations with female slaves acquired through 
jihad (any marriage was deemed annulled by their capture). Islamic law prescribes as 
permissible sexual intercourse between husband and wife or slave and master.717 Outside of 
these relationships, irrespective of consent of the women, the man will be considered to have 
committed a tort and subjected to pay damages: a bride price if the woman is not married; 
damages to the owner of the slave. Depending on the qadi, the man may attract additional 
discretionary penalties, and in certain exceptional circumstances, where the parties hold 
particular legal status, persons who have had illegal sex can be punished with 100 lashes or 
death by stoning.718  Imam Malik states ‘if a Muslim is held as a prisoner of war...it is obligatory 
on others to secure his release, even if it requires all the Muslims’ wealth.’719 It is important 
not to expound as evidence of Islamic law what is more attributable to the acts of certain 
individuals (excluding the Prophet).  
 
5.5 Distinction: Property 
‘Do not destroy palm trees; do not burn dwellings or wheat fields; never cut down 
fruit trees; only kill cattle when you need it for food. When you agree upon a treaty 
take care to respect its clauses. As your advance progresses, you will meet religious 
men who live in monasteries and who serve God in prayer: leave them alone, do not 
kill them or destroy their monasteries.’720 
                                                     
See also, Ahmed Yamani, ‘Humanitarian International Law: A General Outlook’, (1985) 7 Michigan Yearbook 
of International Legal Studies 189-215. 
715 Farhad Malekian, The Concept of Islamic International Criminal Law: A Comparative Study (Graham & 
Trotman/Martinus Nijhof 1994) 156-159.  
716 alZuhili (n596) 283; See M Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Evolving Approaches to Jihad: From Defense to Revolutionary 
and Regime Change Political Violence,’ Cherif-BassiouniaJihada(n19) 139-41; Bennoune ‘As-Salamu Alaykum? 
(n607) 605. 
717 Peters Crime (n254) 59 
718 ibid (n254) 59-60 
719 Tafseer al-Qurtubi cited in Begg, ‘Jihad’ (n8) 
720 Malik The Qurʾanic Concept of War (n304), Preface; Kamali, (n506), 45. ‘Do not destroy the villages and 
towns, do not spoil the cultivated fields and gardens, and do not slaughter the cattle.’ Sahih Bukhari cited in 




As with conventional international law, Islamic law elevates certain property with special 
protection. Islamic law notes a ban on the destruction of civilian objects and property,721 with 
specific prohibitions on attacking religious sites.722 The Qurʾan adopts a strong position on the 
protection of the environment with six verses articulating specific protections.723  
 
The prohibition on the destruction of enemy property is unsettled, some juristic opinion 
permitting such destruction using the legal base of the Prophets conduct during the Battle of 
Uhud in 4 AH. During this battle, the Prophet ordered the palm trees of the Banu Al-Nadir tribe 
be cut down to induce surrender during a bloodless siege that ultimately ended without 
fighting.724 It follows that the destruction of property loses its prohibitive status if it is can be 
justified on the grounds of military necessity, maslaha or is the only way to win the war.725 
Other jurists counter this reasoning claiming the practice was abrogated by the Prophet as 
evidenced in Abu-Bakr’s Commandments.726  
 
5.5.1 Religious Property 
The first and second Caliphs, Abu Bakr and Umar al Khattab made positive statements about 
protecting religious and cultural property in and after conflict.727 In his address to warriors, 
Caliph Abu-Bakr ordered the Muslims: 
 
 ‘In your march through the enemy territory, do not cut down the palm, or other fruit 
trees, destroy not the products of the earth, ravage no fields, burn no houses […] Let no 
destruction be made without necessity.’728  
 
                                                     
721 Muhammad Munir, ‘Suicide Attacks and Islamic Law’, (2008) 90(869) Int’l Rev. Red Cross 82-88 
722 Bedjaoui, 289; Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian 
Law, 2 vols, Vol I: Rules (ICRC and Cambridge University Press,2005) 763  
723 The Qurʾan 2:20; 2:30; 3:10; 7:56; 30:26; 30:41 
724 Similarly, Deuteronomy ‘When you besiege a city for a long time, making war against it in order to capture it, 
do not destroy its trees by wielding an axe against them, because you can eat their fruit. Do not cut them down. 
Are the trees in the field men, that you should besiege them? However, you may cut down trees that you know are 
not fruit trees and use them to build siege works until the city at war with you falls. The laws of warfare captured 
in the passage of Deuteronomy reflect early Islamic thought indicating a common culture of conflict regulation 
‘in the ancient Middle East shared between Jews Christians and Muslims.’ Abdel-Haleem (n4) 119-120. 
725 Mohammad Dayem and Fatima Ayub, ‘In The Path of Allah: Evolving Interpretations of Jihad and Its 
Challenges’ (2008) 7 UCLA Journal of Islamic & Near Eastern Law 67-120. 
726 These jurists include Al-Awza’i, Abu Thawr, Al-Layth Ibn Sa’d, and Al-Thawri. See Dayem and Ayub (n725) 
67-120. Hadith 965 in Ibn Malik, Mutwatta.  Badar ‘Ius in Bello’ (n25) 613-614.  
727 Cherif-Bassiouni,‘Evolving’,(n716) 120-121 
728 Abdur Rahman Doi, Non-Muslims under Shari’ah, (Kazi Publications 1983) 94-95, 222; Aly, (n618). 
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He reportedly went so far as to say that when Muslim armies ran out of food, they should only 
take food from civilians in enemy territory enough for one meal. Such a stance pivots on moral 
rather than utilitarian rationale as it is ‘preceded by encouragement to be a good Muslim.’  
Interpretations shifted over time, with Abu Hanifa, concluding in the 8th century that 
everything which fighters could not conquer should be destroyed, including homes, churches, 
trees, and livestock. But the majority of scholars argued against the destruction of religious 
property.729 
 
Table 3 Protections of Specific Categories of Property  
 
            Salafi Usul on Qital 






































If Muslim fighters cannot 





5.6 Means and Methods of Warfare 
Presuming the salafist ANSG subscribes to one of the Sunni madhahib, the means of warfare 
can be distinguished in two distinct camps.730  In one camp, the Hanafi, Hanbali and Shafi’i 
allow all means ‘to break the enemy’s strength, whether they are stringent or lenient.’ Muslim 
armies are ‘free to subdue the enemy to use any means for example, weapons of steel and 
deadly agents, even to the point of poisoning the enemy with projected incendiaries and 
                                                     
729 Aly (n618). 
730 It should be noted that Sunni Muslims do not subscribe unanimously or exclusively to one particular madhhab 
– adopting a pick and mix formula to back individual philosophy. 
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noxious gases.’731 The other camp houses the Maliki philosophy, a more rigid interpretation of 
means of warfare.732 Enjoining and pervasive through the two camps is the common theme that 
if a less evil means exists, a Muslim should employ restraint.733 
 
The inability to distinguish combatants from protected persons makes certain means and 
methods of warfare prohibited, for example using water to flood the enemy, or poisoning the 
water supply of the enemy. The Islamised lex talionis, ‘whoso commits aggression against you, 
then respond with the same degree of aggression waged against you,’ ‘if you punish, then 
punish with the same punishment which has been inflicted upon you’ displaces proportionality 
considerations and undermines IHL.734  
 
In relation to burning combatants there is disagreement in classic literature regarding its 
prohibitive status.735  It is generally accepted that Muslims cannot ‘punish the creatures of God 
with the punishment of God,’736 that ‘the deliberate burning of persons, either to overcome 
them in the midst of battle or to punish them after capture, is forbidden.’737 Some assert the 
doctrine of darura can temporarily suspend its prohibitive status, for example if burning the 
enemy is the only way to overcome the enemy, the notion of a ‘supreme emergency’ to justify 
killings of civilians in order for a society to save itself from the ‘ultimate threat’ of 
annihilation.738 Attaching a heavy weight to the intention of breaking the enemies strength 
aligns with the doctrine of darura in that holding this intention, to break the enemies strength, 
will suspend normally prohibited acts, the idea that what cannot be avoided, must be pardoned.  
In one hadith, Shaybānī is quoted as saying:  
 
                                                     
731 Al-Zuhayli Athar al-harb fi al-fiqh al-islami: dirawa muqarana, 46 cited in Hashmi, ‘Saving’ (n624) 171. 
732 Hamidullah, (n584) 207 
733 2:194; 9:36; 16:126; 16:127-16:128. The Qurʾan 9:36 ‘So wrong not yourselves therein and fight the Pagans 
all together as they fight you all together.’ ‘..And if one has retaliated to no greater extent than the injury he 
received, and is again set upon inordinately Allah will help him: for Allah is One that blots out (sins) and forgives 
(again and again) [22:60] In Yusuf, Qurʾan. 
734 The Qurʾan 2:194; 16:126 respectively. 
735 Ibn Rushd, Bidaya vol.1, 281-2 cited in El-Fadl ‘Rules’ (n473) 156; Abdel-Haleem (n4) 94. 
736 Hadith 2854 and 6524 in Al-Bukhari. Hadith 4351 in Abu Dawud, Sunan Abi Dawud. Hadith 1458 in Al-
Tirmidhi, Sunan Al-Tirmidhi, Hadith 16597, 16635 and 17841 in Al-Bayhaqi, Sunan Al-Bayhaqi, cited in Badar 
‘Ius in Bello’ (n25) 611  
737 Sohail Hashmi, ‘Islamic Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction: An Argument for Non-proliferation’ 
in Sohail Hashmi and Steven P. Lee (eds.), Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Religious and Secular 
Perspectives (Cambridge University Press,2004) 328. 
738 Aly, (n618); Adil Salahi, Mohammad Man and Prophet: A Complete Study of the Life of the Prophet of Islam, 
Leicestershire, Islamic Foundation, 2002/1423, 659 
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‘there was nothing wrong with the Muslims’ burning the polytheists strongholds or 
flooding them with water; setting up catapults against them; cutting off their water; or 
putting blood, dung, or poison in their water to befoul it for them. This is because we 
have been commanded to subdue them and break their strength. All these things are 
military tactics that will cause their strength to break; they derive from obedience, not 
disobedience to what has been commanded. Furthermore, all these things damage the 
enemy, which is a cause for the acquisition of reward.’739  
 
5.6.1 Unnecessary Suffering 
Unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury refers to the effects of certain methods or means 
of warfare which uselessly aggravate suffering. IHL forbids such methods and means.740 The 
principle of unnecessary suffering claims ‘the necessities of war ought to yield to the demands 
of humanity’.741  
 
The concern for humanity runs through all Islamic principles, congruent with the Qurʾanic 
concept that all mankind is one community.742 The laws of qital state that ‘[f]airness is 
prescribed by God in every matter, so if you kill, kill in a fair way.’743 Permissible weapons 
under traditional Islamic laws of jihad were restricted to those that existed in the seventh 
century CE. The only clear prohibition is in a hadith that relates to punishment by fire, which 
the Prophet forbade ‘no one punishes with fire, save the Lord of the fire (Allah).’744 This 
                                                     
739 Al-Sarakhsi’s Mabsut is a commentary on the mukhtasar (epitome) by Muhammad b. Muhammad al-Marwazi, 
which in turn summarized some of the foundational texts of the Hanafi school written by Muhammad al-Shaybānī. 
Al-Sarakhsi Al-Fahd: Page 13, 14 “Al-Sarakhsi, citing Muhammad ibn al-Hasan [al-Shaybānī] (Sharh al-Siyar al-
Kabir, 4:1467). 
740 Verse 16:126 is invoked consistently to support this idea of doing no more harm than is necessary, including 
mutilation. See Article 35, AP I. Article 35 (1) ‘In any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict to 
choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited (2) ‘It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and 
material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. [...]; Customary 
IHL Rule 70. Marco Sassoli, Antoine Bouvier & Anne Quintin, ‘How Does Law Protect in War: Glossary’ (ICRC 
2012) 
741 See also The Martens Clause which places all mankind under the safeguards from ‘customs established between 
civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the demands of public conscience. There are many IHL instruments 
concerning iterations of unnecessary suffering: St. Petersberg Declaration 1868; A. 23(e) 1899 hague regulations 
which talks of ‘superfluous injury’; A. 23(e) 1907 Hague Convention changes the language to ‘unecessary 
suffering’as does A. 35(2) AP I. 
742 The Qurʾan, 2:213. 
743 Hamidullah, (n584) and Noor Muhammad, ‘The Doctrine of Jihad: An Introduction’ 3 J L &Religion (1985) 
204  
744 Sunnan Abu Daoud, Book 14, Number 2667. Historical accounts allege that the practice of Muslim armies was 
to set enemy forts on fire while enemy fighters were hiding in them. ‘The Prophet later prohibited this practice 
saying that Allah alone could punish by fire.’M. Bin Ismail Al-Bukhari, Kashful Bari: Kitab Al-Maghazi (Book 
of Ghazqat) (trans. S. Khan, 2008) 576; B.A. Al-Hasan Ali Marghinani, The Hidaya (trans. C. Hamilton, 2005), 
457 in Shah, ‘Force’ (n71) 361. 
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prohibition has not been interpreted to apply to weapons like bombs as evidenced by the 
Taliban and other ANSGs continued use of incendiary weapons in their conflict conduct. Al-
Sarakhsi, an 11th century CE Shafi’i jurist, interpreted Shaybānī’s work and found ‘[t]here is 
nothing wrong with releasing water into the enemy’s city, burning them with fire, or 
bombarding them with the catapult, even if there are children or Muslim prisoners of war or 
traders among them.’745 Contrast with the punishment for those who ‘wage war against God 
and His Messenger and strive to cause corruption in the land’ which attracted the punishment 
of crucifixion or cross-amputation.746 Such hudud applied in early Islam to the crime of 
brigandage or highway robbery, a crime that was particularly problematic in that era.747  
 
Many methods used by Islamic ANSGs are ‘gleaned from a number of non-Islamic sources, 
and show little more respect for Islamic, or any other, law than do those used by modern 
states.’748 Islamic law also prohibits persons from being maimed, ‘starved, made to suffer thirst, 
tortured, severely abused, assaulted or [have] their property plundered, in violation of the 
sanctity of human brotherhood, except when necessity so requires and to ward off 
aggression’.749  Hizb-i-Islami upheld the prohibition against staving the population during the 
Afghanistan conflict in 1994 whereby justification for blocking aid convoys delivering food 
was justified on the grounds that several markets had opened in the area which would sustain 
the population without the humanitarian aid.750 Algerian extremists have sought to justify their 
preference of slicing throats over other forms of killing on economical and practical grounds 
(it does not require ammunition) as well as being closer aligned to Islamic practice, two verses 
referencing ‘smite their necks’.751 
                                                     
745 Al-Sarakhsi (al-Mabsut, 10:65) 
746 The Qurʾan 5:33 
747 Abou El Fadl Rebellion (n627) 47-60 
748 Abdel-Haleem (n4) 97. 
749 alZuhili (n596) 273 
750 Report on the practice of Jordan (1997), as cited in Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, 
Customary International Humanitarian Law, 2 vols, Vol II (ICRC and Cambridge University Press,2005) 1132. 
AFP, Press information, Islamabad, 15 February 1994. However, in a report addressed to the UN Secretary-
General, Kuwait denounced Iraqi ‘practices [violating] all the values of Islam and of civilization... [including) 
[c]learing of warehouses, and co-operative societies of foodstuffs with a view to causing starvation among 
citizens’. Kuwait, letter dated 5 August 19go to the UN Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/214 3, 5 August 1990. 
Rule 53. The use of starvation of the civilian population as a method of warfare is prohibited. 




The answer to whether torture is permissible in Islam will vary according to who is answering 
and how it is defined.752 There is no specific direction in the Qurʾan. Some parts of the Sunna 
suggest a prohibition on torture; others clearly advocate ‘‘beating’ (daraba) suspected 
wrongdoers to extract [a] confession.’753 The Prophet is reported to have said: ‘God will torture 
those who torture people on earth.’ Some scholars say that while the Prophet opposed 
‘treacherous killing and mutilation’, he allowed Muslims to retaliate in kind against such 
practices.754 There are clear examples of practices in the Islamic world, sanctioned by the state, 
that would be positioned on the continuum of cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment through 
to torture.755   
 
Mutilation 
In Islamic discourse, the era of jahiliyya is associated with mutilation of mortal remains, torture 
of captives and indiscriminate killings. The Prophet’s uncle Hamza ibn ‘Abdel-Muttalib 
(d.625) is said to have been brutalized and mutilated, along with other Muslims, after the Battle 
of Uhud. The animist women allegedly wore the severed ears around their necks and danced 
around the mutilated corpses as a celebration of the pagan victory. The Prophet and his 
followers vowed to do the same if they got the chance. However, following this, the Qur’ānic 
verse on mutilation was revealed and the Prophet subsequently forbade the mutilation of mortal 
                                                     
752 Using the definition from the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment (1984), 85 UNTS 1465. Article 1 ‘’[T]orture’ means any act by which severe pain or suffering, 
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a 
third person information or a confession…when such pain or suffering is inflicted…by a public official or other 
person acting in an official capacity.’  
753 Reza, (n 25) 21-22. See also Mohammad Hashim Kamali, The Right to Personal Safety (Haqq al Amn) and the 
Principle of Legality in Islamic Shari’a, in Abdel-Haleem, Adel Omar Sherif & Kate Daniels, eds, Criminal 
Justice in Islam: Judicial Procedure in the Shari’a (IB Tauris 2003) 84-89.  
754 Bennoune (n607). 
755 ‘[S]evere beatings that do not break the bones or cause lesions but cause intense pain and swelling are ‘classic’ 
forms of ‘torture,’ whereas ‘[p]erhaps beatings that are not severe or sustained…would be inhuman treatment but 
not torture.’ John Parry, Escalation and Necessity: Defining Torture at Home and Abroad in Sanford Levinson 
Torture: A Collection (OUP,2004),147-148. Torture as an investigative method is distinguished from the torture 
as a punishment post-conviction, and there is an emphasis on the legal parameters around Conventional definitions 
of torture, ‘[n]o punishment however gruesome, should be called torture.’ Islam has not stood alone in state 
sanctioned torture and there is a revival in the West of the utilitarian case for torture where Bentham equivocates 
whether physical pain can exert irresistible control over its victims will. John Langbein, Torture and the Law of 
Proof: Europe and England in the Ancient Regime (University of Chicago Press 2006) 3 
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remains,756 including remains of the pagan animists.757 There is however some support that 
mutilation is permissible in a lex talionis framework.758 
 
Operational practice shows some evidence of a contemporary prohibition against mutilation in 
a conflict context. For example, the Instructions to the Muslim Fighter of 1993 provide that 
‘Islam … forbids the mutilation of enemy wounded.’759 There are other examples clearly 
disregarding this principle, the Taliban treatment of Najibullah mortal remains where his dead 
body was dragged behind a driving car through the streets of Kabul, his penis dismembered.760  
 
Suicide Attacks/ Martyrdom Operations 
Those who engage in jihad are called mujahidin and those killed doing it are called shuhada 
(martyrs) who have obtained a rank unparalleled in the hierarchy of the Hereafter.761 One 
Islamic tradition tells Muslim men that Allah will reward them with seventy-two virgins in 
heaven should they die waging jihad against the enemies of Islam.762 This obscure ahadith has 
been transformed into a ‘topic of sensational public interest, as well as ridicule.’763  
                                                     
756 The Qur’an 16:126-127; Hadith 966 in Ibn Malik, Mutwatta’. Hadith 1408 and 1617 in Mohammad Ibn Isa 
Al-Tirmidhi, Al Jami’ Al-Sahih Sunan Al-Tirmidhi. Hadith 2613 in Abu Dawud, Sunan Abi Dawud. Hadith 1731 
in Al-Qushayri, Sahih Muslim. Hadith 2342 (prohibition of mutilation) and 5197 in Al-Bukhari, Al-Jami’ Al-
Sahih AlMukhtasar cited in Badar ‘Ius in Bello’ (n25) 620. 
757 Never mutilate, for God purified Islam and the Muslims from rashness and excessive wrath’, and that Propeht 
never permitted the mutilation of his enemies.’ https://www.thereligionofpeace.com/quran/muslim/019-smt.htm. 
Al-Shaybānī in his Kitab al-Siyar (book of conduct), draws on a number of hadith in pronouncing that the Prophet 
forbade treachery, mutilation, and the killing of women and children. ‘nor should you mutilate or kill children, 
women, or old men.’ Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybānī, as translated by Khadduri Islamic Law (n13) 59–60. 
Contrast with R. 113 CIHL ‘Each party to the conflict must take all possible measures to prevent the dead 
from being despoiled. Mutilation of dead bodies is prohibited’.  
758 Ibn Taymiyah claims that ‘[a]s for cruel and exemplary punishments or mutilation, it is not permissible except 
as retribution. Imran Ibn Husayn ‘Never did the messenger of God… preach a sermon to us but that he commanded 
us to charity and forbade us to mutilate. Even when we killed non-believers, we did not mutilate them after killing 
them. We did not cut off their ears and noses or rip open their bellies, unless they had done that to us; and then 
we would do to them as they had done. However, abstaining from such things is better, as God has said: ‘And if 
you chastise, chastise even as you have been chastised; and yet assuredly if you are patient, better it is for those 
patient.’ ‘And be patient; yet is thy patience only with the help of God.’ Halverson (n260) 40; Subsequent 
interpretations state Islamic law prohibits the ‘mutilation of bodies in war’ (2005), 87(858) IRRC 275 
759 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Instructions to the Muslim Fighter, 1993, para. c, as cited in Henckaerts and Doswald-
Beck (n750) 2172 
760 Human Rights Watch. ‘Blood Stained Hands’ (2005) https://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/afghanistan0605/  
761 The Nobel Quran, Surah al-Baqarah (1:54) And say not of those who are killed in the Way of Allah, ‘They are 
dead.’ Nay, they are living but you perceive (it) not. Cited in Begg, ‘Jihad’ (n8). The idea of instantaneous 
salvation is not isolated to Islam, and was likely appropriated from Jewish and Christian texts and practices that 
existed through the Revelation era. The influence of other Arabian cultures as well as monotheistic religions on 
Muhammad is evident through his doctrine on Martyrdom. Bonner, (n487) 72-83 
762 Especially appealing to young men from sexually repressed countries, the promise of seventy-two virgins 
cannot be seen as causal to martyrdom operations as women have also acted as suicide bombers. For example, the 
‘Black Widows’ of Chechnya avenging the deaths of their husbands.  




Like civilian targeting, the issue of suicide bombings or ‘martyrdom operations’ is relatively 
recent, emerging only in the final decades of the twentieth century. Unprecedented in both 
nature and use as a weapon, this relatively recent phenomenon falls to qiyas and ijtihād to 
determine its permissibility under Islamic law. 764 Although such means have influenced Sunni 
ANSGs, it is doubtful whether this tactical influence extended theologically, the law as it is 
being confused with the law as it ought to be.765 Difficulty in agreeing a coherent position is 
compounded by the fact that discourse is often limited to geographical scope: Palestine, Iraq 
and Afghanistan.766 Furthermore acts which are condemned to prohibitive status in one area 
are permissible in adjacent areas.767  
 
While the Islamic position on ‘suicide attacks’ is unclear, the Qurʾanic position on suicide is 
settled.768 Islam forbids suicide.  The objective of the fidayin is not to martyr themselves in 
their first operation. On the contrary, they aim to do as much damage as possible to the enemy 
to inspire fear in both present and future generations. ‘He who commits suicide kills himself 
for his own benefit, while he who commits martyrdom sacrifices himself for the sake of his 
religion and his nation.’ The Mujahid becomes a ‘human bomb’ that blows up at a specific 
place and time, in the midst of the enemies of Allah and the homeland, leaving them helpless 
in the face of the brave shahid [martyr] who . . . sold his soul to Allah, and sought the Shahada 
[Martyrdom] for the sake of Allah.’769 The claim that martyrdom purges the martyr of all his 
sins is based on numerous traditions according to which the martyr is admitted into paradise 
by virtue of his martyrdom in jihad. The martyr is absolved of all his sins and ‘is transported 
directly to Paradise without having to be interrogated within his body by the angels.’770  
                                                     
764 David Bukay, The Religious Foundations of Suicide Bombing’ (2006) 13(4) Middle East Quarterly 172; 
Wiktorowicz ‘Genealogy’ (n415) 92  
765 Aligned with the Latin maxim ‘de lege lata de lege ferenda’. Arguments for this method of warfare is derived 
from Shi’ite traditions of martyrdom. Wiktorowicz Genealogy’ (n415) 9.. 
766 See Munir ‘Suicide Attacks’ (n721).  
767 See the Barelvi scholar Mufti Muneeb who issued a fatwa ‘condemning the unjustified homicide in Pakistan 
but left open the legality of suicide attacks in Kashmir and Palestine’ cited in Nagamine (n71) 66. 
768 For example, ‘And spend of your substance in the cause of Allah and make not your own hands contribute to 
[your] destruction; but do good; for Allah loveth those who do good.’ 2:195; ‘Nor kill (or destroy) yourself’ 4:29 
in Yusuf Holy Qurʾan. Also, hadith ‘None of you should make a request for death because of the trouble in which 
he is involved, but if there is no other help to it, then say: O Allah, keep me alive as long as there is goodness in 
life for me and bring death to me when there is goodness in death for me.’ In Sahih Muslim Book 035, Hadith 
No. 6480  
769  See Al-Rayah, ‘Qaradawi Fatwa’s Middle East Quarterly (Summer 2004); Wiktorowicz ‘Genealogy’ (n415) 
72 
770 Most writings argue that the martyr has a seat in Paradise, avoids the torture of the grave, marries seventy black 




Scholars from all ideological persuasions agree on the virtues of martyrdom even though the 
concept of suicide is missing from earlier religious commentaries on war.771 Islamic thought 
on warfare reveals suicide bombings are not part of this heritage.772 Current jihadi arguments 
about suicide bombings pay scant attention to constructing a theological argument justifying 
such attacks; rather the focus is on extolling the virtues of martyrdom.773 Conferences of 
Islamic scholars pass declarations ‘condemning or supporting suicide attacks while rarely 
grounding them in legal arguments.’774 
 
A number of fatwas quote early mujtahid who ruled that Muslims may give up his life 
intentionally in jihad if his act hurts the enemy, dispirits him, or encourages Muslims. But if 
he is not sure that such an act will kill the enemy, he is ‘discouraged from performing it.’ 775 
Islamic history reveals instances where authorized army commanders have permitted Muslim 
warriors to storm the enemy, knowing the warriors had no chance of surviving. Importantly it 
was not permissible for the individual to decide for himself, such a decision could only be taken 
by the Muslim ruler or Caliph who was best placed to weigh the overall benefits and damages 
of such an act.776 Using the intent of the perpetrator as determinative of martyrdom allows the 
consequences of collateral damage to be ignored. Justifications of suicide missions will fall on 
the writings of ibn Taymiyya who extolled the virtues of martyrdom over the Islamic 
obligations of fasting and pilgrimage.777 
 
The suicide bombers’ failure to distinguish themselves as a combatant is perfidious, and under 
Islamic law such actions are forbidden. However, if it is deemed that the Muslim community 
                                                     
‘Genealogy’ (n415) 92; Shmuel Bar, Warrant For Terror: Fatwas of Radical Islam and the Duty of Jihad 
(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2006) 65 
771The family of a martyr acquires a privileged position since it receives material benefits and often money. These 
considerations should not be underrated and are especially relevant in the case of young men who were formally 
petty criminals, their sacrifice suddenly bestows upon the family a status which had previously seemed 
unattainable.  Abou-Zahab & Roy (n418) 38. 
772 Wiktorowicz ‘Genealogy’ (n415) 92; Bar (n770) 63. 
773 ibid (n415) 92; Nagamine (n71) 53. 
774 Nagamine (n71) 65. 
775 Nida ul-Islam, Dec-Jan 1996-1997 cited in Bar (n770) 6 
776 Extremists invoke the conduct of the Sahaba to support the permissibility of suicide attacks, citing the example 
of when the Companions ‘charged into the ranks of the kuffar knowing they would be killed.’Fatwa:: Imam 
Muhammad Naasir-ud Deen Al-Albaanee, ‘Suicide Bombings in the Scales of Islamic Law,’ in Abu Saalih, 
Muhammad Zorkane Al-Maghribee, Al-Masjid al-Aqsa: The Path to Its Freedom (SSNA, 2005) in Bar (n770) 62, 
64 
777 For Ibn Taymiyya fatwas see Qasim, Majmu’ Fatawat Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyah Vol 9 (Riyadh: Matba’at 
al Hukymah 1996) cited in Nagamine (n71) (fn 125), 225. 
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is at risk, arguments around the permissibility of martyrdom operations are moot: the doctrine 
of darura would be invoked to justify any acts that would in normal circumstance be 
prohibited.778 The critical issue with the ‘at risk’ argument is that there is scope that any 
unfavourable outcome of hostilities would lead to unfettered conflict conduct and violations of 
the laws and customs of war.   
 
Consistent with IHL, Islamic law balances means and methods of warfare proportionate to the 
principle of necessity. While mainstream Islam prohibits the targeting of civilians certain 
extremists groups have manipulated an Islamic defence to allow such a violation, al-darura 
tubih al-mahzurat, necessity makes permissible the prohibited, and ‘advocate collective guilt 
on behalf of the perceived enemies of Islam to circumvent the prohibition.’779  More than its 
Western counterpart, the doctrine of darura ‘underlines the seriousness of threat to existence 
and sense of urgency to act.’ Focusing on the resultant harm has allowed Islamic jurists to avoid 
committing to rigid definitions of necessity.780 Weighing the expected harm against the 
expected benefit allows a broad discretion in interpretation of what is necessary. Darura can 
be used as an Islamic law justification to violate IHL. Three cumulative criteria must be met to 
ensure compliance with Islam, the derogation to the prohibited act must be: of vital necessity; 
of unambiguous certainty; its importance must be universal.781  
 
5.7 Proportionality 
‘I am the Prophet of a gentle compassion; I am the Prophet of a fierce battle.’782 
 
IHL defines the principle of proportionality as prohibiting attacks against military objectives 
which are ‘expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to 
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete 
                                                     
778 The Qur’an 8:58 ‘ If thou fearest treachery from any group, throw back (their covenant) to them (so as to be) 
on equal terms: for Allah lovetth not the treacherous; Shaybānī The Islamic Law of Nations, 77. See for example 
the Lebanese Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah when talking about the use of suicide bombers by 
the Palestinians against Israel, ‘…There is no other way for the Palestinians to push back those mountains, apart 
from martyrdom operations.’ ‘We could provide a million suicide bombers in 24 hours,’ The Telegraph (London 
4 Sept 2002) 
779Ali & Stuart, (n363) 12; Parry ‘Legal Methodology’ (n250) 97. 
780 Nagamine (n71) 64. 
781 Hashmi ‘Saving’ (n624) 177. 
782 Ramadan (n13) 67. 
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and direct military advantage anticipated’.783 The principle seeks to limit damage caused by 
military operations by requiring that the effects of the means and methods of warfare used must 
not be disproportionate to the military advantage sought.784 Aligned with this conventional 
definition and supported by several Qurʾanic verses is the proportionality doctrine enumerated 
in the Islamic law of qital.785 Muslim jurists advocate a balancing test, weighing the possible 
evils against potential good.786 Classical Islamic texts contain evidence of concern regarding 
collateral damage ‘analogous to the ius in bello criterion of proportionality.’787  
 
While the Qurʾan does not rule out war; however, it does set limits to it. ‘And fight in the way 
of God those who wage war on you, but do not transgress, for God loves not the 
transgressors.788 In conflict, Islam prescribes Muslims must stay with the limits of not 
becoming cruel or vengeful. The general command to be just and fair is taken from the Qurʾan: 
‘…believe[rs] stand out firmly for God as witnesses to fair dealings… let not…hatred…make 
you swerve to wrong and depart from justice. Be just, that is next to piety. And fear God. 
Surely, Allah is aware of what you do.’789 
 
Indiscriminate attacks are defined as those that are not directed at a specific military objective, 
or that employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military 
objective. Indiscriminate attacks ‘which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian 
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.’ This last is 
known as the rule of proportionality.  
 
                                                     
783The principle of proportionality demands restraint in response so that excessive force is not used. Excessive 
force includes the indiscriminate targeting of civilians and military personnel. John Head, The United Sates and 
International Law After September 11’, (2001) 11 Kan. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 1, 4. 
784 See AP I Protection of the civilian population, Article 51(5)(b); CIHL Rule 14 ‘Launching an attack which 
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a 
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated, is prohibited’ Sassoli, Bouvier & Quintin, (n740)  
785 ‘And if you were to harm (them) in retaliation, harm them to the measure you were harmed. 
And if you opt for patience, it is definitely much better for those who are patient.’ The Qurʾan, 16:126; ‘The one 
who does something evil will not be punished but in its equal proportion.’ The Qurʾan, 40:40; ‘The recompense 
of evil is evil like it. Then the one who forgives and opts for compromise has his reward undertaken by Allah. 
Surely, He does not like the unjust.’ The Qurʾan 42:40. 
786 El-Fadl ‘Rules’ (n473) 147. 
787 John Kelsay, ‘Arguments Concerning Resistance in Contemporary Islam’, in Richard Sorabji and David Rodin, 
(eds.), The Ethics of War: Shared Problems in Different Traditions (Ashgate 2007) 65. 
788 Qurʾan 2:190 (n326) 
789 The Qur’an 5:8. 
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The Qurʾan permits only the extent and degree of force necessary to achieve a military 
objective.790 Success in achieving this goal invalidates further use of force; it also prescribes 
temporal and geographic limitations on the use of force.791 The Qurʾan reiterates this sentiment 
in several verses in various forms: that one should fight the attackers until they are defeated, 
restrained from mischief or choose peace instead of war.792  Once the military necessity to fight 
has ceased to exist, the use of force is no longer permissible.793 As discussed in chapter four, 
the two nation theory, with the obligation on believers to convert the dar al harb into the dar 
al Islam could easily be seen as perpetual struggle until all lands fall under the dar al Islam. 
 
In the seventh century, weapons were relatively limited in the damage they could cause and 
combat generally happened in short range, hand-to-hand.794 Still, there is evidence that certain 
weapons were considered an affront to human dignity and repugnant to divine law. 795 Military 
necessity was given a greater weight in the seventh century than is accepted in contemporary 
targeting cycles of proportionality and precautions in attack.  
 
Islamic laws of war balance military necessity with principles of distinction, proportionality 
and humanity. If it is universally accepted in Islam that ‘[i]t is the duty of individuals, societies 
and states to protect [the right to life] from any violation, and it is prohibited to take away a life 
except for a Shari’a prescribed reason’ the broad interpretation of these reasons can be 
manipulated to serve a violent agenda. 796  
                                                     
790 ‘Military Objectives are limited to those objects which (a) by their nature, location, purpose or use make an 
effective contribution to military action, and (b) whose partial or total destruction, capture or neutralization, in the 
circumstances ruling at the time, offers an advantage. ‘This definition of military objectives is set forth in Article 
52(2) of Additional Protocol I; See also CIHL Rule 8.  
791 See the Qurʾan, verses 2:191 and 2:194 
792 ‘Fight them until there is no fitnah anymore, and obedience remains for Allah. But, if they desist, then 
aggression is not allowed except against the transgressors.’ The Qurʾan 2:193.  ‘Kill them wherever you find them 
and drive them out from where they drove you out, as fitnah … is more severe than killing. However, do not fight 
them near Al-Masjid-ul-Haram (the Sacred Mosque in Makkah) unless they fight you there. However, if they 
fight you (there) you may kill them …’ The Qurʾan 2:191; ‘But if they desist, then indeed, Allah is Most-
Forgiving, Very-Merciful’ The Qurʾan 2:192; ‘The holy month for the holy month, and the sanctities are subject 
to retribution. So when anyone commits aggression against you, be aggressive against him in the like manner as 
he did against you …’ The Qurʾan, 2:194’ in Shah ‘Force’ (n71) 360 
793 In IHL, the principle of military necessity ‘permits measures which are actually necessary to accomplish a 
legitimate military purpose and are not otherwise prohibited by international humanitarian law. In the case of an 
armed conflict the only legitimate military purpose is to weaken the military capacity of the other parties to the 
conflict. Military necessity generally runs counter to humanitarian exigencies. Consequently, the purpose of 
humanitarian law is to strike a balance between military necessity and humanitarian exigencies.’ Sassoli, Bouvier 
& Quintin (n740)  
794 Mahmassani (n368) 292 in Badar ‘Ius in Bello’ (n25) 610 
795 Weeramantry (n246) 138 
796 Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, 5 August 



















































The following chapters will provide context to Part One, by examining a particular ANSG 
operating through the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The part will consider the tribal code of 
one of Afghanistan’s ethnic groups that comprised the original Taliban insurgency and 
compare certain norms of this code as well as ‘salafi’ Shari’a and IHL against the conflict 
conduct of this group over the period 1994-2001. What follows is a crude form of reverse 
engineering, where certain of the most heinous documented war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and violations of the laws and customs of war will be measured against regulatory 











Chapter 6 Afghanistan: Ethno-Political Dynamics and Conflict History 
 
‘Afghanistan is ugly today…not because the people of Afghanistan are ugly. 
Afghanistan is not only a mirror of the Afghans; it is the mirror of the world.’797   
 
Understanding the background elements inherent in the evolution of the Taliban cannot be 
separated from understanding the elements that have shaped Afghanistan. The roots of the 
Taliban are entwined with the state’s history of conflict and the ethno-regional bias and 
competition for power that has historically characterized Afghanistan.798  By providing 
background to Afghanistan’s recent conflict history and its resistance to control, this chapter 
sets the basis for the Taliban insurgency to be understood.  
  
Positioned at the crossroads of Central, West and South Asia, a ‘geographical map, more than 
a political one, best explains Afghanistan’s importance over the centuries.’799 Its geopolitical 
importance has hindered its internal stability and made it a target of sustained use of force by 
external actors.800  Around 250,000 square miles of British imagination, the modern state of 
Afghanistan was drawn only in the last 150 years. Located on the eastern side of the Iranian 
Plateau, it linked the Great empires of Central Asia, the Middle East and the Indian 
subcontinent.801 Regional geopolitical manoeuvrings shaped the formation of the modern state 
out of ‘shards of rival tribal fiefdoms, ethnic loyalties, and shifting alliances and allegiances.’802 
The terrain is unrelentingly harsh, so while easily invaded, it has proved impossible to hold in 
the long term.  
 
                                                     
797 Barnett Rubin March 26 1992 response to Letter from Nejat Khalili Feb 12 1992 in Ahmed Rashid, Taliban, 
Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia (IB.Tauris 2000) 108. 
798 While the term ‘Afghan’ in the third century was interpreted as ‘noisy’, ‘unruly’ or ‘less than sedate’, the 
country’s violent history has undoubtedly intensified the nature and reputation of its people in the contemporary 
state. Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History From Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban 
(OUP,2002) 5 
799 Tanner (n798) 2 
800 John Bew, Ryan Evans, Martyn Frampton, Peter Neumann, Marisa Porges, ‘Talking to the Taliban: Hope over 
History?’ New America Foundation, 2013.http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/ICSR-TT-Report_For-
online-use-only.pdf 
801 Graham Chapman, The Geopolitics of South Asia: From Early Empires To The Nuclear Age (Routledge 2009) 
89; Tanner (n798) 2 
802 See Karl Ernest Meyer & Shareen Blair Brysac, Tournament Of Shadows: The Great Game And The Race For 
Empire In Central Asia (Basic Books 1999) 65. 
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The country is demarcated by four strategically crucial and ethnically varied cities around the 
Hindu-Kush: Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-i Sharif and Kabul (Map 1).803 Its country’s capital sits 
in its own strategic sphere of influence, with Bamiyan to the west, Bagram to the north; Ghazni 
to the south and Jalalabad, the ‘head of the Khyber Pass’, to the east. While ‘[p]ossession of 
Kabul does not translate into control of the entire country… no one can hope to rule 
Afghanistan without holding Kabul.’804 
Map 1:  Afghanistan 
 
Credit: University of Texas Libraries 
 
6.1 Afghan Resistance to Domination 
Welcoming waves of migration, the country is described as a ‘roundabout of the ancient 
world.’805 Stretching back to Antiquity, Afghanistan fell victim to a string of conquerors and 
was subsumed in larger empires.806  
 
A feature of the various conflicts over the last two centuries is the involvement of external 
military forces and organizations, a feature amplified in the recent decades-long history of 
                                                     
803  Hirad Abtahi, ‘From the Destruction of the Twin Buddhas to the Destruction of the Twin Towers: Crimes 
Against Civilisation Under the ICC Statute’ (2004) 4 Int’l Cr L Rev 3, 4. 
804 Tanner (n798) 4. 
805 Arnold Toynbee cited in Tanner (n798) 1. 
806 While each ethnic group can claim some period of history, none can make an absolute indigenous claim to the 
region. Thomas Barfield, ‘Problems in Establishing Legitimacy in Afghanistan’ (2004) 37(2) Iranian Studies 263 
 Bamiyan ∙  
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warlordism and the direct military involvement of three of the United Nations Security 
Council's five permanent members.807 Its strategic location made the state a Game changer. 
Hinging on imperial ambitions, it acted as a buffer between the Russian and the British Empires 
during the nineteenth century and served as an ideological swing-vote between the Soviets and 
the US in the twentieth century. ‘[T]he fate of Afghanistan is decided not by Afghans but by 
foreigners [to its] north, south, east and west…’808 The increasing use of sea and air-power 
however has made ‘Afghanistan.. less [geo-strategically] important to a round world than it 
was to a flat one,’809 leading to its current designation as ‘a mere hideout… offering refuge to 
international terrorists.’ Yet the Afghan terrain and the people ‘present the same problem to 
foreign antagonists today as they did 2,500 years ago,’810 ‘with love [Afghans] will accompany 
you to hell but with force not even to the heaven.’811 
 
The state of Afghanistan emerged in 1747 as the Mughal and Persian empires were 
imploding.812  When the Pashtun prince and military commander Ahmad Shah Durrani united 
fragmented tribes and provinces into one nation he created an Afghan tribal confederacy.813 
Dominated by ethnic Pashtuns, this distinct political entity was midwife to what would become 
Afghanistan.814 While forging a state, this expansion and consolidation of his dominion came 
at the expense of causing deep division among the ethnic and religious groups, in particular 
among the Pashtuns vis a vis the Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks and Turks.815 All Afghan rulers up 
                                                     
807 Afghan Wars: The First Anglo-Afghan War (1839-1842), Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-1881), Third 
Anglo-Afghan War (1919), Soviet War in Afghanistan (1979 – 1989), Soviet Involvement, Afghan Civil War 
(1989-1992), Najibullah’s Regime Collapse, Afghan Civil War between Mujahadeen (1992-1996), Afghan 
Conflict (1996-2001), Taliban Regime. Talatbek Masadykov, Antonio Giustozzi, James Page, Working Paper No 
66 ‘Negotiating With the Taliban: Toward a Solution for the Afghan Conflict’ (2010) Crisis States Working Paper 
Series No 2 LSE Development Studies Institute 1. See ‘Afghanistan Profile’ BBC News (London, 31 Mar 2013) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12024253> accessed 29/05/13  
808 K Yousafzai, Afghan Pashtun politician based in Kandahar. Ali Chishti ‘Do the Taliban represent Pashtuns?’ 
The Friday Times (Pakistan, 03 February 2012)  
Niaz Shah ‘The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’ (n72) 456  
809 Rhea Stewart, Fire in Afghanistan 1914-1929: The First Opening to the West Undone by Tribal Ferocity Years 
Before the Taliban. (Orig. 1973.) iUniverse.com 2000 
810 Tanner (n798) 1 
811 Quote from revered Bacha Khan (6 February 1890 – 20 January 1988),a Pashtun independence activist against 
the rule of the British Raj. In Quotes about Pashtuns, Pakistan Defence https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/quotes-
about-pashtuns.248868/  
812 Anthony Hyman, ‘Nationalism in Afghanistan’ (2002) 34(2) International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 
299-301  
813 ‘Pashtun or Pathan a corruption of the native ‘Pakhtun’ used in the subcontinent, identified the Pashtuns in 
British colonial ethnography…’ Avihail & Brin, Lost Tribes from Assyria, Trans. S. Matlofsky (Amishav, 1978). 
814 The Durrani dynasty came to an end only in 1974, when Afghanistan became a republic. Chapman, (n801) 90-
91. Derek Gregory, Colonial Present (Blackwell Publishing 2004) 31.  Karen Spriggs, The Legal System of 
Afghanistan, 9 Mod. Legal Sys. Cyclopaedia 5 
815 The majority Pashtuns straddle the now Pakistan border, the Tajiks (roughly 25 % of the population) are found 
in the northeast, the Hazaras (13 %) reside in the central mountains, the Uzbeks and Turks (<10%) inhabit the 
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until the 1978 Marxist coup have been branches of the Durrani tribe,816 leading the Pashtuns to 
identify initially as King-Makers, and subsequently government makers.817  The Pashtun 
domination in governing the land led to Afghanistan and Pashtunistan being used 
synonymously (See Annex 3 for list of Pashtun tribes).   
 
Both the Mughals and the Durrani Afghan kings encouraged Pashtuns to respond ‘tribally’, 
that is to maintain family-based networks instead of other forms of organization.818 The British 
continued this tradition, making great efforts to engage Pashtuns along tribal lines to the 
exclusion of other methods. Pashtuns were entitled to subsidies, to a rank in the Indian army, 
and a direct relationship with the Crown. ‘Schooling internalized the racial taxonomy, 
supplanting allegiances to village, family, clan while linking Pashtun identity with 
modernization.’819 Cultivating a Pashtun identity as a unitary ‘pure’ race in contrast to the 
‘mixed’ Tajiks, Baluchis, Hazaras and others with whom they mingled, colonial officials 
invented the reputation of the Pashtuns as a warrior caste. They were ‘‘our chaps’, natural 
rulers, the equals of the British.’820 Attempting to increase tribal solidarity, they ‘introduced 
special tribal laws and developed competing theories about how tribes worked and should be 
handled.’821 The British believed that regulating customary law institutions would help them 
better control the Pashtun populations of the ‘tribal areas.’ That approach was unsuccessful.  
 
Ethnic divisions are a major source of identity in Afghan societies with Pashtuns historically 
occupying the dominant ethnic group based on percentage of the total population. However, 
with over twenty different ethnic groups speaking more than forty languages Pashtun 
                                                     
north centre. While accurate census data is lacking, it can be estimated that at least forty million….Pashtuns live 
in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Afghan figures are based on Afghanistan Statistical Yearbook 2009-2010, 
http://cso.gov.af/yearbook.zip. These figures are contentious with census data never collected. Larry Goodson, 
‘Afghanistan’s Long Road to Reconstruction.’ (2003)14(1) Journal of Democracy 82 
Leon Hadar, ‘What Green Peril?’ (1992) 72(2) Foreign Affairs 84 
816 Since 1818 not only from the Durrani tribe but also from the Mohammadzai class. Abubakar Siddique, The 
Pashtun Question: The Unresolved Key to the Future of Pakistan and Afghanistan (Hurst & Co Publishers 2014) 
11 – 12; Rasul Rais, Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity, and the State in Afghanistan (Lexington Books 
2008) 29, 44-47; Aisha Ahmad & Roger Boase, Pashtun Tales From the Pakistan- Afghan Frontier (Saqi 2008) 
13; Anwar-ul-Haq Ahady, ‘The Decline of the Pashtuns in Afghanistan.’ (1995) 35(7) Asian Survey 7.  
817 Caroe (n80); Barnett Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the 
International System, Second Edition (Yale University Press 2002) xxi 
818 Hugh Beattie Imperial Frontier: Tribe and State in Waziristan (Curzon 2002) 199. 
819 Post-colonial Afghan Governments have also found that ethnic division of Pashtun and non-Pashtun politically 
expedient, in turn fuelling ethnic polarization and the militarization of politics. Nick Cullather ‘Damming 
Afghanistan: Modernization in a Buffer State’ (2002) The Journal of American History 515-517. 
820 Contrast with the colonial practice of the Belgians and their treatment of the Huts and the Tutsi’s in Rwanda. 
‘Damming Afghanistan: Modernization in a Buffer State’ the Journal of American History September 2002, 517. 
821 Beattie (n818) 199. 
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domination was not welcomed.822 Indeed each of these ethnic groups have either autonomously 
or through strategic alignments resisted rule by the other, attempts to dominate met with 
bloodshed. Recent history evidenced the extent to which the Uzbeks and Tajiks would align to 
resist a Pashtun-based government.823 The relevance of ethnic friction and historical unrest is 
directly related to the most egregious human rights violations and violations of IHL over the 
last 40 years.  
 
In terms of population, after Pashtuns, Tajiks account for approximately a quarter of Afghans 
with Uzbeks, Hazaras, Aimaq, Nuristani, Kirghiz and other minorities comprising the 
remainder. With the increased visibility of the Pashtuns since the Taliban emerged, the large 
percentage of Afghans that are not tribal has been overshadowed. These non-tribal groups live 
mostly in the central, western, and northern areas of Afghanistan and include Tajiks, Uzbeks, 
Hazaras, and many city-dwellers.824  Northern Afghanistan, in contrast to the largely Pashtun 
south, is a complex ethnic mosaic.825  
 
Unlike the Tajiks, where geographical location encourages loyalty, the Pashtuns have a web of 
tribal divisions and hierarchy. Two large and historically hostile categories that have carved 
out pockets of Afghanistan: the Durrani and Ghilzai Pashtuns.826 The Durrani’s occupy south-
Western Afghanistan and the Ghilzai are based mainly in the mountainous region in eastern 
Afghanistan along the border of Pakistan. These divisions splinter into smaller tribes, sub-tribes 
and families. The dynamics of social organization which stems from the different tribe’s 
agrarian economics has led to the Ghilzai's thriving politically in time of war and anarchy, 
                                                     
822 Besides constituting the country’s lingua franca, Persian is one of its two official languages, together with 
Pashtu, an Eastern Iranian language spoken by Pashtuns (40%). Abtahi, (n803), 4. A. Rashid, Taliban, 2; Tanner 
(n798) 6. This complex linguistic and religious composition of Afghanistan impacted on internal tensions. Ahady 
(n816); Amin Saikal & William Maley, Regime Change in Afghanistan: Foreign Intervention and the Politics of 
Legitimacy (Westview Press 1989) 13 
823 This alliance would be known as the ‘Northern Alliance’ and the Pashtun Government, the Taliban.  Tanner 
(n798) 6 
824 RB Ferguson & Neil Whitehead ‘The Violent Edge of Empire’ in War in the Tribal Zone: Expanding States 
and Indigenous Warfare, eds. RB Ferguson & Neil Whitehead (School of American Research Press 1992) 12-14. 
825 The Pashtun presence in the north dates to the 1880s and early 1890s, when Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, the 
Durrani Pashtun ruler in Kabul, forcibly relocated thousands of Ghilzai Pashtuns and members of other rival tribes 
from southern Afghanistan to the north. Later settlers, such as the Shinwari Pashtuns who began moving to 
Kunduz from eastern Afghanistan in the late 1940s, came voluntarily. Both the forced and voluntary migrants 
were allocated land by the central government, a development that fostered tensions with communities that 
consequently lost access to farmland and pastures. Louis Dupree, Afghanistan (Princeton University Press 1980) 
188, 419; Asger Christensen, ‘Afghanistan: Can the Fragments be Put Together Again?,’ (2001) 4 Nordic 
Newsletter of Asian Studies, Nordic Institute of Asian Studies 
826 Previously known as Abdali’s, Ahmad Shāh Durrānī was also known as Ahmad Khān Abdālī 
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while the Durrani’s have emerged as victors during times of peace.827 While the Ghilzai are 
larger in number, the Durrani have generally been more politically dominant, occupying 
important representative offices as well as higher levels of the armed forces.828 
 
6.2 Anglo Afghan Wars 
The first Anglo Afghan War (1839-1842) also known as ‘Auckland’s Folly’ was the first major 
conflict in the Great Game era.829 More aptly characterized as a patriotic over religious war, 
there were elements of jihad bi’l sayf, especially from the Ghilzai.830 
 
The Russian expansionist agenda through Asia in the first half of the nineteenth century 
required the quiescence of geo-strategic Afghanistan. Providing support to Russia was not 
repugnant to Dost Muhammad, the Durrani King at the time. However, he had his own agenda, 
to secure Peshawar which had been previously taken by the Sikhs. Dost was in negotiations 
with both the Russians and the British for an undertaking to satisfy this agenda, his loyalty 
given to whichever country provided support first. The British saw Dost’s negotiations as 
duplicitous and subsequently labelled him a Russian conspirator and enemy of the British 
Empire. Consequently, the British invaded Afghanistan in 1838 to overthrow the King and 
impose a British styled government which would halt Russian expansion.  
 
The creation of an ‘artificial state outside its natural element, albeit with best intentions, the 
devil’s choice soon became whether to support it in perpetuity or to abandon it with more dire 
consequences than would have come before.’831 William Macnaghten, designated as Envoy to 
the new government, argued that continued support of Afghanistan was in the best interest of 
the British Empire. This support Macnaghten conditioned on austerity measures including the 
counterintuitive reduction of British military personnel with simultaneous reduction in the 
subsidies paid to the Afghan tribes for their quiescence. Calling on the Ghilzai chiefs, 
Macnaghten informed them that their ‘stipend would cut in half.’ While appearing amenable 
                                                     
827 Thomas Barfield, Weapons of the Not So Weak in Afghanistan: Pashtun Agrarian Structure and Tribal 
Organization for Times of War & Peace (Agrarian Studies Colloquium Series 2007) 15 
828 Thomas Barfield, ‘Afghan Customary Law and Its Relationship to Formal Judicial Institutions’ (USIP, 
Washington 2003) 4; Saikal & Maley (n822) 15 
829 The term ‘Great Game’ was coined by Lieutenant Arthur Connolly of the 6th Bengal Native Light Cavalry.  
the British agent sent to reconnoitre the region between colonial India and the Caucasus in 1829. Peter Hopkirk, 
The Great Game: The Struggle For Empire In Central Asia (Kodansha 1992)123-124. 
830 Lord Auckland was the Governor General of India. Tanner (n798) 172. 
831 Such transposition of imperial governance would suffer the same defects America would endure in Vietnam 
in the twentieth century.  Tanner (n798) 156. 
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to the new terms, the Ghilzai retreated to the hills. Within forty-eight hours, the Ghilzai attacked 
a caravan coming from India to Afghanistan terminating the ‘British lifeline to India…’ 832 
Macnaghten drastically underestimated the Ghilzai, an error that would prove fatal over the 
coming years.    
 
The tribes had a two-fold agenda: remove the foreigners from Afghanistan while taking as 
much booty as they could. Although there are recorded instances of Afghan mercy attested to 
by British officers,833 there are many examples of the tribes not simply killing the British, but 
‘cut[ting] them to pieces with knives’; they would not just target the soldiers, their wives and 
children were also ‘hacked to death.’834 Congruent with the Badr narrative (Ch. 5.2), the 
subsequent years saw a ‘catalogue of errors, disasters, and difficulties, which following close 
upon each other, disgusted [the British] officers, disheartened [its] soldiers, and finally sunk 
[them] all into irretrievable ruin, as though Heaven itself, by a combination of evil 
circumstances for its own inscrutable purposes, had planned [their] downfall.’ In 1842 when 
the British impenetrable forts were flattened by an earthquake in eastern Afghanistan. Akbar 
Khan, the son of Dost, considered this the ‘intervention of Allah.’835  
 
The complicated Afghan power politics was not an intuitive construct for the British to 
understand. The King could be unilaterally declared and would be legitimated if and when 
support was gleaned. Akbar Khan, led negotiations with the British however as a Durrani 
prince, he laid no claim to Ghilzai loyalty.836 While many of the tribes united under a patriotic 
defensive war, none of the chiefs could exercise control over Ghazi Mohammad Jan Khan 
Wardak, and his force of 10,000 Afghans whose fervour was dedicated to destroying the 
British.837    
 
Akbar would eventually kill Macnaghten and mutilate his body, the ‘trunk of his body turned 
up in the Kabul bazaar. His head and limbs had meanwhile been paraded around the city.’ The 
                                                     
832  Bernd Horn & Emily Spencer, No Easy Task: Fighting in Afghanistan (Dundurn 2012) 45; Tanner (n798) 157. 
833 Captain Trevor said that on several occasions Afghan fighters let him go rather than kill him. Tanner (n798) 
171, 175. 
834 Among the last words of a British Colonel Mackrell was ‘This is not battle, this is murder.’ Cited in Tanner 
(n798) 161 -162, 166-167. 
835 Tanner (n798) 167, 191 
836 This is in line with the Islamic notion of ‘right authority’ in 4.2.1.   
837 Ghazi is a title given to Muslim warriors. The Wardak are from the Karlani subgroup of the Pashtuns in central 
and Eastern Afghanistan. Historically, the Wardak are known for their opposition to the British during the Anglo-
Afghan wars. Tanner (n798) 172 
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British retreat saw massive civilian losses at the hands of the Ghilzai. In the Khord-Kabul Pass 
over 3000 bodies were left behind, ‘500 soldiers and 2500 civilians.’838 These civilians were 
either directly targeted or victims of indiscriminate attacks both a violation of the laws and 
customs of war in at least a CIHL sense if not jus cogens. There is no record of the attack being 
based on status as apostates. 
 
Since 1849, and for nearly one hundred years, the British Empire attempted to control the 
Pashtun tribes of the North-Western Frontier of India in a continuous series of campaigns 
aimed at subduing the tribes.839 To ward off Russian expansion, the British would not concede 
their interest in securing the northern border through a physical presence. This presence was 
hostile to Pashtun libertarianism. Concepts of freedom in these remote areas were not derived 
from liberty enunciated in a Bill of Rights, rather it was the ancient derivation, being 
‘unbothered by government at all.’840 A stale mate ensued until the late nineteenth century. 841    
 
6.3 Abdur Rahman and the Durand Line Agreement 1893 
Abdur Rahman, the grandson of Dost and nephew of Akbar Khan was Amir of Afghanistan 
from 1880 until 1901. He is credited somewhat paradoxically as both undermining the Pashtuns 
through a literal division of their homelands in the Durand Line Agreement, while at the same 
time reinforcing Pashtun dominance. Initially, Abdur Rahman directed his campaigns to reduce 
power on three fronts: of the anti-British Pashtun tribes; of his rival cousins who ruled 
Turkistan; and the non-Sunni ethnic groups in remote Afghanistan that had escaped control of 
an executive body. This ‘internal imperialism’ was designed to reconstruct Afghanistan so 
there were no more autonomous regions and the Amir could rule autocratically.842 The 
simultaneous imposition of direct control and taxes vexed a population that did not invite nor 
consent to either. The more than forty uprisings against his regime over the course of his rule 
is testament to this opposition, however lack of coordination in the insurgencies meant the 
Amir’s regime was never overthrown.843  
                                                     
838Of the 17,000 garrison that had retreated Kabul in 1842, only one man, Dr Brydon had reached sanctuary. 
Tanner (n798) 181-182, 187. 
839 Simner (n82) 9 
840 Tanner (n798) 4. 
841 Simner (n82) 9. 
842 Dupree Afghanistan (n825), xix 
843 ‘The level of violence it took to bring Afghanistan [to a police state, where even subversive talk would end in 
detention or worse] has been frequently overlooked by historians and later political leaders, who instead lauded 
the Amir’s ability to bring order to such a fractured land. Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political 
History, (Princeton University Press 2010) 147. 
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Amir Rahman internalized ethnic divisions using force and manipulation to centralize the 
modern state. While directing the majority of his early campaigns against the Pashtuns, 
particularly Ghilzais’, the Amir then became instrumental in their subsequent domination and 
privilege in Afghanistan’s power politics. Next the Amir made jihad in defence of Islam part 
of Afghan national identity. It was in the Amir’s interest to forcefully impose his xenophobic 
views as any talk of reconciliation and brotherhood could undermine the spirit of jihad.844 
Directing jihad outward united the people internally. Some claim Afghans are only capable of 
unity when they are responding to a foreign threat.845 The Amir ‘linked elements of Islamic 
belief with Afghan tribal customs in ways that convinced his largely illiterate population that 
the two were identical. The tautology was that since all true Afghans were devout Muslims 
then all their customs must be Islamic as well, otherwise they could not be good Muslims. 
Anyone proposing to change tradition could therefore be accused of attacking Islam itself.’846 
The Amir’s ‘retrograde view of Islam combined with his policy of xenophobic isolation’ 
preserved the territorial integrity of Afghanistan and closed the state to any external innovation, 
even from the Muslim world. While promoting on the one hand the wholly Islamic character 
of the Afghan state, he simultaneously created a fundamentally secular government that 
dominated the religious establishment.847 
 
Although there are some examples prior to the Anglo-Afghan Wars where fighting fi sabil 
Allah was used to motivate insurgencies, Abdur Rahman sowed the seeds for the stylized 
Afghan jihad that can be seen in modern conflicts. Distinguished from eighteenth century 
Afghan jihad, where the struggle was offensive and directed against Hindu India, Abdur 
Rahman, referring to the ‘God-granted State of Afghanistan’ encouraged jihad to defend the 
land against attacks from the infidels to the north and south of the country.848 
 
By 1896 the Afghan Government was viewed as a Pashtun Government rather than a Durrani 
dynasty, creating an ethnic hierarchy that would typify Afghan society for the next century, 
transforming the relative egalitarian Pashtuns into elitist aristocrats.849 This hierarchy crudely 
                                                     
844 A cleric who preached a softer line, calling for Afghans to view Christians as brothers was put to death at the 
impetus of Abdur Rahman. Hasan Kakar, Government and Society in Afghanistan (University of Texas Press 
1979) 178-179; Olseen (n34) 74. 
845 Tanner (n798) 4; Department of the United States Army (n35) 5. 
846 Barfield, Afghanistan, (n843) 159. 
847 Barfield, Afghanistan, (n843) 155. 
848 Oleson (n34) 89-93 
849  Kakar (n844) 228 
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positioned Pashtuns at the apex followed by Persian speaking Tajiks who played a significant 
role in the administration of government and then the Turks who were voiceless in areas of 
governance. The Hazara’s sat outside the hierarchy and were actively discriminated against.850   
 
Abdur Rahman was the nationalist who declared the necessity of defending Afghanistan’s 
borders to the death, never ceding Afghan land. In reality he made calculated concessions 
which lost land. 
 
6.4 Durand Line 
To prevent tribal feuds from inviting Russian influence colonial officials devised a strategy to 
bring the Pashtun belt under British control, a literal divide and conquer strategy. They split it 
in half by surveying the Durand line, a 1200 mile boundary that continues to demarcate 
Afghanistan and Pakistan.851 (Map 2) Drawn in 1893, the ‘scientific frontier’ followed a 
topographic ridgeline that could create a ‘terrain advantage for the British defenders of the 
Raj.’852 Slicing through tribes, villages, and clans, it ‘cut the [Pashtun] people in two.’853 It 
separated the Pashtun tribes on both sides of the line into 26 agencies, each with its own laws 
and tribal councils.854 While some inaccessible sections remained unmarked, the line created a 
strategic frontier that ‘did not correspond to any ethnic or historical boundary.’855  
 
This ‘confusing, artificial and unnecessary border’ compounded the already unappreciated 
foreign intervention and united the largest tribal grouping straddling either side of the Line. 
The Pashtun tribes resisted the division. The British responded by stationing permanent 
garrisons. The Pashtuns remained restive, with religious leaders often playing leading roles in 
the unrest.856  
                                                     
850 Abdur Rahman quashed a Hazara revolt in the late 1880’s. He then began a campaign of ethnically cleansing 
forcing Hazara girls into marriage and slavery. He sent Sunni clerics to Hazarajat, forced Hazara to attend the 
mosque and abandon Shi’ism. He imposed punitive taxes on the group and they remained defacto slaves until 
1919 when King Amanullah declared independence. Barfield ‘Customary’ (n828) 155. 
851 A British commission led by Sir Mortimer Durand was tasked with creating a border. 
852 George McMunn, Afghanistan from Darius to Amanullah (Sang-e-Meel Publications 2002) 225-8; Tanner 
(n798) 5 
853 Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan: Eye Of The Storm (Yale University Press 2009) 
854 Milt Bearden, ‘The Pashtuns of Afghanistan: Alexander the Great Also Got in Trouble Here’ New York Times 
(New York, 31 March 2004) 
855 Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan (Cambridge University Press 1990) 17. The Durand Line 
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Frasertytler, Afghanistan: A Study Of Political Developments In Central And Southern Asia (OUP 1953) 188. 
856 Abdulkarim Khan, ‘The Pashtun Man’ in Adam Jones Men of the Global South: A Reader (Zed Books 2006) 




The Durand demarcation, although contentiously official, did not divide the Pashtuns of 
Afghanistan and Pakistan.857 ‘[T]he Pashtun themselves have never paid the boundary much 
regard since it was drawn…. They don’t recognize the border. They never have. They never 
will.’858 Through bisecting tribal homelands of three million pastoralists..., the Durand Line 
restricted Pashtun autonomy and facilitated new forms of indirect influence over peoples on 
both sides of it.’859 This remnant of nineteenth century predatory colonialism has left a porous 
Afghanistan-Pakistan frontier which has sustained insurgencies.860  It ‘raises questions about 
the relationship between contested borders, nation-building, failed states, cultural differences 
and foreign interventions.’861 Conflicting values within an artificially-created state are at the 
root of Afghanistan's current instability.862  
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Map 2: Durand Line, 1893 
 







6.5 Resistance to Centralization: The Urban Rural Divide  
‘We are content with discord…; we are content with blood; but we never will be 
content with a master.’863 
 
Identities in Afghanistan are shaped by more than ethnicity, with religious divisions and urban-
rural tensions also impacting the stability of the State.864 ‘A bridge between the Persian and 
Indian worlds transmitting elements of each to the other,’ Afghanistan was the conduit for 
Buddhism to reach China and Japan.865 During the 7th century, Arab armies invaded 
Afghanistan and Islam became the predominant cultural influence by the mid 800’s.866 Islam 
became the lingua franca between the various tribes and ethnicities of Afghanistan, the ‘central 
nerve for Afghan culture, complementing and extending existing structures as well as creating 
a monopoly on education and learning in the region, a legacy that has continued into the twenty 
first century.’867 In the nineteenth century amid imperialist agendas, Islam emerged as the 
dominant legitimating discourse in Afghanistan. 
 
From 1818 a series of opposition movements emphasized Islam as their dominant symbol.868 
A power struggle between the urban and rural, the state and tribal structure pushed the reformist 
King Amanullah from power in 1929 under the slogan ‘Islam is in danger’.869 Propaganda 
successfully depicted his modernists policies as attacks on Islam; ‘religion became a focal point 
                                                     
863 A Pakhtun leader once told Elphinstone in William Hough, A Narrative of the March and Operations of the 
Army of the Indus (BiblioLife 2015) 141 
864 Hyman (n812) 299-315.  
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Religion, Politics and Society (Oxford University Press 1987) 85 
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and the tribes were asking themselves why they should resign the freedom which they had enjoyed for the past 
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duties and bribes for its officials, and possibly the restoration of the arms looted from the government posts and 
arsenals.’ Richard Maconachie, British Minister in Kabul, writing in 1931, quoted in Martin Ewans, Afghanistan 
A New History (Curzon 2001) 101. 
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for opposition that was essentially political’.870 Indeed, Governments perceived as un-Islamic 
continue to have little chance of long term survival in Afghanistan.871 
 
The urban-rural divide is an important characteristic of Afghan society. Where Afghan cities 
have engaged and absorbed science and development, rural areas have remained mostly 
‘decoupled from the development of cities.’872 There is a ‘mutual contempt’ entrenched on 
either side, urban population seeing their rural counterparts as ‘barbarian’, while these 
‘barbarians’ see city dwellers as political elitists removed from traditional Afghan culture.873  
 
Successive Afghan governments have sought to impose centralized code based judicial 
institutions upon local communities that have historically had their own informal institutions 
for conduct regulation and dispute resolution.874 However its reach has rarely penetrated the 
rural and peripheral areas of the country, providing little to and asking little of the population.875 
‘While the content of these state-supported codes has varied in ideology, opposition to them 
has not,’ and depending on whether the community perceived a foreign flavour to the code that 
potentially compromised Afghan tradition it could result in rebellion and overthrow of the 
regime that imposed them.876 This foreign flavour need not be external to Afghanistan, rather, 
it is any state imposed system that is foreign to the customary law and practice of traditional 
Afghan society. During the 20th century modernists and Islamists battled over the Afghan legal 
                                                     
870 Eden Naby, ‘The Changing Role of Islam as a Unifying Force in Afghanistan’ in Banuazizi and Weiner (eds), 
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and must be willing to grant people rights and protections as incentives for support. Charles Tilly, Coercion, 
Capital and European States (Basil Blackwell 1990); Barfield ‘Customary’ (n828) 1. 
876 Thomas Barfield, ‘Culture and Custom in Nation-Building: Law in Afghanistan’ [2008] 60(2) Maine Law 
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system, the former advocating replacing exclusive dependence on Shari’a with statutory law. 
Such attempts were met with fierce resistance.877 
 
Shari’a developed procedures for evaluating evidence, deciding cases in a consistent manner, 
and justifying decisions by reference to Hanafi fiqh. Yet the translation of judgments was often 
a poor fit between its procedures and the needs of illiterate rural Afghans. Customary law was 
part of an oral tradition in which any competent adult could participate; state law courts 
demanded written documents and citation of specific laws to bring a case. The use of Shari’a 
by state courts often ran contrary to rural traditions, particularly the right to blood revenge, 
payment of bride price, denying property inheritance to women, and punishment of crimes like 
adultery.  Rural Afghans often ignored the gap between Shari’a law and local custom because 
they often assumed that there was none inferring compatibility on the same logic used by Abdur 
Rahman, that they themselves were good Muslims therefore it must be compatible. The high 
level of illiteracy in Afghanistan and weak training in Arabic even among educated clerics 
meant too few of them actually knew just what Shari’a actually required.878 
 
Proposed and actual legislation was used as a vehicle by conservative mullah’s to mobilize 
opposition to the government in Kabul which was seen as legislating against the will of rural 
Afghanistan. The most widely cited example was the opposition to King Amanullah’s reforms 
in the 1920s that resulted in rural revolts that eventually toppled his regime. What rural Afghans 
tended to resist, and what Muslim clerical opponents could effectively play upon, was the 
imposition of direct control by the Kabul government (ignoring the fact that Shari’a was an 
alternative type of direct state control).879 Although to outsiders the alliance of rural 
communities and Islamists clerics seemed natural, it was not. Islamist clerics opposed 
customary law institutions as blood feud, marriage payments, and exclusion of women from 
inheritance rights as much or more than the Kabul government did, and they had more influence 
to change them at the local level. 
 
                                                     
877 Afghanistan’s first written constitution in 1923 Shari’a was given a supplementary and subordinate role to 
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Renewing a top-down process of centralization contested community autonomy. Challenging 
the formal legal system was a feasible option because the alternatives to it were well developed 
traditions with deep roots, both tribal and religious.880 These alternative systems better reflected 
local values and traditions than did the formal system, which was often attacked in the past as 
a vehicle for introducing alien ideologies into the country.881 The very notion of state-imposed 
codes is inimical to traditional Afghan political and governance dynamics. This has proved true 
for both liberal and conservative changes.882 
 
Afghanistan was never held under the sway of a strong central government.883 From Europe’s 
first encounters with Afghan tribes and states, these Muslim men of the mountains have 
represented to the West the firmest resistance to its power and domination.884 A product of the 
rapid turnover of ruling parties, central government is a temporary condition in Afghanistan, 
‘…many areas… operate without (or outside of) formal government institutions…; not just 
because of war, but because that is the way things have always been.’ While Afghan 
governments formally reject claims of personal justice, they have never been able to extend the 
formal justice system to rural Afghanistan; the people there never relied on state institutions 
and often took offense when the state interfered in what they viewed to be personal matters.885 
Whether a result of occupation or civil war, the absence of a functional government over a 
thirty year period led the people of Afghanistan to rule themselves on the basis of these 
traditional codes through local assemblies, jirgas or shuras.886 
 
The preservation of order and the ability to resolve disputes in the absence of government is 
only a problem when the society depends on the state and its formal institutions to define law 
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and ensure its enforcement. Hobbes believed that the absence of government or its collapse led 
to anarchy and a breakdown of social order to produce a ‘war of each against all.’ He posited 
the maintenance of social order legitimized the government and took precedence over tyranny, 
failure to preserve social order inviting replacement.887 This Hobbesian bargain has been 
invoked by Afghan governments to justify oppressive behaviour.  
 
The benefits of the many failed attempts at centralization meant a diminished role and reliance 
on formal government. As the tribes have been left mostly to themselves, the tribal system is 
consistent in providing resilience and stability in tumultuous times.888 Anarchy has not been as 
prevalent at local level even when government institutions proved incapable of maintaining 
order, the local population mobilizing their immediate relatives and larger kinship groups to 
get justice. The use of customary law sustained rejection of the Hobbesian bargain.  
 
The reconstruction of the post-colonial world asserted ‘all nations followed a common 
historical path and that those in the lead had a moral duty to those who followed.’ This 
problematic assumption firstly failed to factor that ‘...the hands of the clock of history are set 
at different hours in different parts of the world [,]’ and that different parts of the world may 
not only use alternate clocks, but they may have different conceptions of time. When referring 
to Afghanistan as a nation-state the term does not presuppose that it fully or even partially 
shares the characteristics of a Weberian ideal state, Kabul does not even claim to enjoy a 
monopoly on the use of force.889 
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Nation building in Afghanistan did not fail for want of money or time. While modernization in 
post-colonial creed manifested in a ‘projection of [imperialist] identity,’890  best efforts in 
history has shown Afghanistan by and large ‘ungovernable’ by Western methods.’891 Ordinary 
Afghans may not see the expansion of the formal legal system as a step forward in establishing 
the rule of law, as historically they had no role in creating the national law codes they were 
asked to accept a system they had only known as a corruption of due process. ‘The values that 
the Afghan state has pledged itself to uphold internationally are largely unknown and 
unenforceable domestically.’892 
 
6.6 The Mujahidin, Saur Revolution and Soviet Invasion 
Afghanistan has been described as a ‘bottomless pit’, the more money and manpower third 
states pour into the country the harder it is to extricate, a reality recently felt by the Americans, 
learned by the Russians in the 1980s, and by the British a century earlier.893  
 
The history of modern armed conflict in Afghanistan began in April 1978, when Soviet backed 
Afghan communists took control of the government in a coup, overthrowing the self-
proclaimed president of Afghanistan, Daoud Khan, the cousin of Afghanistan’s former King 
Zahir Shah, who was earlier overthrown in a bloodless coup by Daoud in 1973.894 This coup 
known as the Saur Revolution was led by the People's Democratic Party of 
Afghanistan (PDPA) in April 1978.895 The revolutionaries who seized power in Kabul 
consisted of two opposed political parties: Khalq and Parcham.896 The revolution was far from 
popular, each had minimal support, and many segments of the country’s army and police 
opposed the coup. The new government, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) was 
dominated by a ruthless Khalq leader, Hafizullah Amin, who sought to terrorize Afghanistan 
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into submission through Stalin-styled purges and arrests. The autumn of 1979 saw largely 
uncoordinated revolts explode through Afghanistan with about ten separate rebel groups 
ranging from the secular left to the monarchical right identified in the insurgency.897 The 
insurgencies led to a first wave of Afghan refugees and by mid-August 1979 about 150,000 
Afghans have fled to Pakistan and about 30,000 to Iran.  
 
Up to 10,000 ‘dissidents’ were executed by DRA as ‘enemies of the revolution’. Such measures 
fuelled the insurgency. By the summer of 1979 the mujahidin, a collective of Islamic ANSGs, 
controlled most of Afghanistan’s countryside. Sensing the increasing hostility towards the 
communist government, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to support the failing revolution 
and government and installed a new leader from the Parcham party, Babrak Karmal.898 A 
Soviet–Afghan War ensued against the Mujahidin.899 This Soviet adventure in Afghanistan 
took a decade to cycle through, ending in exactly the same fashion as all the other foreign 
enterprises in that land, with failure. The Soviets could not establish their authority.900 
 
When the Saur revolution occurred, Afghanistan was not particularly militarized. The 
mujahidin were severely under-equipped to fight a standing Soviet army, and the communist 
Afghan government was severely disorganized and poorly outfitted. The Soviet invasion filled 
Afghanistan with weapons. During the 1980’s, Afghanistan likely received more light weapons 
than any other country in the world, and by 1992 it was estimated that there were more light 
weapons in Afghanistan than in India and Pakistan combined.901 Once armed, the insurgency 
and the government needed to be financed. Pakistan used the Afghan Jihad to enhance its ties 
with Saudi Arabia and the United States, who provided money for jihad.902 In the 1980’s, the 
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United States, Saudi Arabia, and to a lesser extent Iran and China, allocated an estimated $6 to 
$12 billion dollars (U.S.) in military aid to mujahidin groups, while the Soviet Union sent 
approximately $36 to $48 billion of military aid into the country to support the government.903 
This covert aid was channelled through Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), 
and given primarily to the most radical religious groupings, thus bypassing the moderate 
Afghan nationalists.904 Pakistan, where some of the mujahidin parties set up exile headquarters, 
arranged large military training programs for the mujahidin and controlled the delivery of Saudi 
and U.S. Pakistan, the US and Saudi cloaked their activities behind intermediaries in what 
amounted to nothing less than a sub-contracting and privatization of the jihad.905 
 
The war had terrible effects on civilian life in Afghanistan. It is estimated that well over one 
million people were killed during the Soviet occupation however they did it in such a ‘boring, 
mechanical, impersonal way as to deflect sustained attention’.906 In the end what ‘worked’ in 
Afghanistan was not reason or negotiation or the advent of perestroika but the Afghans’ 
willingness to die.’907 A country inhabited by a people willing to endure a decade of brutal 
bombing, scorch-earth campaign and see a million dead and another third of its population 
subsisting in make-shift refugee camps, is a country that ‘one should think twice before taking 
head on.’908 It was not the military prowess that defeated the Soviets, rather it was the mujahid 
commitment to defend their land against evil.909  Accounts of good triumphing over evil fed 
into many accounts within the Afghan jihad that align with the Badr narrative.  
 
‘A large battalion came from Russia; consisting of seventy tanks and some regiments, 
covered by twelve planes. The mujahidin were only one hundred and fifteen in number. 
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A fierce battle ensued. Eventually the enemy was defeated. We had destroyed thirteen 
tanks. From amongst us only four were blessed with martyrdom.’910  
 
‘When the communists entered a town with their tanks, they enquired where the ‘stables 
for the horses of the Muslim brothers’ were. The people were surprised since they did 
not ride horses. Then they realized that these were the horses of angels.’911 
 
The Pakistani government, through the army and its ISI, used the opportunity of the Soviet 
invasion to nurture and radicalize resistance groups. Islamabad hoped to undermine the Soviet-
backed pro-communist regime, its very existence offending a conservative Muslim like Zia-ul-
Haq.912  He used the ISI to support, train, and prop up the Islamic resistance movements by 
involving Pakistan-based Islamic movements (mainly Jama’at-i-Islami) to instil greater 
commitment amongst the refugees, while also ameliorating tribal divides in favour of the 
concept of an umma.913  
 
‘The presence on Pakistan’s soil of large numbers of refugees, most of them cut off 
from their traditional leadership, economically dependent, and united in belief of the 
righteousness of their resistance cause, benefited most from the highly conservative 
domestic religious parties… it was Pakistan's Jama’at-i-Islami that took the lead in 
assisting the displaced Afghans and promoting their cause…’.914  
 
Afghan refugees enrolled in Pakistani madrassas. Meanwhile the curriculum of instruction was 
‘wahhabized’ under the influence of Saudi benefactors. Madrassas become militarized and 
politicized during the Soviet invasion; indeed, Islam became increasingly radicalized as a result 
of the 1980’s.915 Thousands of ‘Gucci jihadis’ who flooded into Afghanistan in order to fulfil 
their Islamic duty of defending the umma, left behind them a religious and cultural legacy. 
They imported into the region a more puritanical strain of Islam which included anti-Shi'ism, 
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opposition to Sufi customs and the broadening of the battle against the invader from military 
defence to cultural defence against a kafir onslaught. 916 
 
At the end of the conflict, Pakistan had to find something to do with the religiously instructed 
and motivated youth. The issue, however was that the mujahidin were increasingly 
uncontrollable and hostile, as they fought over the spoils of Afghanistan.’917 The disunity 
among the mujahidin was aggravated throughout this period by the continuing policy of the 
United States, Pakistan, and Saudi to give a disproportionate amount of military assistance to 
one particular mujahidin party: Hizb-i Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.918 There was never any 
real unity between the mujahidin parties: some were openly hostile and occasionally fought 
battles with each other. For most of the 1980s, the mujahidin groups, supported by the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, China, Iran, and Pakistan, fought a brutal guerrilla 
war against Soviet and Afghan national forces, attacking convoys, patrols, arms depots, 
government offices, airfields, and even civilian areas. Much of the countryside became a battle 
zone in the 1980s.919 Through the 1980’s, Hekmatyar received the majority of assistance from 
these countries, and in 1991, the CIA (with Pakistani support) was still channelling most U.S. 
assistance through Hekmatyar—including large shipments of Soviet weapons and tanks the 
United States captured in Iraq during the first Gulf War.920     
 
6.7 The Geneva Accords 1988 and the Soviet Withdrawal 
The Geneva Accords, a series of bilateral agreements negotiated at the end of the conflict 
between the US, Soviet Union, Pakistan and the pro-Soviet Afghan government did not include 
the mujahidin.921 Having lost their common enemy and having not been included in the 
negotiations, the mujahidin split into factions and fought each other for the control of the 
country, resulting in years of civil war.  
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Facing an increase of mujahidin attacks against the government, the Soviet Union completed 
its withdrawal from Afghanistan, pursuant to the Geneva Accords on February 15, 1989. 
Najibullah, the Soviet backed president, remained in power and in control of the country until 
1992, although his followers were now a minority in the legislature. It was only through the 
continued Soviet support that Najibullah maintained a tenuous grip of the Government Post-
Soviet withdrawal. After the Soviet Union collapsed, bringing an end to the flow of money, 
food and weapons that sustained Najibullah’s regime, Kabul fell to the mujahidin.922 A 
collective of mujahid reflecting every major ethnicity in Afghanistan took control in 1992. This 
was formalized in a power sharing agreement, the Peshawar Accords with the idea of a rotating 
presidency.  When Burhanuddin Rabbani became President in 1992 the framework was 
undermined. A power struggle ensued between the mujahidin leaders that were meant to be 
supporting the presidency.923 These groups exploited local factional conflicts that had 
expanded from family rivalries to recruit fighters.924  Afghanistan once again plunged into a 
civil war, as Pakistan and other regional powers supported different factions.925 
 
The period from 1992 – 1994 was marked with broken peace agreements, switching alliances, 
violence and anarchy.926 One of Afghanistan’s darkest eras Kabul was the scene of almost 
constant armed conflict among hostile Afghan military factions, rival mujahidin and defecting 
army forces who swept into the city after the Soviet backed government collapsed. In 1994 
after several secret alliances and negotiations in the shadows between various factions, the 
Uzbek General Dostum struck an alliance of convenience with Hekmatyar’s Hizb-i to take on 
the Tajik Massoud. Intense fighting between the factions overwhelmed Kabul with an 
estimated 25,000 people killed over six months. These included targeted attacks on civilian 
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areas.927 Eventually, this fighting reached the threshold of a NIAC, with the means and methods 
of combat destroying the capital and surrounding areas.928 Gradually the carnage in Kabul was 
mirrored throughout the entire country, fragmenting Afghanistan into ‘fiefdoms of mujahidin 
who fought in an array of alliances, betrayals and bloodshed.’929 Kabul and the northeast of 
Afghanistan became controlled by Tajik government of Rabbani; the Uzbek Dostum occupied 
the north, the Hazara’s controlled central Afghanistan, Jami’at’s Ismael Khan took the Western 
areas and forces loyal to Hekmatyar occupied come areas in the East.930 
 
During this period, various factions battled over Kabul and committed countless atrocities 
against the Afghan civilian population. Most of these civilian casualties were the result of direct 
or indiscriminate attacks on the civilian population and other serious violations of IHL. 
Disappearances were commonplace as was looting and wanton destruction.931 A failing 
centralized government and continued fragmentation of the state provided ripe conditions for 
the proliferation of ANSGs. 
 
These movements were not centrally coordinated. Personal rivalries and ethnic divisions 
compounded by strategic differences frustrated any chance of genuine unity between them. 
Networks of personal relationships played a substantial role, especially among former mujahid 
who fought in Afghanistan, and madrassa alumni which were all based on ethnic 
connections.932 As fighting militias representing specific localities, each mujahidin group had 
its own unique combination of ethnic and tribal support, and there were rivalry and violent 
clashes even between the Pashtun groups.933 Some fought on the side of Hekmatyar against 
Massoud, but the majority were attached to local commanders, who were nearly all Pashtuns.934 
Where there was no clear mujahid responsible, power vacuums created an environment of 
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violence and suffering where warlords ravaged the civilian population, taking children into 
sexual slavery; brutalizing food supplies to the extent of famine; imposing arbitrary taxation.935 
 
6.8 An Afghan Solution 
‘If you do not like the image in the mirror, do not break the mirror, break your 
face.’936 
 
Since the establishment of modern Afghanistan in 1747, tribes have played an important role 
in installing and in deposing their rulers. The tribes have also played an equally important role 
in establishing order in the country, especially in areas where the reach of central government 
was non-existent.937 ‘Afghanistan is a vague backdrop in a long running international 
drama,’938 conflicts reappear as ‘iterations of the binary divides between civilized versus 
uncivilized, reason versus faith, and modernity versus fundamentalism.’939 
 
Afghanistan confronted modernity through its forced integration into the Eurocentric state 
system as a buffer between the Russian and British empires. The formation and transformation 
of that state system as well as the reformulation of tribal and ethnic loyalties as national 
identity, created discord, violence and decay, a reflection of Afghan that society.940 Some say 
that these conflicts were ‘not about Afghanistan, [rather it was] about [the] people straddling a 
border.’941 After the Soviet invasion, communities that were reshaped by the process of 
detribalization found new ways to organize themselves.942 Between 1992-1994, an ‘iconic post-
Cold War scene unfolded on the streets of Kabul, with ethnic and factional battles killing 
thousands, questioning not only the composition of the government but the nature and existence 
of the state.’943  
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Although Afghanistan is often cited as a ‘failed’ State, a term which has lost favour,944 whether 
it was the imperialist interventions of the British including Durand’s arbitrary line, or the 
Russian ideological expansionist agenda triggering an opportunistic American restaging of 
Vietnam, it was a state that and remained fragile by the design of a paranoid Pakistan.945 A 
predictable seven-stage repetitive cycle has emerged since the State’s inception, a cycle of 
‘order, counter-order, disorder’,946 consisting of invasion by a foreign power or ideology; 
destruction of existing social fibre within Afghanistan in the name of progressive reform; 
reconstruction attempts mirroring that of the invading State; resistance by large pockets of 
Afghan society; breakdown of social control and social power internecine fighting; anarchy.947  
 
Afghanistan was not hugely unstable, fractured, or militarized in 1978, when the Soviet Union 
orchestrated the communist coup in Kabul. But the Soviet invasion coupled with decisions by 
the United States, United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, China, Iran, and Pakistan to support the 
mujahidin, ultimately made Afghanistan one of the most unstable, fractured, and militarized 
places in the world. Afghanistan is yet to see a peaceful transfer of power. Compounding an 
already volatile atmosphere are external forces which have repeatedly transformed the state 
into a Pashtun-sponsored coliseum where global powers would, using both regular and private 
armies, use this arena to advance their imperial agenda. Though ideological divisions have 
undoubtedly played a role in ongoing conflict, Afghanistan's troubles derive less from foreign 
forces and the ideological divisions between groups than they do from the moral incoherence 
of Afghanistan itself. 
 
Irrespective of contentions around whether the Taliban was a Pashtun Movement. It was a 
movement comprising Pashtuns.  The following chapter considers the impact Pashtun 
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customary law has had as a regulatory mechanism in shaping relationships between Pashtuns, 

































Chapter 7 The Pashtuns:  Customary Law and Conflict Conduct 
 
‘Every man is a warrior, a politician and a theologian. Every large house is a real 
feudal fortress…Every family cultivates its vendetta; every clan, its feud…Nothing is 
ever forgotten and very few debts are left unpaid.’948 
 
Understanding the culture of the Pashtun tribes in Afghanistan and Pakistan has been a 
challenge for all who interact with them, and particularly for outsiders who have attempted to 
occupy their territories.949 The inability to understand the ‘labyrinthine tribal machinations’ of 
the Pashtuns in Afghan Politics has hindered progression towards peace.950 Interest in this 
ethnic group arose not just through their dominance of Afghan politics but also the role they 
played in the mujahid-cum Taliban.951  In contemporary Afghanistan, this ethnic group are 
often viewed through the prism of the idiosyncratic interpretation of Islam presented by the 
Taliban.952 This perspective skews the recognition of certain cultural values and rules of 
behaviour, which had been determining the way of life of many Pashtuns since jahiliyya, and 
which remain of influence today.953 The chapter will present an overview of the local law that 
was operational through the Taliban’s evolution and applicable to its Pashtun members 
individually. 
 
The origin of the Pashtuns is not clear.954 Historical documentation refers to ancient people 
called Pakthas between the first and second millennia living in the region between the Hindu 
Kush and Indus River, an area the Pashtuns continue to occupy.955 Tribally organized, the 
Pashtuns claim patrilineal descent from a common ancestor known as Qais bin Rashid of Gor, 
a tribal chieftain of the seventh century.956 While originally egalitarian, history has 
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incrementally stratified the Pashtun system dividing into a large number of separate clans and 
lineages.957  
 
Mapping tribal, and clan identities and boundaries only tells a small and potentially misleading 
part of the story. Local knowledge adds critical context.958 Despite ‘tribe’ providing a 
convenient narrative for understanding pockets of Eastern Afghanistan, scholars who have 
performed research in Afghanistan are unanimous in the view that Pashtun ‘tribes’ are not 
political units that act collectively.  
 
‘...[A]mong academic anthropologists and historians, there is a unanimous consensus 
on the subject of tribes in Afghanistan… The classic definitions of Middle Eastern tribes 
are hard to find in Afghanistan. In fact many scholars are reluctant to use the word tribe 
at all for describing groups in Afghanistan.’959 
 
Rather, as an analytical unit, preference is given to the word qawm loosely transcribed as a 
‘solidarity group’, a group of people that acts as a single unit and is organized on the basis of 
some shared identity.960 Qawm, is a flexible term that indicates ‘us’ as opposed to ‘them’ 961 
Fellow qawmi at its broadest can include all members of a large tribal or ethnic group or as few 
people as members of the same village or lineage. ‘...[Q]awm and ethnic affiliations are…a 
dynamic process and not a static taxonomia.’962 
 
While Pashtuns often answer with their tribal identity that doesn’t mean they will act on it. ‘No 
clear evidence exists of tribes actually coalescing into large-scale corporate bodies for joint 
action even defensively, even for defence of territory.’963 Qawms change. They can cut across 
family relationships.964  Conditions and context dictate Pashtun alliances.  
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The Pashtun ethnic group exists in a confederation and provides the umbrella framework for 
the tribal connections. This filters to the qawm or tribe which occupies a specific territory with 
its own interpretation of law, practice and politics. The qawm is then divided into large lineages 
or clans known as the khel. Finally, the khel comprises the khol, smaller lineages or family 
groups. The head of each khol is referred to as malik (Fig 1). This system creates a hierarchy 





Figure 1: Pashtun Tribal Structure  
Adapted from Kfir (n893) 
 
In Afghanistan ‘...the family still takes precedence, reserving the right to take revenge or 
demand compensation when one of its members has suffered an injury.’966 Almost every aspect 
of Afghan society is related to the structure and function of the family system. The country’s 
harsh terrain isolates communities making it necessary for loyalties to focus on family first, 
then on the tribal group and lastly on the nation.967  
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However, there are alternate ways Pashtuns might organize themselves in addition to family 
relationships.968 While some countries structure their tribal system like trees, in Afghanistan 
‘tribes’ are like jellyfish, with a notoriety for changing their form of social organization when 
pressured by internal dissension or external forces.969 The tendency for rural Pashtuns to form 
groups that aren’t based on family relationships has been a way for Pashtuns to stymie attempts 
by central governments to establish control over them while simultaneously providing ‘social 
capital’ for the resilience of the Afghan society to external shocks, such as war and failed 
governance.970 For Pashtuns, the phrase ‘blood is thicker than water’ is not an accurate 
depiction. Pashtuns are just as likely to choose a way of organizing that has nothing to do with 
the closeness of family relationships. This made it difficult to externally predict how the group 
would coalesce and dissolve.971 So while tribe is a factor in Pashtun society, it is neither the 
only source of Pashtun identity, nor the foundation of Pashtun social organization.972 
 
A more traditional form of social organization in Afghanistan is patronage networks which 
depend on the ability of the patron, or khan, to distribute resources to make a convincing case 
for his leadership. Local khans are not elected, and people decide whether to support or reject 
them.973 Rivalry between close male relatives, the formation of factions within kin groups, and 
the dynamics of patronage make Pashtun social structures complex.974 
 
Absent a functioning government since 1978, the majority of Pashtuns used the tribal and 
district structures. The qawn, has played a strong role in keeping security and ensuring 
governance. It is among people of the same qawm that customary law has its strongest force.975 
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‘Obedience to a law which we prescribe ourselves is liberty’976 
 
The Pashtuns distinguish themselves through their tribal code of Pashtunwali which guides 
acceptable behaviour within the community and governs the individual and inter-tribal 
relationships.977 Of the pluralistic mechanisms regulating conduct through Afghanistan and the 
Pashtun tribal belt including Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and the Federally Administered 
Tribal Area (FATA), Pashtunwali remains the least known outside South Asia. Fragmented 
and arguably orientalist, the literature is however unified in asserting the importance of this 
tribal code as a pervasive feature of social organization in Pashto speaking areas.978 
Pashtunwali defines the Pashtun as a ‘man of honour’, honour being the backbone of the code. 
It is an ethnic self-portrait of the Pashtuns, including all traditions by which the Pashtuns, 
according to their understanding, distinguish themselves from other ethnic groups. 
 
Like many other concepts which are aimed at shaping ethnic identity, Pashtunwali describes 
an ideal. Among the Pashtun tribes, these general principles and practices (tsali) have been 
transmitted orally for centuries, an inherited way of life, especially for Pashtuns in rural areas 
on both sides of the Durand Line.979 The nuanced rules within the Pashtunwali matrix, the strict 
adherence the code demands, and the severity of punishments it gives the authority to 
summarily execute, makes it difficult to imagine a situation where the code could be 
subordinated to another regulatory mechanism. 
 
However, forty years of conflict has seen the ideals of Pashtunwali compete with other value 
systems which gained influence during that time. The transformation of its institutional aspects 
is more obvious than changes within the system of values. There is no doubt that ideals of 
Pashtunwali still continue to present an attractive and sometimes binding option for 
contemporary Pashtuns.980 
 
                                                     
976 Jean-Jacques Rousseau The Social Contract and Discourses 178 (G.D.H Cole trans., J.M Dent & Sons Ltd. 
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Kegan Paul 1980). 
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Just as Islam claims, Pashtunwali is also more than a system of customary laws. It is a way of 
life.981 As an egalitarian model, each member had equal power. This meant any violations 
would trigger lex talionis.  
 
‘Pashtunwali requires that every insult be revenged and, conversely, every guest 
protected. To safeguard his honour, or the honour of his family or clan, a Pashtuns will 
sacrifice everything, including his money and his life. He will return even the slightest 
insult with interest.’982  
 
The Code stresses personal autonomy and equality of political rights in a world of equals. 
Mobilization of consensus is at the heart of leadership with acceptance of any authority needing 
to be voluntary and not coerced by force as evidenced in the Anglo Afghan Wars. As such it is 
a code that is practically impossible to fulfil in a class-structured society or where blood feuds 
are prohibited. It is the Pashtuns living beyond the reach of state government, where state or 
proto state power legitimacy is contested, that see themselves as true Pashtuns because only 
they can maintain the strict standards of autonomy demanded by the Code.  
 
Pashtuns who moved to large cities were farther removed from the values of the Pashtunwali 
because there they were enmeshed in state systems of government that restricted autonomy, 
and cash economies that valued money more than honour. It is for this reason that examples 
of customary law as a living tradition are found mainly in the marginal areas of rural 
Afghanistan even though the ethos of the Pashtunwali is common to all rural Pashtuns. Thus, 
the Pashtun tribes that have remained in the hills and deserts continue draw a sharp distinction 
between themselves and their tax-free way, blood feuding, way of life (nang) and those 
Pashtuns who live under state control (qalang). The hill tribes assert that they are the proper 
Pashtuns because their cousins on the plains and in the cities have been stripped of any true 
autonomy and are forced to obey state regulations.983 This divide is the source of the Pashtun 
proverb that ‘honour ate up the mountains, and taxes ate up the plains.’984 
 
                                                     
981 This way of life resonates with Islam which claims the same, albeit with an emphasis on God above all else. 
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Premised on punitive deterrent mechanisms, Pashtunwali’s paternalistic chauvinistic tribal 
code is sensitive to diverging from valued tribal norms, and suspicious of those who neither 
understand nor subscribe to these norms. Prioritizing collective interest over the individuals is 
evidenced in the mechanisms of social exclusion, exile, and revenge which can extend to the 
individual’s entire family and over generations. A social death, not a physical one was the worst 
possible punishment that could be inflicted on a member of the community.985 The application 
of these rules is called narkh (informal or traditional law), the implementation of which is being 
the responsibility of a jirga and shura.986 It is not a single set of rules that can be collected and 
codified for simple application. Rather it encompasses sets of principles and rules that are 
tailored to specific contexts that are used to seek reconciliation rather than adjudication. It is 
this sensitivity to local social relations that make it so effective. It has a number of specific 
institutions, the most important of these are badal (revenge), melmastia (hospitality), and 
nanawati (sanctuary). In addition, it valorizes the accumulation of ghayrat (personal honour) 
and defense against insults by outsiders to the honour of the group or its women (namus).987 988 
 
These central tenets of Pashtunwali are used in a string like manner, each concept is 
interconnected. As a regulatory framework it is subject to cultural variations and nuances. 
While attempting to avoid uncritically drawing upon colonial literature which ‘has 
strengthened the colonial stereotypes about the Pashtun’, as well as reducing Pashtunwali to 
the sum of its constituent parts, it is these parts that provide the skeleton of the customary law 




Without jurisdictional boundary, the Pashtun must obey the first law of Pashtunwali, melmastia 
or hospitality, which must be extended to all without discrimination. While showing the 
generosity of the Pashtun, melmastia also imposes expectations on the beneficiary of the 
hospitality who must not test the limits of the hospitality by engaging in shameful acts.990 It 
demands that guests be welcomed without question. In addition to shelter and food, the Code 
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demands that guests receive absolute protection. This obligation applies to all irrespective of 
wealth and supersedes even the requirements of revenge. This means that even if a host 
discovers that his guest is an enemy which under other circumstances he would, under the 
Code, be within his rights to kill, he must not harm him. Failure to treat a guest properly results 
in in an offence to one’s honour.991   
 
The obligation has a defensive element also. If enemies are pursuing the guest, the host is 
required to take up arms to defend him from them. If another person is planning to carry out a 
revenge attack, he will ordinarily wait until his victim has left the host’s property so as not to 
provoke a blood feud with the host. Melmastia replaces the protection of kin with the protection 
of the host. The host is personally liable for the security of his guest and seeing that no harm 
comes to him is his primary obligation.  The exception to this rule is where the person seeking 
protection has committed an act that would bring shame, for example the rape of a woman. In 
this instance there is no claim to melmastia.992  
 
The guest must not deliberately burden his host: his stay must be limited, and he must accept 
the host’s authority. As melmastia is temporary, and the roles can be reversed at different times, 
and seeking the protection of a host is not seen as an infringement of a man’s autonomy.993 
Melmastia is practical in that it allows for travel in rural regions outside the cash economy 
where one cannot buy food or rent a room while ensuring personal security in a country with 
no overarching legal authority that preserves the peace. Adherence to melmastia brings honour 
to the host. Breaching the code brings tremendous dishonour. Pashtun narratives revel in stories 
that reveal the extent to which a man is torn between his desire for revenge and the need to 
fulfil his role as host. There are also cases where enemies are murdered after being invited to a 
feast. While such killings may bring power, they have no honour. An old Baluch folktale 
illustrates the point, telling of an old Khan who killed his own son who had brought dishonour 
on his clan by murdering their guest in order to avenge his brother’s death.994 
 
So powerful is this tenet, its application arguably played a pivotal role in the US invasion of 
Afghanistan in 2001. This will be discussed in the following chapter on the Taliban. 
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Badal is the right and expectation of retaliation that lies at the heart of the Pashtunwali as a 
non-state legal system, lex talionis in operation. While the community may recognize that acts 
such as theft, homicide or rape are wrong, it does not take collective responsibility for judging 
or punishing people who commit such acts.995 This is a right reserved to the victims. Pashtuns 
are notorious for family feuds, it is proper under the code for a son to be killed for a father’s 
crime extending the temporal scope of the conflict for generations. As such these are private 
wars, the right of every free man to seek his own justice by attacking whosoever wrought him 
ill and by bringing his entire family into the quarrel.996  One scholar recounts the story of a man 
he interviewed 'who proudly declared that he had killed seven male members of [another 
Pashtun] family for having insulted his wife, and so far only his brother had been killed in the 
revenge.'997 As Lord Auckland discovered, a Pashtuns loyalty to his social superior depends on 
how he is treated, the slightest disrespect can transform him into a killer. What the British 
called treachery, the Pashtun called vengeance. It is the duty of a Pashtun to avenge the murder 
of his family. Until this vengeance is fulfilled his honour will remain in question. When revenge 
is complete a psychological need for justice is satisfied. ‘The whole village knows what was 
done, and to whom; the whole village takes pleasure in an act of revenge successfully 
performed.998  
 
Revenge need not be hasty but it must be effective. One example talks of a village elder who 
scolded a Pashtun for his haste in avenging his father’s killer after fifty years.999 There are no 
temporal limits for exacting revenge. Unresolved cases hang over the communities like 
uncollected debts. The most classic of these cases involves the responsibility of revenge falling 
on young boys whose fathers were killed and remain unrevenged. Upon reaching adulthood 
many years later they return to kill their enemies. Given that each revenge killing demands a 
response by the new victim’s family, blood feuds between hostile kin groups can last for 
generations and involve many deaths if left unresolved.  
 
                                                     
995 Barfield ‘Customary’ (n828) 5. 
996 Scott (n228) 
997 Andre Singer, Lords of Khyber (Faber and Faber 1984) 
998 Khan The Pashtun Man (n856) 369. 
999 Dupree Afghanistan (n825) 127-128. 
184 
 
However, this need for effectiveness does not mean a Pashtun should miss an opportunity for 
revenge. In Pashtunwali tsali the murder of an innocent man put a target on the killer’s agnatic 
relatives. Killing any of them was considered a legitimate form of retaliation. Over the course 
of the 20th century the custom was modified to make only the murderer himself the legitimate 
target of revenge attacks unless he had fled the area and could not be found. Under these 
conditions the murderer’s adult sons or brothers were considered acceptable substitutes.  
 
7.3.1 Pashtun Compensation 
Because revenge is an individual right there is the option to bring the cycle of retaliation killings 
to an end. Where Islam says ‘haram’, Pashtunwali says ‘pay’.1000 By far the most complex 
rules for compensation are applied to personal injury. Pashtun tsali divides the human body 
into four parts: eyes, feet, hands and the rest of the body. The middle of the twentieth century 
saw the value of a human Afghan life set at 60,000 Afghanis (Afs) ($1200 USD) and so the 
each of the four parts was deemed worth 15,000 Afs ($300 USD) (Table 3 and 4).1001 In 
addition to actual wounds threatening a person with a knife or rifle carried a 1,000 Afs 
compensation penalty.1002 
 
Money is paid to the victim’s family by the murderer’s family along with two sheep as a shame 
payment and an apology. In addition, the victim’s family receives an unmarried girl in 
marriage. Giving a girl in marriage serves two purposes: it provides a replacement for the life 
lost and binds the two families with a marital alliance that should act as a barrier to further 
hostilities. In fact, the judges may encourage an even larger exchange of women in which each 
side accepts in marriage the sisters or daughters of the other. This is sometimes easier to arrange 
because the exchange is a mutual one and thus does not call into question a family’s honour.1003 
 
Pashtunwali protects the ‘three Z’s’: Zan (woman), Zar (gold) and Zamin (land). These are 
Pashtuns inviolable assets. Disputes among Pashtuns are traditionally said to arise from 
violating one of the three Z’s which is tantamount to a crime that can only be redressed through 
revenge.1004 These are the most difficult cases as they provoke blood feuds. Settlements are 
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difficult to arrange because they involve questions of honour and giving up the right of 
retaliation. Unlike state law which may imprison for a crime, Pashtuns seek compensation and 
social reconciliation,1005  bearing in mind ‘he is not a Pashtun who does not give a blow for a 
pinch.'1006 
 
The tables below are used to illustrate the pragmatic approach to injury and compensation 
similar to that used in common law tort. Sometimes compensation discharges the need for 
revenge, other times it is awarded concurrent to revenge. 
 
 
Table 3 Bodily Injury Compensation Schedule ($1 USD = 50 Afs) 
Body Part Injured Level of Compensation  
Eye (right)/ Eye (left) 7,500 afs/ 7,500 afs 
Ear (right)/ Ear (left) 5,000 afs/5,000 afs 
Incisor (middle)/Incisor (side)/ Canine 5,000 afs/5,000 afs/2,500 afs 
Premolar/ Molar 2,000 afs/1,000 afs 
Hands (right)/ (left) 10,000 afs/ 5,000 
Thumb/indexfinger/middle 
finger/ring/pinky 
3750 afs/2,500 afs/2000 afs/1,500 afs/1,000 
afs 
Feet (right)/ (left) 7,500 afs/7500 afs 
Amputation of Foot 30,000 afs 
Fingernail/toenail (visible) 150 afs 
Fingernail/toenail (not visible) 100 afs 
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Table 4 Environmental Compensation Schedule1007  
 
Type of Tree Compensation Type of Animal Compensation 
Apple 1,000-2,000 afs Camel 10,000-20,000 afs 
Apricot 500- 1,000 afs Ox 3,000- 7,000 afs 
Pomegranate 100-300 afs Cow 2,000 – 5,000 afs 
Walnut 1,500 – 2,000 afs Donkey 1,000 – 2,000 afs 
Mulberry 1,000- 1,200 afs Sheep 1,000 – 3,000 afs 




7.3.2 Blood Revenge 
There is the obvious desire to punish the person who committed the act by the victim’s family, 
but it also involves questions of honour and personal responsibility. Not seeking blood 
retaliation personally is deemed a sign of moral weakness, even cowardice, not just of the 
individual who was wronged, but his whole kin group. Payment of compensation agreed to by 
both parties can also bring an end to the dispute without violence but settling too quickly may 
also impugn the honour of the victim’s kin group. This task cannot be outsourced to the state 
and using state law will not necessarily negate a customary law response. Reporting a murder 
to get action from government officials is considered a sign of weakness, that the kin group is 
too weak to take revenge honourably themselves. As with the Australian indigenous concept 
of ‘pay-back’, punishment by a government court does not erase the obligation to take revenge: 
a victim’s family is expected to kill the murderer once he is released from prison unless there 
is a settlement to end the feud before that time.1008 This works both ways. Local communities 
also reject the legitimacy of state actions to punish men who have taken their revenge 
legitimately or to take action against a killer who has arranged a settlement with his victim’s 
kinsmen. Similarly, if the death fails to meet the standards set for blood feud, people also 
believe that the government has no right to interfere because no crime was committed.1009  
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Blood revenge is preconditioned on certain rules. Partial defences include if the death is the 
result of an accident or an involuntary act, the victim’s family may be entitled to compensation 
but not revenge. Blood revenge may also be prohibited if the victim was engaged in a 
dishonourable act, such as a thief killed in the night or a man caught engaging in adultery. 
Within badal there are elements of distinction. Since blood revenge is the obligation of a kin 
group, a man who kills his brother is not subject to revenge (since the murderer would have to 
take revenge on himself) but he would have to flee the community. Women and children are 
excluded as targets of revenge in all cases. In relation to how revenge killings are achieved 
there is little prescription. Pashtuns have had however, a reputation for mutilation.1010   
 
‘When you're wounded and left on Afghanistan's plains 
An' the women come out to cut up what remains, 
Jest roll to your right an' blow our your brains 
An' go to your Gawd like a solider.’1011 
 
The rules of blood revenge change in a conflict context. Personal blood revenge cannot be 
taken in time of peace for a man killed in battle because the fight was group against group, 
although if hostilities are renewed then each side tries to even the score.1012 There are also 
guidelines around who is allowed to take blood revenge. Death must be of equal value/loss.1013 
The person taking the revenge should be a close relative of the victim, although in some 
Pashtun traditions it was legitimate to hire a substitute to take revenge in the name of the victim. 
The most honourable revenge attacks take place face to face but killing in ambush is also 
acceptable as long as those taking revenge take public credit for their deed.   
 
There are further rules around distinguishing civilian and religious property, booty and mortal 
remains. Revenge attacks cannot be carried out in a mosque or against a guest. The goods and 
weapons of a man killed in a revenge attack cannot be robbed and, as in Islam, relatives should 
be given quick notice of the death so that they can recover his corpse for burial.1014 If revenge 
cannot be carried out the victim’s family will often leave the village to avoid the public shame 
of having to live in proximity to the killers.  
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Badal is counterbalanced by nanawatay or sanctuary.1015 In common parlance it is taken to 
mean submission or forgiveness. It is a remedy of feuds. When an enemy enters a Pashtuns 
neighbourhood and, begging forgiveness, places his life in the hands of that Pashtun, there is a 
heavy obligation on that Pashtun to grant it. The begging can take collective form, begging the 
village jirga to intervene on his behalf. While ultimately up to the Pashtun whether forgiveness 
is granted, if the jirga’s request is received positively, his enemy will enter the hujra, the men’s 
assembly place, and slaughter a sheep or goat which denotes his contrition. 1016 The formal 
request to grant pardon puts the offended party into the role of the more powerful party even if 
this is not in reality the case.  
 
There is a duty to grant asylum to any who request. In its best-known form someone leaves his 
own community looking for permanent protection, for example someone fleeing a blood 
revenge which is due him.1017 The institution of sanctuary recognizes an exception to Pashtun 
egalitarianism. Because the supplicant must declare his lack of autonomy, the request for 
nanawati occurs only in extreme cases.  
 
7.5 Gundi & Tarburwali 
In Pashtun, gundi means factional, tribal or personal rivalry.1018 Gundi can start from 
internecine rivalry between brothers or cousins, within a clan or tribe. Gundi within the family 
or among cousins is also called tarburwali. In gundi, each side tries to develop relationships 
with other gundi in other villages or sub-tribes, which may lead to larger rivalries between two 
influential families or major tribes.1019 
 
These informal relationships are strong and when an event occurs that requires the support 
from others, help comes from the connections and relationships of gundi.1020 In order to 
strengthen your gundi, you and your family should have a reputation for supporting others in 
times of need. If a member of the gundi is killed in enmity, he or she will be counted in the last 
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of final peace agreement by jirga. So when both sides finally agree to have long term peace, 
the jirga will count all of the people who have been killed or wounded in the duration, as well 
as all damages inflicted upon each side during the duration of the conflict. As hostility is carried 
from one generation to the next if the conflict has lasted several generations, they count all the 
people who were killed in each generation.1021 
 
One reason the ‘family tree’ model of tribes doesn’t apply to Pashtuns is this relationship 
between patrilineal first cousins. It is unique to Pashtuns in Afghanistan and Pakistan and is 
said to be a defining feature of the Pashtun ethnicity.1022 Tarburwali refers to the enmity of the 
brother’s son (cousin) rivalry.1023 This enmity is traced to competition over the inheritance of 
land from common ancestors. The daftar (tribal land) and daftari (individual share in tribal 
land) are central to understanding tarburwali.  Daftari means only those that own land can have 
a say in the running of the village. A person without land becomes a person without a voice, a 
faqir.1024 Being a faqir is sub-optimal, thus land disputes are often at the core of blood-feuds. 
Farming land is scarce, as a result the individual men of each succeeding generation inherit 
smaller and smaller parcels. Compounding the situation is the fact that the family members in 
competition are also neighbours, sharing borders, which, in the absence of a system of 
conveyance, are the cause of many violent negotiations.1025 Feuds between first cousins and 
their respective factions can last decades and there are no shortages of examples of protracted 
first cousin feuds.1026 
 
While land and money are central to cousin conflicts, ezzat (reputation or good name) can also 
serve as a trigger. The behaviour of cousins reflects directly on a man’s reputation.  
 
‘A vital dynamic of tribal society – arguably the fuel that keeps honour alive as a moral 
code- is the understanding that a man will not willingly allow his paternal cousins and other 
peers to outdo him in any competitive endeavour, particularly combat. One gains renown 
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by being the first into the fray, the most daring in the pursuit of glory, and the most 
successful in battle.’1027 
 
If a cousin makes himself seem braver, better, or more successful, then a man will feel 
compelled to match the cousin. 
 
‘[A feud began with a] boy’s refusal to let his second cousin play soccer with him. This 
trivial insult led to a fight which spread to include the boys’ fathers. [In the end] three men 
were dead and the fields of both families had either been sold for weapons or else left fallow 
as the remaining men sought to eliminate their rivals.’1028 
 
7.6 Namus  
Honour is not just an ideal in Pashtun society, it is viewed by many Pashtuns as the very 
mechanism that preserves Pashtun society as something separate from the wider world. Men 
seek to preserve and enlarge their reputation at all costs. Positive acts as physical courage, 
generosity, outstanding public speaking, success in building political alliances, or winning 
disputes add to ezzat.1029 
 
In order to live in a Pashtun family, village or society, you should be able to protect your namus 
and you should have ezzat. Land property and female members of the family are namus. 
Homeland is also namus. Protection of homeland is the same as protecting your family. If 
someone cannot protect his namus, he loses ezzat in his society. That person will not have a 
place in the family, village or in the larger Pashtun society and will have to migrate to another 
location to live as hamsaya (to take protection and live outside one’s tribe – essentially an 
asylum seeker.) As hamsaya, a person doesn’t have the same status and privileges as the other 
inhabitants who live in the village. Hamsaya live under the protection of the family whom they 
dwell.1030 
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Matters of honour can be to some rural Pashtuns as real as infringements against a land border, 
if only because they are ‘representative’ of some possible future event in which actual resources 
are involved.1031 The role of personal honour (ghayrat) in the Pashtunwali is the driving force 
behind these institutions. Nowhere is fear of shaming the group stronger than in the requirement 
to defend the honour of women. 
 
Namus demands the maintenance of sexual propriety. Complete chastity among female 
relatives is of the essence. Only with the purity and good repute of his mother, daughters, 
sisters, and wife (or wives) does a man ensure his honour. Women are restricted to private, 
family compounds in much of the Pashtun Belt, secluded from contract with strangers and have 
no public face in disputes. While they cannot accumulate honour in their own right, they can 
lose it through misbehaviour or attacks on them. Any attack on a woman, physical or verbal, is 
seen as an attack on a man’s honour, and must be avenged.1032 Similarly any sexual 
improprieties by women themselves are deemed such serious violations of the honour code that 
they can and should be killed by their male relatives.  
 
The Pashtun attitudes towards women are Manichean archetypes, either considered fickle or 
virtuous. There are recurrent themes in Pashtun folktales of the adulterous wife whose ‘bad’ 
action can only be atoned by death or exile. However, while there are many misogynistic stories 
there are some that elevate the status of women, at least the virtuous woman who knows how 
to preserve her honour, is seen as more wise and courageous than a man.1033  Women’s passive 
role in the honour system is well known, but they also play a large role in assessing men’s 
honour. It is women’s opinion that is often decisive in raising and lowering a man’s position. 
Their praise or malicious gossip can have a powerful impact in how a man or group is 
judged.1034  
 
7.6.2 Illicit Sex, Gender Crimes and Abduction  
Sexual misbehaviour is subject to rigorous consequences similar to those that legitimize 
revenge killings because it is deemed an offense against family honour. Pashtun tradition takes 
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such violations so seriously that while revenge for murder is one for one, a victim’s family is 
seen as having the right to kill seven members of the offender’s family in revenge for adultery, 
abduction or rape. Adultery is punished by killing both individuals if they are caught in bed 
together. If only one of the two is slain, the killing is viewed as illegitimate because it throws 
suspicion on the killer’s motives. In the case of rape or if a woman reports that she has been 
sexually harassed, only the man is liable to be killed. Even making lewd innuendos or, in the 
case of women, having one's reputation maligned may mean death.  Such honour killings may 
also occur in cases of abduction when a man takes an unmarried woman or girl without her 
family’s permission. Because her father and brothers are then expected to kill them, the man 
often flees with the woman or girl and seeks nanawati elsewhere. In cases of abduction of a 
married woman, the woman and her abductor are similarly liable to be killed if caught by 
either the husband’s family or the women’s family since both have had their honour offended. 
Should the man be killed in revenge the woman is expected to marry her lover’s brother, but 
this now marks him as a target for revenge as well. Badal is closely related to the notion of 
honour.1035  
 
7.7 Narkh  
In areas where government is weak, Pashtuns solve their disputes through local councils. The 
rules of dispute resolution are called narkh. Narkh are unwritten rules based on precedent. 
Literally it means ‘price’ because each decision involves certain costs.1036 Different contexts 
produce different narkh. Where these interpretations would cause a conflict of norms in an 
inter-tribal dispute, a decision would be made in advance whose narkh would be used (akin to 
Private International law rules on selectig a forum).  
 
The authority of local law is upheld by tribal or Shari’a councils, jirgas or shuras.   
 
‘A jirga in its simplest form is merely an assembly, a local/tribal institution of decision-
making and dispute settlement. It is an informal institution which utilises local 
customary law to arrive at collective decision about the resolution of a dispute is binding 
on the parties involved.’1037  
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Shuras are local councils, either religious or secular, that are typically convened on an as-
needed basis to resolve disputes or decide issues of community governance or resource 
management. Jirgas and shuras are similar however jirgas are more prevalent among Pashtuns. 
These informal institutions do not enforce the state laws of Afghanistan, but rather Islamic 
Shari’a law, customary tribal law, or the collective wisdom of elders (Fig.2). In a typical jirga, 
for example, decisions are made in accordance with well-developed understandings of morality 
and justice 
.  
Figure 2 1038 
 
 Tribal Islam 
 Jirga/Shura Shari’a 
What is the 
madnate? 
To make decisions according to 
particular tribal values 
(Pashtunwali) 
Interpretation/decisions made 
according to universal rules (Fiqh) 
Who Makes the 
Decisions? 
Well regarded members of the 
community 
Judge who is an externally appointed 
expert 
What is the 
Format? 
Context sensitive resolutions Rule specific judgments 
 
Where the jirga is the wellspring of Pashtun identity and provides a key socialization tool for 
younger Pashtuns, the village mosque is the ‘locus of religious belief.’ The role that religious 
families played in these tribal consultative bodies was traditionally small; the mullah would 
recite a few Qurʾanic verses at the start and would have minimal input throughout the 
discussion. If a mullah had greater involvement it was likely linked to his holding a tribal 
standing. 1039 
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The main contrasts between the local councils and a court of Shari’a may be summarised as 
the difference between negotiations to restore equilibrium between two contestants and 
adjudication to restore justice.1040 In a jirga the mediator is a well-regarded member of the 
community whose identity is agreed upon by the disputant. This is often a person who is 
reputed to have a lineage with an accepted claim to descent from the Prophet.1041 He is expected 
to utilise both his religious and his personal influence and knowledge about the conflict to settle 
disputes, while in a Shari’a court the judge (Qadi) is a religious expert who passes judgements 
on the basis of interpretations of general rules.  
 
Afghanistan has a multitude of justice providers.1042  From the courts and prosecutors, the 
police, the district governors, the mullahs, to the elders, there is a continuum of justice options.  
Universal law codes do not work in Afghanistan.1043 Afghans are famous for forum shopping. 
If they do not like the decision one source makes, they will readily turn to another for an 
alternative.’1044 Since the 1940s a pluralist political choice has always existed in Pashtun 
society.1045 For Afghans, customary forms of justice are prevalent, and they ‘use the 
government as an alternative for justice.’1046  
 
7.8 Pashtunwali Resilience to Instability and Resistance to Completing Legal 
Orders 
In the absence of any higher or even hierarchical authority, people’s first source for practical 
governance is the local village leaders. The government is not the only source or the most 
effective and pervasive rule of law in rural Afghanistan. Pashtunwali and Shari’a produce 
legalistic effects and as such essentially do governance without a government.1047  
 
The existence of plural legal orders makes plain that state law is not the only relevant and 
effective legal order in people’s lives. Pluralism will vary in jurisdiction, procedures, structure 
                                                     
1040 Khwa, (n1083). 
1041 Ask ‘Legal Pluralism’ (n34) 347, 356. 
1042 Kate Fearon, ‘Grappling with Legal Pluralism in Afghanistan’ Session II USIP, GWU & WORLD BANK 
CONFERENCE AGENDA Conference on Customary Law Washington, DC November 17-18, 2009. 
1043 Johnson & Mason, No Sign (n860) 27-28. 
1044 For an overview of this theory, see David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla, (OUP 2009) 77-82 
1045 Ruttig ‘Tribal’ (n953). 
1046 Reedy ‘Customary Law’ (n881) 27. 
1047 ibid (n881) 29-30. 
195 
 
and degree of autonomy.1048 Numerous interrelated factors influence the evolution of legal 
pluralism including ‘colonialism; the state’s need for legitimacy; the quality, reach and 
relevance of official legal systems; as well as other social, political and economic factors.’ 
 
Afghanistan has a rich history of legal pluralism where informal systems existed before the 
formal state institutions. These informal institutions are based upon local custom, tradition, and 
religious practices and have existed in Afghanistan for centuries.1049  In most parts of 
Afghanistan, tribal structure or locally established shuras and jirgas have been the only source 
of social justice in times of conflict and to some extent prior to that.1050  Power struggles and 
vacuums through the Pashtun belt over at least six centuries continue to manifest in 21st century 
Pashtun Politics and legal structures. War, invasion and internal struggles seem to bolster 
Pashtuns resilience, while the Pashtuns have never being fully integrated into a ‘single empire, 
state or political system, they have formed empires of their own.’1051  
 
Pre-Soviet invasion, Afghanistan was a Pashtun dominated state. ‘Ironically the historic pattern 
of political instability and outside interference in the region has helped to reinforce the tribal 
nature of Pashtun society, particularly in the countryside, where most Pashtuns live.’1052 
Traditional Pashtun life was disrupted by the social consequences of the Soviet invasion, both 
through the actual conflict as well as through the loss of people forced to seek refuge as well. 
Over 80 % of the 6.2 million Afghan refugees who sought refuge in Pakistan were Pashtun.1053 
Even when foreign fighters came to Afghanistan to support the mujahidin altering the tribal 
dynamic temporarily, the elasticity of the Pashtuns showed their ability to accommodate 
external forces until they have the opportunity to regroup and readjust to a power position. 
When there is no wider conflict outside of the local conflict, factional disputes may remain 
limited to the local community. When a national conflict overlays the local situation, the local 
conflict can transfer itself into the different sides of the larger conflict.  
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Understanding local conflict dynamics is a critical first step in understanding its actors.1054 The 
commonality of Afghanistan-Pakistan Islamic movements include that ‘all [claim to] give the 
Muslim umma priority over ethnic or national identities or interests.’1055 However, these 
networks operate with two sets of criteria in view, the local and the global. While there are 
similarities in language, with their appeal to the jihad and the umma, this can hide the 
essentially ethnic motivations that arise within the local context.1056 
 
Though convenient, the tribal narrative can oversimplify local conflicts and distract observers 
from key issues in these disputes. Pashtuns’ motivations for choosing how to identify and 
organize politically are flexible and pragmatic. ‘Tribe’ or qawm is only one potential choice of 
identity among many, and not necessarily the one that guides people’s decision making.’1057 
While a way of life, Pashtunwali is not as prescriptive in its conflict conduct as is siyar or IHL. 
Rather permissible conflict conduct is derived from Pashtun norms. Where tribal narratives 
may be inappropriate in understanding local conflicts, it remains appropriate in examining the 
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Chapter 8 The Afghan Taliban, 1994-2001 
‘We have never called ourselves Taliban…If you want, it is a Taliban movement, a 
movement of religious scholars rather than an organization.’1058 
 
It is difficult to isolate the Taliban’s actual constitution.1059 It has been cited as an umbrella 
organization for a loose network of dispersed constituent groups varying in size and levels of 
coordination.1060 Some claim these groups have achieved ‘significant unity of purpose and even 
some unity of effort;’1061 some cite these groups as alliances only, a franchise;1062 while others 
contend the Taliban are mere puppets manipulated by external actors.1063 There are arguments 
that the label ‘Taliban’ was lazily imposed on any person who offered armed opposition to the 
Afghan Government,1064 the Movement compared to a ‘caravan to which different people 
attached themselves for various reasons.’1065Scholars and commentators disagree over whether 
the Taliban be treated as a primarily political movement with political aims, and not as a tribal 
one,1066 or if it was more a military organization than a political one.1067  
 
While there are many incarnations of the Afghan Taliban, there are two distinct and organic 
parts to the Taliban insurgency: the formative years of the Movement led by mujahidin and 
madrassa students up until late 2001 and everything after. The 'old' Taliban, a quasi-national 
liberation movement with tribal undertones needs to be distinguished from the 'new' Taliban, 
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part of a transnational 'citizens of jihad' with religious overtones possessing distinct ideologies 
and susceptible to different influences.1068 For the purposes of this research, only the formative 
years are examined with a focus on the Taliban’s conception around the principle of distinction 
through a selection of the groups campaigns.  Having considered the various non-state laws 
that were operational through the Taliban insurgency (1994-2001), the purpose of this chapter 
is to examine the application of these laws in certain of their conflict conduct. 
 
The Taliban movement is understood by contextualizing its evolution. The early 1990’s woke 
to an anarchic Afghanistan. ‘Soviet withdrawal meant that the Afghan-Pakistan border was left 
with…highly motivated, deeply religious men looking for a new cause.’1069 Heavily armed, 
with no employment opportunities, disaffected Afghan war veterans became the kernel for 
militant Islamic networks. The situation in Kandahar was particularly bad because the roads 
had been taken over by unemployed fighters who now specialized in robbery, rape and 
extortion. There was widespread corruption and theft, and roadblocks everywhere.1070 The 
post-Soviet power vacuum caused the once unified mujahidin to descend into an era of 
warlordism. These ingredients added to what would become a brutal civil war. ‘Anything that 
looked like a human being would be targeted. They shot everything: rockets, shells, 
bullets…’1071   
 
There is no consensus about the birth of the Taliban or the hands that crafted it. While the 
majority see it as an organic response, others see it as a design from the ISI. Regardless, it 
seemed the only effective remedy to warlordism and tribal disputes was religious zeal.1072 
There are ‘an entire factory’ of myths and stories to explain the Taliban’s rise to prominence 
in Kandahar,1073 with some describing their rise to government as amateur if not accidental.1074 
There is however a consistent theme that enjoins its emergence as a moral project, marrying 
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extreme piety with a humanitarian impulse to answer the desperate pleas of their 
countryman.1075 This narrative of the pious, courageous and disciplined Taliban aligned with 
the populations need for salvation.1076 
 
‘On 20 September 1994, a Herati family, while on its way to Kandahar from Herat, was 
stopped at a check point ninety kilometres short of Kandahar by local mujahidin bandits. 
The men and women were separated. The boys were taken away and molested. The girls 
were repeatedly raped until they became unconscious. Later all of them were killed and 
their bodies partially burnt. It was Mullah Omar (sometimes referred to as Mullah 
Mujahid) who was the first to arrive on the scene. He is reported to have gathered some 
talibs who helped him in collecting the bodies. These were washed and given a decent 
burial. He then gathered the [religious] students and pledged to start a campaign to get 
rid of such criminals... The Taliban movement had begun.1077  
 
A variation of this account sees Mullah Omar, enlisting 30 talibs with only sixteen rifles 
between them, mounting the rescue of two teenage girls who had been abducted and repeatedly 
raped at a military base in his hometown of Sangesar. On freeing the girl, the Talib’s hung the 
responsible commander from the barrel of a tank. The Mullah and his talib’s claimed to restore 
peace, enforce Shari’a and defend Islam as sanctioned through the primary sources.1078 ‘Asking 
for no reward save help in establishing an Islamic system, Mullah Omar’s prestige grew 
rapidly.’1079 The restoration of law in this mythical story is dominated by an Islamic narrative 
with a flavour of Badr, however it also aligns with Pashtunwali, using the traditional rules of 
badal to restore namus.  
 
It was in the context of a disparate state with a dispirited population that the legend of the 
Taliban emerged. The group and its agenda were localized from inception and attracted little 
comment from the international community.1080  They were a purely Afghan movement with 
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‘no foreign policy’.1081 The idea of an ordered Afghanistan was appealing to large pockets of 
the Afghan communities attracting new recruits from like-minded people.1082 Within a year, 
the Taliban grew to 10,000 members, capturing Kandahar with minimal losses.1083 Within three 
years their control extended to over 90 % of the country.1084 
 
The Afghan jihad against the Soviets demonstrated the unifying power of channelling 
nationalist sentiments within an Islamic framework. Indeed, Islamic and nationalist values were 
twinned by the Taliban, who spoke of their ‘lofty Islamic and nationalist aims’,1085 in turn, 
mobilising a distinctly rural constituency, a feat that was not accomplished by an array of 
regimes prior.1086 Yet, the Taliban did not have a sophisticated view of what a genuinely 
Islamic system would look like. Further, speaking in the name of Islam neither brought unity 
of ranks nor unconditional popular support’.1087 
 
The Taliban made clear from the start it would be uncompromising. One of their first public 
moves was pulling president Najibullah from the UN Compound he was residing under house 
arrest. They tortured him and mutilated his body in the streets of Kabul.1088 After the capture 
of the capital, the Taliban issued no manifesto. There was no administration, no public services 
and no economic plan. Once in the capital, ‘the Taliban did not so much take control of Afghan 
institutions as completely eviscerate them, erecting in their stead only three functions: morality, 
commerce and war.’1089 However the Taliban did leave the structure of the old government 
court system intact, creating a parallel court system to run out of Kandahar. They enumerated 
no new government codes, believing the Shari’a offered answers to all questions. Taliban 
courts were particularly keen on reinvigorating hudud punishments, such as stoning adulterers 
and amputating the hands of thieves that had largely disappeared from Afghanistan generations 
earlier. Yet in spite of their clerical garb and professed interest in imposing a pure form of 
Islamic law, Taliban leaders were not so much ulama scholars as they were rural ‘tribal 
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puritans,’ men who focused more easily on what they wished to destroy than what they wished 
to build.1090  
 
Within months, Mullah Omar’s talibs controlled most of the country. The Taliban’s immediate 
goals were to disarm all rival militia, fight against those who refused to disarm, enforce Islamic 
law and retain all areas captured by the Taliban.1091 A series of events aligned in the early 
1990’s which thrust the Taliban as a legitimate contender for power. The group profited from 
a turf war which occurred within Benazir Bhutto’s government in Pakistan. The ISI, which had 
been supporting Hekmatyar in his quest to capture Kabul, was undermined by Naseerullah 
Baber’s Ministry of the Interior.1092 When the Taliban rescued a Pakistani truck convoy, Baber 
took Mullah Omar under his wing. The Bhutto government dropped Hekmatyar, who was 
increasingly viewed as a losing horse, and put all of its money on the Taliban.1093 Bhutto aimed 
at strategic depth in the region as well as stability to facilitate trade and the transport of oil and 
gas from the Central Asian Republics.1094 With the aid of Pakistan, the Taliban displaced 
Hekmatyar’s Hizb-i-Islami as the leading Pashtun faction in 1995 and their power spread 
quickly through other Pashtun regions.1095 Despite a number of setbacks, they succeeded in 
occupying Kabul in 1996 and then extended their control to all of Afghanistan except the 
northeast by 1998.1096   
 
The Taliban took the momentum from their early territorial gain in the capital to expand its 
control. The expansion was quashed in the Uzbek controlled, Hazara populated Mazar-i-Sharif. 
General Dostum’s second in charge had made a secret pact with the Taliban allowing them 
easy access into the area. Whether through arrogance or naivety, the Taliban failed to factor 
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the possibility that there could be a revolt by the population it was taking by force. A massacre 
ensued with the slaughter of 600 Taliban and the capture of 1000 under the watch of General 
Dostum.1097  This revolt, while temporarily damaging the Taliban offensive was permanently 
etched in the groups collective memory.1098 
 
The Taliban were able to seize power in Afghanistan by exploiting a series of divisions among 
the mujahidin. ‘[M]ujahidin internal conflicts, which inflicted heavy damages and huge 
suffering on Afghanistan, provided the Taliban with a golden chance to verify their claim over 
the corruption and hypocrisy of their opponents.’1099 However, they themselves were not 
unified. After all, the Taliban was a Pashtun-dominated movement embodying the ‘ethnic 
polarisation of a rural and segmented society under the banner of Islam.’1100 
 
8.1 ‘Every Pashtun is not a Talib but every Talib may be Pashtun.’1101 
The Taliban were primarily a Pashtun phenomenon rooted in tribal society, motivated by 
‘family, clan, tribal and economic interests.’1102 The Movements’ rise to power represented a 
consolidation of Pashtun power.1103 It was a Movement sustained by Pashtun nationalism 
which sought to re-establish the Afghan state, the traditional fief of the Pashtuns.1104  
 
A puritan religious movement with no political narrative beyond ‘the Shari’a, the whole 
Shari’a and nothing but the Shari’a’. Taliban Islam in this sense displayed a Saudi character 
and did not relate to an anti-imperialist revolutionary project such as had previously existed in 
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Iran.1105 Dominated by Pashtun clerics from southern Afghanistan,1106 the Taliban’s leadership 
was almost exclusively clerical, however most had neither distinguished religious lineages nor 
been educated at particularly prestigious madrassas. The Pashtun dominance in leadership 
meant the movement was less well received in other parts of the country.  However, the stronger 
emphasis on the Taliban’s supra-tribal ideology of Islamism broadened membership for non-
Pashtun elements allowing the systematic expansion into non-Pashtun areas of the North and 
West.1107 Yet, the overtly unified ideological dimension blurs the underlying fragmented nature 
which draws its strength from local grievances.1108 
 
The Taliban identified in its rhetoric as a religious movement purifying society of evils. It 
sought to impose a strict salafist interpretation of Islamic law after seizing power. This 
‘provoked antagonism by championing a set of values that were as far from the Afghan 
mainstream as those of [King] Amanullah and the socialists had been, albeit in opposite 
directions.’1109  The Taliban were seen as using state power to impose a rigid legal system with 
foreign roots that ignored the country’s traditions and values.1110 The Taliban’s theocracy was 
a particularly unusual and largely unrepresentative form of Islam. ‘Notwithstanding the sui 
generis nature of the Taliban’s edicts and the reality that they mostly emerged from a culture 
of war, the fact remains that they also drew from Islam.’1111 
 
8.2 ‘Every Afghan is a Deobandi’1112 
The principle formative influence of Taliban radicalism has been the Deobandi School, named 
after Deoband, where a religious academy was founded near Delhi in 1867. It comprises 
religious figures of a traditional and conservative inclination, ‘whose manifestation in the 
sphere of politics is the Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Islam, the largest Deobandi-based party, established 
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in 1945.’1113 The thrust of the Movement was to resist British imperialism by training cadres 
of conservative clerics who would adhere to what they viewed as puritanical Islam. 
 
The Taliban recruited mainly among Deobandi madrassas, some local, others through the 
Durand Line.1114 These madrassas were run by Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Islam, headed by Maulana 
Fazlur Rahman. Its students were particularly poor and generally war orphans. The Deoband 
School preached a form of Sunni conservative orthodoxy, and madrassas under its influence 
provided the bulk of the Afghan ulama.1115 While mujahidin professed to be followers of the 
Hanafi school of Islam, almost all declared allegiance to the teachings of Deobandi Islam.1116 
 
In the tradition of reformist Sunni movements in the region, the Taliban sought to purify society 
from non-Islamic influences. It appealed inconsistently to the authority of Ibn Taymiyya, and 
Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. It looked to the practice of Syed Ahmed Barelvi (Ahmed 
Shaheed) and Ismail Shaheed, the leaders of the so-called ‘Wahhabi’ movement,1117 ‘a rigid 
puritanical version of Islam [that] views the outside world and modernity with hostility.’1118 
The majority of attacks by armed non-State groups against the West have been from Islamic 
groups espousing Wahhabism.1119 Wahhabism met the tacit approval of many Western and 
Muslim governments because it obstructed both communism and the ideological expansion of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran. This view aligned with the Taliban who were particularly contrary 
to the Shi’a.1120 
 
The Movement are viewed through a lens of militarization and Islamization of Pashtuns during 
the Afghan jihad. The Islamization process saw Pakistani-based Islamic groups promote a 
Deobandi interpretation of Islam, in which believers were more than members of a tribe or 
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clan, they were part of the Caliphate. Ideologically, most Islamic movements operating through 
the Durand Line share two characteristics: they are ‘jihadist’ and ‘salafist’. Jihadist in that they 
seek to recover ‘occupied’ Muslim lands, or usurp Muslim regimes regarded as traitorous, and 
salafist pertaining to the demand to return to a strict Islam, untainted by local customs and 
culture. If the Taliban are ‘salafi jihadist’, there can be no place for Pashtunwali.1121 
 
8.3 Department for the Promotion of Virtue and the Elimination of Vice 
The Taliban emphasised the individual dimension of faith as the basis for rebuilding the umma, 
the view that Muslims must first return to the true faith before it becomes possible to issue any 
call to jihad.1122 For its realization, the Taliban established an Islamic state with rule by edict 
based on a salafi interpretation of Shari’a. These edicts controlled most aspects of life, from 
the clothes that a woman was to wear; to the length of a man’s beard, to appropriate family 
activities. The religious edicts were enforced by the Saudi inspired ‘Department for the 
Promotion of Virtue and the Elimination of Vice’ (Amr el-Maruf wa el- Munkar), the raison 
d’etre of the Taliban.1123  It was the most cohesive organization in the Taliban’s otherwise 
inchoate structure, institutionalising the operation of Shari’a. 
 
A cross between the church and the army, the Taliban recognized no private sphere beyond the 
purview of its authority.1124 Over 30,000 Taliban were tasked with enforcing the observance of 
religious service, dress codes, and enforcing bans on all forms of entertainment. Indeed, the 
long beards and turbans which became the Taliban hallmark had long been a part of Kandahari 
culture. The Taliban thus sought to universalise a specifically Pashtun custom and enforce its 
adoption across Afghanistan, a visible expression of piety but also as a symbol of the Taliban’s 
political monopoly.1125 
 
Men with beards shorter than the ‘Islamic’ standard were whipped, drinkers were flagellated 
with rubber hoses, the limbs of thieves amputated and murderers executed, all of which were 
deemed the only legitimate forms of public spectacle as thousands of people were crowded into 
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stadiums to watch.1126 Public punishment was a cornerstone of the administration of draconian 
justice through Shari’a courts.1127 In terms of punishment, the Taliban’s approach conflicts 
with the restorative approach used by the Pashtun tribal Elders who aimed to restore 
community harmony where social bonds had been ruptured by the actions of one or both 
parties. The Taliban focused on the enforcement of modes of behaviour which externally 
seemed to run parallel to solving Afghanistan’s problems. 
 
Although restricting civil liberties, the Afghan population wanted security and the Movements 
policy of moral purity resonated with the values of those under Taliban control. For the affected 
population, the Taliban represented discipline and order which they juxtaposed with the 
mujahidin lawlessness and brutality. This initial support turned into a benign tolerance as the 
regime progressed, the diminished public services became outweighed by enhanced security, 
or ‘peace in the graveyard.’1128 
 
8.4 Mullah Omar 
Mullah Omar was an obscure character on the Kandahar political map. Like many mujahidin-
cum Taliban, he wore the physical effects of the Soviet resistance.1129 The son of a village 
mullah and a mullah himself, the Taliban’s leader was renowned for doing much of his strategic 
thinking on his prayer mat.1130  
 
Sharing hallmarks of fundamentalist leaders like Amir Abdur Rahman Khan a century earlier, 
Omar also had his call to action through a visionary dream in which the Prophet visited him 
and told him to lead the country.1131 This mystical dimension distinguished the Mullah from 
other politicians and served as a charismatic basis for personal authority.1132 In order to 
authenticate his role as a ruler ordained by God to lead the Afghan people, Omar drew upon 
both Islamic and Pashtun motifs. In 1996, he visited the shrine of the Cloak of the Prophet 
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(Khirqa-e Mubarak), which is situated next to the tomb of Ahmad Shah Durrani, the founder 
of the Pashtun dynasty. Standing in Kandahar’s central bazaar, Mullah Omar removed the cloak 
and wore it in front of a large crowd of followers, a symbolic legitimation for his authority. He 
was then named Amir al-Mo’mineen (Commander of the Faithful),1133 which bestowed on him 
supreme executive power.  
 
In donning the cloak, the Taliban’s leader sought to adopt the Prophet’s mantle, as he did when 
he stood up to the oppressive warlords and initiated the Taliban’s crusade against ordinary 
people’s suffering. But this powerful symbolism did not long insulate the Taliban from a crisis 
of authority.1134  In his rhetoric Omar often harked back to the days of early Islam for the model 
of society he wished to see installed in Afghanistan. His stock answer to every legal question 
was that the issue was adequately addressed by the Shari’a, without ever referencing the many 
issues that were still subject to long debate within the different legal schools of Islam. This 
insistence on imposing Shari’a without being clear on its details or sources was a hallmark of 
Taliban fiqh. 1135 
 
The Taliban arrived in a perfect storm, appealing to the rural population as a beacon of security 
and stability; appealing to the war orphans who evolved in the politicized madrassas in 
Pakistan and needed to focus on a localized saviour against the savage, good over evil; 
appealing to Pakistan as a better positioned (than Hekmatyar) group to defend their national 
interests triggering a change in alliance; and appealing to the transport mafia which funded the 
Taliban with a monthly retainer in the expectation that the Taliban would reopen the border 
route.1136 The Taliban stepped into the power vacuum and culture of war. ‘[Its] grip on power 
in Afghanistan was derived from a society with a starkly negative view of the outside world, 
due to the cycle of intervention and abandonment by the Soviets, the United States and other 
foreign interests.’1137 
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8.5 The Taliban Insurgency 1994-2001 
“[W]e are ruled by men who offer us nothing but the [Qurʾan], even though many of 
them cannot read… we are in despair’.1138 
 
The period from 1978-2001 has been stained by the most heinous abuses of human rights and 
violations of IHL as well as siyar. Massacres, uprisings, rapes, arbitrary arrests, detention, 
torture, indiscriminate bombardments and reprisals have been perpetrated by the government 
and ANSGs.1139 
 
While Afghanistan was once described as a graveyard of empires, the entire country became a 
mass graveyard.1140 The period leading up to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan was marked 
by daily and arbitrary abuse.1141 Some of this abuse shows a clear reversion to both lex talionis 
in jahiliyya and badal. Indeed, it has been proffered that many Pashtuns joined the Taliban as 
a ‘revenge of the Pashtuns,’ after their slaughter in Mazar.1142 
 
The Taliban militancy is ‘one of the most complex [least understood] conflicts.’1143 Originally, 
a manifestation of widely held grievances and issues within a broader population, the Taliban 
combined successive or simultaneous use of violence against civilians to build control over a 
population.1144 Despite a long history of engagement with IHL, they continued to execute 
attacks while hiding among civilian populations, the number of attacks against protected 
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property increased and distinctive emblems protected under the Geneva Conventions were 
deliberately targeted by Taliban fighters.1145 In the mid to late 1990s, the Taliban committed 
numerous war crimes during military operations, and as a governing power operated almost 
entirely outside of established human rights standards.1146 A sample of instances concerning 
‘distinction’ will be measured against Pashtunwali, salafi Islam and IHL using material 
documented by international agencies. 
 
8.6 IHL Distinction in the Afghan Conflict 1994-2001 
The IHL principle of distinction is described both as a cardinal customary IHL rule and the 
cornerstone of IHL.1147 A fundamental rule of humanitarian law is that civilians enjoy general 
protection against danger arising from military operations. The rule of ‘civilian immunity’ has 
been codified in numerous treaties,1148 and is binding on all parties to a conflict regardless of 
conflict typology.1149  Civilians are protected at all times from attack unless they take a direct 
part in the hostilities (DPH).1150 Under certain interpretations of Islam there appears a broad 
notion of what constitutes DPH, the distinction  less clear between the ‘common people’ not 
engaged in government related activities and everybody else subject to penalty. There are no 
discrete protections within the common people head. Rather than invoke darura to make lawful 
the targeting of civilians, radical interpretations of Islam changes the status of civilians like 
drivers and contractors to be subsumed under what they consider a legitimate target.1151 
 
Under IHL, civilian objects, such as residences, schools and mosques, are protected from 
attack, except for such time that they are military objectives. A civilian object becomes a 
military target during the period it is used for military purposes.1152 In order to ensure respect 
for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall 
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at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants, and between civilian 
objects and military objectives, and accordingly shall direct their operations only against 
military objectives.1153 
 
As discussed in chapter 5 there is also a strong principle of distinction running through Islamic 
Law with prohibitions on targeting civilians. However differing interpretations of ‘civilians’ 
and constructions on how they can lose their protected status means that claiming to comply 
with rules of IHL or using IHL terminology does not prima facie make such prohibitions IHL 
compliant.1154  
 
8.6.1 Taliban Distinction: People  
Apostasy  
In Taliban orthodoxy, evil and apostasy were defined in terms of ‘action wrapped in a web of 
symbolism’.1155During the formative years of the Taliban insurgency, through their puritanical 
Sunni narrative, the Taliban pursued a virulent anti-Shia agenda under the head of apostasy, 
directing attacks against mainly Shi’as and Hazaras civilians and their cultural heritage.1156 
 
‘Hazaras are not Muslim, they are Shia. They are [kufr]… wherever you go we will 
catch you. If you go up, we will pull you down by your feet; if you hide below, we will 
pull you up by your hair’.1157 
 
In August, 1998 Mazar i-Sharif became the scene of ‘one of the single worst examples of 
killings of civilians’ in the Afghan wars.1158 Within hours after the capture of Mazar-i Sharif 
(Mazar), the Taliban killed civilians in indiscriminate attacks, regardless of age and gender, all 
over the city; in some cases, firing uninterruptedly from machine guns mounted on jeeps.1159 
The Taliban hunted Hazara men, shooting them in the head, chest or testicles, suffocating them 
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in shipping containers or slitting their throats ‘the Halal way’. Up to 8000 were killed, with 
thousands more maimed or raped.1160 The Shia were targeted in other parts of Afghanistan, too. 
At one point, a Taliban commander announced in a mosque that it was the Taliban policy was 
to ‘exterminate’ Hazaras.1161  
 
‘One witness recounted that a Taliban member, who had personally shot people in 28 
houses, realised that on two separate occasions he had unintentionally killed Pashtuns 
instead of Hazara’s. He was ‘very worried he might be excluded from heaven. [. . .] 
That he had killed people in 28 Hazara households seemed not to cause him any concern 
at all.’1162  
 
As a result of the massacres, the holes dug along the roads, from which soil was excavated to 
build houses, were filled with bodies, elsewhere, they were left in the streets, their burial being 
prevented by the Taliban ‘until the dogs ate them.’1163 Non-Pashtun males were detained in 
Mazar’s prison, which soon became overcrowded.  In case of doubt as to their religious identity, 
detainees would be asked to recite Sunni prayers. Thousands of detainees were transported into 
the desert and packed in closed metal container trucks resulting in death by asphyxiation of 
many. While it is not clear whether these deaths were intentional, container killing had 
precedent in Afghan wars.1164  
 
Civilians displaced from Mazar headed toward the central Afghanistan’s highlands. The road 
was “black’ with a column of people, led by about 700 Hazara combatants.’1165 The column 
was fired at indiscriminately, from the air, but also from the land by imprecise weapons such 
as rocket launchers.1166 
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Within months, Taliban forces bombed the town of Dara-i Suf, a predominantly Hazara 
enclave. Ground forces burned down the entire central market and destroyed wells and homes. 
1167 If a Hazara became a prisoner of the regime, Taliban forces would summarily execute 
them.1168 There were also reports that the Taliban used detainees for mine clearance.1169 While 
prima facie this appears an ethnic cleansing under IHL, through an Islamic and tribal narrative 
it would be better seen as a reprisal. Neither Islam nor Pashtunwali can rationalize this conduct. 
However a hybrid of the two frameworks of law, a pick and mix approach to the law could see 
hudud punishments for apostasy or arguments stemming from ‘isma’ matched with badal and 
blood revenge circumventing prohibitions on killing.1170 
 
While freedom of religion stems for the Charter of Medina, in Afghanistan religious 
persecution has been part of its cultural history. For example, Amir Abdur Rahman vilified the 
Hazara Shia’s and solicited fatwas condoning attacks on them. Under the relatively moderate 
reign of Amanullah in the 1920s, the Constitution provided that the followers of certain 
unacceptable sects were ‘to be killed’.1171 Harsh attitudes towards the Shia specifically 
persisted well into the twentieth century.1172 After the defeat of the Soviet Union in 1988 and 
despite the fighting prowess shown by minority groups during the resistance, minority rights 
were not dealt with. When the mujahidin’s Charters declared the supremacy of Hanafi 
jurisprudence, the Shias were largely left out of the process of political reconstruction.1173 The 
religious persecution is arguably an example of a cultural rather than religious norm, however 
it could be argued that in the Prophet’s experience there was no other religion claiming to 
represent true Islam.  
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A series of Taliban offensives was marked by the abduction of women, forced labour of 
detainees, the burning of homes, and the destruction of agricultural assets, including fruit 
trees.1174 In one village, 3,000 houses were systematically destroyed. 1175  The affected 
populations were mainly Uzbek and Tajik who were Sunni Muslims. The Taliban never 
contended that the Uzbeks or Tajiks were kufr, as such no crime of apostasy making the 
targeting ethnically based and prohibited in both Siyar and IHL.  
Women 
The Afghan Taliban have been a subject of journalistic and academic outpourings reiterating 
misogynistic aspects of their ideology attached to their salafi, Wahhabi or Deobandi 
postulations, depending on who was writing. This narrative has dominated the West since 9/11 
however existed long before.1176   
 
Women in urban parts of Afghanistan would feel the full extent of the Taliban’s proscriptions. 
Overnight they were deprived liberties such as education. Failure to adhere to these new edicts 
would attract public punishment.1177 The Mahram decree issued by the Taliban authority in 
July 1997 was the first among a series of decrees that restricted Afghan women's legal rights. 
Shari’a classifies cross-sex relationships within two categories, lawful, (mahram) and 
unlawful, (na-mahram). In customary law the norms for how men and women of these two 
categories associate in everyday life are related to institutionalised gender segregation between 
men and women.1178 
The Taliban’s repressive gender policy has been credited, or at very least find roots in 
Pashtunwali.  The group’s severe attitudes toward the seclusion of women seemed closer 
                                                     
1174 U.N. Special Rapporteur of the Commission of Human Rights, ‘Question of the Violation of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms in Any Part of the World: Report on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan 
submitted by Mr. Kamal Hossain, Special Rapporteur, in accordance with Commission resolution 1999/9,’ 
E/CN.4/2000/33, January 10, 2000, 12-13. 
1175 Human Rights Watch interview with a human rights investigator HRW ‘Killing You Is A Very Easy Thing 
For Us To Do’ Islamabad, May 2001 
1176 Malik, Pashtun Identity (n434), 53. 
1177 Department of State, ‘International Religious Freedom Report – Afghanistan,’ Washington, DC, 2000; Rashid 
The Power of Militant Islam (n928) 225; John Burns, ‘A Year of Harsh Islamic Rule Weighs Heavily for Afghans,’ 
New York Times (NY, 24 Sept 1997); United Nations, ‘Report of the Secretary- General on the Situation of 
Women and Girls in Afghanistan, Submitted in Accordance with the Sub-Commission Resolution 1998/17,’ ed. 
Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities, July 15, 1999, paras 9-11. 
1178 For a discussion of the shifting priorities given to human rights programming during the Taliban regime see 
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George Ulrich and Louise Krabbe (eds.) Human Rights in Development Yearbook 2001 (Kluwer Law 2001) 124-
128; Ask, ‘Legal Pluralism’, 353. 
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aligned to rural Pashtun life than interpretations of religious law.1179 Under the Taliban, the 
rights of women in the national law codes were abolished in the name of bringing state law in 
conformity with their interpretation of Shari’a. Although the Taliban asserted that its draconian 
policies that removed women from the workplace and required them to be veiled were simple 
applications of religious law, Shari’a legal experts in other Islamic disagreed. However, in the 
Afghan countryside the emphasis on enforcing Shari’a often increased women’s rights to 
inheritance and control over marriage that were denied to them under customary practices. 
Social restrictions that were so widely resented in the cities provoked little opposition in the 
countryside because they reflected commonly accepted rural values and lifestyles.1180  
 
While their repression of women symbolizes the vulnerability of women it also shows the 
impotence of their male relatives. Dupree argues the situation is more complex. The 
dependence of the Taliban movement on young, madrassa educated combatants made the 
leaders concerned about how these young men may act in a cosmopolitan city and decided that 
rather than educate the men on how to behave it was easier to exclude women from spheres of 
education and employment and imprison them behind the burqa and cast them to exist in the 
shadows of society.1181 
 
8.6.2 Taliban Distinction: Property 
After its initial conquest of the central Hazarajat region in September 1998 the Taliban 
withdrew most non-local forces from several districts and left them under the nominal control 
of Hazara commanders who had changed their allegiances.1182 After retaking Bamiyan districts, 
Taliban forces under the command of Mullah Dadullah burned about 4,500 houses, 500 shops, 
and public buildings. As they retreated east, they continued to burn villages and to detain and 
kill Shi'a Hazara civilians in villages in Bamiyan district. The Taliban ‘planted bombs in 
schools and occasionally burned its opponents alive’1183 Burning was permissible in 
Pashtunwali but prohibited in Islam.  
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Several refugees described witnessing the subsequent movement of ethnic Pashtun pastoralists 
into the valleys, and the grazing of large herds of sheep on their farmlands.1184 As discussed in 
chapter 7, farming land was a rare and valuable commodity. Conflict over fertile land was 
common. By stealing the Hazara’s property, the Pashtuns found a solution to the intractable 
problem of daftari.  
 
The Buddhas of Bamiyan 
Due to its location in Afghanistan’s central highlands, the Bamiyan province constitutes a 
strategic area. It was the site of sustained pattern of Taliban abuse from September 1998 to 
January 2001. 1185 Four hundred years before the rise of Islam on the eastern flank of Iran, the 
Bamiyan Valley, then full of monasteries, witnessed the birth of the Irano-Buddhic art, 
characterised by the Bamiyan Buddhas.1186 Seven meters taller than the Statue of Liberty, the 
largest of the Buddhas (53 and 38 meters respectively) were built around the 3rd century and 
constituted the world’s tallest standing Buddha.1187   
 
In 1997, a Taliban commander declared that if the valley were captured, he would destroy the 
Buddhas. 1188 Two days after the capture of Bamiyan in September 1998, two non-Afghan 
groups of Taliban members shelled the lower parts of the smaller Buddha and blew its face off, 
creating some cracks in its body. The following year, the burning of tires blackened the face of 
the bigger Buddha.1189 Mullah Omar originally responded to the hostility against Afghanistan’s 
cultural objects with a decree in 1999 declaring that ‘all historical cultural heritage is regarded 
as an integral part of the heritage of Afghanistan’.1190 Within two years, the Amir did a volte 
face holding that Afghanistan’s Islamic clerics had decided that the Buddhas should be 
destroyed, in order to save Afghans from idolatry. Mullah Omar rationalized the decision that 
‘because God is one God and these statues are there to be worshipped, and that is wrong, they 
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should be destroyed so that they are not worshipped now or in the future.’1191  This argument 
was made in relation to a region where the Buddhist faith had disappeared for a millennium. 
To counter arguments appealing to historical tradition, Omar explained that ‘if people say these 
are not our beliefs but only part of the history of Afghanistan, then all we are breaking are 
stones.’ 1192 According to the Taliban ambassador in Pakistan, Shari’a necessitated the 
destruction of sites decorated with pictures, since it ‘orders the destruction of statues and 
considers the drawing of portraits a mockery to the servants of Allah’, adding that the fact that 
these Buddhas were not destroyed in the past did not constitute ‘a valid precedent.’1193  
 
After the intent to destroy the Buddhas was known, but before it was completed, high-ranking 
Egyptian clerics personally visited Omar in Kandahar and attempted to convince him that 
Shari’a did not require their destruction. After his refusal to heed their advice they were 
scathing in their opinion of Taliban legal reasoning.1194  
 
‘[Because of the Taliban’s] incomplete knowledge of jurisprudence they were not able 
to formulate rulings backed by theological evidence. The issue is a cultural issue. We 
detected that their knowledge of religion and jurisprudence is lacking because they have 
no knowledge of the Arabic language, linguistics, and literature and hence they did not 
learn the true Islam.’1195  
 
Omar responded to criticism for his destruction of the Buddhas by ordering the sacrifice of 100 
cattle and giving the meat to the poor to express his regret for not having destroyed the 
monuments sooner. ‘[L]ike a banner, the mullah show[ed] his beauty in a headwind.’1196  In 
March 2001, having survived over a millennia of Arab and Turco–Mongol invasions, ‘the most 
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important twin representations of Buddha anywhere’ were destroyed not by Afghan Taliban, 
who refused to carry out the destruction, but by non-Afghan members.1197  
 
The Taliban sought to bring the ‘Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’ to their perceived idyllic era 
of the dawn of Islam. To do so, they imposed a harsh moral regime on Afghans and sought to 
destroy everything that, during the fourteen centuries following the life of the Prophet, had 
‘polluted’ Islam, namely culture.1198 The destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan, while 
outraging the international community, reportedly increased the Arab support for the Taliban 
tenfold.1199 
 
8.7 Osama Bin Laden 
A compelling example of the hybrid legal regulation that the Taliban used in practice is that of 
Mullah Omar’s protection to Osama bin Laden after the attacks in America on September 11, 
2001.   The Pashtunwali obligation to provide asylum and hospitality, nanawatay and 
melmastia, tested the limits of the Pashtun Taliban. The Taliban initially relied on parts of 
Pashtunwali that involve treatment of foreign guests as a basis to resist bin Laden’s ejection 
from the country. Pashtunwali dictates that he must be protected because he is hamsaya.1200  
 
Mullah Omar, affording Bin Laden Islamic hospitality, owed him three days, which could 
arguably be extended to such a time when the Mullah had nothing left to offer. By not handing 
bin Laden to the American authorities, he allowed his guest to become sinful.1201  However if 
Omar was adhering to the tenets of Pashtunwali, there was no such temporal or substantive 
limitation, melmastia extended for as long as the guest required it.  
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After September 11th, 2001, when the U.S threatened them with destruction if bin Laden and 
al Qaeda were not expelled, Omar called for a jirga to meet and affirm his claim that because 
Osama was a guest of the country he could not be given up. With a nuanced approach the 
assembled clerics told Omar that he must protect his guest, but that because a guest should not 
cause his host problems bin Laden should be asked to leave Afghanistan voluntarily as soon as 
possible. It is notable that the question Omar tabled was not one of Shari’a jurisprudence, but 
rather an issue of Pashtunwali. Afghanistan issued bin Laden with a fatwa requesting he 
voluntarily leave the country but did not follow up on this edict. The Islamic Emirate then 
decided to compromise and suggest that bin Laden stand trial under Islamic law.1202 Mufti 
Nizamuddin Shamzai, the spiritual adviser of Mullah Omar was a member of the delegation 
who went to Kandahar to officially persuade Omar to abandon bin Laden. In reality, he 
encouraged the Mullah not to succumb to international pressure.1203 He issued a fatwa in 
September 2001 calling on Muslims to wage jihad against the US if they attacked Afghanistan. 
The fatwa also stated that according to Shari’a, citizens of Muslim countries which supported 
the U.S or any other infidel force were no longer obliged to obey their governments.1204 Such 
a position is consistent with challenging authority under Islamic law.1205 
 
While the Taliban could not have anticipated the potential difficulties that might arise by giving 
sanctuary to bin Laden, it must be stressed that the last major policy decision of the Taliban 
before they were attacked by America was based on good customary law standards in which 
religious law provided only the ‘window dressing’.1206 Mullah Omar sacrificed his regime to 
protect Bin Laden.1207 However by refusing hand him over to the Americans it solidified their 
status in a David/Goliath narrative, or more aptly the Pharaoh narrative. The response from the 
Arab communities was tangible with funds and personnel advanced in support of the 
Taliban.1208 
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8.8 Violations of International Humanitarian Law  
It is not contentious, at least regarding traditional international law, that the requirements for 
the initial Taliban insurgency qualified as a NIAC, and the Taliban qualified as a party to the 
conflict under the threshold requirements in both APII and CA3.1209  CA3 which applies to 
NIAC requires ‘as a minimum’ that persons taking no active part in hostilities be ‘treated 
humanely’. These minimum safeguards are meant to protect human life and dignity and bind 
both the government and rebel forces.1210 APII developed the CA3 safeguards by prohibiting 
violence to life, health and physical and mental wellbeing of persons, including torture; 
collective punishment; hostage taking; acts of terrorism; outrages upon personal dignity.1211 It 
also protects children, civilians, treatment of prisoners and detainees and the wounded and 
sick.1212  
 
Afghanistan only ratified API and AP II in 2009. As such, they were not directly applicable 
over the 1994-2001 period. Regardless of the direct inapplicability of APII, there is a wealth 
of alternate humanitarian, human rights, criminal and customary law that have sought to bind 
ANSGs during the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. In addition to the protections found in CA3, 
customary international humanitarian law provides civilians and captured combatants a number 
of fundamental guarantees. Those particularly relevant to the situation in Afghanistan in 1994-
2001 include prohibitions against enforced disappearance, sexual violence, arbitrary 
deprivation of liberty, and forced labour.1213 In addition, certain provisions of AP I applicable 
to IAC, including many of those concerned with protection of civilian populations, are also 
reflective of customary international law applicable to NIACs.1214   
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However evidence of increasing violations and casualties indicates a disconnect between the 
binding nature of these obligations, enforcement and compliance.1215 With the exception of the 
Disability and Refugee Conventions, Afghanistan had ratified all the major international 
humanitarian conventions, human rights conventions and covenants, international criminal 
conventions and statutes, anti-terrorism conventions and weapons conventions.1216 
International human rights standards, which do not cease in times of armed conflict, were also 
violated, in particular the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights1217and the 
Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment,1218 both of which had been ratified by Afghanistan. Applying the complex body 
of international laws relevant to the NIAC occurring in Afghanistan has not increased 
compliance with these norms.1219  
 
In a NIAC, IHL is legally binding on both government forces and armed opposition groups or 
between such groups. Over the period of 1994-2001, violations of IHL amounting to war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and other serious violations of the laws and customs 
applicable in NIAC were perpetrated by the Taliban. 1220 These include intentionally directing 
attacks against civilians and destroying or seizing the private property of civilians where there 
was no militarily necessity for doing so.1221  
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There are several examples that evidence violations of the laws and customs of war committed 
by the Taliban. There are reports on lootings and executions as they advanced on Kabul, of 
massacres, ethnic cleansing, rape and indiscriminate attacks.1222 Throughout their battle 
chronology, the Taliban once known for the virtuous behaviour resorted to scorched earth 
tactics of burning down homes, businesses and entire villages.1223 The Taliban exacted ruthless 
reprisals against minority communities that were perceived to have supported its rivals. In 
several cases, its forces carried out large-scale summary executions of Hazara, Uzbek, and 
Tajik civilians or systematically destroyed homes and means of livelihood, effectively 
preventing the return of displaced populations.1224 
 
‘Hazaras abducted Pashtuns and Pashtuns abducted Hazaras wherever they saw each 
other. They pulled out the fingernails of prisoners, cut off hands, cut off legs, even 
hammered nails into prisoners’ skulls. Humans were kept in [shipping] containers and 
containers were set on fire…Cruelty, injustice, and inhumanity began, and became a 
chronic disease; humanity and honour were crucified.’1225 
 
All sides committed acts tantamount to war crimes, crimes against humanity and violations of 
the laws and customs of war. Launching indiscriminate attacks that may be expected to cause 
loss of civilian life, the Taliban treated entire cities as a single military objective.1226 Feasible 
precautions to protect civilians against the effects of attacks were not taken, rather these 
civilians were caught in a prolonged and indiscriminate shelling and artillery attacks. 
 
The Taliban blossomed in a civil war followed by factional fighting. It was an era in 
Afghanistan when there was flagrant disregard for IHL.1227 Examining the conduct of the actors 
including the Taliban evidences inconsistent use of IHL, in particular ad hoc compliance with 
the principle of distinction as framed in IHL. It shows that sometimes the group used distinction 
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in the IHL sense, other times distinction was used to distinguish between Muslims and 
apostates, sometimes targetability was based on reprisal consistent with Pashtunwali. There 
are instances where the Taliban’s practice cannot be aligned to any of these laws. Inchoate 
compliance with rules on IHL distinction could indicate an understanding of IHL rules and an 
active choice to displace with another norm. During the Taliban era, it is difficult to see any 
instrument effectively tempering the harshness and cruelty of combat.1228 
 
International law is ‘riddled with the baggage of two centuries of ill thought and ill-explained 
assumptions and beliefs.’1229 This law of nations remains the law for nations. Over the last 60 
years, there have been several attempts by international human rights and humanitarian 
institutions, security agencies, foreign policy makers and academics to manipulate the existing 
arsenal of international law to pierce the state’s sovereign veil and effectively regulate 
ANSGs.1230 Despite innovative legal gymnastics, the reality remains that international law, 
both positive and other, suffers in its application. It has not and arguably cannot bind, in any 
meaningful way, ANSGs without undermining existing international law and the international 
system. 
 
Irrespective of the context through which the international legal framework governing ANSG 
in NIAC is experienced, its position is at best convoluted. Criminalized by the State, 
contentiously legitimized by the international community, the status of these groups exists in a 
figurative vise. ANSGs ability to wage war and mimic state functions threatens core 
Westphalian principles of sovereignty and territorial supremacy. State preservation dictates 
insurgents be regulated under the vertical domain of domestic law. Paradoxically, it is ANSGs 
very ability to undermine the state that elicits international intervention. Added to which, 
traditional Westphalian approaches to enforcement mechanisms largely ignores ANSGs.1231 
 
Dominating contemporary conflicts yet unyielding to international legal influence, ANSGs 
ability to impact the international landscape, to truncate the process of peace and state-building, 
necessitates an alternate engagement and regulation strategy. IHL, IHRL and international 
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criminal law (ICL) are attempting to work in tandem to address the legally created intractable 
problem of the international framework governing, or not governing ANSGs. Traditional 
international law should not be diluted or interpreted ad absurdum to account for ANSGs in 
NIAC.1232 Developed in response to IAC, this cross referential framework sought to regulate 
state conduct. Attempts to transpose the rights and obligations from States and their actors to 
non-state actors; from international armed conflict to NIAC has revealed the existing 
international infrastructure ill-equipped in both substance and mandate.  
 
Of these international legal pillars, IHL stands alone in its express ability to engage and regulate 
ANSGs. IHL grants rebel groups belligerent status in certain circumstances, but this 
recognition is legally and politically problematic. The equality of belligerents (EB) principle, 
a central tenet of IHL, strikes at a central tenet of the state, that is, its authority over its 
constituents.1233 Fundamental to ANSGs effective regulation and engagement is an appropriate 
diagnosis and treatment of the underlying problem with an overarching rule of law focus. 
Systemic and consistent engagement need not equate to a ‘direct’ approach. Indirect regulation, 
engaging with the environment in which the armed group operates, would free the international 
community from its self-imposed political and legal restraints.  
 
8.9 Creating Unstable Rights Through Legal Pluralism 
Factoring norms from Pashtunwali and Shari’a to complement IHL in NIAC must be fully 
thought through. Recognition of cultural differences in the form of plural legal orders must 
assess ‘actual human rights impacts on inter- and intra-group equality; the proportionality of 
any restriction on rights caused by such recognition; and whether the cumulative effect of the 
proposed measure would be to create a qualitatively new level of discrimination.’ There is 
evidence that plural legal orders are structurally likely to precipitate certain negative outcomes. 
The ‘subordination of rights to a regime based on (religious or other) identity can cause 
discrimination and inequality before the law…Those who are poor or otherwise marginalised 
can be seriously disadvantaged.’ Recognition of customary law does not translate to 
‘backward’, rather it may legitimate present and future political claims. Yet the ‘demand to 
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recognise the culturally specific is often invoked in the name of universal equality which by 
definition, implies giving status to something that is not universally shared.’1234  
 
The Taliban’s idea of peace was staged in a medieval theatre.1235 If Pashtunwali influenced the 
Taliban’s interpretation of Islam, it was equally shaped by a desire to reject the customary laws 
they believed contravened their interpretation of Shari’a.1236 At governance level, the Taliban 
sought a return to ‘authentic Islam’, however such authentic Islam could not escape, 
paradoxically being shaped by local customs.1237 All the policies were justified as the proper 
enforcement of Shari’a. The way that the Taliban interpreted Shari’a as well as its violent 
enforcement, betrayed a concern with Pashtun conceptions of honour and control. The use of 
Islamic discourse to legitimize protection of honour through control asserted the unity of the 
values often cited by Pashtuns as motivation for participating in jihad.1238 Such sentiment in 
line with a Pashtun call to action: Da Islam Da Para, Da Watan Da Para, Da Namus Da Para, 
‘For Islam, for homeland and for honour’.1239 
 
The Taliban rhetoric was that they were a Salafist movement, opposed to the tribal system as 
well as tribal law. Islam provided a platform to create cohesion in a growing ethnic and 
politically heterogeneous movement. Combining the religious and tribal provided the Taliban 
organizational elasticity in its tribal dimension allowing discussion and even dissent. It 
appealed to Pashtun individualisms permitting quasi-autonomy of local commanders, a sense 
of freedom. However, as most of the leadership was trained in rural Pakistan madrasas that 
could not provide advanced religious training in Arabic, there was a conflation of Pashtunwali 
with Shari’a. The laws the Taliban promulgated during their years in power were idiosyncratic 
arrangements of local law and Shari’a.1240 Mullah Omar’s social edicts were frequently met 
with serious resistance prompting Omar to issue an order allowing Taliban field commanders 
discretion on the implementation of his social edicts in the areas under their control.1241 
                                                     
1234 Nagaraj (n1048).  
1235 Tanner (n798) 277. 
1236 This is evidenced in relation to tribal dealing of women. See chapter 7.6. Doronsorro (2005) 300. 
1237 Durrani (n15) 412. 
1238 Rubin Fragmentation (n817) xvii. 
1239 Hakim Taniwal, ‘The Impact of Pashtunwali on Afghan Jehad’ (1987) 2 Quarterly Journal of Writers 
Union of Free Afghanistan 1 - 24  
1240 For example, executions of murderers could only be authorized by a Shari’a court, but at the public 
execution itself the victim’s family was given the opportunity to shoot the prisoner personally, an anastomosis 
of Islamic punishment and blood feud revenge. Barfield ‘Customary’ (n828) 35. 




The twentieth century phenomenon of violent Islamic ANSGs draws a link between ‘populist 
theological and doctrinal teachings to ideologically motivated violence.’1242 Whether through 
a misguided or inchoate knowledge of Islam, there is an increasing deficit in certain societies’ 
understanding of the religion. The subsequent teaching of this knowledge by unqualified 
mullahs, imams or other self-proclaimed religious leaders, has not passed through a ‘corrective 
filter’ from better informed religious scholars.1243 The Taliban did not possess the tertiary 
learning of many Islamists like Khomeini, Fadlallah and Qaradawi. Their ‘madrassa education 
is best captured in their own self designation as ‘students’1244 When a former official of the 
Taliban Ministry of Foreign Affairs was asked what he thought was the relationship between 
Mullah Omar and Azzam, the ideological defender of offensive global jihad and inspiration for 
al-Qaeda, the official posited that Mullah Omar was not interested in Azzam’s writing and was 
ignorant about the state of global jihad.1245 
 
While the Taliban have been labelled fundamentalist, extremist, radical, puritanical and 
totalitarian, it is the label of ‘traditionalist’ which provides an accurate description of the 
group.1246  The Taliban as a ‘traditionalist’ Movement has received scant attention. A minority 
opinion, scholars argue that the Taliban, through reinvigorating established modes of 
behaviour, are implicitly characterized as traditionalist. They argue that the Taliban represented 
the ‘arrival of ‘village’ values and attitudes in the cities.’1247 While the majority dismiss the 
idea that the Taliban are traditionalist, and relegate the Taliban as representing a radical 
departure from established patterns of social authority in Afghan society, it is an important 
dissenting voice that weighs rural tradition in shaping and underpinning the Taliban movement. 
The ‘tradition’ may not represent the values of the village de facto, but rather is warped to 
represent the ‘values of the village as interpreted by refugee camp dwellers or madrassa 
students most of whom have never known ordinary village life that the Taliban [sought] to 
impose…’1248 This warped tradition made permissible that which would have attracted penalty 
in the typical Afghan village.1249  
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The many labels attached to the Taliban reflect the different language they have used to 
legitimize themselves in the eyes of their different stakeholders: religious, nationalist, tribal or 
iterations of all three. A former official of the Taliban Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed ‘the 
Taliban feared the ire of the populace more than anything. They were fully aware that people 
would avenge all the torture and hardship they had suffered at their hands at the first 
opportunity.’ This is a destiny common to all tyrannical regimes upon defeat’ and a cornerstone 
of Pashtunwali.1250 Pashtunwali and Islam both contend to govern all aspects of life.1251 In the 
rural areas there is much more blending of tribal and Islamic law, and the ‘two are often viewed 
as inseparable and mutually supportive.’1252  
 
Individually, the Taliban are deeply rooted in their tribal societies. But in their self-
identification the balance between being Pashtun and being Muslim has, as is the case with 
many Afghans, changed. In the thirty years of conflict and gradual state collapse, Pashtun tribal 
society has undergone drastic changes. The authority of traditional Malik’s and Khans have 
been targeted by the communists, warlords and mujahidin, undermining the centrality of tribe 
as a source of identity.1253  During the last quarter of the 20th century the changing Afghan 
regimes have de facto operated on the principles of the 'rule of the gun’ trumping any 
semblance of the ‘rule of [any] law’.1254 
 
‘Observers considered the [original] Taliban a Sunni movement against the Shia in a wider 
confrontation of geostrategic interests between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, on the one side, and 
Iran, on the other side.’1255  There are competing layers which complicated the overarching 
interest for the Taliban to exist: tribally it was a victory for the Pashtuns attempting to restore 
the glory of the past and a way for the Ghilzai to reassert supremacy against the Durrani. 
Locally, it provided a platform for the rural movement to judge and condemn the elitist 
bourgeoisie of the urban population.1256 The Taliban were born into two worlds at the same 
time without truly belonging to either. Their narrative indicated they were a puritanical Islamic 
movement however there was not an absolute fidelity to prescriptions of salafi dicta. Their 
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rhetoric rejected all notions of tribal law however their actions betrayed compliance with 






























                                                     
1257 John Esposito & John Voll, Makers of Contemporary Islam (OUP 2001) 61. 
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Chapter 9 In the End. 
 
This thesis opened with the following hypothesis: 
 
‘The Afghan Taliban (1994-2001) operated through various legal systems: state based legal 
codes, IHL, Islamic law and local customary law. The conflict conduct of Pashtun Taliban 
could be regulated through any or all of these legal systems. While the Taliban as a Movement 
adjusted justification for conflict conduct to fit in an Islamic legal framework, in practice 
conduct was regulated through a hybrid tribal-religious law. IHL compliance was incidental, 
dependent on whether the tribal (local) or religious norm is compatible with IHL norms. Where 
there exists a conflict of norms regarding behaviour in war, Islam takes precedence in the 
narrative irrespective of what ‘law’ was used in practice. The system of reference individual 
Taliban or their leaders allude to: tribal, international or Islamist, depends on the circumstances 
under which a particular decision is taken and on the particular tactical or strategic aim at 
stake.’ 
 
Contrary to accepted wisdom, this thesis has found that the Afghan Taliban (1994-2001) in its 
conflict practice displayed incidental, ad hoc adherence to all the non-state laws examined in 
this research. In relation to a hiearchy of norms regulating the groups conflict conduct, IHL 
was the least compelling legal framework. There could be no conflict of norms between 
Pashtunwali and Shar’ia as the Taliban’s rural Pashtun members historically conflated the 
customary and religious laws, subsuming the principles of the tribal law under their unique 
interpretation of the Shari’a. 
 
It is clear that the Movement in its collective narrative wanted to be seen as a fundamentalist 
Islamic ANSG. It is clear that both Pashtunwali and Shari’a had authority in regulating Taliban 
conflict behaviour. Less clear is the authority of international law to regulate Taliban use of 
force.   
 
Conventional ius ad bellum, ius in bello and weapons law, while evolving separately, all 
evolved regulating a type of force that is not reflected in contemporary conflicts.  Since the 
creation of the UN Charter, these legal regimes have beome surrounded by contestation around 
their interpretation and application according to what is seen as the best interest of the state 
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making a particular claim. Multiple claims of legality by states around the military operations 
they have entered have reduced the certainty and predictability of international law. These legal 
regimes also uphold imperialist views of international law, claims made by northern powers 
gain more attention than those from the south. The legality of military intervention in 
International law is assessed accordingly.  
 
In IHL the engagement of different legal regimes such as international criminal law and IHRL 
has led to inconsistent legalism from tribunals, domestic and international courts, for example 
what constitutes a legitimate target and can norms of IHRL be the lex specialis in conflict 
contexts. 
 
Several similiarities can be drawn between the way the Taliban Movement manipulated 
different legal frameworks and the way states use international law in justifications around use 
of force. Interpretation by states about what constitutes force and self- defence attempts to 
make legal that which is otherwise illegal. The notion of self defence has been reduced to 
nothing or everything depending on the interpretation. Suffering the same criticism as 
international law, the Taliban (1994-2001) focused on legitimacy at the expense of legality.  
 
Part I outlined the difficulties international law faces in regulating ANSG. It then looked at 
Shari’a as an alternate form of ANSG regulation. Chapters 3-5 considered the application of 
Islamic law and legal theory through a salafi lens, looking at points that distinguish between 
violent and non-violent puritans. It concluded that there are no fixed or universal keys for 
reading the intellectual map of political Islam. Traversing the vast terrain of this phenomenon 
it is clear there is no ‘one fundamentalism fits all formula for generalising about a complex 
current that is multi-vocal, and whose discourses speak to multiple ‘islams’ in the name of a 
single and universal Islam. Irrespective of proclaimed authority of radical or moderate 
declarations of what is prohibited in Islam, these are not characterized by absolute 
definitiveness. At most they are ‘approximations or understandings of God’s law rather than 
definitive statements of it.’1258 As a result, no jurist can claim greater authority in the Shari’a 
than another which makes Islamic law vulnerable to universal and equal application even 
among Islamic groups. 
 
                                                     
1258 Reza (n 25) 26 
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Part II considered the extent to which local law regulated the conflict conduct of the Taliban, 
whether conflict conduct of contemporary mujahidin flows from fidelity to foundations of faith 
or whether other sources of law impact conflict behaviour. It revealed a historical pattern. As 
with Amir Abdur Rahman, Mullah Omar and his talibs ‘linked elements of Islamic belief with 
Afghan tribal customs in ways that convinced his largely illiterate population that the two were 
identical. The tautology was that since all true Afghans were devout Muslims then all their 
customs must be Islamic as well, otherwise they could not be good Muslims. Anyone proposing 
to change tradition could therefore be accused of attacking Islam itself.’1259  
 
Laws are important because they shape relations with others, because they become either a 
source of peaceful coexistence, setting the rules for just and equitable relations, or one of 
demonization of others which may lead to the use of violence. The globalization of western 
norms through the ‘software of international law’reveals the need for a greater legitimization 
of public international law within the Muslim world.1260 The imposition of western legal norms 
creates dissonance among certain ulama.1261 Radicalization cannot be separated from ‘a deep-
rooted sense of Islamic exclusion from geopolitical institutions’.1262  Where international law 
has dictated, as opposed to mediated, processes, it has resulted in criticism that the international 
justice system is imperial. Local culturally-contoured justice mechanisms may be more 
effective in changing behaviour. ‘Universal rights must be subject to local implementation.’1263 
Every person must have an existential sense of such rights rather than a sense of them having 
been imposed.  
 
Without deep knowledge of local norms and practices, it is difficult for outsiders to understand 
such a system. Of greater difficulty is how to deal with cases in which the norms and 
expectations of the local community violate internationally accepted standards embodied in an 
ever-wider series of conventions designed to protect human and civil rights that are presumed 
to be universal.1264  Normally in a country with a sovereign and functioning government, 
potential contradictions between the two are mediated by the state. But where state institutions 
are weak or non-existent, contradictions leave it to the individual or community leader to 
                                                     
1259 Barfield Afghaistan (n843) 159. 
1260 Michael Ignatieff, The Attack on Human Rights’ (2002) Foreign Aff. 102-103.  
1261  An-Na’im, ‘Human Rights’ (n5) 725-726 
1262 Drumbl (n99) 92. 
1263 Rosen (n13) 215.  
1264 Certain ways of maintaining order like blood feuds or particular hudud punishments cannot be accepted as 
they constitute human rights violations. 
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regulate. They cite an equally praised principle that customary systems deserve protection and 
respect because they embody unique local cultural values.1265 
 
Pashtunwali needs to be understood as an idealised concept. As with the Pashtuns’ 
genealogical chart, it can change in time and space.1266 As opposed to the highly localized 
systems of Pashtunwali, Shari’a is universally applicable to all times and places, despite the 
Shari’a being increasingly supplemented by non-Muslim influences.1267  However, ‘[i]t can be 
argued that Islam provides the sole coherent, non-liberal world view of any political 
significance, and consequently the only vital external perspective on the liberal project of 
public international law.’1268  
 
There is an urgency to improve compliance with IHL by ANSGs and state forces. Its 
observance is dictated mainly by non-legal factors, such as public opinion, ethics, religion and 
reciprocity, just as violation in the law or its mechanisms of implementation.1269 However, 
culturally specific norms should not be elevated in the name of universal equality.1270 
 
‘Modern law’s insistent claims of its universality notwithstanding lines of demarcation that 
separate legality from illegality often create zones where bodies and spaces are placed on the 
other side of universality, a moral and legal no man’s land, where universality finds its spatial 
limit.’1271  
 
The Afghan Taliban operating from 1994-2001 do not fit into any insurgency template. Fashioned from 
blended Pashtunwali/Islamic material, the Taliban were crafted by the UK, the Soviet Union, the USA, 
Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. So unique is the Afghan experience, the original Taliban has no Islamic 
ANSG comparator. Indeed, there is not one type of Islamic ANSG. Lacking a centralized authority, 
there is not one Islam. However, there can only be one international humanitarian law, which is the IHL 
codified in the Geneva Conventions and customary IHL.1272 While it can be enriched through other 
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versions of humanitarian law, there should be no cultural variation or regionalization of this law. That 
said, it should reflect the different legal traditions not just a Euro-ethnic approach. 1273  
 
In this growing body of literature focusing on post-conflict bottom-up justice initiatives, the relative 
absence of pre-conflict or conflict grass-roots initiatives to obviate the need for transitional justice 
mechanisms conflict conduct is a gap that is ready to be filled. This research has been contextualized 
geographically and temporally. There is an opportunity for it to serve as a possible template. The 
hypothesis can be transposed to similar pluralistic contexts, potentially testing tested against the Houthis 
in Yemen, al-Jughaya in Iraq, or the Shilluk in South Sudan, considering the narrative of these groups’ 

























                                                     




Annex 1 Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention 
 
‘In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of 
one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a 
minimum, the following provisions: 
 
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who 
have laid down their arms and those placed ' hors de combat ' by sickness, wounds, detention, 
or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse 
distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar 
criteria. 
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place 
whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: 
 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment 
and torture; 
 
(b) taking of hostages; 
 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; 
 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment 
pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are 
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. 
 
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. 
 
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may 
offer its services to the Parties to the conflict. 
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special 
agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention. 










Annex 2 The Charter of Medina 
‘To the Jew who follows us belong help and equality. He shall not be wronged nor shall 
his enemies be aided…the Jews shall contribute to the cost of war so long as they are 
fighting alongside the believers. The Jews of the Bani ‘Awf are one community with 
the believers (the Jews have their religion and the Muslims have theirs), their freedom 
and their persons except those who behave unjustly and sinfully, for they hurt but 
themselves and their families. The same applies to the Jews of the [other 
tribes]…Loyalty is a protection against treachery…None of them shall go out to war 
save the permission of Muhammad, but he shall not be prevented from taking revenge 
for a wound…The Jews must bear their expenses and the Muslims their expenses. Each 
must help the other against anyone who attacks the people of this document. They must 
seek mutual advice and consultation, and loyalty is a protection against 
treachery…Yathrib [i.e Medina] shall be a sanctuary for the people of this 
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Annex 3 Pashtun Tribes 
Achakzai Pashtun tribe situated in SW Afghanistan and SW Pakistan. Part of the Durrani 
confederacy. 
Afridi Pashtun tribe that inhabits regions around the Khyber Pass. 
Alizai A Durrani Pashtun tribe in SW Afghanistan. 
Alokozai A Durrani Pashtun tribe in SW Afghanistan 
Barakzai Durrani Pashtun tribe in SW Afghanistan 
Bhittani One of the four main Pashtun tribal groupings. Also the name of a smaller tribe living 
in Waziristan and the neighbouring Tank district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province. 
Durrani Pashtun tribal confederation in southern and SE Afghanistan. The majority of modern 
Afghan rulers have been Durrani. 
Ghilzai Pashtun tribal confederation in southern and SE Afghanistan.  
Ghurghust One of the four main Pashtun tribal groupings. 
Hotak Pashtun tribe of the Ghilzai confederation. 
Ishaqzai Pashtun tribe of southern Afghanistan. Part of the Durrani confederation. 
Kakar Pashtun tribe in southern Afghanistan and neighbouring south western Baluchistan 
province. 
Karlani One of the four main Pashtun tribal groupings. 
Khattak A large Pashtun tribe in KPK. Some Khattak communities also live in the eastern 
Punjab Province.  
Khugiani A Pashtun tribe mainly concentrated in the eastern Afghan province of Nangahar.  
Lashkar Armed groups organized by tribes to defend territory 
Mehsud (Maseed) A tribe of Waziristan 
Mohmand Pashtun tribe situated in eastern Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal areas. 
Noorzai Pashtun tribe of south-western Afghanistan. Part of the Durrani confederation. 
Panjpir A village in the Swabi district of Pakistan’s KPK known for its madrasa which 
propagates a puritanical strand of Sunni Islam close to Salafism. 
Panjpiris Followers of the Panjpir, a distinct sect in the Pashtun regions. 
Popalzai Pashtun tribe of southern and western Afghanistan. Part of the Durrani confederation. 
Former President Hamid Karzai’s tribe. 
Safi Pashtun tribe in eastern Afghanistan which extends into Pakistan’s Tribal areas.  
Sarbani One of the four main Pashtun tribal groupings. 
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Taraki Pashtun tribe in eastern and southern Afghanistan. Member of the Ghilzai 
confederation. 
Wazir A Pashtun tribe predominately based in Waziristan and south-eastern Afghanistan. 
Yousafzai Large Pashtun tribe in Pakistan’s KPK 































‘adil Just man 
‘adl Justice 
‘aql Reason 
‘illa (ratio legis) cause, occasional factor; the attribute or set of attributes common between 
two cases and which justify the transference, through inference, of a norm from one case (that 
has the norm) to another (that does not have it). See also qiyas.  
‘ilm (pl. ‘ulum) Religious knowledge, Those possessing ‘ilm are known as ulama. Also known 
as science.  
‘ilmani scientific  
Abu Bakr al Siddiq The first caliph of Islam after Muhammad’s death, 632-634 CE. 
Ahl al-Kitab Peoples of the Book 
Akham, plural hukm Rulings 
al-Adilla’ or al-Ada’ The Guides; Scouts, who studied approaches to the terrain and the 
battlefield. `Ahd  A truce.  
Amal ahl al Madina Practice of the people of Medina. For the Maliki Madhhab, the practice 
of the people of Medina post the Prophet (Salla allahu ‘alayhi Wa Salam) death was a 
storehouse of the Sunna. 
Aman A safe-passage agreement issued to a person from non-Muslim territory.  
Ameer/Amir Leader/Commander 
Anno Hegirae In the year of the Hijra. Islamic or Hijri calendar. It consists of 12 months and 
354 days.  It is used concurrently with the Gregorian calendar. The first year was the Islamic 
year beginning in AD 622 during which the emigration of the Prophet (Salla allahu ‘alayhi 
Wa Salam) from Mecca to Medina, known as the Hirja, occurred.  
Apostasy One of the most serious crimes in Islamic law. Denying one’s faith in Islam, or 
conversion to another religious creed.  
Aqidah Creed, clearly derived from Qurʾan or Hadith. 
Ard Land 
Asir Prisoner of War 
Baghi Dissenter/Rebel. The hadd crime of engaging in armed rebellion against a legitimate 
ruler. 
Banu Nadir  One of three Jewish tribes living in Medina.  
Banu Qaynuqah One of three Jewish tribes living in Medina. 
Banu Qurayza One of three Jewish tribes living in Medina. 
Barelvis: Adherents of a traditionalist movement which appeared in the 1880’s under the 
leadership of Ahmed Riza Khan in reaction to the Deobandi movement. In the majority in the 
rural areas, the Barelvis are characterized by the importance they ascribe to the veneration of 
saints and their especial devotion to the Prophet Muhammad. 
Bashar A human being. Al Bashar refers to humankind.  
Bid’a(h) Literally means innovation (in religious practice and beliefs). In Islamic law it 
means carrying out actions which displease Allah ta`ala and his messenger. The word heresy 
has no equivalent in Islam, but bid’a come close. 
Caliph (Khalifah) A political office used to govern urban areas of pre-Islamic Arabia and 
chosen by the consensus of tribal elders. The term predates Islam and simply means 
“successor.” The four Caliphs to succeed Muhammad from 570-632 A.D were, in order, Abu 
Bakr, `Umar, ‘Uthman, and `Ali.  
Caliphate: The spiritual and political headship of the Sunni Muslim community; an 
expansionist state where Shari’a functions as state law 
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Da’eef  Weak 
Daʿwa(h) Invitation, preaching, proselytism. Literally the call to faith, to accept Islam. 
Dalil indicator. It is the piece of evidence (like a verse from the Qurʾan, or a Prophetic 
tradition) that points to or indicates a particular hukm or ruling regarding an act, for example, 
whether a particular act is obligated, permitted, prohibited, disliked, preferred, etc. 
Dar al-harb Literally the abode or house of war. Territory that is not controlled by Muslims.  
Dar al-Islam Literally the abode or house of Islam. The territory controlled by Muslims where 
Islamic law is observed.  
Dar House 
Darar Harm/Injury 
Darura Necessity. In legal terminology, a state of necessity on account of which one may 
omit doing something required by law or may do something illegal. The conditions allowing 
this license and the extent of the license are stipulated variously by different legal scholars. 
Most legal theorists agree that murder or other gross physical harm is never legitimate. 
Judicial norms can be set aside in cases of extreme necessity. 
Deobandis: The adherents of the reformist movement based on the Deobandi madrasa 
founded in 1867 in Uttar Pradesh in Northern India, which expounds the fundamentalist 
inheritance of Shah Waliullah. Islamic revivalist movement  based on strict adherence to 
Hanafi Sunni Islam as defined by its founders Maulana Mohammad Qasim Nanautavui and 
Maulana Rasheed Ahmed Gangohi. 
Dhimmīs   A person living in a region overrun by Muslim conquest who was accorded a 
protected status and allowed to retain his or her original faith. non-Muslim subjects who 
become subjects after a war. If there is no war and there is a negotiated settlement, then they 
are called mua'ahids. People of the book 
Din Religion, faith. 
Diwana Mad 
Diya Blood Money 
Durand Line Border between Afghanistan and Pakistan drawn in 1893. 
Faqih (pl. Fuqaha) Jurist/Scholar of Shari’a; Fiqh expert 
Fard (also Farida) Duty/Obligation 
Fath Al-Dhari’a Opening of the door to something usually haram but if you say it haram 
you close the door to a greater benefit.  
Fatwa (pl. Fatawa) Ruling/verdict given by the scholar. Answer to a question. An opinion 
given by a jurist (Mufti), usually on a point of law which is not obligatory to follow. 
Fida Ransom 
Fidayin: the plural of ‘fida’i’, a person who martyrs himself 
Fiqh From the Arabic word al-fahm al-daqiq means a deep understanding. Islamic 
jurisprudence. Fiqh is divided into two branches: fiqh ibadah and fiqh mu’amalat. Fiqh 
ibadah is the Islamic laws that regulated the worship and rituals between individuals and their 
God, for example prayer, pilgrimage, fasting. Fiqh Mu’amalat is the Islamic laws that 
regulate relations between how the individual conducts himself, as well as how he conducts 
himself in relation to others. The scope of fiqh mu’amalat is broad and includes laws related 
to crimes; to Non-Muslim peoples who reside in a Muslim country; to the Government 
system and human rights. 
Fi sabil Allah In the path of God (a phrase often associated with jihad) 
Fitna Literally means temptation, test or trial, but has come to refer to discord and civil strife 
among Muslims; a fattan is a tempter or subversive.  It is a common way of referencing the 
first civil war in Islamic history (656-61), which is generally considered the point of origin of 
the division between Sunni and Shi’a. Applying these terms to our enemies and their works 
condemns their current activities as divisive and harmful. The term "Fitna" refers us to 
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misconduct on the part of a man who establishes his own norms and expects obedience from 
others, thereby usurping God's authority-who alone is sovereign. The term has many 
meanings, including sedition, schism, insurrection, to mislead, and to guide in error.  
Gharb The West 
Ghazi Warrior 
Ghawza Originally meant a raid but has evolved into the term for battle. When one sees this 
term in the context of a sentence, it may also denote battles that the Prophet Muhammad 
participated in directly.  
Hadd (pl. Hudud) Penalties prescribed in Qurʾan 
Hadith(pl. ahadith) A narration that carries the Sunna. Tradition of the Prophet. Hadith are the 
report of the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad, and there are seven collections of 
compiled hadith that are considered to be “sound,” or reliable by the majority of Muslims: al-
Bukhari, Al-Tirmidhi, Muslim, Abu Dawud, al-Nisa’i, al-Nawawi, and Ibn Majah. These are 
the recorded sayings of Muhammad or his Companions, in both the Shiite and Sunni versions 
of Islam. Harb War, the general term for warfare not specifically designated as jihad. Hashir: 
(Stuffer): Specialists who brought up the rear of an army.  
Halal That which Allah and the Prophet (Salla allahu ‘alayhi Wa Salam) have allowed to be 
done in a lawful manner. 
Haram That which Allah and the Prophet have completely and specifically forbidden. 
Engaging in an act that is Haram (i.e. eating food like pork, drinking alcohol, having sex 
outside of marriage) would lead to punishment in the Next Life, and maybe even in this Life. 
Harbi Enemy Person 
Haqq (pl. huquq) Right; truth 
Hasan Good 
Hasana(h)  If a new thing opposes the Qurʾan and Sunnah then it is Say'iah, but if it is not 
against the Shari’ah then it is Hasana(h) 
Hakimiyya/Hekimiyyah Sovereignty. In the Islamic context it is used to assert God’s 
sovereignty. 
Hijra(h) Refers to the migration of Muslims from Mecca to Medina and Prophet Muhammad 
escaping the genocide of Muslims in Mecca around 622 A.D.  
Hiraba(h) derived from the Arabic root which refers to war or combat, means sinful warfare, 
warfare contrary to Islamic law. 
Hudud  Severe penalties for the capital crimes in Islamic law which include apostasy, 
sedition, adultery, and fornication. At the court’s discretion, the penalties may be death by the 
sword, lapidation (stoning, usually to death), or lashing; rarely applied in pre-modern Islam 
due to strict requirements of procedural law. 
‘ibadat (singular ibada) Matters of worship/ ritual practice. 
Ibn Taymiyya  A 13th century Islamic jurist who redefined jihad and apostasy to address the 
Crusades and the Mongols who had invaded the region and influenced local rulers in his day. 
He is considered a spiritual source for Islamic militants and al-Qaeda.  
Ijma Consensus/agreement. There is disagreement as to how this consensus is found: 
scholarly /ummah/silent 
Ijtihād (Legal) Juristic reasoning, to endeavour, self-execution. Systematic reflection of the 
foundational sources of the law to arrive at a new legal ruling. Independent intellectual 
reasoning by learned scholar where either the Qurʾan or Sunna is unclear or silent on a topic. 
It is a methodology of producing a fatwa.   
Ikhtilaf Legitimate disagreement 
Imam: An imam is, in one meaning of the word, merely a prayer-leader. For the Shi`a Muslims, 
the Imam is appointed by God to lead the Muslims. The Ja`fari Shi`a sect are called the 
Twelvers because of their belief in a line of twelve Imams who were the rightful authorities, 
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the last of which is in occultation (absent, not dead or alive) and will return one day to 
humanity. In the Muslim rulings on war, the term imam stands for the legitimate ruler, who 
was then called the caliph. For that reason, radical leaders have sometimes used the title of 
Imam.  
Iman Belief/ Faith 
Intifada ‘Shaking off’; mass uprising 
Iqra Read/recite 
Islah reform 
Istihsan: juristic preference/ consideration of maqasib: the mufti based on maslaha would 
choose an opinion because he feels that it benefits his society more. It is a form of Ijtihād. An 
objective won’t be achieved through qiyas ijma etc so for this specific situation, based on 
maslaha, a decision is reached.  
Istishab: presumption of continuity or the status quo. If something is OK, it remains OK. 
Innocent until proven guilty. 
Istislah literally, to find something good or serving a certain lawful interest. ‘To seek the best 
public interest’.  
Jahada Struggle 
Jahili  From the pre-Islamic period, or “time of ignorance.” Islamists often brand the West, or 
their own governments, as jahili or being in a state of Jahiliyya, just like the pre-Islamic world.  
Jahilyya Age of Ignorance/pre-Islamic culture and philosophy 
Jihad  Struggle or offensive war. Frequently defined in English as “holy war,” Muslims 
distinguish between the greater jihad, the daily struggle to fulfil the requirements and ideals of 
Islam, and the lesser jihad, fighting for the faith. After the Battle of badr (22 AH/624 CE)  
between Muslim forces in Medina and Meccan forces, where Medinan forces were victorious, 
Muhammad referred to this battle as the smaller jihad.  
Jizya(h) A tax levied on the Jews and Christians, who are not subject, as are Muslims, to 
payment of zakat. The jizyah was similar to the Roman poll tax. Land taxes were also charged.  
Al-khilafa al-rashida ‘The rightly guided caliphate’ the common designation in Sunni Islam 
for the first four Caliphs (Abu Bakr; ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab; ‘Uthman ibn ‘Affan and ‘Ali ibn 
Ali Talib) to rule the community between the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 CE and 
the death of ‘Ali in 661 CE.  
Kaffir  a polytheist. Khaybar: The Jewish section of Medina when Prophet Muhammad 
governed the city.  
Kafir Infidel 
Kufr Unbelief; Ingratitude. 
Lashkar People gathered to defend against common enemy 
Layeha Rule/Program 
Madhhab: Schools of scholars who have accepted a methodology of fiqh/jurisprudence 
Madrasa: A religious school, offering theological and juridical instruction 
Mafsada Injury. Opposite of maslaha 
Makrouh Something that is not liked. Also defined as offensive. 
Makrouh Tahrimi This is a category of Makruh, and is defined as offensive in the extreme, 
and close to the Haram. 
Makrouh Tanzihi Another category of Makruh. It is defined as less offensive, but still 
extremely distasteful. 
Mashbooh Questionable or doubtful. 
Mushtabahat This is described as the “grey area” that is found between Halal and Haram. It 
has also been defined as questionable. It is based on the Hadith: What is Halal is clear and 
what is Haram is clear. Midway between them are things which people do not know whether 
they are Halal or Haram. He who keeps away from them will protect his religion and will be 
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saved. He who approaches them is very near to Haram, like a shepherd wandering his flock 
near Him (protected grazing land), who could soon enter the forbidden area, and Allah's 
protected area is what He has declared forbidden.” 
Harb War 
Malik ibn Anas An early Islamic scholar who founded the Maliki school, or madhhab of 
Islamic law. Niya(h) Intention, specifically the pure intention to commit an act. For instance, 
scholars argue that the intent for prayer is more important than the physical completion of that 
act.  
Maqasid goal/purpose/objective 
Maqasid of Usul-al-fiqh: to allow the scholar with a greater certainty of representing the 
Prophet (Salla allahu ‘alayhi Wa Salam)  in his absence when it comes to answering 
community questions.  
Maslaha Public Interest. 
Mawdoo’ Fabricated 
Mu’amalat Those aspects of Islamic law that relate to the relations of human beings with one 
another, as distinguished from the relationship of the human being with God. 
Mufasar: person qualified to do Tafsir 
Mufti Person who gives a fatwa. Juris-consult. 
Mullah/Mawlavi/ Maulvi/Maulana Islamic cleric who is usually a prayer leader in a 
mosque. 
Muhaddith Scholar of Hadith 
Muhajirun Literally a refugee. Denotes Muslims who leave their homeland because of 
oppression or a calamity.  
Mujahidin: Plural of ‘mujahid’, warriors in the holy war. 
Mujtahid: Scholar who exercises Ijtihād. Not anyone can represent the Prophet (Salla allahu 
‘alayhi Wa Salam) in his absence. Scholar qualified in representing the Prophet (Salla allahu 
‘alayhi Wa Salam) 
Murtad Apostate 
Naskh: The abrogation of one verse with another 
Qaulu Sahaba Opinion of the Sahaba 
Qawa’id Ground Rules 
Qazi Islamic judge 
Qital  Fighting or killing, a term for military activity used in the Quran. 
Qiyas reasoning by analogy (alcohol/cocaine example) which expands Islamic law 
Qubh Evil 
Quran  Islamic book of divine revelation. The Quran is divided into 114 Suras, or chapters, 
with 6,219 Ayahs or verses.  
Sadd Al-Dhari’a: Blocking of the ways to haram/Where a thing is halal but could lead to 
haram you close the door.  
Sahaba Companions of the Prophet (Salla allahu ‘alayhi Wa Salam) 
Sahih Authentic beyond question 
Sahifat Page. Sahifat traditional meaning is a ‘declaration’ and its contemporary counterpart 
is a constitution. 
Salaf Pious ancestors. The first three generations of Muslims. 
Salafiyya A neo-orthodox brand of Islamic reformism originating in the late 19th century and 
centred in Egypt. Its aim was to regenerate Islam by returning to the tradition represented by 
the ‘pious forefathers’ – al-salaf al-salih. 
Shafi’i  One of the four traditional madhahib. Al-Shafi developed a cohesive procedure for 
legal derivation of verdicts. Where Hanafite methodology accounted for the sayings and 
rulings of the companions and successors, Shafi’ held only those practices directly passed 
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from the Prophet (Salla allahu ‘alayhi Wa Salam) were valid. Shafi’i seminal work, Risala 
reflects logic and order being injected into Islamic jurisprudence. The term ‘usul’ however is 
not found within the text of this work. The jus ad bellum for jihad in the Shafi madhhab is 
kufr not injustice as it is with the other schools. 
Shahada Testimony; Bearing Witness 
Shahid One who is martyred for the cause of Islam.  
Shari’a: The corpus of models and obligation contained in the Quran and the Sunna, which 
make up Muslim law. The road to the watering place1275 
Shaykh also known as Sayyid or tribal leader 
Shura Council/Consultancy. The process of consensus.  
Siyar Conduct of state (in international affairs). (Pl) Sirah 
Sunna Ahaad is broken down into Gharib (single chain hadith); Azeez (double chain hadith); 
Mashur (three chain hadith) 
Sunna Mutawatir Muli chain Hadith (greater to or equal to a 10 chain hadith) 
Sunna: Custom, rule based on Prophet precedent; The corpus of deeds, acts, words and 
opinions of the Prophet Muhammad. The exemplary bibliography of the Prophet; the 
normative precedent, conduct, and cumulative tradition, typically based on Muhammad’s 
example. 
Tafsir:  Translation or commentary on the meaning of the Qurʾan. 
Tajdid renewal  
Talfiq  mixing madhahib/cross pollination of madhahib for greater benefit 
Takfir  The act of passing verdict or declaring kuffar (deviation from fundamental Islamic 
beliefs) on an individual or community whose acts or words openly manifest deviations or 
opposition tom fundamental Islamic beliefs. 
Talib Student (sing) Taliban (pl) 
Taqlid Imitation. The opposite of Ijtihād 
Tauhid/ Tawhid From the root-words w-h-d and a-h-d. Divine unity. Acceptance or 
recognition of the singularity and centrality of God. It refers to the one-ness of the creator, the 
controller of the whole universe and all its contents. One-ness of the creator also implies one-
ness of the systems, functions, destiny, and objectives of the universe. Tauhid nullifies the 
concepts of atheism and polytheism. Belief in a creator nullifies atheism. Belief in only one 
God nullifies polytheism. 
Ulama/ Ulema (sing. Alim) Scholar. Pleural of Maulanas or mullahs 
Umma(h) nation/community (of believers). Used to denote Muslim 
nation/community/transnational Muslim community.  
Urf: custom (cultural practice) 
Usul  source or origin 
Usul al-fiqh source or philosophy of law; the knowledge of the evidences; what can be used 
as evidence in Shari’a; how to use those evidences and who qualifies to use those evidences. 
It is a science where the scholars came back to the scriptal sources to try to define a 
methodology of extraction, how to extract from the sources. When you get this methodology, 
as fiqh is the practical implementation, usul al fiqh is philosophy of law, a better 
understanding of the scriptal sources. This provides the methodology which help you extract 
the rules from the text, and a list of conditions and principles that have to be referred to in 
order to understand how to deal with the scriptal sources. 
Usuli, Usuliyyun (pl.) Literally ‘fundamentalists’. Those who follow a fundamentalist 
approach as defined in usuliyya. 
                                                     
1275 Rom Landau, Islam and the Arabs (George Allen and Unwin Ltd 1958) 141 
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Usuliyya  Literally ‘fundamentalism’. A movement by conservative theologians who rejected 
reason as a basis for interpretation and called for a return to the early practices of Islam as a 
way of preserving the purity and unity of Islam. 
Wahhabis: The followers of a religious reformist movement founded in the eighteenth 
century in the Arabian peninsula by Muhammad Abdul Wahhab. The Wahhabi doctrine, 
strongly opposed to Shi-ism and Sufism, places its emphasis on the reaffirmation of ‘tawhid’, 
or divine unity. 
Wahy Inspiration 
Wasat(i)/Wasat Harmonizing middle ground; the golden mean 
Zakat ‘purification.’ This is not an act of charity but of religious devotion. The tax legally 
obligatory on all Muslims under the Shari’a, which represents 2.5 % of profits realized 
during the year 
 
Pashtunwali/ Afghan Terms 
Adera Cemetery. Unlike the burial norms in Islam, Pashtunwali places importance for the 
Pashtun to be buried in his ancestral graveyard. 
 
Amanat To ensure the safety of anything kept in the custody. A Pashtun must ensure the safety 
of anything in their custody, including prisoners. 
 
Arbab village representative; may be appointed by the community, who liaises in a quasi-
official capacity between community or government; may also fulfil an executive role (see 
malik, qaryadar)  
 
Arbaki tribally mobilised community police force in southeastern Afghanistan. Arbakai is a 
tribal based community policing system grounded in volunteer grassroots initiatives. The 
Arbakai are volunteers and carry responsibilities which are approved and recognized as the 
common or public good. Lashkar and Arbakai have different functions and roles in Pashtun 
tribes. The Arbakai institution plays the role of the police in tribe, sub-tribe or community 
areas. 
 
Badal Literally means ‘exchange’. For example a wedding in which two families exchange 
brides is a badal wedding; however it also means exchange in the sense of ‘payback’. Pashtun 
concept of reciprocity. Revenge or retaliation to protect, defend or restore honour. It is 
mandatory for a person who has had his honour offended to take revenge in order to restore the 
compromised honour to its initial standing. The obligation to take revenge is considered 
essential to maintaining the respect of honour which underlies the Pashtun value system.   
 
Badraga Escort/Convoy This element of Pashtunwali states that any tribe that grants 
permission to someone outside the tribe to travel in a particular tribal area, that tribe is bound 
to protect the visitors safety and security until their departure. 
 
Bundez Stay order. If a Pashtun community determines a particular area is off limits, this 
injunction must be respected by Pashtuns.  
 
Chagha War Cry/ Siren. Within a Pashtun community, if a Pashtun becomes aware of an 
incident that warrants alarm, like a fire or a robbery, they are bound to assist. This call for help 




Da Khazo Dranaway Women, respect and rights. The protection of women during warfare is 
linked to honour. If a Pashtun kills a woman in this context they could expect to be taunted and 
stripped of their Pashtun identity for 100 years. 
 
 Da Masher Manena Recognizing the elder’s wisdom. The principle points to the pre-
eminence of elders as the chief custodians of Pashtunwali and its cultural history. Age grants 
credibility to the tribal institution. 
 
Da tharrey thug Women follow men and young follows old (when walking). This is about 
protection of what Pashtuns consider vulnerable groups. 
 
Da zina saza Death sentence. This particular death sentence is implemented for adultery. 
Where Islam requires three witnesses, in Pashtunwali the articulated imaginings of infidelity 
can be enough to invoke the death sentence.    
 
Dah’uz  Man of no honour. 
 
Dala Tapala Political lobbying or coalition building. The element of Pashtunwali emphasises 
collective organization. Pashtuns are bound to organize themselves in networks, by joining an 
existing coalition or developing their own. Such networks frequently have political 
connections.  
 
Darra Guerrilla War. This is the Pashtunwali concept describing guerrilla warfare wherein a 
Pashtun tries to create the impression that his force is stronger against a more powerful enemy. 
 
Ghleh (pl) People who steal. 
 
Gila Complaint. If a man in a village has done something non-violent which is at odds with 
community values, the offended party may approach the man’s kin with gila, a complaint about 
his behaviour. The man’s kin will then approach him about his behaviour to extract an apology. 
 
Gwand Political party or faction. 
 
Haqqani An honourific title for the alumni of Darul Uloom Haqqania Akora Khattak in the 
Nowshera district of KPK province in Pakistan which is considered a major seat of Deobandi 
learning. 
 
Hujra: is traditionally a male club and social centre which exists in every village of the tribal 
as well as settled areas. They have lost much of their functional importance. 
 
Jirga Decision process. Assembly/Council. A Jirga is a process which is convened to resolve 
an important question. It is often thought of as a meeting of elders, but it is properly understood 
as a process, not a singular event. The meeting of elders itself is part of a decision making 
process which may take a period of weeks or months. It is a meeting of elders with an external 
party. It is considered to have substantial authority because it frequently includes the 
participation of a political agent. A loya Jirga or grand Jirga is held between all tribes to resolve 
a shared dispute. 
Khan A clan leader or notable land owner in some Pashtun communities. 
 




Khum Baha  Bloodshed. Lex talionis. If a Pashtun kills a person then the victim’s family or 
community must kill either the person or a person from the offending family. 
 
Lashkar army is formed for the implementation of the decision taken by the jirga. The word 
is originally from the Persian lashkar, 'an army,' 'a camp.' 
 
Lass neva To raise hands for condolence. If a member of the Pashtun community dies from 
unnatural causes, the Pashtun is bound to attend the funeral for two reasons: to show solidarity 
and sympathy; and to dispel suspicion of involvement in their untimely demise.  
 
Lauz (waada) Promise or word. A Pashtun should suffer extreme hardship rather than sacrifice 
his word. Failing to honour a promise is tantamount to losing credibility and even honour. 
 
Layeha Pashto for ‘Book of rules’. 
 
Loy Kandahar Pashto for ‘Greater Kandahar’ denotes the Pashtun regions of southern and 
south western Afghanistan. 
 
Loy Nangahar (Mashriqi) Pashto for ‘Greater Nangahar’. An unofficial term for the Pashtun 
regions of eastern Afghanistan.  
 
Loya Jirga Pashto for ‘Grand Council or Assembly’. 
 
Loya Paktia Pashto for ‘Greater Paktia’ denotes the Pashtun regions of south-eastern 
Afghanistan. 
 
Malik village representative; may be appointed by the community, who liaises in a quasi-
official capacity between community or government; may also fulfil an executive role (see 
arbab, qaryadar)  
 
Markara/Maraka is the primary forum for dialogue between communities and tribes at a local 
level. 
 
Melmastia Hospitality. One of the primary obligations of a Pashtun. He is required by his 
honour to offer rank-appropriate hospitality to all. This often takes the form of offering tea to 
visitors. 
 
Nagha Penalty on disobeying norms, rules and regulations. The Jirga is empowered to impose 
fines (money or chattle) upon any member of the community who violates Pashtunwali or 
Pashtun norms. This norm can be triggered if someone does not attend a funeral or does not 
give requisite regard to a guest. 
 
Nanawatey Literally means ‘going in’, when a weaker man surrenders to a more powerful man 
in exchange for mercy. It is the ultimate dishonour, but it is mandatory under the code to give 
it when asked, even to an enemy. Reconciliation / repentance/ peace delegation. Involves 
making a gesture to relieve enmity or discordant relations. Nanawatey is not prescriptive and 




Nang Honour. Primacy status within the code. Manichean in construction.The highest personal 
value of a Pashtun. Temporary loss of honour triggers an automatic requirement for revenge. 
 
Nang o Ghairat Protection of self-respect and honour 
 
Narkh Pashtun customary laws based on the principle of Pashtunwali. 
 
Nikat Good standing. Nikat comes from the same root word as grandfather. It assesses social 
ranking or standing within a community based on individual genealogy and descent from the 
original clan ancestor. 
 
Paighor Taunt. Paighor is a mild humourous taunt directed at a person’s behaviour to remind 
them that they are close to the edge of acceptable community behaviour. 
 
Panah Asylum. Panah is the asylum or refuge offered to a man in need, which will include 
food, water, shelter and protection. Panah is to take someone in personal protection. Even if a 
notorious criminal or an outlaw asked for panah he will definitely be granted asylum and duly 
protected. It has happened many a times that a murderer after committing murder asked for 
panah from the family of the victim and they have him panah. During panah he enjoys equal 
rights and status but when he leaves their house, he can be killed in revenge and his family 
cannot claim for any penalty of reward under the custom of badal. Seeking refuge or shelter; 
sanctuary or protection. A Pashtun is obliged to provide shelter to anyone seeking refuge. There 
are numerous accounts of this practice in peculiar circumstances including providing shelter to 
one’s enemy. 
 
Pashto First language of most Pashtuns. 
 
Pashtunwali Fundamental Pashtun values codified as customary laws among most Pashtun 
tribes. 
 
Peghore Taunting. There is an obligation on the Pashtun to taunt an individual and their family 
members over generations for any act which is considered against Pashtunwali. Taunting can 
occur at any opportunity but is generally undertaken at special events. This norm is pivotal in 
the Pashtunwali deterrence regime, perpetually reminding Pashtuns of the consequence and 
shame that must be imposed for acting outside Pashtunwali. 
 
Qaryadar village representative; may be appointed by the community, who liaises in a quasi-
official capacity between community or government; may also fulfil an executive role (see 
arbab, malik)  
 
Quetta Shura Exiled Taliban Leadership council in Quetta, Pakistan 
 
Rish-e-safed male elder; “whitebeard”  
 
Rogha Jorra Non-war time intervention from the Jirga. Similar to Tega, this is the process for 
settling disputes which have not yet reached the threshold to qualify as warfare. This dispute 




Sakhawat To be generous to others to the extent it may cause the benefactor to suffer. 
Examples of this can be seen when communities adjacent to an area where the civilian 
population has been displaced accommodate families to the detriment of their own. 
 
Salah Mashuwarah Consultation; emphasis on an inclusive approach to dispute resolution if 
it impacts the community.  
 
Saugand To swear an oath; similar to covenant/ deposition testimony or qasam in Islamic law. 
The practice of Saugand often manifests by swearing on the Qurʾan. Used to emphasize the 
importance or truthfulness of the idea which follows it in the sentence; to swear that a version 
of events is true or make an unbreakable commitment.  
 
Seyali Competition, Seyal means equal. These terms are intricately intertwined to create 
balance and justice. 
 
Shah-rel  Ostracism. Shah-rel encompasses a spectrum of remedies from the mild (gila) to the 
extreme (killing) to keep social behaviours within the acceptable norms of the village.  
 
Sharm o Haya Modesty. The obligation to avoid disgracing oneself and others. This concept 
is also linked to the protection of dignity and honour. Contravening Pashtunwali in front of 
Pashtun, especially an elder can be to disgrace him.  
 
Sharrontya Exile. Social boycott. This punishment exists on a continuum ranging from 
participatory restrictions in community events or exiled from the community completely. In 
the case of exile, tribes from neighbouring communities may accept the person and reform 
them depending on the severity of the crime. Reintegration into their community is possible 
post reform.   
 
Shura community council  
 
Siyali Competition among relatives or cousins. 
 
Spin geree male elder; “whitebeard” (Pashto) 
 
Swara Transfer of an unmarried girl as compensation for a violent crime. Such compensation 
is intended to resolve any outstanding conflict. A swara marriage is generally considered 
dishounourable and the girl is stigmatized. Other general features of a swara marriage are a 
large mismatch in the age of the bride and bridegroom as well as the forced bride being subject 
to ongoing punishments.  
 
Tarburwali Agnatic rivalry, common among male cousins. A common pattern of animosity 
and competition in Pashtun society. 
 
Tarun A declaration issued by tribal jirga 
 
Teega A binding or collective decision by a tribal Jirga, particularly in Waziristan. A 
Truce declared by Jirga to avoid bloodshed among two or more tribal factions. 'Teega' literally 
means a stone which is fixed at a certain place across which both the combating parties make 
pledges to have no concern with life or property of the opposite party until the time a permanent 
settlement is carved out. Teega, in other words, is a temporary truce in a feud arranged by a 
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tribal jirga or the jirga arranged by the government which is symbolized by the setting out of 
a Teega. 
 
Tega War time intervention through Jirga. The process for initiating ceasefire during conflict. 
 
Wajhoonkee (pl) Killers 
 
Yerghama Tranfer of men between two opponents or rivals for confidence building. This 
concept governs the process of negotiations particularly when there is significant conflict. Men 
from each tribe or group are transferred between the two groups to act as a surety of good faith 
in negotiations. If something should go wrong during negotiations the transferred men would 
probably become hostages. If negotiations are settled amicable the men return to their 
respective tribes.  
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